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Throughout this study the following con- 
tractions are used 
Grey's Debates = Debates of the House. of 
Commons_from"the year 1667 to the year 
1694. Collected by... Anchitel Grey. 
Parl. Hist. = Cobbett's parliamentary 
history of England. 
S. T. _. Cobbett's complete-collection of 
state trials. 
S. T. Wm. III =A collection of state tracts, 
publish'd on occasion of the late 
Revolution in 1688 and during the reign 
of King William III. 
Soin. T. = Somers (John Somers, Lord). A 
collection of scarce and valuable tracts. 
When no special edition is mentioned in the 
footnotes, the edition is the one given in the 
bibliography. Most of the pamphlets cited were 
published anonymously. When the writer is 
known, he is mentioned in the notes if he is 
of sufficient importance, e. g. Burnet, Defoe, 
etc. When the author is not given, it does not 
follow that he is unknown. A sufficient part 
of the title is given to enable it to be. 




ship and full details are given. In the 
bibliography anonymous works are entered 
under the author's name where knowny with 
a cross-reference from the title. Anonymous 
works, whose authors are unknown, are entered 
alphabetically under the first word, exclud- 







CHAPTER I: THE DOCTRINES OF RESISTANCE AND 
NON-RESISTANCE : INTRODUCTORY pp. 1-38. 
Aristotelian concept of sovereignty not appli- 
cable in the Middle Age, 2; But, with the, 
growth of the modern state, political theory 
becomes-dominated by the theory of sovereignty, 
2-3 ; Legacy of the Middle Age regarding the 
locus and content of sovereignty, 3-6 " Polit- 
ical consequences of the Reformation, 6-8 ; 
Jesuits and tyrannicide, 8; George Buchanan, 
8" Luther, 8-9 ; Calvin, 9-10 ; English 
Reformation Lutheran in spirit and doctrine of 
non-resistance adopted in England in the 16th 
century 10-13 ; Growth of the conception of 
absolutism in France at end of the 16th cen- 
tury,. 13 ; Bodin, 13-18 ; His definition of 
sovereignty, 14 ; His view of the English parl- iament 16 ; His sovereign limited by natural 
law ands the leges imperii, 17 ; Knolles' English 
translation of the De Republica (1606), 18 ; 
Advocates of popular sovereignty and resistance, 
18-22 ; Vindiciäe contra tyrannos, 19 ; Althusius, 
19-20 ; Grotius, 20-22 " Stewart expansion of 
the doctrine of non-resistances 22 et seq. ; 
Manwaring, 24 " Sanderson, 24 " Doctrine not 
universally held before 1660, L-26 ; Ussher, 25 ; 
Sanderson's introduction to Ussher's work in 
which he condemns contract and popular sovereignty 
(1660), 26-28 ; The same thought expressed by 
Parker in 1684,28 " General acceptance of the 
doctrine of non-resistance after 1660, ; ý8-29 ; 
Embodiment of the doctrine in. statute law 09-31'- 
Exclusion Bill 31-32 ; Decrees of the University 
of Oxford (1681), 33 ; Hicks's Jovian 33 ; 
Parker' s Religion and loyalty 9 34 '; High-water 
mark of the doctr nee ; Summing-upi 34-38. 
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CHAPTER II vi 
CHAPTER II : THE DOCTRINE OF RESISTANCE pp. 39-82 
I: The popular,, d basis of government 
The Revolution a violation of the doctrine of 
divine right ofHcngs and non-resistance, 40 ; 
Revolution justified by putting government on 
a popular basis, 40 " Inherent right of a people 
to recall or remedy 
defects in governmental 
power when abused, 41 ; Popular origin of 
government usually the foundation of the doctrine 
of resistance, 41 Government in the abstract 
admitted to be a divine institution, but the 
form held to be human, 41-42 1 Monarchy based 
on divine grant and on a patriarchal basis both 
denied 42-43 ; Moral obligation of obedience 
by divine right and patriarchal theories and 
Berkeley's theory of natural law, 43-44 ; The 
patriarchal theory discussed, 44-45 ; Locke and 
Hoadly deny that political power can ever evolve 
from the power of the father, 45 "A state of 
nature, therefore, assumed, in which men are 
free and out of subjection to any civil author- ity, 46 ; The right of individuals in a' state 
of nature to punish others for a breach of 
natural law, 46-47 ; Necessity for this claim, for opponents, such as Blackall, argued that 
men in a state of nature never had coercive 
power and so could not transfer it to the magis- 
trate, 47 ; All power requisite-for the political 
magistrate to be found to be possessed by men 
in a state of nature, 48 ; But this power was 
often abused through ignorance or selfishness, 
48-49 ; Political society, therefore was , deliberately instituted to remedy this defect' 
49 ; The t1ransference of power from the people 
to the magistrate is effected by an original 
contract, 50. 
II : The original contract 
Brief historical reference, 51-55 ; Contract, 
as an historical fact, not essential for contract 
theorists 55-56 ; Lockets description of the 
pactum unionisI 57 ; Whether there was a second- 
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ary pact, 57 ; Whether the dissolution of 
government dissolves society, 58 ; society 
dissolved by foreign conquest, 58 ; But this 
means that conquest alone deprives a people of 
the right of determining their own form of 
government, 59 ; But dissolution of government 
from other causes dissolves society without 
depriving the people of this right of self- 
determinationt 59 ; If society was not dis- 
solved, there must be a pactum subjectionis, 
59-60 ; But there is no such pact because 
Locke says dissolution of government puts men 
back into a state of nature, 60-61 ; Resistance, 
therefore, after a dissolution, must come from 
individuals. in a state of nature, 61-62 ; The 
form of government, says Locke, must be known 
before we can know what constitutes dissolution, 
62 ; His description of a constitution and the 
ways in which it may be dissolved, 62-65 ; When 
the government is dissolved, the people may set 
up a new one in any form they think fit, 65-66. 
III : The sovereignty'of the people 
Right of resistance does not. follow from the 
popular origin of government if power has been 
transferred irrevocably, 67 ; Resistance theor- 
ists, therefore, made the people perpetual 
sovereign 67 ; This inherent power may be used 
to maintain the fundamentals of the constitution, 
68-69 ; Government regarded as a trusteeand 
the people, who remain sovereign, may resist a 
breach of trusteeship, 70-73 ; Whether resistance' 
may be by individuals or only by inferior magis- 
trates, 73 ; The right of the people to judge 
their rulers criticised, 73-74 ; The criticism 
that-the right would be used capriciously unjust 
for the right was limited, 74-76 " But although 
the right was hedged about with limitations, 
how were men to know conclusively at what point 
obedience should give way to rebellion ? 76-79 ; 
Resistance doctrinaires could give no complete 
answer 79 ; Only safeguard against factious 
rebellion was that men would not rebel until 
they had right on their side and till there, was. 
such a pressing necessity that success was 
assured, 80-81, r. '. i, 61'A 
"ý, gib 
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CHAPTER III : THE HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINES 
OF RESISTANCE AND NON-RESISTANCE FROM 1688 
TO 1714 pp. 84-202 
Section I: 1688-1709 pp. 84-146 
I; The Convention 
Convention necessitated by James's flight, 84 ; 
Resolution of January 28,85 ; Regency plan 
defeated 85 ; Debate over words 'desertion' and 
' abdicatý{on' , 86 ; The vacancy of the throne, 86-87 ; Relative and absolute vacancy, 87-90 ; 
If the throne was vacant, was there a successor? 
91 ; Affirmative answer, 91-94 ; Negative ans- 
wer based on maxim 'nemo est haeres viventis', 
94-97 ; Negative answer was accepted and the 
choice of a successor was left to the Convention, 
97 'There was no claim made for, the right of 
resistance or the right of deposition, 97-98. 
II : Repeal of oaths against resistance and the 
new oath of allegiance 
Oaths against resistance repealed, 99-101 ; 
Oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy Act, 101 ; 
The oath of allegiance, 101 Repeal of oaths 
against resistance probably 
intended merely 
to'simplify the new oath of allegiance, 102 ; 
Whether section xi of the Bill of Rights dives 
statutory sanction to the doctrine of resis- 
tance, 103-105 ; That it does not, suggested, 
although it has significance in shattering the 
theory of indefeasible hereditary right, 104- 
105-; Furthermore, resistance is never claimed 
to have positive-law sanction, but is based on 
natural law, 105-106. 
III : Change from abdication to resistance 
theory of the Revolution 
Parliament avoided discussion on doctrine of 
non-resistance, 107 ; But although abdication 
was the official interpretation, the debates in 
the Convention supplied much of the material 
for the doctrine of resistance 107-108 ; 
Contract theory as-an alternative to deposition, 
108-100 ; Convention avoided question of de- 
positidný 109-111 Deposition upheld, however, 
by some writers, 111-112 ; But the right of 
deposition was never confused with the right 
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of resistance, 112 ; Deposition inconsistent 
with the theory that James had ceased to be 
king some time before the Revolution, 113-114 ; 
But the king may reign indefinitely after he 
has ceased to be king by primary causes 
(breaking the original contract, etc. ) unless 
official cognisance is taken of the fact, 115 ; 
James's abdication, therefore, admitted to be 
the result of secondary causes, viz. resistance, 
115-116 ; That the resistance theory to the ex- 
clusion of the abdication theory came to be the 
official view of the Whigs commented upon by )01' 
. Leslie, 116-117. 
IV : The slow development'of the doctrine, of 
resistance until Anne's reign 
James II's reliance on the doctrine of non- 
resistance, 118 ; Refusal of the bishops in 
his reign to make a public declaration in its 
support, 118 ; The doctrine, however, was not 
abandoned but suspended in William's reign, 
119-122 ; Reluctance to admit that the Revol- 
ution was a violation of the doctrine, 122-123 ; 
Many pamphleteers attack the doctrine negative- 
ly, 123-124 ;A smaller number do so positively 
by upholding the right of resistance, 124 " 
But the resistance theory was not developed 
for want of opposition from the non-resistance 
theory 125 ; Both doctrines largely in abeyance in William's reign and the crown supported on 
the basis of de facto kingship, 125 ; William's 
right at first held as a rule only by men who 
clung to the abdication. theoryl 126 " Situation 
altered in Anne's reign, 126 Doctrine of non, 
resistance resuscitated, 126-i27 ; Revolution 
Settlement threatened by Tory attacks on the 
Toleration Act and on occasional conformityt 127; 
Whigs accused of using the Revolution to under- 
mine the Church, 127-128 ; Drake's Memorial of 
the Church of England, Sacheverell Trial and the 
triumph of High-Toryism at the end of Anne's 
reign, 128-129 " Main cleavage between Whig and 
Tory policyl. l26-130 ; Resistance and the Revol- 
ution maintained aq only alternative to-non- 
resistance and Jacobiti6m, 131. 
S 
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V: The growing antagonism between the doc- 
trines in Anne's reign leading up to the 
Sacheverell Trial 
Use of periodical literature for political 
propaganda, 132 " The Review, the Observator 
and the Rehearsa{, 132-134 ; Hoadly comes-'into 
prominence in defence of the doctrine of resis- 
tance, 134-135 ; He is accepted'by parliament 
as the champion of Revolution principles, 135 ; 
Tory clergy constantly preach the doctrine of 
non-resistance, 135-136 ; One of Wake's sermons 
on the doctrine noticed, 136-139 ; Blackall's 
sermon of March 81 1708,139-140 ; Attacked by 
Hoadly, 140-143 ; Leslie joins the Blackall- 
Hoadly controversy and asserts the doctrine of 
divine right and non-resistance, 144 ; That 
controversy merged in the Sacheverell affair of 
1709/10,145-146.1 1 
CHAPTER III (continued) 
Section II : The Sacheverell Trial pp. 147-187 
I: Introduction 
. 
The occasion for the trial l 148 ; Reasons why ,"'s the Commons promoted the impeachment, 149-150 ; 
Articles against Sacheverell and comments on 
first two, 151-154. 
II : The sermon 
Sacheverell defines a false brother in relation 
to the Church, 155-156'; and in relation to the. 
state, 156 et. seq.; Mutual dependence on each. 
other of the church and state, 157-158.; Enun- 
ciation of the doctrine of non-resistance 158; 
Attacks the doctrine of resistance, 158-160 ; 
Revolution cannot be pleaded in defence of that 
doctrine, 159 " Quotes Burnet on resistance, 160; 
Attacks Dissenners, 160 ; and comprehension in,. 
the Church which is a danger to the state,, 161- 
162 ; On Anne's hereditary right, 162. ý ±" 
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III : The Trial 
xi 
In answer to first Article Sacheverell pleads 
that firstly, he is required as a clergyman to 
preach the doctrine of non-resistance, 163-164; 
secondly, that by resistance he meant conquest 
when referring to William, 164-166 ; thirdly, 
that when he said the Revolution could not be 
pleaded in justification of resistance he did 
not refer to the Whigs who held that doctrine 
but to republicans and those who justified 
murder of Charles I9 166-167 ; But Sacheverell 
would not categorically admit that there was 
resistance in 1688,167 ; Case for prosecution 
depended on the acceptance of this fact, 167 ; 
But Commons made issue of the trial depend on 
acceptance of that one case and would not enun- 
ciate a general doctrine of resistance, 168-169; 
Holland virtually accepts the doctrine of non- 
resistance by arguing that the Revolution was 
an exception to that rule, 169 ; Hawles for the 
prosecution accepts doctrne as preached by , Sacheverell 169 ; Harcourt opening case for' defence admits resistance in 1688 but pleads' 
that it was not inconsistent with the doctrine 
of non-resistance, 170 ; He adopts the exception 
argument and pleads that Sacheverell could not 
be guilty for omitting to mention the Revolution 
as the one exception, 171 ; Resistance having been admitted by both sides, was there resis- 
tance to the supreme power? 172 ; Attorney- General holds that Sacheverell meant by supreme 
power the executive and since-James was resisted 
Sacheverell condemned the resistance used, 173- 
174 ; But Harcourt argues that the supreme power 
had not been resisted for the supreme power was 
parliament, 174 ; Lechmere and Hawles for the 
prosecution agree that the supreme power is 
parliament 174 '; Inconsistenc@ in Lechmere's 
argument, 175 " Parker in order to prove Sacheverell a Jacobite makes the inconsistent 
statement that Sacheverell condemns resistance 
to James but allows resistance to Anne, 175-176; 
Harcourt takes notice of this, 176-177 ; Dodd 
follows Harcort in placing the supreme power in 
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parliament and thus regarding resistance to 
James as consistent with the doctrine of non- 
resistance, 177 ; Phipps points out inconsis- 
tencq$ between the speeches of Montague and 
Parker, 177-178 ; But he becomes involved in 
his own argument, 179-182 ; Sacheverell in his 
speech adopts Harcourt's interpretation of 
supreme power, 182 ; Jekyll replying for the 
Commons notes concessions made by the defence, 
namely, that there was resistance and that it 
was an exception, but he holds that Sacheverell 
did not make these concessions in his sermon 
and therefore he must be held guilty for what 
he preached, 182-183 ; Conclusion, 183-187. 
CHAPTER III (continued) 
Section III : 1710 - 1714 pp. 188-202 
Opinions on the wisdom of impeaching Sacheverell, 
189-190 " Tories do not regard sentence as a 
condemnaiion of the doctrine of, non-resistance, 
190 " Popularity of the doctrine, 190-191 ; 
Hoadly attacked more vigorously 190 " His last 
work in our perioff--in defence of the Revolution, 
191 ; Some new writers: Atterbury for non-resis- 
tanve, 192 ; Bradbury and Steele for resistance, ' 
192 ; The extreme form of the doctrine of non- 
resistance propagated, 193-194 ; This leadsito 
anextreme form of the doctrine of resistance, 
194 ;A reaction against both forms, 194 ; 
Swift's attempt to reconcile the opposing doc- 
trines, 195-199 ; Gatton's attempt, 199-201 " 
Both uphold doctrine of non-resistance but ad- 
mit resistance to be lawful in exceptional cases, 
201 ; Whigs therefore gain a point when they 
have succeeded in forcing, the Tories to admit 
that resistance in some circumstances, can be justified, 201-&2, 
,., ý, :ý 
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CHAPTER IV : THE SOVEREIGN'S TITLE AFTER 1689 
ACCORDING TO THE DOCTRINES OF NON-RESISTANCE 
AND RESISTANCE pp. 203-272 
Section I: By conquest . pp. 
203-219 
Difficulties of abdication theory avoided by 
conquest theorists, 204 ; Conquest theory held 
to be consistent with doctrine of non-resis- 
tance, 204-205 ; William's right to:. allegiance 
through success in a just war, 205-207 " Was 
England, therefore, a conquered nation 20? ; 
To avoid this conclusion some conquest theorists 
make a distinction between sovereignty-depri- 
vation and sovereignty-acquisition, 208 ; 
Sovereignty wrested from James could be assumed 
by William only with the consent of the people, 
209 '; Consent however, may be virtually com- 
pulsory, 209-ý11 ; But some conquest theorists 
did not require the element of consent, 211 ; 
Bishop Lloyd, 211-214 ; Parliament takes into 
consideration conquest theory, 214-215 ; Bearing 
of the theory on sovereignty, 215 ; The theory 
obviously an adaptation of the doctrine of non- 
resistance to suit the Revolution, 215-217 ; 
-Unpopularity of the theory, 217 ; Final con- 
clusions: - (1) importance of the element of 
consent, 218 " (2) conquest theorists could 
not be Jacobites, 218-219. 
CHAPTER N (continued) 
Section II : By possession - De facto kingship 
pp. 220-250 
Dominating theory in William's reign, 221 ; 
Its popularity based on grounds of expediency, 
221-224 ; Success could be its only justification) 
224 ; The new oath of allegiance only to a de 
facto king, . 225 ; But not intended to shield Jacobites, 226 ; Harbin's comments on de facto- 
de jure controversy, 227-229 ; Hampden's com- 
ments, 229-231 ; Halting lead given by parlia- 
ment 232-234 ; Abdication interpretation ig- 
noretd, 234 ; Sherlock's views, 235-237 ; The 
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treason law argument discussed, 237-241 " 
Contemporary criticism of the theory, 241-242; 
Why allowances must be made for those who 
would not go farther than de facto kingship 
242 ; Men not prepared to decide nice questions 
of legality, 242 " This illustrated by opposition 
to abjuration bilis, 243-245 ; Prideaux's 
reasons against them, 243-244 " Nottingham's 
opposition to abjurationbof 1762,245 ; The -ýº 1 
gradual recognition of William's right, 245- 
249 ; Bill of 1690,245-246 " Jacobite con- 
spiracies force men to consider question of 
right, 246'- Association of1696 , 246-248 ; 
Abjuration Aill of 1702 marks the triumph of 
upholders of William's right 249 ; Importance 
of this step in view of Anne's succession, 249- 
250. 
CHAPTER IV (continued) 
Section III : By hereditary right against the 
claims of a parliamentary title based on the 
justice of the Revolution pp. 251-272 
I 
No successful attempt made in William's reign 
to"prove that the succession had not been 
broken, 252-254 ; Anne's hereditary claim made 
possible by death of James III 254-255 ; De 
facto theory abandoned by Whigs to combat 
hereditary title with a parliamentary one, 255- 
256. 
II 
Tories profess to regard 'James III' as supposi-' 
titious to justify their passing him over in 
1702,256-257. " Whigs suspect sincerity of this 
profession 25'ßl ; They think Tories' hand was 
forced in 1702 but that by preaching non-resis- 
tance and hereditary right they would prepare 
men's minds for a Jacobite restoration on. Annels 
death, 257-259 ; Anne's attitude to James, 259- 
260 ; Legitimacy of James regarded by Whigs as.! 
too slender a barrier between Hanoverian and-,,., 
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Jacobite succession, 260'; Whigs therefore 
own James, 260 " They are criticised for this 
policy, 260 ; This criticism unjust, for, first- 
lye parliamentary right was unaffected by 
James's legitimacy and secondly, Whigs intended 
thereby to force Tories to abandon hereditary 
right or confess their Jacobitism, 261 ; Even 
if Tories were not Jacobites hereditary right 
excluded Hanoverians, 261-262, ; Parliamentary 
right, therefore, the only guarantee of a Han- 
overian succession, 262 ; Apart from Jacobite 
question, hereditary right condemned the 
Revolution directly by inferring that William 
and Mary were usurpers, 262-263 ; and indirectly 
by the doctrine of non-resistance, the comple- 
ment of hereditary right, 263 ; counter accu- 
sations of non-resistance and resistance 
theorists, 263-264 ; Whig defence of Revolution 
and Anne's parliamentary title, 265-268 " 
Ambiguity of word 'hereditary') 268 " Whigs do 
not deny hereditary succession but it must be 
parliamentary not indefeasible, 271-272. 
CHAPTER V: THE KING AND THE ILAW pp. 2? 3-304 
Section I: The office of king ' pp. 274-286 
Seventeenth-century conception of kingship, 274; 
Coke and Calvin's Case, 274-275 ; Oath of 
allegiance can be taken to a person only, 276 ; But the office is inseparable from the person 
and king has inherent right to the crown by birthright, 276 ; Distinction between person and 
office brought out at the Rebellion, 276-278 ; But statutes after 1660 condemned position that 
arms may betaken against the king's person by 
his authority, 278 " Inseparability of person 
and crown maintained in debates on Exclusion 
Bill, 279 ; and. by Parker, 279-280 ; Necessity 
for overthrowing this tenet if monarchy was to 
be prevented from becoming absolute, 280-281 " Separation actually made at the Revolution, 2h; 
Allegiance is now held to be due to the person 
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of the king only in so far as he is repre- 
sentative of the crown, 281-282 ; When the 
allegiance to the crown conflicts with alleg- iance to the king, the former must take pre- 
cedence, 282-285 ; Plea of the defence of the 
crown against the king judged by Rom. xiii, 
285-286. 
Section II : The king under the law pp. 287-294 
Mediaeval conception of law, 287-288 ; Growth 
of royal prerogative and consequent superiority 
of the king to the law, "289-290 ; Locke on the 
prerogative, 290 ; Prerogative must not conflict 
with rule by 'established standing laws', 291 ; 
Condemnation of absolute monarchy by Locke, 
Toland and others 293 ; Enunciation of maxim 
that law is superior to the king's will, 293 ; 
This maxim does not always have the right of 
resistance as a corollary 293-294 " But right 
of resistance always based on it, 234 ; Resis- 
tance against a king governing by law not 
justifiable, 294. 
Section III ; Constitutional original contract 
pp. 295-304 
The pactum subjectionis, 295 ; Burnet on inter- 
pretation of Convention's use of phrase 'original contract', 296-297 ; Fear of consequences 
of accepting a pactum unionis, 298-299 ; Contract, 
therefore, usually means tie between king and 
people, 299 ; Symbolised by coronation and 
allegiance oaths, 3QO-302 ; King by breaking his 
coronation oath breaks the contract and absolves 
his subjects from allegiance, 302-303 ; Thus 
subjects who owe no allegiance cannot be guilty 
of treason, 303 ; Interpretation of maxim 'King 
can do no wrong', 303-304., 
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CHAPTER VI : PARLIADENT pp. 305-350 
Smith and Whitelock on sovereignty of king in 
parliament, 306-308 ; This 'greater sovereignty' 
difficult to attain owing to inharmonious 
partnership of Stewart king and the two houses, 
308 ; Power of parliament increased after 1660, 
but position falsified by church-king alliance 
which elevated prerogative, 308-309 ; Parliament 
regarded as king's servant, 309 ; Sovereignty 
of the 'Three estates' condemned by Oxford 
Decrees (1683), 309 ; Church-king alliance 
broken by James II and parliament left free to 
assert its position in our polity, 309-310 ; 
But parliament not yet prepared to assert that 
it is sovereign, 310 ; But it claims to be sole 
law-making organ, 310 ; Whether parliamentary 
legislation is subject to natural law, 313-314; 
Nevertheless, parliament has no rival in legis- 
lation, 314 ; Whether this means that parliament 
is irresIstible, 314-315 " Four options regard- 
ing resistance, i non-resistance and the Revolut- 
ion offered, 315-316 ; The fourth, that non- 
resistance means non-resistance to parliament, 
discussed, 316 " Whigs do not accept this inter- 
pretation, 316A17 ; Blackall's sovereignty of 
parliament, 317-319 ; Hoadly's, reply to Blackall, 
319-320 ; Some of Hoadly's followers side with 
Blackall, 320 ; Attempt to reconcile doctrine of 
non-resistance and resistance at the Revolution 
by interpreting supreme power as parliament 
made at the Sacheverell Trial, 320=321 ; and by 
Swift, 321-322 " But since new interpretation is 
adopted to justify resistance, it demonstrates 
that it is no solution to the problem of resis- 
tance, 322-323 ; Whigs retain old meaning and 
consequently abandon the doctrine of non-resis- 
tance altbgether, 323-324 ; Weakness of new 
interpretation brought out by consideration of 
resistance doctrinaires' attitude to parliament, 
324 et seq.; Locke's conception of parliament, 
324-326 ; Locke's parliament is not omnipotent, 
326-328 ; Defoe and Hoadly think parliament may 
be resisted, 328-329 ; Reluctance to give 
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parliament unlimited power, for two reasons, 
329 ; firstly, the Houses might ally themselves 
with the king to destroy the people's liberties, 
330 ; secondly, the constitution is fixed and 'is 
unalterable by constitutional means, 331 ; con- 
stitution must be maintained by a due balance 
of power of its constituent parts, 331-332 ; The 
inter-reýationship of these parts the pivot on 
which the doctrine 6fcresistance turns, 333 ; 
Whig theory of equal co-ordinate powers, 333 et 
seq.; Leslie attacks this position, 334-336 ; 
Danger of equal co-ordinate powers, 336 ; 
Leslie's remedy is to make the king sovereign, 
337 ; Hoadly's remedy is to make the people 
supreme, 337 ; Since object , was. to control the 
king, could the two Houses not be made supreme? 
337 ; Grotius quoted on this point, 337-340 ; 
Johnson, 340-341 ; Reason why theory of 
superiority of the Houses untenable, 341 ; 
Difficulty of demonstrating that king, was not 
actually a superior partner of legislature, 342; 
King's right of veto and consent to bills gives 
king decisive voice in legislationZ 343-346 ;' 
Lastly, the king as executive could not be con- 
trolled by parliament except by his own con- 
currence, 347-348 " That there was no concept- ion of parliamentary sovereignty, the con- 
clusion, 348-350. 
CHAPTER VII : CONCLUSION pp. 351-378 
Rgsum4 of the development of the doctrine of 
resistance, 352-359 " Tory reconciliation of 
Revolution and doctrine of non-resistance, 359- 
362 :- (1) by regarding Revolution as an excep- 
tion to the rule, 359-360 ; (2) by interpreting 
supreme power as parliament, 360-361 " (3) by 
clinging to abdication theory, 361-362 ; Tories, 
who were forced to, abandon divine right and 
indefeasible hereditary succession cling all the 
more tenaciously to a general doctrine of non-- 
resistance, 362 ; They accuse Whigs of denying 
sovereignty in a state, 362-364 ; Whigs reply 
that there is no supreme power in Tory sense, 
364-365 ; They agree that the king is no longer 
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sovereign, but they do not accept parliament- 
ary sovereignty as the alternative, 365 " Their 
limitations on the power of parliament, 
365- 
366 ; Parliament dare not alter the constit- 
ution, 366-367 ; Criticism of this attitude, 
368 ; Reasons why supremacy of parliament 
could not solve problem of. executive control, 
368-371 ; Inter-dependence of parliament and 
executive, 371 ; Control of king could be by 
act of parliament only to which king must 
consent, 371 Illegality of Revolution demon- 
strates futility of such control, 371-372 ; 
Swift's deduction, 372 ; Whig theory that where 
positive law cannot preserve the constitution, 
a higher law - the sovereignty of the people - 
must take its place, 373 ; Problem of resistance 
solved by rise of cabinet government, 375-377 ; 
Doctrine of resistance held by Radicals not the 
same as Whig theory, 377 " But Whig political 
philosophy evolved to jusiify their doctrine 




The doctrines of resistance and non-resis- 




Over two thousand years ago, Aristotle 
wrote: "It is evident that every form of 
government or administration, for the words, 
are of the same import, must contain a 
supreme power over the whole state"* The 
{ 
nature of the Greek city-state made such a 
theory tenable, but (after the fall of the 
Roman Empire, at any rate), the idea could 
find no place in mediaeval political thought. 
Not till order had been restored out of a 
disorganised European society, could a pol- 
itical situation be attained'in which Aris- 
totle's concept could have any relation to 
,, 
facts. The gradual centralisation of power in 
the king and the growth of nationconscious- 
ness of peoples, settled within fixed territorial 





limits, were the essential factors in the 
growth of modern states. When the, power of 
a state 'came to be personified in a'national 
monarchy, political theory came to be y*. 
dominated by the theory of sovereignty. `, 
The determination of the locus-of the 
_supreme 
power in 'a state' was the most charac-tý 
teristic legacy of the Middle Age. ` For, with 
few exceptions, mediaeval-political philoa= 
ophy had treated kingship as the only concei- 
vable'form of government. But, asito the 
content of this sovereignty, the Middle'Age 
left no guiding rule: Kingship'was generally 
regarded as a divine'institutiong'but this did" 
not mean that a king had the quality of - 
absolutism. ' , It' is true that, since the king 
was ordained by God, absolute obedience must 
" 
be rendered to him. But a cardinal feature of 
the mediaeval conception was that the king had 
not only the material welfare of his subjects 
in, his keeping, but',. also their äpiritual"; w, Thtls 
'. ;`. ;r te ; ") 
. 
k. Y M, 
4 
I4' 
his functions were twofold, and by no means 
the less important were. the, ethical 
. 
Hence 
a distinction was drawn-between a true king 
and a tyrant. Though a true king was-subject 
only to the laws of God, it was tentatively 
suggested that the-same could. not be-said of 
a tyrant. - But even where this reservation was 
madeq'it was held that the, judge of the 
king's righteousness-was 
_the* church and not\ 
the people. Herein we-see the hierarchical . °» 
doctrine of the state. In the Middle Age, the 
church claimed to be-the"arbiter in internal 
conflicts within a state ý for the power oft: <;, 
the pope was universal. In the disputes be- 
tween the regnum and the-sacerdotum, the 
-anti-papal writers were wont to exalt the 
secular ruler. While the papal writers mini- 
" 
mised the power of kings, their opponents 
tended to'ättribute to them almost sovereign 
rights within their own territories. '. It cannot, 
however, -be said that it was the general rule 
(1) See Carlyle, History Sr mediaeval_, political 
thought in the west, iii, pp. 115 et seq. 
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that-the king was made absolute even by the 
supporters of his cause. In England, for 
example', untill, the Tudor dynasty possessed 
the throne, Englishmen, who gave their 
thoughts to politics, were, on the whole, ' 
disinclined to give to the, king"the quality 
of absolutism. But the' actual course of 
political events forced upon men the realis- 
'ation of the necessity for an absolute ruler. 
And rather than be faced again with the disinteg-'" 
rating tendencies of a War of the~Roses, men\ 
submitted willingly to the strong personal'°- 
rule of the Tudors. The next s.. ibversive element 
which the Tudors had 'to face was' an element 
common'to all western Europeg. viz. the 
Reformation. ' 
The dispute for supremacy in the Middle 
Age between the universalchurch and secular 
rulers, while it had, at times led to armed 
conflict, was, upon the whole, theoretical 
(1) Cf. Glanvil, De legibus et consuetudinibus 
regni Angliae (c. 11 9). 
Bracton De legibus et consuetudinibus 
Aggliae (c. lL56) 
Fortescue, De laudibus legum lice (c. 1470). 
I6 
In the main, it' had been an academic , 
controversy waged by scholars., The. Refor- 
mation brought the controversy down--to the 
level of the people.. At a time when national 
states were almost in their infancy, their 
growth seemed tobe threatened by the new 
religious upheaval in. Christendom. -While in 
the Middle Age a ruler had to contend with, 
a united church, he often found himself-the, 
weaker party in the struggle. In this conn-'' 
ection we may note that the church in-England 
claimed the honour of winning and preserving 
our liberties. The church, while it was on the' 
side of liberty, wasa check on the growth 
of royal absolutism. It was the unequal 
struggle between an individual monarch and 
the universal church which claimed world-wide 
dominion over the bodies and minds of all men. 
This state of affairs was shattered by the 
Reformation. Subject was divided against- 
subject-within the same state. The king, if he .' 
were a'Protestantg no longer fought single= .' 




had now the alliance of men of the new 
religion against men of the old. `Never before 
was the biblical warning that a'nation 
divided against itself cannot stand brought 
home to the minds, of men as it"was in the 
sixteenth century. The-growth of-national 
unity seemed to be threatened with destruct- 
ion in its infancy by religious factions.: 
'-Hence the necessity for a ruler to take his, 
stand for one religion or the other, to foster 
the one chosen and ruthlessly attempt to 
, '-stamp out the other., That a state could not 
"-""embrace both the old and the new j was - admitted 
in the. -German Empire at the Peace of Augsburg 
when the maxim 'cuius regio eriüscreligio' was 
"i 
established. Men of the proscribed religion 
became enemies of the state,, -, for, in-the-life 
, and death struggle, toleration was impracticable. 
In a Protestant state, the Roman Catholics 
were persecuted : in a Roman Catholic state, 
the Protestants. Were the persecuted to submit,,, -... 
,: tamely'to persecution ? In self-defence, the 
minority were driven. to. theýenunciation of a 
I 8 
` doctrine of resistance against the king. 
The claims to the'right of-rebellion were 
not new, but their wide recognition, -'as' :. 
formulated in a doctrine, first assumed 
importance in Europe in the sixteenth cen 
tury owing to the political consequences 
of the Reformation. 
Subjects' allegiance to their prince 
came to be determined by their religious 
principles. The Roman, Catholic Church freed\ 
subjects from their allegiance I to a heket- ;,, ' 
ical king. Jesuits taught the right of 
tyrannicideP, Presbyterians, too,. such as"., 
George Buchanan, held that it was not-. only, 
a right, but a duty for subjects to depose 
a Roman Catholic king. 
O 
The middle way between 
these two extremes is represented by Lutheran- 
ism. To Luther, secular authority, at its best, 
gas but a , necessary evil. The contempt for 
(1) Cf. Pope Pius V issued a Bull of Excommun- 
ication and deprivation against Elizabeth in 1570: ='' 
" "The sentence of our holy Lord Pope ... against Elizabeth ... wherein ... all her subjects are declared to be absolved from the oath of alleg- 
iance and whatever duty they owe to her". 
(2) Cf. Mariana. 
(3) De jure regni spud Scotus dialogue (1579)" 
I 
I. 
civil government, carried to limits of 
absurdity by some of his extreme follow- ý". - 
led Luther to enunciate the doctrine 
of passive obedience and to admit of the 
state's right to regulate the outward forms 
of religion, and, if necessary, to, use 
force. But Luther weakened-in his attitude 
to passive obedience, following on the' 
rupture between the Emperor and the Lutheran 
princes, and he came, to hold the belief 
that Christians had the right; of self-defence 
. against a ruler who threatened their religion. 
The, mediaeval distinction between a king 
and a tyrant is found in Calvin's'political 
thought. "Magistrates derive their authority 
from God alone; should they rebel against 
God, their commission ceases and they-are 
magistrates no more". 
0 
"If they command any- 
thing against Him, let us not pay the least 
regard to it". 
6) 
But the subject's disobedience 
(1) This, as we' shall see, was the central' 
idea in Hoadly's political thought. 




must be passive 
m The latitude Calvin allow- 
ed to the ind'*idual's own determination in this 
A 
matter made his attitude to the doctrine 
of resistance sufficiently ambiguous to 
justify Presbyterians - who were Calvinists - 
in adopting whole-heartedly-the theory of 
the right of resistance. °`On a broad analysis 
, 
'- of the thought of. Luther , and 
Calvin, it is 
safe to say that Luther-inclined towards 
-estate authority leaving the ruler as the 
judge, whereas Calvin laid stress on the 
"individual and the individual' s, right,. to 
'. -self-determination in religion and political 
'obedience. 
The English, Reformation, which was 
'-Lutheran in spirit, adopted the doctrine of 
non-resistance, and political thought in .. 
England in the sixteenth century was main- 
ly concerned with this doctrine. It was 
(1) Professor Allen's view is that Calvin 
"taught'a doctrine of absolute non-resistance, 
qualified only, as. it was qualified. by'. every 
one in the sixteenth century, by an obligation 
in some cases to a passive disobedience. ' -. 
A history of olitical thought in the sixteenth 
century. 1928), p. 58. 
I 
0 
taught by the most celebrated clergymen 
and laymen, and was incorporated in. the 
Injunctions of 1536,1538 and 1547 and 




office of magistrate was held to be the 
ordinance of God. - Although writers in the 
11 
I 
sixteenth century spoke of prince or king, 
they did not mean to convey the idea that 
monarchy was the only form, of regiment 
ordained by: God, or even that God special- 
1 favoured it. Nor or was the. supreme 
magistrate the only governor against whom', ';, 'ý 
there could be no resistance. "The relig- 
ious duty of-obedience to the prince was'', 
constantly associated with the'conception 
of. ' a similar duty, in relation to every 
recognised form in human society. " 'A 
(1) See Allen, op. cit., 'pp. 125 et 
Homily against rebellion was one of 
main props of the argument in favour 
non-resistance both before and after 







(2) Hooper carefully explained that the 
powers St Paul referred to in Rom. xiii 'be 
not only king and emperors, but all such as be 
appointed to any public office and common 
regiment, either for a king, where there is 
a kingdom, or in the place of a king, where 
as the state of the commonwealth is no 
monarchy'. - cited Allen,. op, cit., p. 127. 
I 12 
0 
right was attached, not only to the prince, 
but to the father in the family, the land- 
hd on his estate, even to-the common 
employer of labour. " The Tudor conception 
of the body politic was derived. from the -, 
analogy of the natural world. Society was 
r 
. __ static; God had put man 
into his alloted 
niche, and he should remain there. God made, 
, rulers 
to'command and subjects to obey. The 
king is the head, and the people-are the 
members, of the body politic. tThis. is the 
essence of Tudor political thought. All, who 
'have been ordained-to obey, must obey all 
commands not contrary to the word of God. In, 
the Book of Homilies, issued by Edward VIA 
passive obedience was enjoined where a subject 
could not in conscience obey actively. The 
doctrine of passive obedience admitted of no 
exceptions. "Perhaps-the most striking 
peculiarity of England in the sixteenth cen- 
tury was* the general refusal to admit that 
(1) Allen, op. cit., p. 135. 




any case can be made for a right of rebel- 
lion. " 0 The Tudor doctrine was-frankly 
theological, but it was accepted by*states- 
men on the grounds of expediency. 
Towards the end of the sixteenth century, 
political thought in France tended towards 
the theory of absolutism. _The Huguenots, who 
had advocated resistance, made a complete'`, 
volte face, and after 1685 convinced them-',, 
selves, that nothing could justify rebellion 
To support the candidature of Henry of 
Navarre to the throne, they put forward 
claims of divine hereditary right. of king--'-- 
ships 
Jean Bodin, tie greatest of the Politi- 
ques, and, indeed, the greatest political 
thinker since Aristotle, propounded, in his, 
De'Republic 
© 
theory of the state designed 
(1) Allen, op. cit., p. 131. 
See 'Appendix I1 Note 2, 
(2) Ibid., p. 377. 
r First published in French in i576. Bodin 






to provide a solution to the political 
problems of. his own time. Like Hobbes, he 
wrote with a practical object in view. France 
was in a state of anarchy resulting from 
the internecine religious wars involving 
the conflikcting claims of religion and loy- 
alty. Bodints political thought is noteworthy 
for its"definite conception of sovereignty' 
He was, however, -as-much a mediaevalist as 
a modern, and hence his theory of*sovereignty. 
has been aptly described as being 'at thel 
crossroads'. 
Bodin endeavoured to. establish the claims 
of an absolute monarch to undivided allegiances 
and with this object in viewl. he tended to, ' 
enunciate the maxim that the sovereign was 
legibus. solutus., "Majesty or sovereignty", he 
. 
wrote, "is the most high, absolute and perpet- 
ual power over the citizens and subjects in 
a commonweal. "Sovereignty, he said, could 
(1) M. A0Shepard, Sovereignty at the cross- 
roads: a study 2f Bodin p. 580. ( Political 
Science Quarterly, vol. 45,1930. ) 
(2) De Republica, Bk. I, chap, viii. 
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reside in one, the few or-the many, but 
he was mediaeval in his definite preference, 
for monarchy. The attribute perpetual found 
in the French edition is omitted in the 
Latin edition where we have simply "summa 
in caves subditos legibus salute potestas". 
The omission in that place is not material, 
for elsewhere in the Latin edition he requires 
the principle of permanence. In his explaný; 
ation of what he means by permanence, Bodin`j 
. IN is a little unsatisfactory. A magistrate, 
holding 'office for a limited and , 
definite " -. 
period9-like the Roman dictator, 'is not sov- 
ereign. "We must understand the word perpetual 
for the term of the life of him that . hath 
power". Bodin did not argue for -a hereditary M` 
monarchy, for he recognised elective, monarchy- 
(1) Op. cit., Bk. III chap. 1. 
l 4ý. 






as a legitimate form. The only stipulation 
he makes is that the king shall be invested 
with sovereignty for life. 
The sovereign is legibus solutus. He is 
16 
not bound by the law of his predecessors, and 
therefore much less is he bound by the laws 
and ordinances which he makes himself. A man 
cannot give a. '. law to himself for he cannot 
give a command to his own will. Sovereignty 
consists in giving laws in'general to subjects 
without their own "consent: - Bodin' considers 
whether the power of an English parliament 
conflicts with his ponception of sovereignty 
of the prince and concludes that it does not. 
This, as we shall see, was the interpretation 
of the place of the English parliament in our 
polity taken by the divine right theorists 
" 
in England. in the seventeenth century and by 
non-jurors such as Kettlewel 
land 
the High- 
Church Tories after the Revolution. 
The estates of the people, both in France 
and in England, in; Bodin's view, have no share 
(1) See below, p. 243, ,; fi 
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of sovereignty. In making the prince 
legibus solutus, did Bodin free the prince 
from all restraint ? Were there no grounds 
at all for rebellion ? Bodin states emphat- 
ically that the sovereign prince is under the 
laws of 'God and nature. "But as for the laws 
of God and nature", he sayst- "Al princes 
of the world are'unto them subject; neither 
is it in their power to impugn them... Where- 
fore in that we said the. sovereign power in 
a commonweale to be free from all laws, con-' 
cerneth nothing the laws of God and nature. 
If, then, the prince breaks the laws of 
God and nature and the leges imperii,. can he 
be restrained by his subjects ? Does a right.,, 
of rebellion follow therefrom ? The general 
opinion among scholars is that in Bodin's 
thesis restraints put upon the sovereign are 
ethical only in character. A different view 
is taken by Shepard-. ® 
(1) See Appendix I1 Note 3. 
(2) De Republica. English tr. (1606)9 Bk. I, 
,* chap. viii, p92. 
(3) Op. cit., pp. 580 et seq. 
Bodin was cited by a writer in 1714 as an 
author who'upheld the right of resistance. See 
Parliamentary right maintain'd, etc., p. 57. ' 
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In 1606 there was published in London 
an English translation by Richard Knolles 
of Bodin's De Republica. In the preface to 
the reader, Knolles says that men. throughout 
the ages "have framed divers and farre-dif- 
ferent formes and fashions of commonweales: 
some of them giving the sovereigntie unto 
the people in generall, some unto the nobil- 
itie" alone, and some others (better advised 
than the rest) unto one most royall monarch; 
which both by reason and experience being 
found the best, is not onely of the more 
civile nations, but even of the most bar- 
barous people of the world ..., in the governments 
received". 
0 In introducing Bodin to the reader, 
he'says: "The chiefe scope and drift of him 
in the whole worke being to make the, subjects ý, a": 
obedient unto the magistrates, the magistrates 
unto the prince, and the prince unto the lawes 
of God and nature". 
While. Bodin was the forerunner of the non- 
resistance theorists in England, the author of 








were the forerunners of the resistance 
theorists. Althusius and his schoolt*"known' 
to their adversaries as 'monarchomachs', 
taught that sovereignty originated in the, 
people and that it was inalienable. " The 
people, iii . whom 
that sovereignty resided, were, 
regarded as the governed part of the state. " 
The governor was outside the body of the 
people and was bound to the people by con- 
tract. The governor's power was fiduciary, 
and if he were guilty of a breach of trust, 
he dissolved the contract, and the people 
were% justified in resisting him. It was a 
mediaeval theory of the Empire that the source 
of the Emperor's authority was the Roman 
people. But the power. was`talienated and the ruler 
was legibus solutus. Bodin, too, admitted 
(1) 1579. The Vindiciae was burned by the 
University of Cambridge in 1622. See The History 
of*passive obedience (1689), p. 15. An English 
translation of the Vindiciae was published in 
London in 1689. 
(2) Pbli ica me hodice digesta. First published 
in 1603. The 3rd ed. (1614) is the final form 
and is the edition reprinted with an'intro- 




that the sovereign's authority. might emanate 
. from the people, but when once surrendered, 
it was irrecoverable. Althusius, therefore, 
in opposition-to this view, maintained that 
the sovereignty was not only originally in 
the people but permanently., 4 The link between 
the thought of Althusius and of Locke, Defoe 
and Hoadly is-so close thatrone is surprised 
, that Althusius is not given a prominent place, ', 
in post-Revolution thought. 
A thinker who was frequently cited in 
England after 1689 was', Grotius 
. 
Grotius 
occupied a position midway between Bodin and 
Althusius. Against Bodin he argued that the 
sovereign power was not necessarily'absolute; 
for, contracts may be made between ruler and ruled 
whereby an indefinite number of rights may be 
" 
taken from the sovereign. Sovereignty, too, 
was divisible. It may be divided between a 
king and a popular assembly. In defence of 





this arrangement, he said: "Many persons 
allege many inconveniences against such a 
two-headed sovereignty, but in political 
affairs nothing is quite free from incon- 
venience". This division of sovereignty, 
as we shall see, had a bearing on English 
political thought 
© In opposition to Alt- 
husius, he repudiated the separation of ti 
ruler and ruled. ' Sovereignty, he said, 
might reside in the whole'body as general 
i 
bearer and in the governor as special bear- 
, er 
© This approach to the idea of state sov- 
ereignty was not developed by Grotius© nor 
was developed in England although some 
0 writers between 1688 and 1714 tentatively 
21 
made the suggestion. Grotius departed 
(1) Op. cit., I, chap,., 
. 
3,9 17. 
(2) See below, chap. VI on parliament. 
(3) "The theory propounded by Grotius of a 
double 'subject' of sovereignty approached 
much closer to the conception of the sov- 
ereignty of the state. " -: Gierke, Natural law and the theory of tbciet , -1500 
to 1800. 
Tr. E. Barker (1934), i, p. . 
(4) "But even Grotius ... fails none the less to attain a true conception of the single 
personality of the state,. " - Ibid. 
f 
(5) 'See Appendix ,Ig Note 4. 
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further from the theory of Althusius by 
allowing that the'people might alienate 
their sovereignty. Grotius treated sov- 
ereignty like a property right which 
might be enjoyed in full ownership or by 
mere usufruct. Hence his ideas could-be 
applied to absolute government or to pop- 11 
ular government. ,., 
When the comprehensive Elizabethan 
church settlement proved, inadequate to 
meet the aspirations of. the growing section 
of Puritans within the Anglican Church, the. _ 
doctrine of non-resistance took on a much 
more politico-ecclesiastical aspect. The 
doctrine of the right of resistance was 
-associated with Catholics and Presbyterians, 
and the Puritans were closely identified 
with the latter. To. meet the subversive 
.. element in the Church andfState, the doe- 
trine of, non-resistance was assumed by the 
Anglican hierarchy as an integral part of 
its -teaching. From the general enunciation 




we pass to the Stewart particular enun- 
ciation that the king ilone., 3e the 'supreme 
power' and is alone ordained by God as the 
supreme magistrate. The new development is 
summed up in James's dictum: "No bishop, 
no king". 
The conception of the divine right of 
magistracy under the Tudors became the divine 
right of kings under the Stewarts: no longer 
was it merely a general command of non-re B'87 
tance to the 'powers that be', but the spec-' 
ific command of non-resistance to the person- 
al king. From being an essential social 
moral precept, it became the exclusive 
. 
prop- 
arty of the king and his ally the Anglican 
Church. We must note, also, that the 
obligation was not to any king but to an 
hereditary one. Convocation incurred 
the censure of James. I for omitting in 1606 
this hereditary element from its canons. 
Two quotations will serve to illustrate 
the doctrine in the pre-Rebellion period., `-, 
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They are from the sermons of Manwaring and 
Sanderson. These two men's works have been 
selected because they were regarded-as 
authorities on the doctrine and were most 
frequently cited after the Revolution. 
Manwaring said: 
"Among all the powers ordained by God 
the royal is the most high, strong andt % 
large. No power in the world or in the, 
Church can lay restraint upon it ... No,, 
persons be they never so great, can 
, 
be privileged from their power, nor ex- 
empted from their case, be they never 
so mean. The laws take their binding 
force from the qupreme will of their 
high lord. "o 
Bishop Sanderson said: 
"Not for the maintenance of the lives 
or liberties either of ourselves or 
others; not for the defence of religion; 
not for the preservation of a church or 
state; no, nor yet, if that could be 
-imagined possible, for the salvation of 
a soul; no, not for the redemption of " 
the whole world" was it lawful to resist 
(1) Quoted by Gooch, Political thought, p. 18. ' 
(2) Seventeen sermons ad aulam, sermon xiiL Ham- 
pton Courts July 26 1 640. in Works (ed. W. Jacob- 
son, 1854), ip p. 24. This passage was cited 
by the defence at the Sacheverell Trial. (S. T., 
xv, 2Robert 
Fleming, referring to this statement 
of Sanderson's, says; "Unless ... such divines be 
. idiots themselves,. and take all others to be 
such, they had best let arguments drawn from, 
reason alone; which they seem so 
little to 
understand. " - The history of hereditary right 
etc. (17114p. 26. ,. 
I 25 
The doctrine, under James I and Charles I, 
however, was not universally held. It made 
few converts outside the Anglican clergy. It 
is noteworthy that Manwaring was impeached 
by the House of Commons in 1628 for his ser- 
mon on non-resistance. Bishop Burnet held 
the view that the full acceptance of the doc- 
trine was not attained till after the Restor- 
ation. Archbishop Usaher was asked by Lord* 
Strafford, on the eve of the Rebellion, to 
write. on obedience to the kings He complied! 
in a work wherein he said: "God's word -is 
clear in the point. Whosoever. resisteth the- 
power, resisteth the ordinance of-God, and 
they that resist shall receive to themselves 
damnation, and. thereby a necessity is imposed 
upon us, of being subject even for conscience 
(1) Gooch, Political thought, p. 21. 
(2) S. T. iii 335-358. 
See Appendix I, Note 5. 
(3) Burnet in his speech at the Sacheverell 
Trial. S. T., xv, 484-490. passim. 
This was the common view after 1689. Cf. 
Ridpath, The peril of being. _z_e_a 
usly affected 
but not well, etc. (1710) g p. 
8. 
(4) Elrington, Life of Ussher. (1848), p. 305. 
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sake, which may not be avoided by the 
pretext of any ensuing mischief whatsoever. " 
The doctrine of non-resistance was in 
abeyance during the Commonwealth period, but 
it was revived with greater life and vigour 
after 166o 
P 
The work of Ussher, to which 
we have referred, was not published till 
166o, when it was thought to be sure of a 
welcome from the English public. More impor- 
tant than 
, 
the treatise itself was the intro-,,, 
duction written by Bishop SandersonT Ussher 
displayed a wealth of learning but little ' 
political sagacity. He based his thesis on 
(1) Ussher, The power communicated by God to 
the prince, etc. (1661). This was cited by the 
Defence at the Sacheverell Trial. S. T., xv, '254. 
(2) See Appendix I, Note 6. ' 
(3) See Appendix I, Note 7. 
(4) The MS. had been lost. It was found before 
the Restoration, "but it was not a time to 
publish such a treatise, and they were obliged 
to wait, for a more favourable opPortunity. " - Elrington, Life of Ussher, p. 306. 
It 1s'very significant that the third 
edition was published in 1710 at the height of 
the Sacheverell controversy. 
(5) The author of The history of passive obed- 
ience calls it "that admirable preface. " p. t3. ] 
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the Old Testament, a narrow interpretation 
of St Paul and the early'Fathers. Sanderson, 
on the other hand, touched on-more vital and 
practical issues. 
"That the original of all government is 
from the people, and that the power which 
kings and princes have was derived unto 
them by way of pact or contract, would 
thence infer, that princes can therefore 
claim no more power. as of right belonging 
unto them than the people 0hall think fit 
to entrust them withal: which the- people 
may from time to time and at all times, as 
they shall see c ause. in order to the public 
weal and safety either enlarge or restrain 
at their pleasure. " O 
He gives also a very interesting analysis of 
the absurdity of the original contract on 
practically the same lines as T. H. Green 
was 
to adopt three hundred years later. 
Sovereignty, says Sanderson resides solely 
in the king. " 
"The known laws of the land have declared 
it so fully and particularly the Oath of 
Supremacy expressed it so clearly, that any 
(1) Ussher, op. cit. 
son, p. 32.3 
(2) Ibid. 
(Introduction by Sander- 
(3) Cf. T. H. Greený Lectures on the pri 




man of ordinary capacity may understand 
it as well as the deepest statesman in the, 
world. That which some talk of, a mixt 
monarchy (which by the way is an arrant 
bull, a contradiction in adjecto, and 
destroyeth itself) and others drawn of such 
a co-ordination in the government as was 
hatched amidst the heat of the late troubles, 
but never before heard of in our land, are 
in very truth no better than senseless and 
ridiculous fancies. Q " 
This was written in 1661. In 1684 - four 
years before the Revolution - Parker expressed 
and the identical thought in n2igip-n-and 
loyalty. 
"For"where the sovereignty of this kingdom 
resides, is a thing so easily and vulgarly 
known that to search it out requires no 
deep Inspection, either into the laws of 
the land or the nature of government. The 
Oath of Supremacy is so full a declaration 
of it, that no man, whoever took its can 
after that deny the sovereign power to 
reside in the king alone without perjury. "1 
ý 
This doctrine of the sovereignty of the king. 
was now universally taught and accepted by 
Anglican churchmen as applying exclusively to 
a king by divine right of hereditary succes- 
4 
sinn. The doctrine now stressed hereditary : 
(1) Ibid., p. 47. 
. 
(2) Parker, Religion and loyalty. (1684), iq 
pp. 100-101. 
0 
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right, for it was seen that non-resis- 
tance without this qualification would 
justify Cromwell'%s government. The doctrine, 
with this narrow interpretation became an 
article of faith to which all Church of 
England4prescribed. The Whig churchmen 
such as Burnet and Tillotson were just as 
© 
warm supporters as the High-Church Tories. 
The significance of this church teaching 
cannot be overemphasised in the light of the 
subsequent development of political thought; 
And in view of the Revolution and the theories 
which-were evolved in its support, the fact 
that the doctrine. of non-resistance was em- 
bodied in statute law becomes exceedingly. 
significant. A statute of 1660 enacted ; 
"That by the undoubted and fundamental 
laws of this kingdom, neither the peers 
of this realm, nor the Commons, nor both 
together in Parliament no-r-the-people 
or out of parliament nor the people 
collectively or representatively, nor 
any other persons whatsoever, ever had, 
(1) Cf. Feilir History of the Tory party, 
p. 490. 
(2) See Appendix I9 Note 8. 
0 
(3) See Appendix I, Note 9. 
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haves hath or ought to... have any coer- 
cive power over the persons of the kings 
of this realm. " 0 
By the- Corporation Act, all officers had 
to swear that they believed 'That it is not 
lawful up°n any, pretence whatsoever to' take 
arms against the king. ' 
The Militia Act(1662)recited : "That 
both or either Houses of Parliament cannot, 
... nor lawfully may raise or levy war, off- 
ensive or defensive, against His Majesty, 
(1) 12 Carl. II, a. 302 sec. 7. 
This statute was cited by Harcourt in 
defence of Sacheverell in 1710 (S. T., xv, 209) 
and by Dodd (S. T., xv, 219). 
It was also used by Whigs against Tories. 
Cf. Tories and Tory_principles ruinous to 
both prince and people. (1714),. 5. 
(2) 13 Carl. II, Sess. 2, c. 1. 
(3) Cited by Harcourt in 




(S. T., xv, 219) 
(4) 13 & 14 Carl. II, c. 3, sec. 2. 
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his, heirs l' or lawful successoIrs. " 
O 
The Act of U2liformit 
y(1662) 
required 
all ecclesiastical persons-'to subscribe to 
the 'truth' that "it is not lawful on arty 
pretence whatsoever, to take up arms against 
the king. " 
& 
There were other statutes also 
which expressed this legal concept. 
The controversies over the Exclusion 
Bill brought out many arguments which were 
to be used against James a second time ten 
(1) Of this statute Peter Allix said : "It 
seems indeed a haed matter to reconcile the 
proceedings of the Convention with this Act 
of Parliament; -yet if I may speak in judg- 
ment of the matter, I think this scruple also 
may be easily satisfied. We must remember 
that the law speaks only in favour of him who 
preserves the title of a king, and not of one 
who divests himself thereof by his unjust and 
arbitrary deportment. " - An examination of the 
scruples of those who refuse to take the Oath " 
of-Allegiance. 1689) S. T. Wm. III, i, p. 313. 
This statute, however, was cited by Har- 
court in defence of Sacheverell. (S. T., xv, 209) 
and by Dodd. (Ibid., 219) 
The oath in the statute was repealed by 
lWm. & Mars c. 8) sec. xi. See below, p. 101. 
(2) 13 & 14 Carl. II, c. 4. 
Cited byHarcourt. (S. T., xv, 210) and by 
Dodd. (Ibid. 1219) 
(3) The oath was repealed by 1 Wm. & Mary, 
c. 81 sec. xi. See below, p. 101. 
-See also Appendix I1 note 10. 
(4) Act for select vestries, Act for associat- 
ion, are examnes. 
f 
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years later. The exciusionists argued in 
favour of an absolute parliament which had, 
therefore, power to alter the succession. 
"Government was appointed for those that 
were to be governed, and not for the sake 
of governors themselves: therefore all 
things relating to it were to be measured 
by the public interest and the safety of 
the people. "G)Our oath of allegiance to 
the king's heir meant the heir by law, and 
the heir sanctioned by parliament was the 
only heir by law. Those who argued against 
the exclusion said monarchy was by divine 
right and no law'could alter what God had 
settled. Lawyers held that parliament had 
no power to alter Magna Carta, which was a 
fundamental law, and, they insisted that the 
law of succession to the crown was likewise 
1 
a fundamental law. 
(1) Burnet, History of his own time, iii p. 203. 
(2) Ibid., p. 205. 
See Appendix Iý Note'_11. ' 
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The conception of the divine right of 
kings and the sovereignty of kings on the 
one hand, and on the other hand the cor- 
responding denial of the right of resistance, 
the human origin of kingship, the sovereignty 
of the people and the original contract, may 
conveniently be found in the Decrees of the 
University of Oxford of 21st July, 1683° In 
the same year, Hickes propounded the same 
theory of absolutism in his Jovian: or an 
answer to Julian the Apostate 
0, In 1684, 
Parkinsoi, Fellow of Lincoln College, was 
expelled from the University for maintaining 
that "the right and foundation of all power :; 
was in the people, that kings are accountable 
for their male-administration, " 
yVM 
(1) See Appendix I, Note 12. 
(2) By Samuel Johnson. Johnson made several 
replies, e. g. An argument proving, etc. 
He calls this year "the year of Jovian 83 
wherein these doctrines were published and 
rung all over the nation" - An argum ent proving 
etc. (1692) in Works (1710), p. 261. 
(3) Cited, HUstgry of passive obedience (1689), . PO 18. 
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In the same year, 1684, 'Parker published 
his Religion and loyalty. This work, says 
the late Master of Balliol, marks the high- 
water mark in-the doctrine of non-resistance 
and contains the best exposition of the doc- 
trine 0 The high-water mark, however, may be 
put a little later. The doctrine, in its 
extremist formi was still cherished in the 
beginning of James II's reign. 
We have considered the official doctrine. 
of non-resistance in the Restoration period - 
as embodied in-statute law, as expounded by 
the Church' through-l. the expressions of ° its 
dignitaries, and as officially enunciated by 
the University of Oxford. There can be no doubt 
(1) A. L. Smith, Cambridge Modern History, V01- 
vi, chap. 23. 
(2) In 1690 a writer said that1James ascended 
the throne, the 30th January became like the 
"Bacchanalia of Rome" or "a general madding day". 
A modest inauy into the causes of the present 
. disasters in England, etc. S. T. Wm. III, -ii p. 96. "When the late King James succeeded to 
the 
crown, the Tories deafened him with the noise of 
their addresses ... stuff'd with expressions of the 
most extravagant loyalty and unlimited passive 
obedience and non-resistance, professing them to 
be even principles of their religion and the very 
characteristic of their Church. " - Faults on both 
sides. 2nd ed. (1710), p. 14. 
ýt 
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that this doctrine was the prevailing cri- 
terion of political obligation. Arty attempt 
to formulate a doctrine' of -resistance was 
º.. 
promptly suppressed. 'Parkinson,, as we have 
seen, suffered in its cause. -Russell died on 
the scaffold, refusing to the end to admit the 
validity of the doctrine of non-resistance. The 
controversy over the Exclusion'Bill-provided the 
most daring example of opposition'to the doctrine 
of indefeasible hereditary right, an essential 
part, at that time, of the doctrine of non-res- 
istance. It would indeed be surprising if the 
'doctrine of resistance had had no supporters in 
the Restoration. period among those who had-, not 
forgotten the Commonwealth. - In, this connection 
we may in conclusion note-the opinions of a con- 
temporary writer and of a modern historian. ' 
Laurence Echard in his History of the Revol- 
"ution'(1725) gives a 
good account of the doctrine 
of non-resistance in the reign of Charles `II, 
but he is unwilling to admit its universality 
which would have made his justification of the` 
Revolution more difficult. - "Yet after all ", ' 
.I 
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he says, "the_ notion of passive-obedience 
seems often to have been in an uncertain and 
fluctuating condition: sometimes sleeping, and 
othertimes rouzing: now contracted, and then 
extended, as the dangers seem'd to arise from 
different quarters, or as various apprehensions, 
humours and provocations were excited and blown 
up amongst a divided-people. -The disputes about 
0 it were infinite. " But he is bound to admit 
that "we are further to remember, that it was 
no small impediment to that Revolution of which 
we are endeavouring to give an account. " 
The historian, to whom we referred, is 
Ranke. He is inclined to believe that the doc- 
trine of resistance was a potent force in-the 
Restoration period; "The right of resistance"$ 
he says, "expressed in the covenant, and main- 
tained by them, formed the basis of the 
(1) Op, cit. p. 23. 
Cf. "Having. always thought, that the doctrine 
of passive obedience or non-resistance of our 
lawful superiors, been a doctrine founded in 
the holy scriptures ... and having lived so long to see that doctrine ridicul'd and call'd the 
doctrineýof the bow-string ant the assertors and 
the practisers of, it explored, as old lacrymists 
... I. could no longer forbear writing in the 
-behalf of that truth which is eternal and unalt- 
erable. " - The history of passive obedience, pp. " C 3-. 4.7 
(2) Echard, Op, cit. p. 24.. 
I 
political theories of the Whigs : in the 
37 
two last parliaments of Charles II they had 
been the stronger party". 
Nevertheless, whatever opinions may have 
been held by the minority of political thinkers, 
it is clear that the political theory which was 
dominant before the Revolution was the doctrine 
of non-resistance. 'The conception of the con- 
stitution which followed from that doctrine as 
a corollary was as follows. Sovereignty was 
held to reside solely in the king 
P The Houses 
of Parliament formed an essential but subordin- 
ate part of the legislature. The power of the 
Houses was not co-ordinate with that of the 
king in law-making. The king possessed the 
whole executive power, and all commands of the 
king had to be obeyed. If the commands were 
legal, they had to be obeyed actively. if they 
were illegal, they had to be obeyed passively; 
that iss a. many who could not conscientiously 
obey a law which he regarded as illegal, must, 
suffer the penalties of law patiently for his 
q 
disobedience. On no account whatsoever could 
(1) History of England (Eng. ed. 1875), iv, p. 393.. 
(2) See Appendix I, Note 13. 
I 
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THE DOCTRINE OF RESISTANCE 
CHAPTER TWO 
THE DOCTRINE OF RESISTANCE 
I: Popular origin and basis of government 
No punitive action taken against James II 
could be': justified as long as the doctrine 
of non-resistance obtained. God, accordingi 1 
to that doctrine, placed a king over the 
people, and the king's'power came from God 
and not from the people, so that the only 
punishment which could be meted out to an 
unjust king was God's judgment., To justify 
the Revolution, that doctrine had to be 
overthrown .0 For the divine right of kingship, 
a popular origin had to be substituted and 
the power of government made to rest directly' 
and not only indirectly on a popular basis. 
(1) or modified, according to the conquest 
school. See below, chap. 4. sect. 1. 
(2) Opponents of this doctrine held that the 
power might be from the people, but that that 
power was given'to the ruler by God. The ruler 
was thus responsible to the direct and not to 
the indirect donor,. 
40 
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In addition, it had to be shown that a people 
could never be under perpetual subjection to 
a ruler without having an inherent right to, 
recall, or remedy defects in, governmental 
power when it should be abused or employed 
I 
contrary to the'public good. The foundation of 
the doctrine of resistance, therefore, was 
generally held to be *the pppular origin of 
government. 
It was freely admitted that government in 
the abstract was a divine institutions God 
It 
ýý/G VIýG 6r3L VIL_iýL i_ º7 LLV jJ Vi iJfLG VGl GLLLý. L Lý1i saV MVi ýýYI V7/ " 
pp. 3-4. See Appendix I, Note 169 
The criterion. or touchstones etc. (1710), PP- 
5-6. See Appendix I, Note 17. 
(3) The criterions or touchstone, etc.,, p. 5. 
made man such a creature as to dispose him 
naturally for political society. But no one 
form of government could be said to have 
(1) Some resistance doctrinaires denied 
popular sovereignty. 
0 (2) Ferguson A brief justifications etc. (1688). 
S. T. Wm. IIIj ij p. 135. See Appendix I, Note 14. 
Four questions debated (1688). S. T. Wm. III, 
. 
ij p. 165- 
Hoadly, A sermon preach'd before the ... -Lord 
41 
Note 15. 
A letter to a friend occasion'd by the conte 
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special divine sanction, and it was left to 
each nation to choose the form which s sited 
its own needs. 
® 
Supreme power in a state was 
not given to the ruler by a direct grant from 
God, nor was power based on natural right. 
These conclusions, applied to monarchy, meant 




origin) of kingship were both denied. The- 
(1) Masters Case of allegiance-considered (1689), 
S. T. Wm. III, I p. 319. 
"The ordinance of government is from God and 
nature but the species of it whether by one or 
more 
Is from men" -A resolution of certain 
queries concerning submission to the government. 
S. T. Wm. III, i, p. 443. 
The speech of ... Thomas Earl Qf Stamf at the ... Quarter Sessions ... -1691 . 
(1691) 
S. T, Wm. III ii, p. 190. 
Tinda An essay concernin obedience to the 
supreme power, etc. '(169 ). S. 
T. 
Wm. III iii p. 432. 
Blackall, The subject's duty. (170452 in Workagiii 
p. 1128. 
Swift, Sentiments of a Church f England 
ma (1708) in Works iii p. 65. 
Even 6achevereli admitted this truth. See 
below, p. 157. 
patriarchal 
(2) Locke admitted the&origin but not the basis- 
9 government. See below, p. 56, j 
and Appendix Iq Note 18. 
ýý 
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doctrine of non-resistance was based on the 
theory of the divine right of kings and 
supported by a literal interpretation of Paul's 
words in his Epistle to the Romans 
ý"That, 
provided the strongest theological argument 
against resistance. But, since opponents of 
absolute monarchy had appealed to natural law, 
Filmer had built absolutism on a natural. basisg-. 
viz. the patriarchal. Leslie, who was the most 
reactionary writer on the side of royal 
absolutism after the Revolution, belonged to 
this school of thought. His Rehearsal was-, - 
largely taken up with Adreary exposition of 
the 
patriarchal origin and basis of kingship. 
ý. 
Many 
other writers used the same argument. 
Both the divine right theory and-the 
patriarchal put a moral obligation on obedience 
to the supreme power. Resistance. implied a 
breach of the ordinance of God in both cases; in 
the patria±chal, in particular, a breach of the 
(1) Rom. xUAI 1-5. 
(2) Hoadly wrote a work of 200 pages against 
Leslie's patriarchal scheme. See The or ginal 
and institution of civil government discussed, 
in Works, ii, pp. 182-2869 
ktll 
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commandment 'Honour thy father'. To these 
44 
two criteria, Bishop Berkeley added a third - 
obedience by the law of nature. Just as a 
breach of the commandments 'Thou shalt not 
steal', 'thou'shalt not commit adultery' was 
vice or sin, so 'Thou shalt not resist the 
supreme power' was "a rule or law of nature, 
the least breach whereof hath the inherent stain 
of moral turpitude". 
(D 
According to. the. patriarchal theory, there 
was no time when. people were out of subjection 
to some form of government. Before there was 
any political society, men were subject to the 
father of the family. The father became the 
king. The opponents of this scheme argued that 
there was a fundamental difference between the 
power of the father and the power of the. 
" 
political ruler. Writers like Hooker and Sir 
William Temple were nearer the truth histor- 
ically when they recognised a gradual evolution 
of the king out of the father of the tribe who 
gained pre-eminence by a combination of blood- 
relationship and power to lead in war. It would 
(1) Berkeley Passive obediences etc. (1712) in 
Works, ed. A. Fraser (1901), iv, p.. 111. 
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be impossible to say At what time a'leader's 
authority passed from the patriarchal to the 
political. During the process, the subordinate 
members of the society were in subjection. 
Although authors like Locke and Hoadly argued 
that the power of the father was never absolute, 
and consequently the power of the'king could 
never be absolute, even if the patriarchal 1. 
origin of kingship were admitted; yet they 
based government on the assumption that the 
father of a family could never become a king 
over his kinsmen without their-own consent 
The father of the tribe might become a king, 
but his authority could not be more than 
paternal without the consent of the tribe, for 
when political government is instituted, the' 
people have the right to choose what form of 
government they wishl, and it may not be monarchy. 
(1) Locke, Second Treatise, § 105-306. See 
Appendix I; Note 18. 
Hoadly, Some consideration 
, 
etc. (1709)9'int. r, 
Works,. iiq p. 133. 
l 
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There was a time, it ras therefore assumed, 
when men lived in a non-pplitical society. Men 
could not be brought under the subjection of 
a political ruler without their own consent, for 
men were born free. In this non-political 
society, men-were also born equal and the 
" right to power which any man had was shared by 
all the others. Power did not constitute right 
and the law of reason teaches us that no one 
ought to be injured in his life, health-liberty 
or possessions 
P If a man violates this law, 'the 
rest of mankind has, by the same law, a right 
0 
(1) Filmer "indeed, believed that there was 
irrefragable evidence that his state of nature 
was a historical fact; while Locke and Hobbes 
were content to urge on a priori grounds that 
theirs must have existed although there was no 
evidence to show it" - Fag iss Divine right 
of kings. 2nd ed., pp. 1 55-9" 
(2) Locke Second Treatise, 94. 
Cf. "Ill men are equal in a state of nature" - 
SDeech of Thomas Earl of Stamford at the Quarter 
Sessions, _l 9. S. T, WYm. III, iii p. 190. 
Hoadly, Some considerations, etc. (1709) in 
Works ii p. 133"x Equality 
" was, ýeconomic, social or intellectual. It'is equality "which all men are in in respect of 
jurisdiction or dominion one over another" Locke, 
op. cit.., 54. ,.,. ý. 






to restrain or punish him-, forýhe makes 
himself a menace to the society in which- 
he lives. (D It was necessary for Locke=and. 
other writers on his side, to argue thus, for 
opponents of the popular origin of govern- 
47 
ment asked how it was that the people could 
give the magistrate the power of life and 
death, since they did not possess such a 
power in the state of nature, and since God', 
alone could give-such power Bishop Blackall9 
for example, maintained that governmental ,J 
power must come only from God, Porgy that the, 
king could not have it from the people is 
evident "because it is such a power as the 
people never had, nor could have: and what 
they have not themselves, they cannot give 
to another". 
(1) Locke, op. cit., S 8. 
. Hoadly Some considerations, etc. 
(1709) 
in Works, ii9 p. 130. 
See Appendix I. Note 19. 
(2) Cf. Pufendorf. See Appendix Iq Note 20. 
(3) The divine institution of magistracy etc. 
(1708) in 
.Wr sg 
iii p. 1164.. See also. 
Appendix 
I, Note 21. 
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Locke and his followers, therefore, main- 
tained that all the power which the magis- -t- 
trate exercised was a power inherent"'. in the 
community-and was derived solely from it. 
0 
Thus all'authority that is essential to pol- 
itical government is possessed by each indiv- 
idual in the state of nature. Each has the right 
to such power, and each, has the right to judge 
when he is injured. In a state of nature, the 
-law of nature provides rules whereby a just 
equilibrium should be maintained between right 
and power 
. 
But selfishness and ignorance often 
(1) "All power is originally or fundamentally in the people" -A letter to a friend ... how to free the nation from slavery for ever Jan., 1 879) 
Som. T. -xP. 19 6. 
"Ail government proceeds from the people" - Political aphorisms. S. T. Wm. III, i, p. 390. 
Reflections upon the late great Revolution, " 
etc. S. T. Wm. III, it p. 255. 
A vindication of the proceedings of the late- 
Parliament of England, etc. Som. T., x, p. 262. 
Johnson An argument proving, etc. in Works (1710) , p. 2''6. See Appendix I,, Note 22. Defoe, Origivel power, etc. (1701) in Works 
(1703), it PP. 13b", "9. 
Toland, Anglia libera, etc. (1701), p. 115. 
Toland Memorial of the State of England 
(1705), p. N. 
C2) On the binding obligation of the law of nature, see Gierke, op. cit., pp. 97 et seq. 
10 
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prevailed over reason; and when the laws of 
nature were not observed, the-state of-nature 
(which was one of peace) gave way to a 
state of war. This was an inconvenience 
which could be remedied only by the institution 
of political society . 
(D Political society, 
therefore, was deliberately devised by men who 
thus subjected themselves to government of'', 
their own free-will; and the sole end"of its 
institution was to secure to each man the due 
(1) Hobbes' state of nature was a state of war. His conception of natural law, says Gierke, "was 
no law at all: it only sailed under the name of law like a. ship under false colours, to conceal the bare piratical idea of power" - op. cit., P. 97" 
(2) Wynne, The case of the oaths stated (1689), S. T. Wm. III, iq PP. 340-341. 
Locke Second Treatise S 13. 
Tyrrell A brief disquisition of the law " 
of nature (1692), p. 31. 
Johnson, Notes on the phoenix edition of the Pastoral letter (1694) in V; brks (1710 9 p. 3o6. His inspiration was not Locke, for he says: "I 
speak the language of Fortescue". 
Hoadly, Considerations humbly offered to 
the Bishop of Exeter 1709 in Works, ii p. 1. 35 The criterion, or touchstones etc. 11710)ß -7 Ppa SSee 
Also Appendix I,, Notes 23 and 24.,. 
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observance of natural law ,O The transference 
of power from the people to the magistrate 
may be effected by an original contract. The 
institution of government by-way of contract 
is not always described in detail, as'it is 
by Locke, but even when it is not mentioned 
at all, it is often, though not necessarily, 
implied by the conditional nature of govern- 
ment required for any scheme of government 
allowing a right of resistance in'the people. 
Since, as we have indicated, Locke was the 
only writer who discussed the contract in 
detail, our next section will be mainly con- 
cerned with an exposition of Locke's theory. 
(1) "The obligations of the law of nature 
cease not in society but only in many cases 
are drawn closer and have, by human laws, known 
penalties annexed to them to enforce their 
observation. Thus the law of-nature stands as 
an eternal rule to all men legislators as well 
as, others. " -- Locke l Second Treatise -9 
S1359, 
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When Somers introduced the idea of contract 
into the resolution of the Convention on Jan- 
. 
uary 28,1689, he was propounding no novel 
explanation of the basis of government. The 
concept is a very old one. It can be traced 
back to the Old Testament period ; and it is.., 
ti.. found exerting its influence on political 
thought through the Greek Sophists and med- 
iaeval thinkers down'to modern times. Its 
chief importance, however, dates from the six- 
teenth century. The contract theory was em- 
ployed to explain the human origin of govern- 
mental power in opposition to the divine right 
theory. It was used by Jesuits on behalf of 
the universal sovereignty of the papacy against . 
the claims of the divinity of kings and their 
independence of the papacy. it was used by 
- non-papal writers to support, on a secular 
basis, either an absolutist or a popular 
government free from, papal control. Although 
the contract theory is usually associated with 
(1) See D. G. Ritchie, Contributions to the his- 
tory of the social ct theory in Political 
Science Quarterly vol. vi (1891), pp. 656-676. 
oo, o 
m ý' r" 
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writers on the side of popular government, 
it was not confined to'them. The only common 
element in the theory was the human origin of 
government and the transference of power from 
the people to the government by way of contract. 
Once the power has been transferred, the con- 
tractual relationship between people and magis-, 
trate may vary in an infinite number of ways 
The transference may be absolute, in which 
case the people can never rebel'against their 
rulers. 'It may be conditional, in which case*' 
the government is regarded as a trustee and 
may be resisted if it breaks the original con- 
tract. In'both cases there is one original 
pact which fixes the relationship between 
governor and governed. Apart from thisrorig='-.; 
" anal contract, there it found a type, in a state 
of flux whereby rights -, may be taken from or 
given to the government from time to time. 
Without respect to t1 consequences of the 
contracts'we-may distinguish two main types. 
(1) Cf. Gierke I op. cit., passir;. 
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The first type was a contract-entered into 
by individuals among themselves, the govern- 
ment-organ being the creation ofýthe contract. 
The second type was one entered into by the 
whole people and a ruler, that iss between 
the governed and the governor. These two 
types were often combined. 
Writers after the Revolution, when deal- 
ing with contract, made very sparing refer- 
ences to previous thinkers. Locke must have 
drawn his inspiration from many writers. But 
apart from Filmer whom he attacks, Hooker is 
the only thinker that he quotes from freely- 
in his Second Treatise. Barclay is the only 
other writer mentioned by him. At the end. of 
the Treatise he quotes Barclay because he finds 
a passage in his writings which he hopes will 
condemn the absolutists out of their own 
mouths. We have found no references to Alt- 
0' 
or to Spinoza in pamphlets of our per-' 
iod. Gvotius, by the use made of him, would 





seem to have been the chief inspiration of 
theorists who endeavoured to justify the 
54 
Revolution, Hobbes is occasionally mention- 
ed, but only with disapproval. Hooker, per-' . e-r 
haps through the influence 
- of - 
Locke l did ::.. 
receive some attentÄ&n. His staunch Atli-. ýi, 
canism made him`a persona grata with the 
Tories. And it was natural that the Whigs'\ 
should appeal to a thinker whom the Tories ' 
were bound to listen. to with respect. For 
rj the same reason, JamesI was-cited in defencö'=,, 
of the contract theory, although it is ob- 
vious to us-that James's interpretation was 
not in keeping with the spirit of the-Revol- 
ution. The doctrine of non-resistance, which 
had drawn much. of . 
its inspiration from the - ,_ 
teaching'of James, had decidedly condemned 
the-contract theory.. It had been condemned 
by Sanderson and by the Decrees of Oxford is 
1683. It is safe to say that the contract 
theory was out of countenance in 1689 and 
(l)- Cf. 'above, p. 27. 
r 
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-there is much acute observation. in the 
remark of a pamphleteer who said that the 
55 
inclusion of it in the resolution was "a 
popular flourish. "0 Though we shall refer later 
to the Convention's interpretation of contract, 
we may note here that, in view of the previous 
. condemnation of the , theory ,' 
its 'inclusion was 
a direct challenge to thä non-resistance 
theorists and calculated deliberately to divert 
political thought into new channels. 
It was not essential to their argument that 
the original contract theorists should believe 
that at some given time in the past there was- 
a state of nature without-civil government of"' 
any sort. T. H. Green1 on the assumption that 
such a position is material for Locke's argu- 
ment, argues that men could not have formed 
political society, as Locke says they did, 
unless they had been living in a society which 
(1) The desertion discuss'd. in a letter to 
a countrv_. gentleman. LProbably by Jeremy Collier. 
] 
(1689) S. T. Wm. III, i, p. 110. 
(2) See below, chap. 5ý sect. 3. [ 
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was to all intents and purposes political 
P 
But, although Locke began his Treatise by 
building a body politic out of a non-polit- 
ical society, he virtually abandoned this 
thesis later ?. Hooker, in his Ecclesiastical 
Poli t 
, 
had visualised a people making a 
compact because they felt impelled to change 
the tyranny of one man for a government 
founded on mutual compact, and Locke follow- 
ed Hooker closely in his Second Treatise. 
The essential quality of the contract theory 
is that the institution "öf government is 
based on the mutual consent of all the individ- 
uals who thus deliberately put themselves under 
civil authority, 
(1) T. H. Greenl Lectures on the principles of 
political obli ation. (1911 ed. ) p. 72. 
Cf. Sanderson , above, p. 27. Cf. also Leslie, who wrote : "And if mankind were 
in such a state of nature they could no more 
produce government from the consent of every 
individual than the"chaos, by its own natural 
force, could have produced this world, by a for- 
tuitous concourse of atoms. " - Rehearsal, No. 38.. (1705). 
(2) Cf. above, p; 42 and see Appendix I, Note 18. 
"(3) Eccles. Pol., I, x, 5. Quoted by Locke, 




Men, said Locke, agree with one another 
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"to join and unite into a community for 
their comfortable, safe and peaceable liv- 
ing, one amongst anotherl in a secure en- 
joyment of their properties... When any 
number of men have so consented to make 
one community or government they are 
thereby presently incorp oratýedq and make 
one body politic, wherein the majority 
have the right to act and conclude the 
rest. " 0 
This was the pactum unionis, According to 
Hobbes, this pact created the sovereign to , 
which the people transferred their powers 
irrevocably, and the dissolution of the 
government, therefore, meant the dissolution 
of the political society. There was thus only 
one pact in Hobbes' theory. It is not so clear, 
however, whether there was one or more than 
one pact in Locke's thesis. In the passage 
quoted above Locke tells us that the people 
are formed into a body politic before the 
majority choose the form of government. It 
might be inferred that there is a second pact - 
a pactum subjectionis - between the govern- 
ment and-this majority. A consideration of the 
(1) Locke, Second Treatise' 95. , Cf, also Appendix I1 Note-24. 
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effect of-the-dissolution of the government, 
however, will show that Locke, did not conceive 
such a secondary pact. 
It has been said that "Locke's chief 
difference from Hobbes lies in his insisting 
that the 
, 
dissolution' of a government is not,.,.,, -, 
O 
the same as the dissolution of society. " It 
is true that Locke says we. must distinguish 
. between the 'dissolution ofýsociety and the 
dissolution of government.. "The usual, and,., 
r 
11 
almost only way whereby this union is dissoly- 
edl is the inroad of.. foreign force making a 
conquest over , 
them. " But., the vital words in 
the passage from which this quotation is taken 
are : -"Where the society-is dissolved, the 
government cannot remain, " We cannot logically 
deduce from this statement that where the govern- 
ment is dissolved the society cannot remain. 
The real meaning of this passage seems to be 
that conquest alone deprives a people from 
(1) Ritchiel-Darwin and Hegel, p. 219. 
(2) Second Treatise, 9211. Cited by Ritchie. 
ý. 
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exercising its inherent right and-power to 
determine its own form of government. A con- 
quered people is reduced to an aggregate of 
individuals, each individual'being by force 
subjected to "a foreign jurisdiction., The 
power "Ito incorporate -`and . act , as one 
body, and 
so be one ' distinct comnmonwealth"is taken from 
. 
them. Locke was endeavouring to, show that, 
resistance by the'people, against their govern- 
ment for breach of contract need not have the 
anarchic consequences which follow from the °' "' 
"conquerors' swords" which "mangle societies 
to pieces.! ' 
Nevertheless 
we believe that 
according to Locke's scheme any dissolution 
of government must involve the dissolution of 
political society. 
Even if society does not lose its cohesiori 
and its sense of corporate unity when the govern- 
ment is dissolved, is-there any body which can 
actin the name of the people and-form one- . 
(1) Second, Treatis 6211. 
(2) Ibid.,,, ;.. 
I 
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party in a pactum subjectionis with a new 
government ? We have already 'suggested that 
one might be inferred. But Locke definitely. 
states that the pactum unionis is "all the, 
compact that iss or needs be, between the 
individuals that enter into or make up a 
0 
commonwealth. " In the next place, he says 
that the dissolution of government puts men 
back into a'state of nature. He states thin 
both explicitly and implicitly. A man "can- 
never be again in the, liberty, of the-state of 
nature, unless by any calamity the government 
Q he was under comes to be dissolved. " 
-"It is in their legislative [i. e. their 
government] that the members of a common- 
wealth are united and combined together into one coherent living body... and there- 
fore when the legislative is broken, or 
dissolved, dissolution and death follows. " 
For the essence and union of the society 
consisting in having one will, the legis- 
when once. established by the maj- 
ority, has the declaring and, as it were, 
keeping of that will. "© 
When the legislative id dissolved, the people 
(1) Second Treatise, &9940 :. 
(2) Ibid., 121. 
(3) - Ibid. , 3212. 
. 
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"come again to be out of subjection and may 
constitute to themselves a new legislative, 
as they think best... Every one is at the 
disposure of his own 'will. " 
0 This last sen-'-'', I 
tence means that the dissolution of govern- 
ment puts men back into a state, of nature j- :,, 
for it is only in that 'state that men have 
the disposure of their own-wills. 
We shall see'that it is only when'the 
' constitution has been altered by the govern- 
ment itself that-the people have, the right to 
rebel. And it is in this connection that 
a proper understanding of the effect of the 
dissolution of government on society becomes 
so exceedingly important, for the effect de- 
termines whether resistance is to come from 
individuals or from some- authorised represen- 
(1) Second Treatise, S212. 
(2) Tindal, Locke's disciple took this view. 
Cf. his Essay concerning obedience to the sup- 
reme powers and the duty of subjects in all 
revolutidns. (1694) S. T. Wm. III, ii P. 431-461., _1111- For a Tory interpretation, see Leslie's 
Rehearsal, No. 38 (1705). He understood Locke 
to say that when government id dissolved, "the 
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tative body. Since resistance. can be. exer- 
cised only after the government is dissolved, 
and since this dissolution involves the diss- 
olution of society, it follows that resistance 
can come only from. individuals. This fact is 
further brought-out by a consideration of the 
causes of a dissolution. 
Before we can ascertain, says Locke, 
whether a legislative is dissolved or not, 
we must know the form of government so that 
we may "know at whose door to lay" the blame 
for misuse of power. 
"Let us suppose, then, the legislative 
placed in the concurrence of three distinct 
persons :- First, a single hereditary 
person having the constant, supreme, 
executive power and with it the power of 
convoking and dissolving the other two 
within certain periods of time. Secondly I 
an assembly of hereditary nobility. Thirdly, 
an assembly of representatives chosen, pro 
-tempore, by the people. " C 
Locke gives five ways in which the constitution 
may be altered :- (1) If, the prince sets him- 
self above the laws©(2), If he hinders the 
(1) Second Treatise, &. 213.. 
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meeting of parliament. (3) If he interferes 
with elections. '(4) If he pr parliament sub- 
ject the nation to a foreign power. (5) If 
the prince neglects his post so that law 
`. ý cannot be administered. A dissolutiont`there- 
fore, can'be effected only by the king. - In 
each of the five cases he must be responsible, 
and only in one case may he have a partner 
in his guilt. 
"The other parts of the legislative [the 
two Houses]... can never, in opposition to 
him or without his concurrences alter the. 
legislative by law, his consent being 
necessary to give any of their decrees that 
sanction. But yet so far as the other parts 
of the legislative any way contribute to 
any attempt upon the government, and do 
either promote or not, what lies in them, 
hinder such designs, they are guilty. " (D 
The effect which this passage has on the sovereig- 
nty of parliament will be considered later. What 
concerns us here is the fact that the government 
cannot be dissolved without the action of the king. 
When the dissolution occurs, the king must be 
responsible, Locke does not specifically mention 
(1) Second Treatise, ýý214-219.7. "4 




resistance to the king but he necessarily 
infers its and the references to James II 
are too obvious to require comment. Resistance 
must come from individuals. Locke does not 
provide any constituent body which may resist 
the king in attempts to dissolve the govern- 
me4t. Of the fivd ways given above in which 
the government may be. dissolved, four are 
executive acts. Only in the fourth can the 
" two Houses participate in its destruction. Even 
in that case they are guilty only of abetting 
the king and the final responsibility rests 
with him. When we come to consider parliament, ' 
we shall see that political theorists could` 
not evolve a constitutional plan whereby the 
king could be controlled. The only remedy 
against unconstitutional acts of the king was 
popular resistance. It is clear that Locke did 
not worry about whether the five cases followed 
necessarily and logically for his scheme of 
contractual government. It is obvious that he, 
selected the five main charges against James 
and, taking these particular cases he general- 
a 
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ised about, them. He was thus able to justify 
the claim made at the Revolution that the 
government had been dissolved by the king by 
his breaking of the original contract. 
This was in keeping with a considerable 
body of opinion at the Revolution. The con- 
clusion drawn from the theory of the dissol- 
ution of the government by the king' ryas that 
when the constitution is. altered the people 
have a right to resist those responsible for, 
, 
this state of affairs. Since the government 
4 
is technically dissolved, the people may set 
up a new government as they think fit. 
0 
This 
(1) A letter to a friend... how to free the 
natio n from slavery for ever. Jan., 1689) 
Som. T., x, p. 195. See Appendix I, Note 26. 
Good advice before it be too late. 
Som. T., x pp. 199,201. 
th i A word e gov- ng to the wise for settl 
ernment. S. T. Wm. III, i, i277* See Appendix It 
Note 27. 
Locke, Second Treatise, 9 222. See Appendix 
I, Note 28. 
A debate upon the qujy, etc. S. T. Wm. III, 
i, p. 234. 
= Swift 
(1 08) 
Sentiments of a Church o- f -England See A endi W 1 I i k iii man. 7 pp n, or s, ., , , p. 7 x Note 29. 
Defoe, A speech without doors. (1710) p. 12. 
II. ii. 66 
theory applied to the English constitution 
as early as January, 1689, was as follows: - 
"All power is... formally in the parlia- 
ment, which is one corporation made up 
of three constituent parts, king lords, 
and commons ; so it was with us 
In England. 
. 
When this corporation is broken, when any 
one essentiating part is lost or gone, 
there is a dissolution of the corporation. 
The formal seat of that power devolves on 
the people. When it is impossible to have 
a parliament, the power returns to them 
with whom it was originally. is it possible 
to have a parliament 7 It is not possible. 
The government, therefore, is dissolved. " 
(1) A letter to a friend... how to free the 
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III : The sovereignty of the people. 
In the first section of this chapter we con- 
sidered the origin of government;. in the 
second section we considered the formation 
and dissolution of government. This section 
. will 
deal with the permänent foundation of 
government, namely, the sovereignty of the 
people, which has, as a corollary, the right 
of resistance. 
A right, of resistance does not necessarily 
follow from the popular origin of government. 
0 
The power might come originally from the people, 
but if the power was alienated irrevocably, then 
no resistance could be justified. Adherents to 
the doctrine of resistance, therefore, made the 
people perpetual sovereign. All power was held 
to be fundamentally in'the people, but formally 
(1) A letter to a friend occasion'd by the 
contest between the Bishop of Exeter and i! r 




in the government. 
"There is a supreme power in every com- 
munity essential to it and inseparable 
. 
from it... which when the safety and peace 
of the publick necessarily requires it, 
can supply the defects and re-establish 
the true fundamentals of the government, 
by purging, refining and bringing things 
back to their first original. " 
This supreme power in the community is to be 
distinguished from the Tory conception of a 
68 
supreme power in a state. It is not a legally 
constituted authority but a power founded on 
the law of nature which the people inherently 
} 
possess. IL is a power to be used only in an 
emergency. 
"There can be but one supreme power" said 
Locke "which is the legislative... yet the 
legislative being only a fiduciary power 
to act for certain ends, there remains 
still in the people a supreme power to 
remove or alter the legislative, when they 
find the legislative act contrary to the 
(1) ! letter to a friend, etc. (1689) Som. T., 
x, p. 196. 
Swift, A discourse of the contests andT 
dissentions, etc. (1701) 4a-Lýý 
See Appendix I, Note 31. 
(2) Some short considerations relating to the 





trust reposed in them. " . And thus the 
community perpetually retains a supreme 
power of saving themselves from the 
attempts and designs of anybody even 
of their legislators, whenever 
they 
shall be so foolish or so wicked as to 
lay and carry on designs against the 
liberties of the subject... The community 
may be said in this respect to be always 
the supreme power, but not as considered 
under any form of government, because 
this power of the people can never take 
place till the government be dissolved. " 6) 
69 
Government was thus regarded as a trustee. It 
was a common assertion in pamphlets that the 
, 
government was a trustee for the exercise of 
the people's sovereignty. Opponents of this 
position argued that resistance did not 
logically follow. "When I trust a man with my 
life, or fortune, all men agree that I put it in 
his power to deprive me of both: for to deliver 
any property to another, with a power of revoc- " 
ation is to trust him (as we say) no further 
than we can see him. " A favourite argument 
(1) Second Treatise, S 149. 
(2) Vindiciae juris regne p. 6. Cited in 
Tyrrell, Bibliotheca politlca, p. 109. 
0 
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against this view was that when a man puts 
himself into the hands of a physician, he 
still retains the right to judge whether he 
is being given poison or a purge. 
0 
Hoadly, as we shall see, was regarded 
as the chief exponent of the doctrine of 
resistance in Anne's reign. He was an unsys- 
tematic thinker and he borrowed largely from, '- 
Locke without digesting his material. He 
accepted the original contract, but he did 
not make it the foundation of his political 
thought. He based his theory on the trustee- 
ship of government, and arguing on that basis 
he did not trouble to be precise on either the 
sovereignty of the people or the sovereignty 
of a government. He did not make it clear 48 
whether he regarded the people's supervision of 
civil authority as supervision of power which they , 
had delegated. Hoadly confused the issue by 
the emphasis which he laid on the words of 
Paul that the king was God's minister. 'for 
good'. 
(3) He made the king responsible to the 




(-17ö8) in Works t iii, P" 70" 
(2) Cf. below, p. 141. 
ý; 
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people for a breach of trusteeship to God. 
If the king failed to-be the minister of 
God for good, he forfeited God's protection 
and the people were justified in rebelling 
against him. This was the mediaeval theory 
that when a king degenerates into a tyrant 
he may be resisted, although his regal 
authority was from God and not from the people. 
Hoadly was not primarily concerned with where the 
king's power came from. He was satisfied that 
the fundamental law of nature was self-pre- 
aervation, and that this right must take 
precedence over all others. There can be no 
higher law than this. "It is stupid nonsense " 
he said, "to say that any resistance is 
lawful to what is called the supreme civil 
0 
power. " There cannot be a supreme over a sup- 
reme. An officer is only superior in so far 
as his commission allows him. Outside that 
he is no greater than anybody else. "So that 
the right of self-defence remains in private 
men as much against one, who is in some respects 
(1) Original and institution of civil govern- 
menty etc. (1710 in oxka, ii, p. 203. 
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a superior, as against one who is in some 
respects an inferior : how much more in the 
whole body politic, against all attempts to 
ruin it, tho' coming from those, rho are, in 
other respects, superior to it, viz. as far 
as their commission, founded upon the will 
of God, makes them so ? Now to argue from 
any person's being, by title, supreme, against 
equality in any respect, is to abuse the 
reader with words. " Hoadly continued : "This, 
is the thing to be proved, that the title 
supreme or superior to all, given to any 
governor, signifies any more than a superiority, 
as far as the ends of his office require it. " 
It does not make a servant his master's 
master or subjects rulers to allow them a 
right to judge of the commands of their ruler 
and to refuse obedience to those which they 
themselves judge to be unlawful. 
0 
Though Locke and Hoadly differed in details". 
and the emphasis they laid on certain pointer 
(1) Ibid., pp. 203-204. 
I 
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they were agreed on the fiduciary character 
of government, involving resistance to the 
government if the trust is abused. We have 
seen that according to Lockets theory resis- 
tance must come from individuals. Hoadly took 
the same, view. 
0 
But most writers, when they 
claimed the right of the people to resist, 
did not define what they meant by 'people 
' 
Some implied that the individual, acting in 
his private capacity, had the right to, resist 
Others implied that resistance could come 
only from inferior magistrates ox the injured 
part of the constitution. 
The right of the people to judge when 
they were injured was severely criticised by 
the advocates of non-resistance. Bishop 
(1) Resistance at the Revolution said Hoadly, 
was by men acting "in their private capacity. " - 
Some considerations humbly offered to the..,. 
Bishop of Exeter. (1709) in Works, "ji, p. 137. 
(2) For Defoe's definition, see Appendix I9 Note 32. 
(3) "Who shall be judge of the actions of sov- 
ereigns? " asked a pamphleteer. He replied that 
it was each person individually. See The crit- 
erion, or touchstone, etc. (1710) p. 11. 
(4) See Appendix Iq Note 33" 
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I 
Berkeley said : 
"Since the prospects men form to`them- 
selves of a country's public good are 
commonly as various, as its landscapes, 
" . which meet 
the eye in several situations: 
it clearly follows that to make the 
public good the rule of obedience iss in 
effect, not to establish any determinate, 
agreed, common measure of loyalty but 
to leave every subject to the guidance of 
his own particular mutable fancy. " 0 
This was the bugbear raised by all non-resist- 
ance theorists. To a certain extent they were 
justified, but. they falsified the Whig posit-"t 
ion by accusing the resistance theorists of 
leaving the determination of when resistance 
should-take place to the capricious will of 
the people. It is true that writers like 
Defoe and Hoadly often laid down in a single 
work the bare rule that self-defence justifies 
resistance. 'But, when their philosophy is 
(1) Passive obedience, etc. (1712) in Works 
(ed. A. C. Fraser), ivy p. 114. 
Cf. Leslie, attacking the thesis that 
individuals have the right to judge of injury, 
said ý""This means that you have power and 
authority tq serve the queen as you served her 
father and grandfather. But you will say that 
is only if she does the like as they did. And 
I say to you, that you make yourself judge of 
that. " - The good old cause further discussed. 
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gathered from all their writings, it will 
be found that 'governing for the common 
good' means governing by law, and 'self- 
defence' 
means 
resistance to persistent 
arbitrary rule. -The resistance theorists 
made it clear that resistance to legal govern- 
ment could not be justified© Nor. could , resistance 
to isolated cases of arbitrary rule be jus-,., 
tified. Arbitrary rule must-be so'persistent 
as to constitute a new, and therefore illegal, 
form of government. Although Locke defined.. 
political power as a power-at the utmost 
bounds limited to the public good© he did not 
allow a right in the people to resist on the 
doubtful grounds thatthe government had over- 
stepped its commission. He made it clear that 
(1) One of Hoadly's definitions of self-defence 
is as follows : "Self-defence is not a pretence 
to a government over those against whom it 
defends itself : but only to the right of pre- 
serving itself, and its privileges, against 
those who have no right to invadý-. -, or destroy 
them. " - The original and institution of civil 
government, etc. 1710 in Works, ii, p. 204. R, _e" 
(2) See below, p. 294. 
(3) Second Treatise, ýý 3 and l35 
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the dormant sovereignty of the people could 
never be exercised as long as the government 
subeisted. 
0 Resistance to James II was always 
justified on the grounds that he had dissol- 
ved the government first and thus absolved 
his subjects from their oath of allegiance 
before they resisted him. It would be impos- 
sible to speak of legal resistance. But all 
resistance must be non-illegal. ' Thus resis- 
tance may begin only when the law ceases. 
Although the right of resistance was thus' 
hedged about-with these limitations, which 
to a certain extent answered the Tory charges 
that the doctrine. was anarchic, nevertheless 
these limitations could not be so clearly 
defined as to give an unmistakable guide as 0 
to when the doctrine should be put into oper- 
ation. To what-lengths exactly had the king to 
go towards irresponsible arbitrary rule before 
obedience should give way to rebellion? The 
test was the dissolutio. of government. But how 
were the people to know that the government was 
(1) Second Treatise, %S 149 and 243. 
4°ý. 
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dissolved ? If the-'nation were reduced to 
a state of anarchy, it would be apparent to 
everybody-that the government was overthrown. 
It is certain that Locke and other writers 
of his way of thinking regarded resistance 
as the legitimate method of preventing this 
state of affairs. It was the boast of the 
Whigs that nothing was altered by them at the 
Revolution and that the constitution was merely 
preserved from destruction., 
DThe 
charge against 
James II was not that he had destroyed the 
constitution but that he had endeavoured to. 
subvert it. If government had totally dis- 
appearedl there would have been nothing for 
the people to resist., Locke had the facts of 
the Revolution clearly in his mind. By dis- 
solution of government he did ,. not mean the 
total abolition of all authority but the 
alteration of the frame of government which 
was a technical dissolution. The government 
remained, but it was not the same government 
(1) Jekyll at the Sacheverell Trial. See 
Appendix I1 Note 34. 
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as the people had set up when the original 
contract was made. And for that reason the 
people may, act as if they were in a state of 
nature and may use force to bring the govern- 
ment back to. its original form. Not only the 
alteration, but the attempt, to make the alter- 
ation may be resisted. The people have a right 
to preserve the institution which they have., 
set up and "the state of mankind is not so 
miserable that-they are not capable of uding\- 
this remedy till it be too late to look for 
San 
"To tell a people they may provide for 
themselves by erecting a new legislative 
when, by oppression, artifice, or being 
delivered over to a foreign power, their 
old one is gone, is only to tell them 
they may expect relief when it is too late, 
and the. evil is past cure. This is in 
effect, no more than to bid them first be 
slaves, and then tell them to\take care of 
their liberty, and, when their chains are 
on, tell them they may act like free men. 
This, if barely so, is rather mockery than 
relief, and men can never be secure from 
tyranny if there be no means to escape it 
till they are perfectly under it ; and 
therefore, it is that they have not only 
a right-to get out of it, but to prevent 
it. 't 0 
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This is one of the few passages in the 
Second Treatise where Locke ceases to be 
the philosopher and becomes the impassioned 
partisan of the Revolution. When he gave the 
five ways 1n which the government might be 
dissolved, and for which resistance alone 
could be justified, there was no. obvious 
connection between them and tyranny. The five 
acts might be unconstitutional, that iss for 
Locke, contrary to the original contract, but 
they need not be tyrannical. But now in this 
passage Locke equates tyranny with dissolution 
of government. Although his dissolution of 
government might be difficult to-perceive in 
practice, yet in theory-it was a clear guide. 
But tyranny is. an elastic term and a man's 
view of what constitutes, tyran y might vary l 
as Berkeley said, like different men's con- 
ceptions of the same landscape. -What was 
tyranny and what degree of tyranny justified 
resistance ? The resistance doctrinaires 
could give no complete answer. 
(1) Cf. the Whig case at the Sacheverell Trial,,,, 
_. below, chap. 31 sect. 29§31 land Appendix 
Note 35. < ': . 
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The only safeguard they could offer 
80 
against the anarchic tendency of the doc- 
trine was that subjects would not rebel un- 
til:: there was such a pressing necessity 
that success was assured. Spinoza had allow- 
ed resistance in one case only and that was 
where a rebellion was successful. Justice 
could be founded only on success. Rebels 
failing to upset the government or to estab- 
lish a new one ought rightly to be treated 
as traitors. Spinoza-was equating might 
with right. If a few, without right but by 
physical strength, upset the government, this, 
according to the Whigs would constitute 
rebellion. They ought to be treated as 
traitors. If a few, with right on their side, 
failed and were punished, their punishment 
would be unjust. But the Whig inference was 
that if only a few rebelled then they could 
not have had right on their side. Success 
could only be assured and justified when the 
majority of the nation rebelled. The assumpt- 
ion was that a whole people would never rebel 
ILT 
'(l) Chuse which you please, etc (1710), p. 5. 
See Appendix II Note, 36. 
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until it had right on its side. The recog- 
nition that the government is"dissolved 
must be so universal as to be beyond doubt. 
"He that appeals to Heaven, " said Locke, 
"must be sure he has right on his side, 
and a right, too$ that is worth the 
trouble and cost of the appeal, as he will 
answer at a tribunal that cannot be de- 
ceived, and will be sure to retribute to 
every one according to the mischiefs he 
hath created to his fellow-subjects - that 
is any part of mankind. " 
An anonymous writer in 1710, using the same 
argümerit, concluded his exposition of the 
doctrine of resistance with these words : 
"This scheme then is so far from rendring 
the prince unsafe on his throne, that it 
has a direct tendency to the contrary 
because he has his safety always in his 
own power ; he has nothing to do but to., 
pursue the public good (the end for which 
he possesseth that post) and it is im- 
possible for any rebellious attempts ever 
to succeed. " 
(1) Second Treatise, 9 176. 
(2) The criterion, or touchstone, etc., p. 12. 
\ý 
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We haves in this chapter, attempted to 
outline the pure philosophy of the doctrine 
of resistance. Out of a heterogeneous mass 
of often conflicting evidence, we have 
endeavoured to extract what is most repre- 
sentative of all the advocates of the right 
of resistance. The full meaning of the doe- 
trine and its implications can be understood''' 
only in relation to the actual political and 
constitutional events and problems of the 
Revolution and of the twenty-five years there-111 
after, usually known as the period of the 
Revolution Settlement. In the following chap- 
ters we shall deal with the history and 




The history of the doctrines of resistance and 
non-resistance from 1688 to 1714. 




Section I: 1688 - 1709 "-- 
I The Convention 
James II, by his flight and by his throwing 
of the Great Seal into the Thame. s, showed 
plainly that he wished to bring all govern-, 
ment to a standstille There was no formal 
act of abdication; for, indeed, King James 
had no intention of resigning his throne. 
Whatever James's intentions might be, however, 
one fact was clear, viz. that England-could 
not long subsist without a government. In 
Face of this crisis, the leading statesmen 
acted as they were bound to do, and, with the 
concurrence of Williams summoned a Convention 
(1) "I am very confident, if the king had not 
again withdrawn himself, the Peers would have 
sent to him before they had made any address to 
the Prince; but what can the most loyal and 
dutiful body in the world do without a head. " 
.- Lord Rochester to Lord Dartmouth, 25th. Dec., '. 1688. (Hisl*. 
-MSS. -Comm. 
Dartmouth NSS., vol. 3, ... 15th Rep., App. pt. 1.9 p. 141. ) 
See also, 
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which duly met on January 22nd., 1688/9. 
On January 28th., the lower house passed 
the following resolution ( drawn up by Somers ): 
"That King James the Second, having 
endeavoured to subvert the Constitution 
of the Kingdom, by breaking the original 
contract between king and people, and by 
the advice of Jesuits and other wicked 
persons, having violated the fundamental 
laws, and having withdrawn himself out of 
this Kingdom, had abdicated the govern- 
ment, and that the throne is thereby 
vacant. " 0 
Without much debate, both houses accepted the 
position that James was no longer acting 
governor. The upper house wished at first to 
accept this position as final and held that in 
the absence of James, the administration 
should be undertaken by a regent. The regency 
plan, having been defeated by a narrow major- 
ity, the Lords carne into line with the Commons 
(1) Burnet had published by authority in Dec- 
ember, 1688, An enquiry into the present state of 
affairs. He was not known as the author. A 
pamphleteer wrote : "The author of the Enqu! 17 
into the present state of affairs_, etc., for 
whose judgment the Commons seem to have a very 
great regard, as appears from their concurrence 
with him: for their most considerable "Votes are, 
from his 11th. paragraph... " - The desertion 
discussed, etc. S. T. Wm. III, il p. 110. - 
(2) By 51 to 49 votes. Journal of the House of 
Lord 
See Appendix S1 Note 38. 
4 
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I 
who had resolved that James was no longer 
king. At first there was a difference between 
the houses over the appropriate term to apply 
to James's flight. The Commons chose 
'abdication'; the Lords preferred to call it 
'desertion'. There was more in the significance 
of the terms than was generally realised at 
the time. 'Desertion' did not carry with it, 
the implication of guilt. A perfectly innocent 
man might run away when finding himself sur- 
rounded by enemies or lukewarm friends. But 
abdication implied that James had, by his 
mal-administration, been abdicated of his 
office of king. 
The Lordsq finding that-the Commons were 
determined to retain their expression, con- , 
curred. The real divergence of opinion in the 
Convention was over the conclusion to be 
(1) A committee of the lower house reported 
that it disagreed to the word 'deserted': 
"because the word 'deserted' does not express 
their meaning so fully, it importing no more 
than a 'removing' which is expressed by the 
word 'withdrawing' in the sentence before; 
therefore they conceive the word 'abdicated' 
a more proper words importing 'a renouncing 
of the crown"' - Grey's Debates, ix, p. 49. 
See Appendix I, Note ; 39,, 
I 
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drawn from the premiss. that James had 
87 
abdicated. The conclusion 'that the throne 
was thereby vacant' reached by the Commons 
was carried unanimously. But when-the Lords 
proposed an amendment to it, there was a 
division in the lower house when the vote was 
taken whether-or not the Lords' amendment 
should be accepted 
In the debates in the Commons, "two inter-, 
pretations of the vacancy were offered. Firstly, - 
the throne might be vacant only as to James. 
Secondly, it might be vacant absolutely. The 
Lords accepted, the former alternative. Dolben, 
(1) House of Commons Journal, Jan. 28,1688/9. 
(2) On 31 Jan. the Lords voted by 52 to 47 
votes that the throne was not vacant. 
(3) The resolution to agree to the Lords' 
/ 
amendment was defeated on 5 Feb. br 282 to 
151 votes. - Journal of the House of Commons: 
Grey's Debates, ix, p. 65. This shows the 
strengthening of the conservative party, for 
the resolution had passed in the negative on_. 
2 Feb., nem. con. - Grey's Debates ix p. 49. 
On 6 Feb. the Lords accepted the Commons' 
resolution that the throne was vacant by 65 
to 46 votes. "Thus ended the first round of 
the Revolution struggle, apparently in a 
shattering defeat for Tory conviction. " - Feiling., History of the Tory_ party, p. 254. 
III. 1.1. 
who spoke first in the Commons' debate, 
objected that the. -Lords were 
illogical in 
. 
accepting the premiss that the throne was. 
88 
vacant and refusing to accept the conclusion 
that it was vacant absolutely. He said: 
"I tell you freely my opinion, that the king 
is demised, and, that James the Second is not 
O 
King of England. " The emphasis which he laid 
on the word 'demise' implied no more than that 
the crown was vacant as to-James-only. Pollexfen 
pointed this out. He demurred at the word 
'demise'. He believed that there was a dif- 
ference between 'demise' and 'vacancy'. on 
the demise of James, the crown would be . full by 
succession Sir Thomas Clarges accepted the 
first alternative ý maintaining that to say that -" 
the throne was vacant meant that "we have power 
to fill it, and make it from a successive. mon-' 
archy an elective. " Finch, too, was ranged on 
(1) Grey's Debates, ixe p. 7. 
(2) Ibid., pl. 20. 
(3) Ibid., p. 
See also Appendix 1, Note 40'. _-' 
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this side. The throne, he argued, was 
vacant as to James only, which meant that it 
was not now vacant at all. In point' of fact 
'demised', ! abdicated' and 'deserted' all 
meant the same thing, he said, viz. that 
James was no longer king., : It meant nothing 
more. King James, by his mal-administrations 
could lose no more'than his personal exercise 
of the government. He could not lose. his 
inheritance. j'Sir Joseph Tredenham voiced 
his doubts: "I agree", he saidi "that the 
throne is vacant; we have no such thing in 
our government as an interregnum, and so no 
© 
entire vacancy*" Sir Robert Sawyer, too, 
maintained that "there is a great difference 
(1) Grey's Debates, ix, p. 18. 
Cf. Burke. Defending the Revolution, he wrote: 
"Though a king may abdicate for his own person, 
he cannot abdicate for the monarchy. " - 
Reflections on the Revolution in France in 
Works, iii p. 294. 
(2) The fact, nevertheless, is that all 
indictments between 11 December and 13 February, ,.. ran 'contra pacem regni' and not 'contra 
pacem domini regis'. This was noted by the author 
of A letter from a lawyer in the country, etc. 
Som. T., x, p. 177, and by Johnson An argument 
pr v ngg etc. in Works (1710), P. L68. 
(3) Grey's Debates, ix, p., 50. 
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between the, throne being vacant by äbdic ation 
and dissolution of the government. The vacancy 
makes no dissolution of the government neither 
O 
in our law, or in any other. " He suggested that 
the relinquishing of the possession of the 
throne was sufficient to make an abdication. He 
'implied that James had, not thereby lost his 
, inheritance 
There was considerable apprehension lest. 




'Polish monarchy'. Complete "'- 
vacancyq for many, implied election. To a 
certain e xtentq they were justified in this 
fear. It is true that the offering of the crown 
to William meant the electing of William. But 
that did 'not make the crown elective, provided 
that the throne was hereditary in the children 
of William and Mary. The single elections how- 
4 
ever, would" in itself be a breach in the 
accepted rule of legal succession 
! D- 
(1) Grey's Debates, ix, p. 21. 
(2) Ibid., p. 22. ,.. _. 
(3) Cf. Mackintosh, VindiciNib Gallic äý. See 
Appendix I Note 41. -7 
Cf. also Appendix I, Note 71. 
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It is quite clear that,,, if the throne 
was vacant absolutely, there could be no 
hereditary successor to it. The throne could 
be filled only by election. But grant that. the 
vacancy was relative only to James, then it, I 
follows that a*hereditary successor to James 
would automatically fill the throne. This, of 
course, raised the question in theýConvention: 
Did such a successor exist? There were supporters 
for both affirmative` and negative answers. ' 
Firstly, for the former it was argued that 
James could abdicate for himself only and 
could not prejudice the right of his heirs. 
"No act of King James", said Ettrick, "can 
destroy the succession of his heirs. If the throne 
" be vacant, the allegiance is due of right where 
e) 
the' succession belongs. " Clarges-. said: "By 
this vacancy, I understand only that the king has 
abdicated for himself, and divested himself of 
the right of government, and that the govern- 
ment comes to the next Protestant heir in 
succession (I explain myself) to the Princess 
(1) Grey's Debates, ixe pp., 54-55. 
SS 
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of Orange.. " It will be noticed that Clarges 
limited his successor: to one of the Protes- 
tent faith. Maynard gave it as his legal 
opinion that a papist was not incapable of 
occupying the throne© Clarges , of course, was 
trying to surmount the legal obstacle of the 
succession of the infant James. The young 
prince, however, was not a 'formidable barrier. 
He was generally held to be an impostor. On the 
" other hand, Sir Righard Temple regarded the 
young prince as an insuperable barrier to the 
admission of an hereditary successor to James II. 
'"You have a pretended brat beyone sea, " he said, 
"whom you cannot'set aside. " 
(D The existence of 
James, it must be admitted, presented noý 
immediate difficulty. It did not require much 
stretching of the conscience to lay aside his 
legal claim. It must be noted, too, that those 
who argued for a legal successor were arguing` ''p 
for the principle, and were not advocates (as a 
rule) for any specific claimant. Usually, in 
fact, no claimant was mentioned. Sir Richard 
Temple thought, no doubt, that he had got home 
(1) Grey's Debates, ixe p., 55" 
(2) Ibid., p. 17. (3) Ibid., p. 62. 
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a good thrust when he asked the house if 
there was a successor to James and if, there- 
fore, the throne was full. "Is it full ? 
Then the Lords would have seen it and not 
put the government into other hands. " 
0 
To the 
unwary, this was a good dialectic thrust. - But 
his query-could not overthrow the contention 
for hereditary succession. The fact that the 
Lords had asked William to undertake a pro- 
visional government might and didl. in fact, mean 
that while the identity of the heir was un- 
certain, some government was essential. It 
did not mean that no heir existed. "It does 
not matter whether we can name the heir or 
not, the heir must, be there somewhere. So 
we can say the throne is full. " "I think it 
sufficient to show that there tire heirs who 
are to take the lineal succession, though we 
do not, or cannot positively name the particular 
person... It is sufficient to prevent the 
vacancy that there is an heir-or successor, 
(1) Grey's Debates, ix, p. 61. 
i, zý ,. 
0 
III. i. 1.94 
0 let him be whom you will. " 
Secondly, Serjeant Maynard was of opinion 
thattJames could have no legal hereditary 
successor. When he spoke of the throne being ,' 
vacant, he did not thereby mean that the throne 
was 'vacant in perpetuity'. Vacancy, never- 
theless, implied more than vacancy as to 
James, not because James, by his abdication, ' 
could prejudice the right of his, heirs, but 
because James had no heirs to prejudice. "Nemo 
est haeres viventis", he said. 
1 
Colonel Birch 
supported this plea. 
3 
(1) Speech of Earl of Pembroke. Parl. Hist., 
V9 90. 
(2) Grey's Debates, ixe p. 5?. 
(3) Ibid.., p. 59. Cf. "If a king dies he hath 
a successor, and the right devolves on him; but 
the king lives he hath no successor. " - Good 
advice before it be too late. Som. T., xq p. 199. 
Cf. also : "King James the Second being 
alive, to call it a demise of the king is a con-_ 
tradiction. " The power is not in James, "nor is 
it in any other person: therefore it is in the 
power'of the people to settle it. If any can say 
it is in any other person, let him assign that 
person, which he can't, because there can be no 
claim by descent during his life: for non est 
haeres viventis, there must be the death of the 
ancestor before the heir can claim any right. " - 
Four questions debated. S. T. Wm. III, il p. 165. 
The same argument was used by Ferguson in 
A brief justification, etc. S. T. Wm. III, il p. 145. 
Cf. also Obedience due to the present king, 
etc. Som. T., x, p. 298. 
J 
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I 
The fact is that Maynard was treating 
, 
the kingship like a private inheritance. If 
James, by being alive, had no heir-in law, 
then it followed that the kingship must still 
reside in James; or if James had-lost his 
kingship, then it did not matter whether-he 
had an heir or not, for then there was no 
inheritance for that heir to succeed to. May- 
nard, by clinging to the maxim 'non est haeres 
viventis',, was tacitly admitting that James 
still retained the kingship. He had no intention 
of making any such admission. Nevertheless, 
I 
he made kingship inseparable from the person 
(1) Cf. "If it be said, non est haeres viventis, 
and so no regular descent, I answer, first, this 
rule relates nat to the descent of the crown, but 
to private estates; for the descent of the crown 
is not, nor can be order'd in all things-by the " 
same rules as private patrimonies, seeing it is an 
estate join'd with an authority or office. Secondly, 
the sessor of a king from-his government is really 
a demise, and will in', law make a degree of descent.. 
Thirdly, where a king in his lifetime resigns 
his government (and the same may be said in the 
case of abdication) his next heir thereupon 
succeeding may doubtless properly be. said to 
inherit, that iss to take as heir, notwithstand- 
ing his ancestor be still in life: for he conveys 
a title to himself by heirship and without that 
he can have no more right to succeed than 
another man. " - Some considerations touching 
succession and allegiance. S. T. Wm. III, i. pp. 337-8. 
J 
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of tfte king. Thus James would be de jure king, 
but, having abdicated, he could not exercise 
his kingship ; and, having. no heir, he'could 
not transmit that authority. Some other person 
had to found to exercise the functions of king- 
ship. And the inference is that that person 
would be king only de facto. But if kingship 
was an office, James-could be dead in his offi- 
cial capacity and have an official heirceven if, 
being alive, he could not have a private heir. 
0 
Finch expressed this view. "I hear it said 
'nemo est haeres viventis'. There are civil 
deaths as well as natural. If the throne be 
vacant as to King James III then he is civilly 
dead, or else it is in the power of any king, 
by his abdication, to destroy the succession. "® 
Finch was willing to allow that James had lost. 
his personal right to rule. "By breaking the 
(1) See below chap. 5. 
(2) Grey's Debates, ix, p. 61. Sir Robert 
Sawyer had taken the same view. "When he 
renounced the civil administration of the 
government, there is a civil death, as well as 
a natural ; though living,, yet in effect dead. " 
Ibid., ixe p. 57. 
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original contract with the people, "" he said, 
"he has made the throne void as to himself. " 
But, by granting that James had an official 
heir to the throne, "he restricted the power 
of the Convention to the mere declaration of 
who was by law heir. Maynard likewise admitted 
hereditary succession, but by his ingenious' 
maxim, he left to the Convention the choice`of 
the king. He, no doubt, saw the danger in 
admitting an heir in that it pointed to 
Mary as that heir and excluded vVilliaml although 
Burnet did not think the admission of an heir 
excluded him. 
From the foregoing analysis of the debates 
in the Convention, it should be apparent that 
the members did not regard the events of the 
HI interregnum as rebellion. No right of resistance 
(1) Grey's Debates, ixe p. 60. 
(2) Clarges"and Tredenham both pointed to 
Mary. ' 
(3). Burnet wrote: "Aid if the king ceases to 
be a king then the next heir becomes the only 
lawful ands rightful king; and if the next is a 
femme covert, then by the law of nations, which 
creates a communication of all the rights of the 
wife to the husband, this is likewise commun- 
icated, so that here we may have still a lawful 
and rightful king. " - An enquiry into the present' 
state of affairs (1688). S. T. WW. III, it p. 131. 
v 
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was claimed ; no right to depose a king was 
put forward 
® At the bare assertion on the 
part of the people to protect their constitution 
in church and state, the king had, of his own 
choice, elected to abdicate. The central 
thought of the members of the Convention is 
" summed up in these words of Sir George Treby s 
We have found-the throne vacant.. . We found 
it soy we have not made it so. " 
(1) Cf. below, pp. 109-111" 
(2), Greys. Debates, ixe p. 13. ß 
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II : Repeal of the oaths against resis- 
tance, and the new oath of allegiance. 
On March 252 1689, when leave was asked to 
bring in a bill to take away the Oaths of 
Allegiance and Supremacy, Sir Thomas Clarges 
complained: "If the oath be-taken away in the 
Corporation Act, 'that it isýnot lawful to resist 
the king' it implies you may resist him. " If 
there was any reply to this observation, it has 
not been recorded; but if Clarges' remark did 
not fall on deaf ears, then we may, assume that 
the bill, as ultimately passed, was open to the, -,, -, -.. 
interpretation-that it negatived the doctrine 
of non-resistance. But it is difficult to 
believe that the legislators intended to give 
,a statutory' sanction to the doctrine of resis- 
tance. While the Whigs believed that this was so© .' 
(1) Grey's Debates, ix, p. 111. 
(2) The repeal of the words referred to by 
Clarges was cited by Jekylli in the Sacheverell 
Trial to prove the contention that parliament 
after the Revolution renounced the. doctrine of 
non-resistance. S' 
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there were many Tories who regarded the bill 
as'in no way-recognising the right of resis- 
tance The bill was entitled the Oaths of 




recited the oaths of supremacy and allegiance '. 
as imposed by 1 Eliz. cap. I. Sand 
3 Jac. cap. 4. 
and the statute enacted: "That from hence- 
forth no person whatsoever shall be obliged 
to take the' s aid oaths or either of them, by, 
force or virtue of the said statutes ... and 
the said others themselves shall be and are 
(1) Harcourt opposing the interpretation of 
ýrv Jekyll in the Sacheverell Trial said: "I 
beseech your Lordships to Consider, whether 
the repeal. of this oath can have any weight --''may 
with your Lordships. 'Twas a general assertion, 
to which all the peers and commons, in the. 
employments I have mentioned, were to swear; 
there is no exception in the oath, but what is 
, 
implied in it. Was, not the proposition as true " 
before it was sworn as after? Was it there- 
fore true because 'was sworn, or was it sworn 
because 'twas true? Did the swearing it make 
it true, or the truth make it fit to be sworn? 
If it, was true when it was sworn, the proposit- 
ion was equally true before and since. " - S. T., 
xv, 210. 
(2) I Wm. ' & Mary, cap. -8. ', Printed ein part). in 
Dykes' Source book of constitutional history, 
PP; 103-5" °' ., 
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hereby repealed, 
6) 1 void. " The oath 
utterly abrogated and made 
101 
'That it is not lawful upon . 
any pretence whatsoever to take arms against 
the king' in 13 & 14 Carl. II9 cap. 
3 
and in 
13'& 14 Car.. II, cap. - 4 was repealed by sec- 
tion XI. The new oath was short and s imply',, 
worded... '. It is : 
"I9 A. B. do sincerely promise and swear 
that i will be faithful and bear true 
allegiance to-their Majesties King William 
and Queen Mary: so help me God. " 
There was also a second clause requiring the 
abjuration of the papal position that princes 
excommunicated by the pope'ma' be deposed or 
(1) The oath in I Eliz. cap. I, sec. ix is 
printed by Prothero', Select Statutes, p. 7. 
There is nothing in this oath which necessitated 
its repeal in. 1689. 
The oath in 3 Jac. I, , cap. 
4, sec. ix ('An 
act for the better discovering and repressing of 
popish recusants') is printed by Prothero, op, cit., 
p. 259. The oath contained the following expres- 
sions: "I, A. B., 'cdo.. truly and sincerely acknow- 
ledge... that our sovereign lord and king James 
. 
is lawful and rightful king of this realm. " The 
renunciation, in the oath, of the doctrine that* 
kings "may be deposed or murdered by their sub- 
jects" referred only to a king excommunicated by 
the pope. It had no bearing on the question of 
resistance in 1688, and it was, in any case, in- 
corporated in the new oath. 
(2) One of the chief props of the doctrine of 
non-resistance. See above, p. 30. 
. (3) Another of the props. See above, p. 31. 
ýý 
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murdered by their subjects. 
102 
The doctrine of 
resistance Shad always been associated, in the 
minds of Stewart royalists, with this popish 
doctrine. It may have been the intention of 
Parliament, therefore, to allay the fears of 
those who might reject the doctrine of the right 
of resistance as the justification of. the 
Revolution because of its popish association,. 
But this is unlikely for reasons which we shall 
presently discuss. 
It seems reasonable . 
to suppose that the repeal 
of the words 'That it is not lawful to resist the 
king' was not intended to give' a, statutory right 
of resistance. It was merely a necessary part of 
the procedure in simplifying the oath of alleg- 
iance: 
" 
An expression of. opinion on whether it was 
or was not lawful to resist the king were better .T 
not to be required. As we'shall see, the oath of 
allegiance was worded so that those who took it 
were not committed to any admission of the king's 
(1) In the debates Sir Henry, Capell said: "I 
would have no more oaths than are necessary to-. -ý 
support the government. "'--Grey's Debate 
p. 111.. Cf. -below, 'p. 225. , 
A 
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right. The oath was toa de facto 
, 
king and all 
01 - 
1. 
controversial points were avoided. . 
In the Bill of Rights, section IX enacted,: 
"That all and every person and persons that 
iss are, or shall be , reconciled to , or hold communion with, the see or church of Rome or 
shall profess the popish religion, or shall 
marry a papist, shall be, excluded and be for- 
ever incapable to inherit, possess or enjoy 
the crown, and in all and every such casd, or 
cases, the people of the realm shall be and 
are hereby absolved of their. allegiance. " 
Bishop Burnet was the author of this 'diffidatio' 
clause. Speaking of the bill, he said: "A clause 
was inserted'disabling, all papists from succeed- 
ing to the crown .... To, this I. proposed an addit- 
ional clause, absolving the subjects, in that case, 
from their allegiance. This was seconded by the 
Earl of Shrewsbury: and it passed without any 
opposition or debate: which amazed us all, 
considering the importance ' of it. " "This clause-in-- 
(1)_ This topic is treated at greaterlength, 
below, chap. 41 sect. 2.. 
(2) Dykes' Source book p. 111. 
It had been suggested in the Convention 
(see above; p. 92) that a Roman Catholic-king was 
incapable of holding the crown. Maynard, whose 
legal knowledge was not doubted assured the house 
that this was not so. (Grey's, ebates , ix . 17. ) Dolben had supported Maynard. (Ibid., p. 2U. ) 
(3) Burnet, H ist., iv, pp. 27-8. 
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the statute was frequently cited by the 
advocates of the doctrine of resistance. But 
it must be observed that it does not necessarily 
support that doctrine; for, its advocates 
were'pleading for a general right outwith 
statutory right, whereas this clause was 
particular-in its application and was specifi- 
cally limited to allegiance to a Roman Catholic 
king. It might further be said that the enact- 
ing of a law legalising resistance in a special 
case negatived, by implication, any claim of 
right to resist in any other instance. Neverthe- 
less, the clause had its significance in so far 
as it negatived the theory of the divine right of 
kings on which the doctrine of non-resistance had 
been largely based. Only a single case of 
(1) This was the view taken by Dodd, Sacheverell's 
counsel. It did not negative the doctrine of 
non-resistance, he said although it was "the 
first a-Rd stated and determined exception to. 
this general rule Li. e,. non-resistance] that 
ever was made inrany Act of Parliament. " 
S. T., xv, 220. 
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resistance had to be admitted to shatter 
the theory of indefeasible hereditary right. 
It was this theory which had defeated the 
Exclusion Bill in 1681. The exclusion of 
James from the succession, by reason of his 
religion, had not been admitted because a 
man's. religiong it was said, could not be a 
bar to his legitimate inheritance to the 
crown to which he was entitled by divine 
hereditary right. But now in 1689 a statute 
enacted that"a Roman Catholic king, or a king 
J whose consort was of that religion, 'could not 
be king of England. Statute law took preced- 
ence over natural and 'divine' law. This was 
a serious breach in the Tory doctrine of 
kingship. 
This clause was admittedly exceptional. 
The resistance doctrinaires themselves con- 
fessed that it would be absurd to expect parl- 
iament to give a legal sanction to resistance 
, 
(1) Locke's right of resistance was extra. 
legal. Cf. Appendix I, Note 53. 
t 
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Resistance was a natural right. and by its 
very nature could never be a legal right. 
The only time the two houses discussed"' 
resistance was tLt the Sacheverell Trial, and, 
in that c ase t they were sitting as a court of 
justice, not as a legislative, body. The history 
of the doctrine, there fore, is to be found 
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III.: Change from the abdication to the 
resistance theory of the Revolution. 
The convention and the parliaments which fol- 
lowed it, studiously avoided being drawn into 
a discussion upon the doctrine of non-resis- 
tance. But although the-official interpre- 
tation of the Revolution was abdication, by 
which it was left to be inferred that the 
doctrine had not been violated, yet the 
debates in the Convention contained much of 
the material out of which the doctrine of 
resistance was built. The references to an 
original contract and especially its inclus- 
ion in Somers's resolution, and the-stress 
put upon James's dispensing with laws demon- 
strated that resistance to James was being 
(1) The only reference in the Convention to, 
resistance was made when the Speaker drew the 
attention of the Commons to the fact that Dr. 
Sharp, who had preached before them on January 
30, had prayed for James by the title 'his most 
excellent majesty. ' Howe said : "The vote we 
made is contrary to passive obedience. and this 
man preaches it up. It (Grey's Debates, ix, p. 37. ) 
Some argued that Sharp was required by the 
Rubric to pray as he, did., The clergy always 
appealed to the Articles in defence of their 
preaching non-resistance. (Cf. Sacheverell, 
below, p. 163. ) Sharp, for the sermon, was 
thanked by the house, nem. con. on 1 February, 
1688/9. (House of Commons Journals. ) 
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supplied with its justification although 
at the same time resistance was being offi- 
cially denied. Many of the arguments put 
108 
forward by pamphleteers before the Convention 
met were adopted by itsalthough the conclusion - 
the right of resistance - drawn by these 
writers', was not adopted. 
' 
The Convention's . 
resolution was a bundle of inconsistences. 
The conclusion did'not logically follow from the 
premiss. And, after the, Convention had done 
its work by securing the coronation of William 
and Mary, pamphleteers more and more came to 
disregard the f indings of the Convention and 
to adopt an interpretation of the Revolution 
which would be more in keeping with the facts. 
By putting forward the plea of contract, the 
Convention hoped to be able to plead 'not guilty' 
to the charge of deposing, their king. The 
assumption was that a theory of contract was 
not inconsistent with the doctrine of non- 
(1) A comparison between the debates and 
Ferguson's A brief justification, etc* is 
most illuminating. Practically all Ferguson's 
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resistance. The original contract, ' it is 
true`, had been explicitly condemned by such 
writers as Sanderson, by the Decrees of the 
University of Oxford, and indeed by all ad- 
herents of the doctrine of non-resistance. ' 
And a contract, it may be argued,, that can- 
not be enforced is no contract, and a king 
cannot-be forced to' observe his part of it 
if he may in no case be resisted. But there 
was a subtle distinction made between the 
declaring of the contract to be broken by the 
king, and the using of force against him. It 
was just for this reason that the contract 
theory served its purpose in the debates in 
the Convention. If James had, by his own 
voluntary acts, broken, the contract, then he 
had ceased to be king and the doctrine of 
non-resistance was irrelevant. 
"The question of James. 's deposition had 
arisen in the Convention, but. it was obvious 
that no one was prepared to give his opinion 
on that delicate matter. The lower house was 
shocked at Musgrove's indiscreet mention of, 
deposition. When he asked if the. Convention 
iii: i. 3. no, ) 
had power to depose a king, the, members were 
determined that his question should not be-., 
answered. Maynard said: "I know not the 
meaning of this, but I am afraid of a mean- 
"ing. " And Treby said of Musgrove's question 
"though he speaks pertinent, -. yet it is not 
proper now. " So far as the debates show, the 
subject of deposition was regarded as irrele-, 
vant. The frequent references to the deposit- 
. 
ion of Edward II and Richard II were' ' not made ' ... 
to support the deposition of-James. - They were-., 
merely brought into the discussion to illus- 
trate the legal significance of the words--.. 
'demise' and 'abdicate'. ' : Burnet tells us that " 
it was maintained in the Convention that "Edward 
the Second. and Richard the Second were deposed 
for breaking ... laws: and these depositions 
were still good in law, - since, they were not re- 
versedl*nor was the right of deposing them ever 
renounced or disowned. " But in contrast with, 
(1) Grey's Debates, 'ixe pp. 10-13- 
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this statement, he also tells us that-"The 
republican party were at first for deposing 
king James by a formal sentence, and' for 
giving the crown to the prince' and princess 
by as formal an election. , But that was over- 
ruled in. the beginning. " The interpretation 
that James had abdicated was adhered to, ý as 
we have seen when we were-considering'the part 
-played by the Conventionl 
While abdication was the official, interpret-", 
ationg. there were not wanting writers who hinted 
at deposition. Indeed, it would have been 
" strange. ifs at such a juncture in our history, 
there had-been no one prepared to avow the right. 
In 1689 there was published in London A true re- 
lation of the manner of the ddposing of King Ed- 
ward II ... as also an exact account of the pro- 
ceedings against King Richard II and the manner 
of his deposition.. Sir Robert Howard dedicated 
his History of the reigns of Edward and Richard 
to William III. Howard, -in thisýworkq main- 
tained. the justice of the depositions. -of Edward 
(1) OP-. Cit., iii, p. 375-6.. 
(2) PublishedqýLondon 1690. 
ýý ,fi 
ýý ý. __ -. 
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and Richard and by inference that of James 
II. 
Among other works published at this time 
which inferred deposition'may be mentioned 
The causes and manner of deposing a'popish 
king in Swedeland truly described 
0 (Feb., 1689) 
and The supremacy debated wherein the author 
asserted that the people "have power to depose 
their kings, in case they contemn the laws, and 
violently rob and spoil their subjedts". It is a 
significant fact, too, that the Vindiciam contra 
tyrannos was reprinted in London in 1689. It-iä_ 
clear, however, that views expressed in 'these 
works represented only a very small section of 
thought at the Revolution. It is sufficient for 
our purpose to note that such ideas were enter- 
tainO. d;, and their real significance lies in the 
fact that they did not gain recognition by any 
influential thinker. The right of deposition 
ßs distinct from the right of resistance was 
never again seriously put forward as an explans"tj 
atioh of the Revolution. Few men were so bold 
(1) In S. T. Wm. III, i, pp. 229-230- 
(2) In S. T. Wm. III, i, pp. 231-233. 
(3) Op. cit., p.. 232. 
113 
as to assert that James II had been deposed. 
Had James been deposed, the exact date 
of deposition would have been upon record. 
Even the 28th January could not be taken as 
the date, for the resolution of that day 
spoke of James "having abdicated", that"is, 
some time before 28th January. ' The problem' 
of a date did arise. One writer said: "we 
were legally discharged of our allegiance to 
James the Second the eleventh, of December 
last past" 
® 
The selection of this date was 
not a happy choice for it suggested that force 
was used. It gave significance to Pollexfen's-. 
remarks: "The stronger did chase the weaker" 
and to his question: '! What means the noise of 
arms? "(S) The fact is, the abdication theory was 
best supported by the choice of no definite 
date. The abdication of James, said, an anony- 
mous writer, "may bear date from the day he 
(1) , See Appendix It Note 43, --a. 
(2) The history of the desertion, etc. (1689)". - S. T. Wm. III, i, PP* 38-39- 
(3) Grey's Debates, ix, p. 21. 
.. 
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first erected the Court of Ecclesiastical 
Commission, established a standing army in 
the nation, or took those customs the grant 
whereof expired by King Charles II's death, and 
ought not to commence again till given by 
another parliament. This was done in the very 
infancy of his reign, whereby his abdication 
became an e arly act" . 
a) 
k. 
This line of reasoning is based on the ý, `' 
assumption that the king is king by law and 
holds his position on. the understanding that. 
he governs by law. The condition of his tenure 
of the kingship is his governance by law accord- 
ing to the original contract. But even if we 
grant that the king by his illegal acts abdic- 
ates the throne, we must see that the king may 
(1) The proceedings of the present parliament 
justified by the opinion of the most judicious 
and learned Hugo Grotius. S. T. Wm. III, 1, p183- 
This author used this argument because Grotius 
7 
had said (De jure belli ac pacis. Bk. II, chap. 7 
S 26. ) that bhildren born before their father's 
abdication could not be deprived of the succes- 
sion. Heq'thereforeq makes James II's abdicat- 
ion take place before the birth of the Prince 
, 
of - 
. Wales. Cf. Also Appendix I, Note : 44). 
(2) On this subject, see below, chap. 5. 
4ý 
ýý 
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govern for an indefinite 'time after the 
abdication takes effect. James, on the 
assertion of at least one writer-quoted 
0 
above, had held the reins of government 
for several years after, he had ceased tech- 
nically to be king. If no drastic action 
had been taken in-1688, would James have 
continued in this anomalous position till 
his death? Obviously, this would have been 
the case unless official cognisance had been 
taken of the, king's 'abdication'. Whose duty 
was it to make this official pronouncement? 
In the particular events of the Revolution, 
this had been done by the Convention. But, 
the choice of time had not been left to it. 
It had been determined by James's flight. If 
James had not fled, when would the declaration 
have been made? These questions undoubtedly 
4 
agitated men's minds, and the sequence of 
actual political events could not be disregard- 
ed in relation to the ultimate declaration that 
" (1) See above p.. 114., 
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James- had abdicated. Had William not been 
called in to put pressure on James, would 
James have abdicated the government as he 
did, and if James had not abdicated the 
government, woulda Convention have met and. '` 
declared the-throne vacant? 'Reasoning thus, 
the Whigs confessed that James would not 
have lost his ' throne -but for an armed insur- 
rection. 'Andthat the Revolution was, founded 
on resistance came to be the official interpret- 
ation of the Whigs. Leslie in 1709 said to . 
Hoadly: ' 
i 
"You took up the mobb-story-that it was. 
founded upon resistance: but neglected 
the Convention and their wise debates, 
which gave it another term. And now you 
see the reason why they did so. For if 
they had put it upon the foot of resis- 
tance they had gone manifestly counter to 
the known laws of the land and to the 
Homilies of the Church, which would dis- 
oblige the clergy not a little". (D 
And in the following year, Leslie made the 
same observation. 
"Another change I observe iss that abdicat- 
ion is now run down, and the Revolution 
(1) , Best of all being the students' thanks to 
Mr. Hoadly (17093 9 p. 18- 
s 
'III. i. 3.117 
must be all resistance. None can deny 
but abdication was set up at the Revolution 
and in a sense different from that of rests--' 
tance which occasioned the long debates 
about it in the Convention: "0 
Although *Leslie held, extreme views, we 
must admit that here at least he made a fair 
and accurate statement of the change. of . 
opinion.. It will be our task now to trace the 
history of this change. 
(1) The good old cause further discussed. (1710) 
p.?. 
; 
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IV., The slow development of the doe trine` 
of resistance until Anne's reign. 
James II had relied on the ' doctrineoP non=: - 
resistance to prevent murmurings against his 
Romanizing policy from becoming open rebellion 
This is shown by his request, to the bishops to' 
make a public declaration-in support-of that 
doctrine. Their refusal might have'warned James 
as to the way the wind was blowing, 'but he was', ` 
too headstrong to take heed. The bishops' action 
showed that that doctrine was not to , be used 'for 
the destruction of the church. As long as the 
king supported the church, the church would sup- 
port him by preaching this doctrine But because 
the doctrine was abused by one. kingt it did not 
follow that it was inherently wrong, and the 
bishops by declining to make the declaration did 
(1) "The unaccountable doctrine of passive obed- 
ience, as it was the source'of a great many mischiefs 
among our selves, so what has befallen the-king, may 
be partly imputed to it" - An.. answer to the late 
_' Dated at Dublin C as le , I, ay ý, ý$9. S. T. Wm. III, ii, p. 61. 
(2) "The reason why the clergy were so zealous for 
tyranny was because it was a tyranny on their side" 
- Samuel Johnson Notes on the phoenix edition of 
the Pastoral letter (1694) in Works 1710), p1 307. 
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not thereby abandon it. They suspended for a 
O 
time its propagation but it remained the doctrine 
of the church, and when the church-and monarchy 
were"once again restored-to a , close harmonious 
partnership. -in Anne's reign, its teaching was 
renewed.,, That the bishops. took , 
this stand, with 
regard to the declaration; that seven of their.,.:. 
chief: ^members suffered imprisonment in, the Tower 
and thus materially helped the Revolution, were 
facts later-held 'up by cone iliating: Whigs as an 
example of their liberal mindedness and a contrast 
to the church's return "to the land of Egypt" 
a) 
and 
by the more uncompromising of the Whigs as proof 
that the doctrine of non-resistance had been 
(1) A writer said that they withdrew themselves 
from the king's personal service in order to be 
able to serve his real interest. They suspended 
their allegiance. See Reflections upon our late 
and present proceedings in England. Som. Tr., 
x, p. 130. 
(2) A phrase frequently used in pamphlets'to 
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preached by the clergy not in the interests 
of the king but in their own selfish interests 
While the church would not assist James to 
effect her own ruin, she was not prepared for 
so drastic a remedy of her ills as the dethrone- 
ment of her king. Thus, many churchmen felt that 
they had gone too fart that in their excessive loy- 
alty to their church they had been disloyal to the 
crown. The Revolution had been accomplished 
and if they could not undo 'what had been 
done, they could at least refuse to recognise' 
(1) A modest inquiry into the causes of the presen 
disasters in England, etc. S. T. Wm. IIIý iii p. 96. 
Samuel Johnson An argument prowi , etc. 4th`ad. (1692), p. 9 in Works 1710) p. 261. 
Defoe, Jure divino 170 )ý . ii. Defoe, High-Chur h address 
(1710), 
p. 16. 
See Appendix I Note 45, 
Cf, also Tindal, The Jacobitism, 
_perjury 
and 
popery of High-Church priests 1710 9 pp. 3-4. 
(2) "Very seldom could either a priest or'a 
soldier be seen in the assemblages which 
gathered round the market crosses where the 
king and queen were proclaimed ... The 
, parson of a parish was naturally unwilling to join in what was really a triumph over 
those principles which, during twenty eight 
years, his flock heard him proclaim on 
every anniversary of the Martyrdom and on 
every anniversary of the Restoration. " -; 
Macaulay, Rist., iii, PP. 1315-1316. 
ý! ý. 
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the new king.. And consequently we have the 
non-juror schism. The non-jurors clung to the 
doctrine of non-resistance and refused to 
swear allegiance to William because he ascended- 
the throne through a breach in the wall of 
that doctrine. But in accordance with their 
own public assurances that they would remain 
quiet though passively hostile, they 
allowed the doctrine to remain in abey-. 
ante. And the rank and file of the church, 
although they, took the oaths, were not 
likely to preach a doctline of non-resistance 
on behalf of-a Calvinistic king, whom they 
regarded as lukewarm in their, interest 
0 
There 
(1) Cf. "They [the High Church men', were 
engag'd in continual plots against him all his 
life and never preach'd passive obedience 
to him. " - Toland, Memorial lof the State oP 
England (1705) p. 20. 
"The publick is sensible what inconveniences 
it has been brought into by the prevalency of 
your passive doctrines, and may look for a 
reasonable restitution, viz. that you shall 
make the nation honorable amends, by being as 
hearty and zealous in preaching up obedience 
to the present government. For till this be 
done tho you swallow the oaths, and come in to 
the last man there must go large grains of 
good nature 
to 
allow your sincerity. " - Plain 
Eng lish, or an-inquiry into the causes, etc. 
(1691). S. T. Wm. III, iii p. 184. 
r 
ý";,, 
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was, consequently, little heard of that 
doctrine from 1689 till 1702. 
The Revolution was a violation of the 
doctrine of non-resistance, and was so re- 
garded except by the conquest school in ' 
William's reign and by a section of the 
Tories in Anne's. But in the heat and 
excitement of the crisis*the doctrine was 
forgotten*"' Facts "were of more- importance 
than theories; and the change of monarch 
which had. been accomplished in'auch a 
remarkably short space of time and with 
an ease that astonished even the principal 
actors themselves in the dramas left them 
quite unprepared for the task of giving a 
unanimoris theoretical justification. The 
(1) See Appendix I, Note 46. 
(2) See below, chap. 4, seat. ' l, pp. 204-219. 
(3) See below chap. 3, sect. 2. 
The. Revolution was not founded upon re- 
sistance, said the author of A true defence. 
of H. Sacheverell in a letter to Mr 
DColbe]n (1710), P. 5. 
Cf. also Doctor Sacheverell's defence i 
By R. 
:ý 
III. 1.4. '123 
leaders of the revolt. did. not act with 
the conviction that they had a right to 
resist the king. They were driven on by ka,. 
what they felt was shere necessity. -, Al- 
alarmed at their own intrepidy, the,, most 
members of the Convention avoided any, 
minute examination of their actions and - 
did, their best to give a semblance of 
legality to what they did. There was an :.. 
obvious reluctance-to abandon the doctrine 
0 
of non-resistance. 
While-the Convention acted with studied- 
caution and reserves pamphleteers were not ý°°° 
. 
(I) "There's one topick which all these pam- 
phlets insist mightily upon, viz. "that such 
and such men have formerly writ and preach'd 
contrary to the principles and-practices 
which they now own; aa: if it were altogether 
" unlawful for a man to change his mind or 
yield to the force of argument "- Adefence 
of the Archbishop's sermon on the death of 
her late maj9P__tyq etc. (1695). S. T. Wm. III, 
iii p. 538. = Cf. Defoe. The church, he said should 
admit, she was wrong in holding the 
doctrine 
of non-resistance. "She was mistaken, and 
''tis no disgrace or reflection on any church 
or any people or person, when they find them- 
selves in an errors to own it, acknowledge 
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Ranting who boldly asserted that all the 
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troubles of James's reign had been the result, -,, 
of "that bug-bear Dagon of passive obedience... 
a notion crept into the worlds; and most zeal- 
ously,, and perhaps as-ignorantly defended. " 
The doctrine of non-resistance was attacked 
O 
in pamphlets and less frequently the justice 
of-resistance maintained © The right 'of 'resis- 
tance was put forward in 1689-and in the . foil-;, ' , 
'owing year or two-as aprinciple on which : the, ý 
Revolution might be-justified. ", It was not, 
however, generally ' accepted even by the, Whigs'' 
LL 
(1) Political aphorisms, S. T. Wm. III, i, 
p" 396"° :.: 
(2) Cf. The doctrine . of passive obedience ,, 
and jure diving disprgyed etc. (16b9). 
S. T. Wm. III, il pp. 368-37i... r Ferguson 
spoke of "ther treasonable doctrines 
of passive obedience end non-resistance. "  
Abrief justification, etc. (1688). S. T. Wm. III ij pp. 140-1. 
C. also Johnson's Notes on the phoenix 
edition of the Pastoral letter [by Burnet] and 
his An argument proving, etc. (1692) e. g. at 
p. 71 in Works 1710Y9 p. 261. 
(3) Cf. Masters The case of allegiance... 
considered. (1680 S. T. Wm. III iý pp. 3ý8-333. 
Political a horisms. (1658) S. T. Wm. III, J, 
Pp- 38-6-402. 
Johnson, Nestes on the phoenix edition, etc. 
in Works, p. 30ö. See Appendix I1 Note 47. ýf°°. 
H. 
"1 
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fore ' as, we shall see in a", -later' chapter the 
rival theories of"resistance'and non-resistance 
were - both, to a large extent : avoided in the 
reignof, William, and the position that 
William was only de facto king was'accepted 
as an adequate, reason, on the grounds of ex-`. 
. pediency, 
for supporting the Revolution settle- 
ment. -On the basis of William's, de facto' 
kingship the question of. allegiance was debated. 
The doctrine of resistance did, not'come to the 
forefront of political controversy'till the 
reign of Anne, chiefly because the, doctrine of 
non-resistance, as=we have suggested, was 
largely°in abeyance., The doctrine of resistance 
was mainly'a counterblast' and' as long as the 
doctrine of non-resistance'was not prominent, 
there was no necessity. for preaching resistance. 
(1) See below, chap. 4, sect. 2. 
(2) An-examination of the Term Catalogues 
shows clearly that political speculation on 
the Revolution was prominent from-1688 till ` "" i} , 
about 1692, and from 1702 onwards. After 
1692 men's interests turned mainly to 
theology and centred round. the deist contro- 
versy. The only problems affected by the .. Revolution were those of a standing army, 
the Convocation controversy and the agitation 
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When William's right was upheld it was 
0 
usually by men who accepted the'. Convention 
decree that James, had abdicated. "ý 
The real battle over Revolution principles 
began'in'Anne's reign. Anne succeeded'accord- 
ing to the, -terms'laid down by statute, and, in 
_so 
far'as-her title was recognised to be par- 
, 
liamentaryg the, Revolution settlement might be 
said to have-''thereby strengthened its foundation. 
But a set-back was given to the,, Whigs when the 
High-Tories put forward the-plea-of Anne's 
hereditary, title 
©, 
Hereditary'right and non- 
resistance were parts of the same doctrine, --'. *,, 
The Tories now took, "every opportunity of; pro= 
pagating the doctrine"ofý-non-resistance, and 
the clergy preached it from-their pulpits. 
(1) See An enquiry i to the nature and obli- 
gation of legal-rights. (16 93 S. T. Wm. III, il,, 
PP. 392-412. 
(2) See below, chap. 4, sect. 3. 
(3) Burnet in 1703 addressed A memorial to the 
Princess Sophia, wherein he denounced the High- 
Church for preaching non-resistance. See Calamy, 
An historical account, etc., ii, p. 2 note. 
Some doubts have been raised as 
to 
whether 
Burnet was 'the author of `, the Memorial, 
j 
. '', 
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The Whigs accused the Tories, of abetting 
arbitrary government. The Tories accused the 
Whigs of being republicans; ýand-on the 30th 
January-each year the-Tory-clergy denounced!. 
the murder of, Charles I, and pointed to. the 
Whigs-as, the spiritual descendents of the 
regicides. ' - 
The Tories, according to the'Whigsq'were 
not only threatening the Revolution settlement 
by their revival of the doctrine of non-res- 
tance. Within the first few months of Anne's 
reign it was threatened by-the Tory attacks. - 
on the Toleration Act. A Tory House of. Commons 
made several attempts to pass 'into law a bill 
against occasional conformity. ° They . were -f, 
frustrated mainly, in, the House'of Lords through 
the opposition of William's bishops. The Tories 
turned wrathfully on the Whigs and denounced.. 
them as enemies of the-church., The Revolution, 
they said, had. had as its main purpose the 
preservation of the church, but the Whigs had 
made use of it to encourage non-conformity and 
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must bear in mind that the doctrine of 
resistance had been and was supported by men 
whose church principles were notabove 
reproach.,;. Locke had been accused of atheism. 
. Ferguson probably had no; religion and was. - 
certainly a. discredit to any party. Defoe was 
-a Dissenter. - Bradbury was aDissenter. And 
Tindal and, Toland were both Deists. % Hoadly, 
though a churchman, was undoubtedly, one of 
Sacheverell. 's-'false brethren'.. While this 
concession is made to the Tories, -it must also 
be allowed that the Whigs were unfortunate in 
having-their. -political faith judged by the 
-standards of 
High-Church theology., The outcry 
against the Whigs was. intensified when Drake 
published his Memorial of the Church of Erg- ., a 
land in 1706, wherein he alleged that the church A}. 
was in danger from Anne's Whig ministers. , . The -.,. -. 
. 
clamour was temporarily silenced by a resol- 
ution of parliament , that` the church was not in 
(1) Walpole called it "one of the most impu- 
dent books that was ever printed in any age 
or nation. " - Four letters to a friend in 
North Britain upon the publishing the tryal. 
of Dr Sacheverell. (1710) p. 4, 
\1 
lýiý 
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danger and-that anyone who suggested it was 
an enemy to the queen and nation. But Drake's 
insinuations were repeated in Sacheverell's 
famous sermon of November 5,1709. The latter's 
prosecution appeared to the Tories to be proof 
that there was a Whig plot against the church. 
-High-Toryism 
became rampant, at first in 
defence of Sacheverell, and when his light 
sentence was regarded as anýacquittal, High-Church 
Toryism took the offensive and remained the 
dominating political philosophy till the end 
of Anne's reign. 
In the struggle throughout the reign, the 
Whigs were always on the defensive. They were 
able to hold their own only. by making use of the 
war against France. The war stood for a crusade 0. 
against the European dominance of France, which, as 
Defoe said in his Review, stood for arbitrary gov- 
ernment. A victory for France would mean the vic- 
tory of the Jacobites and the return of arbitrary 
government and popery.. It was a Whig war, just as 
the Peace of Utrecht was a Tory peace. The Whigs stood 
for the Revolution and its results, - the war with 
.r 
1, 
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France, the Preservation of the Toleration 
Act, and the Hanoverian succession. The 
Tories were mainly composed of the High- 
Church party, who opposed the war and con- 
130 
sequently brought it to as speedy a close 
as they could when they came into power in 
1710; who suffered non-conformity to be 
barely tolerated, attacked vigorously occas- 
ional conformity; and who opposed the admis-;, '' 
sion of anyone to offices in the state who 
were not members of the Church of England. 
The Tories, in defence of the church, clung 
to the doctrine of non-resistance, which, they 
said, was its traditional teaching. To deny 
that doctrine, they asserted, was to under- 
mine the foundations of the church. The Whigs 
retorted that that doctrine undermined the 
state, for the Revolution settlement was 
founded on resistance. Only by the adherence 
to the doctrine of resistance as exemplified 
in 1688 could the justice of Anne's tenure of 
the throne be' vindicated. 
IIt. i. 4. 13 1 
Resistance, the Revolution and the Han- 
overian succession : non-resistance and 
Jacobitism - these seemed to be the alter- 
natives between. which, Englishmen must choose. 
The protagonists in the struggle were Hoadly 
and Defoe on the one side, Leslie and Sachev- 
erell on the other., Between these two extremes 
came Swift, perhaps occupying the most impor-,. 
tant position of all because of*his, moderation. 
It was Swift, more than anyone" else, who 
brought together the antagonistic theories of 
resistance and non-resistance and demonstrated, 
like his 'contemporary' Sir. Roger de Coverleyi, 
"that much might be said on both sides. " 
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V : The growing antagonism between the doc- 
trines of resistance and non-resistance in 
Anne's reign, leading up to the Sacheverell 
Trial. 
Anne's reign is noted for the rise of period- 
ical literature. This-type-of literature was 
mainly didactic, and-even the lightest"period- 
icall such as the Spectator, was intended to 
-' . inform and reform as well as to amuse. In 
addition to the everyday events of politics, 
-political philosophy was freely discussed: The 
, chief of these journals were Defoe's Review 
and Tutchin's Observator on-the Whig side, and 
Leslies Rehearsal and Swift's Examiner on the 
Tory. 
On 19th February, 1704, the first number 
. of the Review appeared.. Its 
full title was, A 
review of the' affairs of France, and its object 
". was to give a running commentary on European 
politics. Its main theme, however, was the 
-evil of arbitrary' ; government and the blessings 
which the Revolution had bestowed upon England, 
Defoe in the Review and Tutchin in the Obser. 
vator (which first appeared in 1702) kept be- 
fore their readers the Whig principles of 
133 
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government based on the Revolution. -- In' ' 
August of 1704, Charles Leslie inaugurated 
his Rehearsal, a weekly paper written in 
opposition to Defoe and Tutchin. In the-col- 
lected edition of the paper, Leslie' explained 
his object in writing it. It was. not "to 
_kick 
and-cuff with Tutchin, 'De Foe, and the 
rest of the Scandalous Club. " But "he'saw 
great pains taken to poison the people of this 
nation with most,. pernicious principles, both 
as to. church and state. " Most of the people 
cannot read'"but they will gather about one 
who can read, and listen to: -an Observator or 
Review (as I have seen them in the streets) 
where all the principles of rebellion are in- 
stilled into them. " These people were not the 
heads, of rebellion, but-they were the hands, 
(1) 
, 
"The Rehearsal began to be spread over the 
nation, two of them a week, which continued 
several years together, to be published without 
check or controul. It was all through one 
argument against the queen's right to the crown. $'- 
Burnet, in his speech at the Sacheverell Trial, 
S. T., acv, 491. 
, 
(2) Under the title A view of the times. 6-vols. 
1? 50. .. ý.. 
9 
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and since it was not in the power of Leslie 
torstop-these pernicious papers, he decided 
to answer them in the Rehearsal. 
0 
It-was about this same time, when the- 
newspaper war was getting into full swing, 
that Benjamin Hoadly began to attract notice 
for his vigorous defence of the-Revolution 
and of the doctrine of-resistance. In a ser- 
mon before-the Lord Mayor-of"London on Septem- 
ber 291,1705, on Romans XIII, i, "He represen-' 
ted the public good as the end of the magis- 
trate's office, and the warrantableness of 
resistance when the end is destroyed. At this 
sermon some were much disturbed. Among the 
rest, the Bishop of London had a fling ate in 
the Lords, when 'the danger of the church' was 
under debate-; and several assaulted him from 
the press. " Whenever the doctrine of resistance 
I 
(1) Op. cit., il pp. iii-iv. 
(2) It was also about this time, according to 
Defoe that the world went mad a second time'over 
" the doctrine of non-resistance. See Jure divino. 
(1706) p. 1. 
(3) Calarir, An historical account, of nkr own 
life, ii, p. 40. See also Appendix 1 Note $. 
4 
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had to be vindicated, Hoadly was in the van- 
guard of the battle. He came to be regarded 
as the champion of the doctrine, and the word 
O 
'Hodleian' was coined to denote a man of Revol- 
ution principles. When the House of Commons 
resolved in 1709 to impeach Sacheverell, they 
also resolved : That the Reverend 1r Benjamin 
Hoadly, Rector of St Peters' Poor, London, for 
having strenuously justified the principles on 
which her majesty and the nation proceeded in, 
the late happy Revolution-, hath justly merited 
the favour and recommendation of the House. "0 
Although the lower clergy constantly 
preached the doctrine of non-resistance, "-their 
sermons had no apparent influence outside their 
parishes. Their collective influence was felt 
only when some outstanding event occurred such 
as the Sacheverell Trial. But there were sever- 
al sermons which, owing to the prominence-, of the 
(1) See Chuse which you please, etc. (1710)___ 
0 sermon. - k1t-Lu) 
A letter to Sir J [acob] B [antis] . '.. concerning 
the late 1}dinehead doctrine. (1711) 
(2) House of Commons journal,, 14 Dec. 1-, 1709... 
t 
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preachers, or of the pulpits from which the 
sermons were delivered, were marked out for 
special: attention. A few of these, many be 
conveniently mentioned' here. 
one sermon which was to be much discussed: -',., 
was preached'on January 30,1707/8 by. William , 
Wake, Bishop of Lincoln, before the-House of 
Lords. At any other-time'-the sermon would 
have passed unnoticed. But when the contro- 
versy between the doctrines. of resistance and 
non-resistance was running high, the rival 
parties seized on the sermon as one-which- 
supported or opposed their respective theories. 
The sermon was regarded by many as 'a vindication 
of the doctrine of non-resistance, and when 
the House. of Lords thanked him for preaching it, 
this was held to prove that the House favoured 
the doctrine. This fact was noted by Michael 
rTaittaire and was offered by him in defence of 
the doctrine of non-resistance The construc- 
tionfput'upon the Bishop's sermon is signifi- 
cant as showing the temper of the resistance 
doctrinaires. The Bishop of Lincoln, it must 
(1) Doctrine of passive obedience (1711) p. 13" 
16 
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-be remembered, spoke in the House of Lords 
against Sacheverell and was among those who 
voted the doctor guilty. 
Wake preached on the text, Matthew xxv, 
t 
v. 51-52, and the significant words were Christ's 
rebuke to Peter : 'Put up again thy sword into 
his place : for all they that take the sword 
shall perish with the sword. ' Wake argued 
that although a man had the right to defend 
himself with the sword against a surprise 
attack, no private person had the right to use 
the sword against a lawful magistrate. The 
soldiers who were sent to arrest our Lord, 
proceeded in a legal way and no private per- 
son, such as Peter, had a right to oppose them 
by force. In words which recall those of 
Sanderson, Wake said : "Their procedure being 
(1) S. T., xv,,. 503-516,469. 
(2) Wake, Sermons preached upon several 
occasions. 1722 iii, pp. 160-183. 
(3. ) See above, p. 24. 
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lawful, they were not to be resisted, no not 
in defence of our Saviour Christ himself. " 
Furthermore, Wake employed the illustration 
of the forbearance of David to take the life 
of Saul when he had the opportunity, a favour- 
ite illustration of the non-resistance 
doctrinaires. Although Wake seemed to be 
arguing for non-resistance, yet'he implied 
that he approved of the. Revolution as an ex- 
ample of-resistance. If Charles I1 he said, 
(and his hearers could substitute the name of 
James II) had chosen rather to desert the 
government than to rule according to his oath, 
and the fundamental laws and limitations of 
it, this might have warranted an oppressed 
people taking the sword for the necessary. - 
defence of their laws and constitution, their 
religion and their liberties 
(1) Op. cit., p. 175. 
(2) : Ibid., pp. 180-182. 




Wake, in this sermon, was really on the 
side of the resistance theorists. His maxim 
that it is unlawful to resist lawful author- 
ity was a cardinal part of the doctrine. But 
he was unfortunate in the choice of his illus- 
trations, for, since they were the stock 
property of the non-resistance theorists, they 
appeared to the uncritical mind to put Wake on 
their side. 
Of more importance than Wake's sermon in 
accentuating the differences between the 
resistance and non-resistance theorists was 
Bishop: Blackall's sermon preached on March 89 
1708, the anniversary of Anne's accession to 
the throne. His sermon was on 'The divine 
institution of magistracy and the gracious 
design of its institution. '0 It was at once 
observed that the tone of this sermon was very 
different from one that he had preached on 
March 89 1704, that iss exactly four years 
,- previously. 
During the interval, Blackall 
(1) In Works, ii, pp. 1161-11? 3. 
(2) The subject's duty in Works, iii pp. 1121- 
1135. jP 
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had been made Bishop of Exeter on the sole 
initiative of Anne. It lookas as if Black- 
all's more pronounced leanings towards 
absolute monarchy in the latter sermon was 
" his way of showing his gratitude to Anne for 
her favour. - His outward expression, at any 
" rate, had obviously changed. 
The similarities and differences between 
the two sermons were clear. In both sermons 
he spoke of the necessity for an absolute 
power in a state and the duty of non-resist- 
ance, but in the former sermon he placed that 
power in. parliaaent, in the latter in the 
king. In the former, he upheld., -the popular 
origin of government, but in the, latter he 
stated clearly that the origin of sovereignty 
was not popular but divine. 
Hoadly9 always ready to accept any 
challenge, did not miss this opportunity of 
again appealing to the public in vindication 
of the doctrine of resistance. He wrote a 
reply to Blackall under the title Some con- 
siderations humbly offered to the... Bishop 
4 
:i 
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of Exeter in 1709P He began by pointing 
out the differences to be observed in the 
two sermons. Hoadly was able to accept most 
of the former sermon, but the whole of the 
latter he strenuously rejected. Blackall's 
supporters did not attempt to reconcile the 
" two sermons. They accepted the latter. That 
Blockall had been inconsistent they were 
ready to admit, and they asked Hoadly if it 
were a sin for a man to change his opinions? 
Ho adly seized on Blackall's assertion: 
"From the magistrate's being called the min- 
inter bf God by St Paul... he hath none above 
him upon earth ... and that he is accountable 
to none but God. "©He argued that the magis- 
trate is the minister of God 'for good. ', If 
the magistrate acts otherwise, he acts out- 
with God's commission, and thus forfeits the 
right, as enjoined by Paul, to absolute 
oit- 
(1) See Appendix I. Note 49. 
(2) Leslie, Best answer, etc. Preface. 
Tom of Bedlam's answer, p. 5. 
(3) Hoadly, op, cit. t in Worker iii p. 127. 
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obedience All that he contended for, said 
Haadly, "is this, that there should be a 
right left in the governed society to pre- 
serve it self from ruin and destruction. " 
m 
He challenged the Bishop of Exeter to prove 
that God gave the magistrate any power con- 
__trary 
to the end for which government was 
instituted. The magistrate's power, he de- 
clared (following Locke) could not be greater 
than that of the society which elected him. 
His authority is limited to the public good', 
and if a magistrate attempts to ruin a nation, 
"self-defence is a most necessary and lawful 
practice. " 
Following Locke ' Hoadly argued in-oppos- 
ition to Blackall that men, not in a state of 
political society, are born free, that they 
(1) Op. cit. in Works, ii, pp. 127-129. 
This was Hoadly's favourite argument. He 
had already used it in his sermon of September 
29,1705. See Works, ii, pp. 18-25. Cf. also 
above, p. 70 and Appendix I, Note 48. 
Thib argument was also used by Robert 
Fleming. See his The history of hereditary 
right. 1711 p. 134. 
(2) Hoad]y, op. cit., p. 129. 
(3) Ibid., p. 134. 
III.. i. 5.143 
enter into political society by an original 
contract and transfer to the magistrate so 
much of their power, but reserve to them- 
selves the right of self-defence. This right 
they may exercise if the magistrate exceeds 
his commission. 
Passing from the metaphysics of govern- 
ment, Hoadly ended his pamphlet. -with reflect-: 
ions on the Revolution. - In 1688, 
he said, 
"Those of the highest, as well as the 
holiest rank, and of the best quality, 
invited over a prince with armed men, to 
awe their legal sovereign king and force 
him into a compliance : and this they did 
in their private capacity... A revolution 
succeeded, which your lordship acknowledgeth 
to have wonderfully saved both church and 
state from ruin. Upon this foundation is 
built all our hainess. " Without this 
resistance "we had never had a queen, so 
great an ornament to the throne, nor 
bishops so great ornaments to the mitre ; 
" nor anything of property, and Protestant- 
'ism, by this time left. And, since this is 
so,.. since these are the benefits which 
the nation hath reaped by resistance; since 
to resistance we owe that establishment in 
the Protestant line ... I may ask, what 
harm 
hath resistance"&one lately done, either to 
the queen, the church, or the nation, that 
it must be thus run against with so unlimited 
a zeal ?"m 
(1) Ibid., pp. 137-138. 
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Bishop Blackall replied with an uncon- 
vincingpamphlet called-The' ll  The Lord Bishop of 
Exeter's answer to Mr Hoadly's letter in the 
same year, and Hoadly rejoined with An 
humble reply-to... the Lord Bishop of Exeter's 
Answer. The Bishoprwas of no more consequence 
in the political sphere than was Sacheverell 
ayear later, but both provided the occasion 
for a public debate on the respective merits 
of the doctrines of resistance and non-resis- 
tance. In Blackall's. case, the contest 
developed into-a single combat betweem Hoadly 
and Leslie. --Leslie entered the fray with a 
paper entitled The best answer ever was made 
and to which no answer ever will be made... 
address'd in a lwtter to Mr Hoadly himself 
and followed, 
Us 
with Best of all, being the 
student's thankits to Mr Hoad], y. 
To Hoadly's assertion that the Revolution 
was founded on resistance and that'Anne's 
S 
(1) Even a Tory writer admitted that Blackall 
merely "huddled up a kind of reply. " - The 
fourth and last part of a caveat against the 
Whiggs. 2nd. ed. (1710) p. 119. 
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title was dependent on that recognition, 
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Leslie replied that there was no resistance, 
that the Convention gave the crown to William' 
s 
following the'abdication of James and that, 
although Anne might have a Revolution title, 
her main one was hereditary? Leslie-stren- 
uously upheld the-doctrine of bon-resistance 
and. the divine right of kings. 
The controversy of 1709 became merged in 
the Sacheverell affair of 1709/10, but the 
Blackall-Hoadly debate proper was summed up 
in a pamphlet named The divine 'rights of the 
British nation and constitution vindicated, 
published in 1710. The author took the side 
of Hoadly, of whom he says : "Mr Hoadly is a 
person well known of late years, by his 
preaching and writings, which show him a 
gentleman of good sense, and, which is a 
character that deserves particular notice, he 
(1) Best of all, etc., pp. 12-14. 
(2) Ibid., p. 15. Cf. below, p. 256. 
f 
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heartily loves his country and the con- 
stitution. " Of Leslie, he says he has an 
"excellency". of. "banter and scurrility" of 
"revilings,, infamous slanders and clamor- 
rudeness. " But even Leslie's revilings ous 
146 
were eclipsed by the vitriolic eloquence of 
Dr Henry Sacheverell, whose sermon before 
the Lord Mayor of London on Noveaiber, 1709, 
brought down on his head the wrath of the 
4nhigs and made him the idol of the Tories. 
The trial 
wich 
arose out of-this sermon is 
so important in the history of Revolution 
political thought that a separate section 
must be devoted to it. 
(1) Op. cit., pp. 5-6. 
(2) Ibid., p. 12. f 
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CHAPTER THREE (continued) 
Section II. The Sacheverell Trial 
I.. Introduction, 
II. The sermon. 
III. The Trial. 
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I. Introduction. 
The high-water mark in the controversy 
over the doctrine of resistance'was reach- 
ed in the Sacheverell Trial at the beginning 
of 1710. Sacheverell was charged with preach- 
ing (and subsequently printing) two seditious 
O 
sermons at Derby assizes on August 15th and 
at St. Paul's, London, on November 5th 1709 
respectively. Complaint was made of these 
sermons in the House of Commons on December. 13 
and Sacheverell was ordered to attend at the 
Bar of the House, which he did the following 
day. The Commons, having received Sacheverell's 
confession that he preached the said sermons, 
immediately ordered-his impeachment. The trial 
began on the 27th February 1709/10 and lasted 
till March 23rd. Since the trial of the seven 
Bishops in 1688 no other trial aroused such 
(1) The communication of sin. 
(2) The peril of false brethren. The printed 
sermon had a great popularity. It was said that 
100,000 were issued. See The thoughts of a 
country_ gentleman upon reading Dr. Sacheverell's 
Tryal, etc. (1710) p. 6. 
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widespread popular interest as did the 
impeachment of Sacheverell. 
At this " time -the Whig ministry was sub- 
jected to much bitter attack`by'their oppon- 
ents. 'A wave of - High-Church Toryism was 
spreading throughout the-country and the cer- 
tainty of the ultimate succession of the House 
of Hanover was by no'means-yet secured. The 
Whigs'believed that a-restoration of the House 
of Stewart was within the bounds of practical 
politics if-the people could be made'to believe 
that the Revolution was unjust and therefore 
the reigns of William and Anne, based on that 
illegal act, usurpations. The impeachment of 
Sacheverell was promoted by a Whig House 'of 
Commons not ostensibly with any desire to pun- 
' 
ish the prisoner but to provide themselves 
with a public forum whence they might vindi- 
cate to the whole nation the justice of the 
Revolution and the justice of the Toleration. 
Act. It was to be a test case. The object 
ofthe trial; as stated by'Dolbenl,. was "to. 
obtain an occasion, in-the most public and 
III. ii. 1. 
authentic manner, to avow the principles, 
1o 
and justify the means, upon which the present 
, government and 
Protestant succession are 
founded and established". Sacheverell himself 
was of. no account. He was "an-inconsiderable 
tool of a party" according to Stanhope. But 
the Whigs wanted a judgment which "shall 
determine, what doctrines of this kind shall 
or shall not be preached". 
0 
Whether the impeachment was wise or not: 
from the Whig point of viewl, it was at least a 
fortunate event for students of the Revolution 
period, for it provides an excellent exposition 
on Revolution principles. We must, however, 
note that both sides spoke with more moderation 
than they were wont to do ina less public 
forum. The managers for. the Commons and the-. 
0 
counsel for the defence were less uncompromis- 
ing than their protagonists out of doors. 
(1) S. T., xv, 168. 
(2) S. T. xv, 134. Sacheverell in his speech 
at the trial referred to this: "I amp it seems, 
an insignificant tool of a party not worth 
regarding". S. T., xv, 364. 
(3) S. T., xv, 134. See Appendix I1 Note 50. ' 
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There were four Articles exhibited 
against Sacheverell. a. The 
peamble stated 
that he had attempted to "undermine and- 
subvert Her Majesty's Government and 
Protestant succession as by law established" 
with a "wicked malicious and seditious in--k- 
tention". - The first Article was worded as ,.,.. 
follows: - 
. 
"Hei the said Henry Sacheverell in his 
said sermon preach'd at St. Paul's doth 
suggest and maintain, that the necessary 
means us'd to bring about the said happy 
Revolution, were odious and unjustifiable: 
that his late Majesty in his Declaration. 
-disclaim'd the least 
Imputation 
of resis=4 
tance, and that to impute resistance to 
the. said Revolutionl. is to cast black and 
odious colours upon his late Majesty and 
the said Revolution". 0 
This Article was the most importantjýand 
it was on this. one that Sacheverell was osten. 
sible condemned. 
© 
The second 'Article recited . 
that: - 
"the said Henry Sacheverell in his sermon 
preach'd at St. Paul's doth suggest and 
(1) S: T., xv, 38. 
(2) Lechmere said that "all parts of the 
design of the prisoner center" in the first 
article - Trial. S. T., xv 59. Sir Joseph Jekyll said: "The whole'charge 
centers in this article. " S. T., xv, 96. 
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maintain, that the aforesaid,, toleration, 
granted by law is unreasonable, and the 
allowance of it unwarrantable". o. 
To the Whigs the Toleration Act was the 
keystone of the Revolution, arch. Though 
the Whigs in the, House of Commons were neces- 
sarily conformists they stoutly. defended the 
.. 
non-conformist Protestants. Thatthe Tolerat- 
. 
ion Act was never repealed. shows . that public 
opinion was strongly in its favour. The Tories 
even in*their period of triumph from 1710 to 
1714 did not make any attempt to expunge it 
from the Statute 
. 
Book... But the Whigs feared a 
revival, of High-Toryism$.. And. should Toryism 
succeed . 
to the extent of repealing, the , 
Toler- 
ation, then. it seemed to the Whigs that the 
whole Revolution Settlement must collapse. 
There was nothing in the sermon that Sachev- 
erell said against resistance that, had not 
been said a hundred times-elsewhere more vio. 
lently. Therefore the question naturally 
arise6; "why was Sacheverell impeached when 
(1) S. T., xv, 38-39. 
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others were untouched? The answer seems 
to be found in the second Article. The 
sermon was a most violate diatribe against 
the Low Churchmen who, to"Sacheverell, 
showed too friendly leanings towards the 
Dissenters. The Whig ministry was-attacked 
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for encouraging Dissenters and for preparing 
the way for the downfall of the Anglican 
Church. Even in this attack Sacheverell had 
been forestalled by the author of the Memor_ 
Jai of the Church of England. If the author 
of this work had been known and had the Whigs 
been in the same strategic position in 1705 as 
they were in 1709/10, he would have been as worthy 
a scapegoat as Sacheverell. But taking the 
(1) Dunton, in his wrath against Sacheverell, 
equalled him in his invectives. He called 
Sacheverell "an unaccountable wretch", a 
"bully-errant" ý "a Jacobite pulpit drummer. " 
Sacheverell's hatred for the Dissenters he 
said, was "so inveterate (that like a true 
factor of the Prince of Darkness) he would 
send 'em to Hell by shoals. " He had "a heart 
set on fire, from Hell, a tongue dip'd in that 
infernal lake, and the impudence of the father 
of lies"9 etc., etc. - The bullbaiting or. 
Sach-ell dress d up in fireworks. 1709)o 
(2) See above, p. 128. ' 
I 
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altered situation into account and 
Sacheverell's outspokenness against the 
Low Churchmenj, one, can more easily under- 
stand why he was. selected for public censure. 
A summary of the sermon will, show that 
Sacheverell's main. concern was for, the Church 
of England and that-his reference to reSis- 
tance at the Revolution was only subsidiary 
to his main theme. ,. " 
(1) Although the sermon at the Derby Assizes 
was included in the indictment only the 
dedication was referred to, anc even that was 
ignored in the Trial. " 
III. 
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II The sermon. 
Preaching on the perils of St Paul among 
false'brethreng he drew a parallel between 
the church at Corinth and the Church of Eng- 
land. 
® The Church ' of England q he said y was 
_rent 
and divided by factions and schismatical 
, 
impostors, and her doctrine corrupted and { 
defiled. - This was done not, only by'our pro-' 
. 
fessed enemies but-by our pretended friends 
and false brethren 
He proposed to define a false brother in 
relation to the church, in relation to the "- 
statel and in relation to his fellow citizens. 
In church-matters, Sacheverell attacked all 
who denied that episcopacy was of divine 
apostolical institution. He railed against 
those who would barter the Catholic doctrines 
of the Church of England for a "mungrell-union 
of all sects" and who would assert that separ- 
0 
ation from her communion was no schism, that 
schism was no damnable sin, that occasional 
(1) S. T., xv, 73-75. 
(2) Ibid., 75. 
III. ii. 2.15"6 
conformity was no hypocrisy., If "the modish 
and-fashionable criterions of a true church- 
man" $ 
exclaimed Sacheverell, , are compliance' 
with Dissenters in both public and private 
affairs, promotions of their interests'in 
elections l'adefence of : their tender -con- 
sciences, and .. piety , 'excuse of their separ- 
ation from, the Church of England and putting 
the blame on that church for carrying matters 
too high, then "God deliver us from such false 
brethren. " 
In regard to the state, Sacheverell dealt 
I 
with political obedience. He began by admitting 
(1) S. T., xv, 76-78. 
Sacheverell in his defence, pleaded that, 
the Toleration Act merely excused certain men 
from the penalties of-the law. The act did not 
grant toleration in the sense that it recognised 
the lawfulness of schism. In justice to Sachev- 
erell, it must be rembered that Burnet wrote : 
"The toleration does not at all justify their 
separation : it only takes away the force of 
penal laws against them : there, as lying, in 
common discourse, is still a sin, and ingratitude 
is a base thing though there is no law against 
it : so separating from a national body as from 
the pdblib worship, is certainly an ill thing... 
so that the toleration is only a freedom from 
punishment, and does not alter the nature of the 
thing. " - Hist., vii p. 176. 
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that constitutions of different govern- 
' ments varied-so that there could . be no "one, 
universal-rule, as the scheme and measure of 
obedience, that may square, to every one. of 
them. " But .a maxim which must apply - to , all 
governments is that no innovation should be 
allowed in the fundamental constitution of 
any state without a very pressing and un- 
avoidable necessity for it. Anyone who singly 
or in private capacity should attempt it, is 
a traitor to the state. These positions, 
which, Sacheverell laid down, were quite in 
keeping with the doctrine of resistance., But) 
when he applied them to the English constit- 
ution, he did not disguise his attack on the 
Whigs. The constitution of both church and 
state, he said, were so contrived "to the 
mutual suppvtt and assistance of one another, 
that 'tis hard, to say whether the doctrines 
of the Church of England contribute more to 
authorize and enforce our iw civil laws, or 
our laws to maintain and defend the doctrines 
of our church. " The constitution of one 
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cannot be altered without its having an 
effect on the constitution of the other. 
"So that:.. whoever presumes to innovatelw, .r 
'alter or misrepresent any point in the Art- 
igle s -'of the - faith of our-church ought to be 
arraigned= as a traitor to our, state,,: hetero- 
doxy in the doctrines of-the one, naturally. 
producing'and almost certainly inferring ; ý. 
rebellion, and high treason in, the other. ",. 
That this. is not a-"highflown-paradox". will 
be, -evident if we examine the doctrine of rests. 
tance. 
"The grand security of our government, and 
the very pillar upon which it stands', is 
founded upon the steady. belief of the 
. subjects' 
obligation to an absolute and 
unconditional obedience to the supreme 
powerl'in all things lawful, and the utter 
illegality of resistance upon any pretence 
whatsoever. " 
But this doctrine-of the church was now 
ridiculed "as an unfashionable, superannuated... 
dangerous tenet. " Our new preachers and new 
politicians tell is that the doctrine is in- 
consistent with the right, liberty and pro- 
perty of the people who have invested in them 
the power to "cancel their allegiance at 
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pleasure, and call their sovereign to account 
for high treason against his subjects" and to 
dethrone and murder him for a criminal as they 
did with Charles I. Ourýenemiesf' said Sachev- 
erell, think they can "effectually stop-our 
mouths" by citing the Revolution in defence 
of the doctrine of resistance. "But°certainly 
they are the greatest enemies of that, and his 
late majesty, and the most ungrateful for the. 
deliverance,. who endeavour to cast such black\ 
and odious colours upon both. " 'William III 
disclaimed all right from resistance and 'a 
pamphlet which pleaded conquest, by which 
resistance was inferred, was burned. Parlia- 
6 
ment gave him the crows upon no other title 
but the vacancy of the throne, "so tender were 
they of the regal rights, and so averse to 
infringe the least tittle of our constitution. " 
Not only the republican faction but pro- 
fessed sons of the Church of England now jus- 
tify the Rebellion of 1641, and in face of the 
doctrines of the church "manifestly defend the. 
resistance of the supreme power, under a 
(1) S. T., xv, 79-81.0 ' 
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new-fangled notion of self-defence. " CD Sach- 
everell quoted Burnet, as saying that if the 
right of deposition was to be allowed, it, were 
better-i to be in the hands of-the-pope than 
of the people 
© God is the only ruler of 
princes. -'-If the- doctrine of'resistance were 
ailowed, "A prince... will be the breath of,, ' 
his subjects' nostrils, to be blown in, or, 
out, at the caprice, and pleasure and a worse 
vassal than even the meanest of his guards. " 
Q 
Continua Sacheverell made a furious 
onslaught-on-the Dissenters' schools, which, 
under the shelter of the Toleration Act, cherish- 
ed monsters and vipers in our bosoms, scatter-- 
ed their pestilence at noon-day, and thus 
threatened to undermine our constitution. ® 
In the same forcible language, Sacheverell 
(1) S. T., xv, 81. This was Hoadly's argument. 
(2) Ibid., 82. The quotation from Burnet is in 
his Vindication of the Church of Scotland. 
(Glasgow, 1673, pp. 68-69: 
0 (3) S. T., xv, 829 
(4) Ibid. j . 83.. 
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went on to condemn toleration and latitudi- 
narianism. He attacked ". schismaticks who 
would intrude upon us a wild negative idea' 
of a national church, so as to incorporate 
themselves into a body, as true members of it ; 
whereas 'tis evident that this latitudinarian, 
heterogeneous mixture of all persons of what- 
faith soever uniting in Protestantcy... would 
render it the most absurd, contradictory and 
self-inconsistent body in the world. " He 
launched a bitter tirade against comprehen 
i 
sion which was attempted ! 'within our memory" 
and which, if'it had succeeded, would have. 
turned "our house of prayer a den of thieves. " 
He saw the Church of England ruined by her 
false brethren. Furthermore, comprehension 
is not only a danger to the church';. it is 'a 
danger to the state. For although these false 
brethren submit to the government-, "their 
. '(1) S. T.,. xv, 84. 
(2) Ibid., 84. 
(3) Ibid., 85. See Appendix. 11 Note 51. 
I 
III. ii. 2.162 
obedience is forced and constrained, and 
therefore so treacherous and uncertain as 
never to be trusted, because proceeding upon 
no principle, but mere interest and ambition; 
and whenever that changes, their allegiance 
must follow it t and therefore. (to use their 
own expression) are as much occasional loyal- 
ists to the state as they are occasional 
conformists to the church ; that iss they, 
will betray either when it is in their power, 
and they think it for their advantage. ' 
That their latitudinarian and rebellious 
principles will sting us to death is obvious' 
from the treasonable reflections they publish 
on the queen's title. They deny that she has 
any hereditary right to the throne. They make 
her a creature of their own power, and tell 
use that by the, same principles they. placed 
a crown on her head, they may reassume it at 
their pleasure *o 
(1) S. T., xv, 86. 
(2) Ibid., 87. 
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III : The Trial. 
In answer to the first article charged 
against him, Sacheverell replied that he did 
noti cast black and odious colours upon his 
late majesty and the Revolution, but barely 
asserted "the utter illegality 'of resistance 
to the supreme power upon any. pretence what- 
soever : for which assertion he humbly con- 
ceives he hath the authority, of the Church 
of England. " He then quoted the words against N 
rebellion in the Book, of Homilies and pointed 
out, quite rightly, that they are affirmed in 
the Thirty-nine Articles to which he was, as 
a clergyman, required_to subscribe by several 
acts of parliament, 'in particular, 13 Eliz., 
0 
cap. 121 confirmed by 5 Anne, cap. 5. "The " 
. said Henry Sacheverell doth with all 
humility 
(1) S. T., xv, 42-43. 
13 Eliz., cap. 12 was "An act for-the 
ministers of the Church to be of sound relig- 
-ion. " All ministers were required by the act, 
to subsctibe to the Articles of 1562.5 Annas, 
cap. 5 was "An act for securing the Church of 
England as by law established. " By this statute 
13 Eliz., cap. 12 and 13 & 14 Car. 2, cap. 4 
"shall remain and be in full force for ever. ", 
The whole act was included*in Article XXV of 
the Treaty of Union, 5 Anne, cap. 8. 
Cf. above, p. 107. 
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aver the illegality of'resistance on any, 
pretence whatsoever to be the, 'doctrine of-the 
" Church of England, and to have been ''the 'gener- 
al--opinion' of our most orthodox and able 
divines, from-the time of the-Reformation to 
this day. " 
0 
In"answer to-the charge that he had' sugg- 
ested that William had disclaimed all-right 
from resistänce, Sacheverell replied that he 
had referred only to conquest. This was true, 
but he had'used conquest-and resistance as 
synonymous term 
© 
and, therefore f by " pleading 
that-there had been no conquest he was-inferr. 
ing there had been no resistance. Sach- 
everell's reference to conquest in the sermon, 
had been obscure, and his counsel, Harcourt, 
-confessed that he. could not easily comprehend 
(l)- S. T., xv, 43., Cf. above, chap. 1. 
It must be admitted that Sacheverell was 
right. Cf. A defence of Dr Sacheverell; or 
passive obedience'prov'd to be the doctrine of 
" the Church of England j etc. (1710) Cf. also The doctrine of passive obedience: -. 
of En land, etc. (1710) 
(2) These two terms, as Sacheverell must have 
known)were not synonymous. See below, chap. 4, 
sect. 1. - 
r 
III. ii. 3. 165 
it himself. But Sacheverell, by quibbling 
over the exact words he had used, could not 
evade the. real meaning of. the words as con- 
veyed by the context. As the Solicitor-Gener- 
al (Sir Robert Eyre) said, his excuse was 
"a mere shift Sand evasion. ', '. He had upheld 
the view that the Convention had given the 
. crown 
to William on the sole ground of the 
vacancy of the throne. It is quite obvious, 
that Sacheverell, by supporting the Revolut- 
ion and the doctrine of non-resistance, at the 
same'time, was insinuating that the Whig 
theory that the Revolution was based-, on resis- 
(1) He pleaded that Sacheverell had expressed 
himself "in an obscure manner; I must confess, 
I can't easily comprehend him my self. " - S. T., 
xv, 212. Harcourt adopted the explanation of the 
school of Lloyd. "The gentlemen of the House of 
'Commons 
declare they mean the resistance of the 
subjects to their sovereigns but resistance, 
" where the doctor mentions his 
late majesty to 
have disclaim'd its cannot have that meaning: 
he was a sovereign prinee, and might resist 
whom he pleased. " - Ibid. 
This was an extraordinary attitude to take. 
It contradicted Sacheverell's own explanation. 
And it contradicted his own assertion that there 
was resistance. Resistance was not admitted by 
the conquest school. See below, chap. 41 sect. l. 
(2) S. T., xv, 104. 
.ý 
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tance was false. His first excuse l, therefore, 
was that he had referred to'conquest. His 
. second excuse was much more ingen. ous. The 
people, he said, to whom he'had referred as 
casting black-and odious'colours on the'Revol- 
ution were not those who asserted resistance, 
but those who claimed that they had the right 
to call their sovereign to account for high 
treason against his subjects and-to dethrone. 
and murder him for a criminal. "Unless, there- 
' 
fore, " said Sacheverell, "those who impute 
resistance to the Revolution, be the same-with 
those new preachers and new politicians above 
r 
specified, the said Henry Sacheverell affirms 
nothing concerning them. "® The prosecution did 
not do justice to this interpretation. The fact 
is-that Sacheverell's description of the doc- 
trine of resistance was a travesty, and the 
Whigs were bound to agree with him that, those 
. who used the Revolution to justify such extreme 
4 
(1) See Appendix I, Note 52. 
(2). S"T.., xv, 42. 
+ ýý . 
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views did, without doubt, cast black and 
odious colours on the Revolution. But, of 
course-however ingenious his'explanation 
might bei it is obvious that Sacheverell had 
no desire to vindicate"the,, doctrine of resis- 
tance. His sole aim was to blacken it by, im- 
puting to it the worst tenets that he could .,, 
imagine. 'But he believed that if the prose- 
cution accepted these two explanations, they 
could not charge him with denying resistance 
the Revolution. his at In reply, he would-` 
neither deny nor` affirm resistance. ' Thus the 
Commons at least won'a moral victory in the 
first round of the contest when'Sacheverell 
would not clear himself by categorically 
stating that he believed that there was resis- 
tance. 
The case for the prosecution depended on 
the acceptance of the fact that there was re- 
sistance ý in 1688. "Every one knows, " said the -4 
Attorney-General (Sir J. Montague), "that 
knows anything of the Revolution, that, the 
0 
Prince of Ora gelcame over hither with an armed 
force. " -That there was resistance, said 
(1) S. T., xv, 55. 
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Jekyll, is "a fact as clear as the sun at- 
noonday. " 
O 
This 'fact''.. as we have seen, had 
.- not always 
been accepted by the Whigs them- 
selves. But proof was not required, for the 
fact was not challenged by the defence. They 
admitted that there was resistance, but they 
differed, as-we shall see, from the prosecut- 
ion in the exact, significanee to be put upon.,, 
that term. 
Having asserted this fact, the Commons 
admitted that the issue of the trial depended 
on the acceptance of the single case of resis-* 
tance at the Revolution. The managers for the 
House of Commons would not commit themselves 
to the enunciation of a general doctrine Of 
r .. 
resistance, but confined themselves to the 
particular case of resistance at the Revol- 
ution. Lechmere, Jekyll, Holland and Walpole, 
who were among the managers for the House of 
Commons, all stated emphatically that the laws 
and Homilies against rebellion were clear and. 
were laid down in general terms. But the 
Revolution was a case of necessity and that 
(1) S. T., xv, 100., ;. 
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necessity was its justification. Holland 
practically accepted the' doctrine of non-- 
resistance by adopting the'argument. that 
-exceptions are allowed to the most rigid 
rule. 
"There is no law more positive and express 
than that which enjoins the observation of 
the Sabbath.. . But yet we know that necessity 
makes an allow'd exception to that general 
law... because the Sabbath was made for man, 
and not man for the Sabbath. " 
Sir John Hawles went even further. He admitted 
that the doctrine of non-resistance was a- l' 
Christian doctrine. He agreed with the doctrine 
as set forth in the sermon, But the Revolution 
was justified by- acts passed. Fby parliament, the 
supreme power in the state. Therefore Sach- 
everell must own th6'justice of the Revolution 
or resist the authority of these acts. For him 
the latter alternative ought-to be untenable, 
it'being inconsistent with the doctrine, of 
(1) See Appendix I9 Note 53. 
(2) S. T: $ xv, 111. Dee, Sacheverell's counsel, 
concurred in this opinion. Ibid., 239. 
(3) Ibid., 119. It was actually older than 
Christianity, he said, for it was as ancient 
as government, because it was impossible that 
government could subsist unless supported by 
its subjects. " - Ibid., 119. 
(4) Ibid., 120. 
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1 
non-resistance 
On the-fifth day of, the trial, Harcourt 
opened the case for the defence.. He began by 
making an admission. 
"I admit" he said, "the doctor has in 
general terms asserted this proposition 
of the illegality of resistance to the 
supreme power on any pretence whatsoever. " 
But he hoped to show that the resistance at 
the Revolution was not inconsistent with this 
doctrine 
? 
"And surely none can shew themselves 
truer friends to the Revolution than those who 
-1prove that the Revolution may stand without 
impeaching t1ie doctrines of our church or any 
fundamental: law of the kingdom. " So-far were 
the defence from calling in°question the jus- 
tice of the RevolutXbn,, he said, that. they 
looked on themselves to-, be arguing for it. 
G 
Harcourt, having admitted that there was 
resistance and that Sacheverell had preached 
the doctrine of non-resistance. adopted the 
(1) See, "Appendix, I, Note 54. 
(2) S. T., xv, 119. : -, (3) . 
Ibid., 200. 
(4) Ibid., -. 211. (5) Ibid., 200. 
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argument of the prosecution that there are 
exceptions to all, general rules. 
"'Tis'objected by the prosecution if'in 
no case whatsoever 'tis lawful to resist, 
'twas then unlawful at the Revolution,, 
Such a doctrine must be a slavish doc- 
trine. An unlimited passive obedience 
is a slavish notion, "0 
He hoped to show that Sacheverell could be 
proved guilty only. if it were shown that he 
had stated explicitly that the Revolution was 
not such a case for exception. 
He therefore defended Sacheverell on the` 
the grounds that he did not explicitly state 
that the Revolution was not such a case for 
justifiable exception 
? 
Sacheverell, in his 
speech on the eighth day of the trial, referr- 
ed to the injustice 6f charging him with neg- 
ative crimes - not for what he had said, but 
for what he.. had omitted to say? His objection 
was not groundless, for Jekyll, in his reply, 
deliberately charged him with this omission 
. (J)- S. T. 7 xv, 201. 
(2) See'"Appendix I, Note 55. 
(3). See Appendix I1 Note 56. 
(4) See Appendix I, Note 57. 
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To recapitulate the evidence so far, we 
172, 
find that both sides admitted resistance in I 
. 1688, that it was an exceptional case, and 
justified only by necessity. The emphasis put 
upon the plea for exceptions to rules favoured 
, the defence, 
for there was no need for the 
prosecution to adopt the argument'unless they 
accepted the validity of the doctrine of non- 
resistance. But the point which must be stressed 
now ýis the fact-that-resistance was admitted, 
for when we consider what was meant by'resis-I 
4%4; "un, 
tance we find- that. ,,. 
the prosecution nor the- 
defence required the exception argument. Not 
only was it superfluous, but it led to grave 
inconsistencsae. 
The point which we have now to consider is 
by far the most important. What was-the con- 
stitution of the'supreme'power against which 
there might be or might not be resistance'? 
0 
(1) Swift, writing to Peterborough in Feb- 
ruary, 1711 said : "This dispute would soon 
be ended, if the divines who write on each 
side, would plainly tell us what the object 
of this passive obedience, is in our country. " 
Quoted by Sir Walter Scott, in his edition of' 
Swift's Works, xv, p., 423. 
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Speakers on both sides differed on what they 
thought Sacheverell'meant himself by the 
phrase 'supreme power. ' Hawles, for the pro- 
secution, went so far as to. i? say that Sachev- 
erell did'not define his meaning either in the 
sermons or in his answer. That, at -arty - rate , 
gave the defence an advantage. 'But for our 
purpose', there is more value in what the pro- 
secution and'defence'thought Sacheverell ; "- 
meant than in what he actually did mean. A 
large part of the debate was to'rest on theirs 
respective interpretations of supreme power. 
The resistance, to'whi'ch'the Commons 
referred, was undoubtly to James, that iss to 
the executive. The Attorney-General, therefore, 
in order to prove that Sacheverell condemned 
that resistance, said that the supreme power, 
against which Sacheverell maintained there 
could be no resistance, was the regal power, 
So far as there is any evidence in the sermon, 
Montague would appear to be right in his 
inference. If the regal power was the supreme 
(1) S. T., xv, 119. 
(2) Ibid., 55. 
(3) Cf. above, p. 159. 
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power. then Sacheverell was guilty, of con- 
demning, the resistance used at theýRevoLution 
since he preached absolute non-resistance to 
the supreme power-. But if the regal power was 
not the supreme power, then there was no con- 
nection between the condemnation of resistance 
to the, supreme power and the resistance used 
in 1688. 
Harcourt admitted that there was resistance 
in 1688, but not that there was any resistance 
to the supreme power. Of the resistance of-. 
ý 
I 
which the Commons spoke, said Harcourt, 
.., 
"The doctor has made no -mention in. his sermon- he has indeed affirm'd the utter 
illegality of resistance on any pretence'* 
whatsoever to the supreme power; but it 
can't be pretended there was arty. such 
resistance used at-the Revolution" the 
supreme power in this kingdom is he 
legislative power, and the Revolution 
took effect by the, Lords and Commons con-, . curring and assisting in it. " O 
Lechmere and Hawle 
©both 
agreed that the 
supreme power in England was lodged in the 
(1) S. T.., xv, 196. ., w 
(2) Ibid., 61. 
(3) Ibid., - 119. 
ý` 
.ý' 
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king- in-parliament. Lechmere said that } if- 
the executive endeavoured to subvert the 
government, the injured part, of the con- 
stitution had the right to save itself.. Hei. 
thus made the two statements : firstly, that. - 
the supreme power was parliament, and 
secondly, that the resistance at the Revol- 
ution was made to the executive. Howq. then7.,, 
could he assert that the Revolution was an 
instance of resistance to the supreme power ?" 
Following Hawles, eight speakers support 
ed the indictment without mentioning the 
meaning of supreme power. They at least 
avLded what was, for the-prosecution, a 
delicate subject. How dangerous a topic it . 0- 
was was shown by the next speaker to mention 
this subject. Serjeant Parker, supporting the 
fourth Article, made a speech remarkable for 
its inconsistences. On the assumption that. 
Sacheverell was a Jacobite, he argued that 
Sacheverell had declared that all resistance 
(1) S. T., xv, 61. Cf. Grotius, below, p. 338. 
Defoe, arguing for the right of resistance, 
. said that we, had a . right to-resist Jaynes .., because he did not possess the supreme power. 
A speech without doors. (1710) p. 9. 
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to the supreme power was unlawful, but had 
insinuated that he did, not thereby mean 
resistance to the queen. ThaVis to say, 
'Parker held that Sacheverell regarded parlia- 
went as the supreme power against which there 
could, be no resistance, and that he regarded 
resistance to the executive as lawful. Sach- 
everell and the enemies of the queen, "he sai4, 
will cling to this doctrine of non-resistance 
(against parliament) and condemn the resistance 
made against, James (the executive) and any 
resistance that shall be made against the 
1 11 11 
" Pretender' when he shall come. 
® 
Harcourt took special notice of this part 
of Serjeant Parker's speech. Parker, in his 
J 
endeavour to infer that Sacheverell's sermon 
was an incitement to rebel against Queen Anne, 
suggested that Sacheverell insinuated that 
resistance to Anne, that iss the supreme 
executive power, was not illegal. But the 
resistance, which the Commons were justifying, 
was resistance to James. The Commons might argue 
that resistance to James was justified because 
(1) S. T., xv, 177-178. See Appendix Is Note 58. 
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he was a tyrant, but unjustifiable when 
applied to Anne. But the distinction between 
the merits of James and Anne was beside the 
point when the question of right was the issue. 
Harcourt, therefore was justified in declar- 
e 
"But had he [Sacheverell] in express terms 
affirmed the unlawfulness of such resis- 
tance C to Anne 3 yet by the same arguments 
which have been used, the doctor would 
have been told he had been preaching a 
slavish doctrine. " (D 
Dodd, who spoke after Harcourt on Sach- 
everell's behalf, also maintained that the 
supreme power was parliament, and that, there- 
fore, the propagation of the doctrine of non- 
resistance could be no reflection on the Revol- 
ution. The executive `only had been resisted, 
andq consequently, the doctrine had not been 
violated. 
d 
The next speaker, Constantine Phipps, 
discussed the same question. He pointed out 
the inconsistences in the speeches for the, 
(1) S. T. l xv, 196. 
(2) Ibid.., 220. 
I 
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prosecution, and the conflicting interpre- 
tations of supreme'power, one speaker hold- 
178 
ing that it meant the executive, another 
that it meant parliament. He argued that the 
charges made by Montague and Parker could not 
both be true. Montague said that Sacheverell, 
regarded-the executive as the supreme power, 
If this-were true, then Parker's objection 
that Sacheverell allowed resistance to. Anne 
in favour of the Pretender, must fall to the 
ground. Ifs on the other liand,, Parker's 
charge. were the, correct one, namely, that 
Sacheverell allowed resistance to the executive, 
then the first Article must be decided in his 
favour, for the resistance at-the Revolution, 
on the assertion of the managers for the Commons 
themselves, was made to the executive. 
So far Phipps argument was sound, but he 
was unfortunate in the rest of his reasoning. 
He paraphrased Sacheverell's enunciation of the- 
(1) above I p. 173. 
(2) above, p. 175. 
(3) S. T., xv, 226. 
(3j 
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doctrine of non-resistance as follows : 
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"An absolute and unconditional obedience 
to the laws made by the Queen, Lords and 
Commons in Parliament assembled, and the 
utter illegality of resisting such laws 
on any pretence whatsoever. " 0 
This, said Phipps, is. a universal truth and 
is an answer to all that has been said, against" 
Sacheverell on the first Article, 
"for all the gentlemen have founded their 
discourse on a supposition, that the doc- 
"-tor preach'd up:. an absolute unconditional 
obedience to, and utter illegality of re- 
sistance of, the queen; whereas he preaches 
up the illegality of resisting the supreme 
power-and that in all things lawful. " 4 
Phipps got badly entangled in his own 
argument. H9 himself had shown that his own 
statement, given above, had no foundation, 
because 'supreme power! had been interpre- 
ted both'as executive and as legislature. Phipps 
said that-even if Sacheverell did condemn 
resistance to, the executive, 'he did not there- 
" ., by reflect on the Revolution because James as- 
executive had actually been resisted. To-explain 
(1) S. T., xv, 230. Had this been a true 
interpretation of Sacheverell's meaning 'the 
Whigs could have had no quarrel with this 
statement. Cf. below, p. 294. 
(2) Ibid., 230. 
(3) above, p. 178. 
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this inconsistent statement, he deduced from 
Sacheverell's sermon the aphorism "That where' 
the thing commanded by the supreme power is 
lawful, the resistance given to it must be 
unlawful. "0 But James's commands before the 
Revolution were unlawful.. Therefore, resistance 
y to James was lawful. Unless Phipps meant that 
parliament could pass unlawful acts (and he 
nowhere makes sucha suggestion) then he must 
have meant that all resistance to the legis- 
lature was unlawful. -As an expression of per- 
sonal opinion it is worthy of attention-but 
he had no-warrant for inferring it was Sach- 
everell's opinion. -For, Sacheverell had said : 
"An absolute and unconditional obedience to 
the supreme power in all things lawful, and the 
utter illegality of resistance upon any pre- 
tence whatsoever. " Sacheverell, "-it will be 
seen, attached the word 'lawful' to''obedience' 
not to 'resistance. "' He meant, obviously, 
(1) S. T., xd, 229. 
(2) Ibid., 230. 
'"-ý 
s 
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active obedience to-all things lawful, and 
passive obedience to all things unlawful for 
the latter part of his statement precludes 
any right to resist whether the commands 
are lawful or unlawful. If Sacheverell had 
said that resistance to commands that were 
unlawful was lawful, then there was no 
occasion for Phipps to-adopt the argument, 
as he did, that: there'are exceptions to all 
general rules ® Phipps argued against himself 
when he did this. To plead that. Sacheverell' 
was "warranted in asserting such a general 
proposition (as the utter illegality of re- 
sistance on any pretence whatsoever] without 
mentioning the particular exeeption" he con- 
tradicted his own thesis that Sacheverell had 
made the general exeeption that it is lawful 
to resist unlawful commands of the supreme 
power. And he further weakened his own argu- 
ment by proceeding to a lengthy dissertation 
(1) Jekyll pointed, this'-out in his, reply. 
S. T., xv, 383. 
(2) Ibid., 230. 
(3) Ibid., 230. 
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on-the vindication of the doctrine of non- 
resistance and passive. *obedience in its 
extreme form as taught both-before and after 
the Revolution. 
On the eighth day of the trial-Sacheverell 
spoke on his own behalf. In his speech, he said : 
"My Lords, the resistance... by me con- 
demn'd, is no where by me applied to the. 
Revolution; nor is it applicable to the 
case of the Revolution, the supreme power 
not being then, resisted, " ° 
On the-ninth day the Commons began their 
reply to the defence made on . behalf of the i 
prisoner., Sir Joseph Jekyll noted the con- 
. cessions -which 
the counsel-for the.. defence 
had made. 
"N(y Lords , -the concessions-are these l that necessity creates' an exception to the, 
general rule of submission to the prince, 
that such exception is understood or 
implied in the laws that require such sub- 
mission, and that the case of the Revol- 
ution was a case of necessity. " Q) 
These concessions, thought Jekyll, proved 
the success of the prosecution. But he also 
(1) S. T. I xv,, 231 et seq. ' 
(2) Ibid., 366. 
(3)' Ibid., 380. 
, 
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maintained that. they were extorted from 
Sacheverell, in self-defence, and since they 
were not . 
in the sermon, Sacheverell. niust be 
judged by what he preached. 
By supreme power, said Jekyll, Sacheverell 
meant the executive power. ; "Now the Revol- 
_ution 
is, not, cannot be urg'd as an instance.. 
of the lawfulness of a ything, but of, resist- 
ing the supreme executive power acting in 
opposition to the'laws. "0 The doctor, in his 
speech-to the Lords said that there was no 
.j 
,, resistance; therefore, he meant that there was 
no resistance to the executive power.. 'The R 
Commons say that there was; and thusj, Sach- 
everell denies that, there was resistance and" 
thus condemns the Revolution., ¢ 
4 
To sum up. It seems to us that the case 
against Sacheverell was 'not"proven. ' it is 
true tht Sacheverell in'his sermon had spoken 
of the utter illegality of resistance against 
the supreme power on any pretence whatsoever. 
:, ,_".. (1) S. T. ,, xv , 3830' 
" (2)''. Ibid. 
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The defence admitted that-'there was resistance 
in 1688, and, 'therefore, the words taken at' 
their face value did suggest Sacheverell's`' 
guilt. But the evidence led in the trial 
showed that the full implication"of these 
phrases used by Sacheverell had to be examin- 
ed. The words 'resistance' and 'supreme power' 
had to be defined. The Commons admitted, by, --,,, -
implication, that the word 'resistance' had `.: 
no absolute significance. It' had a meaning \ 
only in relation to the phrase 'supreme power. ' 
The prosecution could*'agree'among 'themselves 
neither as"to the locus of'the supreme power 
nor as to what Sacheverell himself understood 
by that phrase. ` Phipps pointed out the weak- 
ness of the case for the prosecution very ..;: 
clearly and justly when he said : 
"But whichever of these gentlemen your 
Lordships shall be of opinion is in the 
right I beg leave to say that this may 'aV 
certainly be concluded anc inferr'd, 
that the construction of that sentence', r"'". '', 
must be. very doubtful, in which such 
learned men differ, and consequently 
cannot be a charge sufficient and cer- 
tain enough to ground a conviction for 
high crimes and misdemeanours. " CD 
(1) S. T. 
9 xv, 
226-79 "'ý ." 
ýý 
ý' - !yr. C, - "°j . 
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The doctrine of non-resistance had meant 
non-resistance'to the king who was the supreme 
power. It is clear, therefore, that Sacheverell 
and his counsel were putting a new interpre- 
tation on that doctrine by making=the parlia- 
ment the supreme'power against which there 
could be I no'resistance. 'But the' prosecution 
did'not`challenge this new interpretation. They 
made'two concessions to the defence. Firstly, 
they virtually admitted the' validity of a 'doc- ° '' 
trine of non-resistance. This'they did'by 
arguing for exceptions to all general rules. 
There was no point in'their pleading that-the' 
Revolution was an exception unless they meant 
it was an exception too, -some rule which con- 
demned resistance, and that rule was the doctrine 
of non-resistance. Secondly, they admitted the- 
new interpretation of the doctrine as relevant 
evidence. They accepted the defence's plea that 
resistance was a relative term and was applicable 
by the doctrine of non-resistance only'to the`supreme 
power. The prosecution, therefore, 
considered what Sacheverell meant by supreme 
power. 'And on this they could not agree. The 
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Attorney-General and Jekyll said.. that he', 
meant by supreme power the king. Parker said 
he meant thereby the parliament., How, then, 
could the prosecution maintain that Sacheverell 
had condemned resistance to the supreme power 
when they-could not agree among themselves 
what Sacheverell meant by that phrase ? 
Furthermore, Hawles, 'for. the prosecution, main- 
tained that the supreme power was parliament. 
That was the-argument of Harcourt, Dodd and Phipps. 
for the defence. And Sacheverell, in his reply, 
concurred with them., If, then, James was resisted 
and the supreme power was parliament, there, was 
no resistance in its relative sense. There could 
be no connection betwýen. Sacheverell's doctrine 
of non-resistance and the resistance used in 
1688. But the prosecution was not alone in this 
dilemma. The defence fell into as many inconsis- 
tences as the prosecution. Their admission of re- 
sistance and their plea that it was a justifiable 
exception to the doctrine of non-resistance was 
inconsistent with-: their argument that there was no 
a 
resistance in its relative sense and therefore 
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no breach 'of the doctrine*' In fact, both aides 
became so entangled in the web of casuistry 
which they wove round the words used by 
Sacheverell in his sermon, that neither could 
escape its mesh with honour. 
It might have been apparent to both 
friends and foes that Sacheverell cast black 
and odious colours on the Revolution and that 
he was therefore morally guilty. But we do not 
think that he was legally guilty according to 
the Whig 'law' by which he was 
'being judged. 
It was a trial of party strength, and at the 
time the Whigs had a majority in both Houses. 
The Lords found him guilty, but only by a 
small majority and the- majority insisted on 
a purely nominal sentence. 
CHAPTER THREE `(continued) f y' 
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CHAPTER THREE : SECTION THREE 
1710-1714 
The wisdom of the Whigs is impeaching Sach-. 
everell has been much questioned. Burke 
heartily approved of the impeachment which, 
he said, afforded the Whigs with "the oppor- 
tunity of ,a clear, authentic, recorded declar- 
ation of their political tenets" and in fixing 
"Whig principles as they had operated in'the 
resistance to King James, and in the subsequent 
settlement. " But it cannot be, said that Burke's 
optimistic view was shared by Whigs at the, time 
of the. trial. - The more cautious Whigs viewed 
the proceedings with misgivings: 
' 
Outwardly, it 
looked as if the Tories had alone gained . 
G) 
Calamy admitted that from the. Whig point of 
view the trial was imprudent. He consoled him- 
self, however, with the reflection that "after 
(1) Burke, Appeal from the new to the old 
Whigs etc. (1791) in Works iiii pp. 43-44.. 
Cf. Appendix 1, Note 59. 
(2) See Appendix I, Note 60. 
(3) See Appendix It Note 61. 
(4) An historical account of my_ownlifeg ii, 
pp. 223-4. 
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all', upon looking back we have this to satis- 
fy us, that by means of the doctor's' trial, 
our constitution was... asserted by our whole 
legislature, in opposition to slavish maxims 
and principles, which, was most certainly some 
O 
advantage. " 
The Tories did not regard the verdict4ot 
the trial as. a condemnation of the doctrine 
of non-resistance. " They were elated at Sachev-. 
erell's light sentence and he was received as, a 
royal personage as he travelled across, -England, 
"The abdicated doctrine"t said an observer, 
"reviv'd is an instant`as ifs like Antaeus, it 
, 
had recover'd strength from being thrown to 
the ground. " Hoadly was assailedmore fiercely 
than ever and was branded as a preacher of 
(1) Calamy, op. cit., p. 234. 
(2) A letter to Sir J [osephl Blanks] concerning 
the Minehead doctrine, etc. L By William Benson 
(1711) p. 2. 
Cf. Matthew Tindal wrote : "Nay, tho one 
of the trumpeters of sedition is persecuted in 
a parliamentary way, yet that has had no other 
effect on his true brethren than to cause 'em 
to preach up with more fury than ever these 
Hellish doctrines. " - The Jacobitism _perjury and popery of High-Church priests. (1710) p. 11. 




Madan's bibliography f the Sacheverell 
pamphlets gives us some idea of the enormous 
interest in political philosophy aroused by 
the trial. Most of the pamphlets were 
written inc defence of Sacheverell and the 
doctrine of non-resistance. There were few 
works of any moment published after 1710 in 
defence of the doctrine of resistance. Hoadly's 
most ambitious work The origin and institution' 
of civil government appeared in that year. As' 
it was the most ambitious, so it was also 
the most unconvincing, work written by Hoadly 
, 
in defence of the Revolution.. Hoadly thereafter 
retired into the background and did not come 
again into prominence till the Bangorian Contro- 
versy. The Tories felt their position to be so 
strong that they could afford to treat him 
with contempt. Hoädiy, in the'work to which we 
have just referred,, attacked Atterbury among 
(1) Calamy, opo cit., iii p. 236. 
(2) Published in The Bibliographer, iii-iv, (1883) 
(3) See, for example, Crispin'the cobler's 
0 
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others. Atterbury, though he had already 
been prominent in convocation disputes, now 
first definitely joined in the resistance 
controversy with a pamphlet called The voice 
6 
of the people no voice of Gods There were now 
writers, too, on the opposite side. Thomas- 
Bradbury (though he had defended resistance 
earlier) came into prominence towards the close 
of Anne's reign with several pamphlets, the 
chief of which were Theocracy: the government 
of the Judges consider'd and applied to the 
Revolution (1712), The ass and the serpgn (1712) 
and The lawfulness of resisting tyrants argued... 
in defence of the Revolution (1714). Steele 
, 
of whom little had been previously heard, 
appeared in defence of the Revolution in his 
Crisis (1714) which evoked a reply from Swift© 
(1) Published in 1710. In his Mitre and the 
crown (1711) he said it was "heartily and 
readily granted" that "it be unlawful for 
subjects, of what order rank or degree soever 
clergy or laity to take arms upon any pretence 
whatsoeverg against their sovereign king, or 
queen. " pp. 4-5. 
(2) The public spirit of the Whigs set forth 
in their generous encöuragement of , he author 
"ö the Crisist etc. 1 
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" During the Tory ascendency of 1710 to'17141 
the doctrine of non-resistance returned to 
"4" 
its extreme form- whereby the queen was exalted 
to the`position of God's vicegerent - "The 
queen, the anointed of the Lord, "the breath of 
our nostrils. " With some"notable exceptions, 
to which we shall refer presently, no attempt 
was now made to reconcile the doctrine of non- 
resistance'with the Revolution, as it'häd'been, " 
for example, in the Sacheverell Trial. One 
pamphleteerg''who was typical of many, argued 
for abdication; that'there was'no resistance 
in 1688; `that the doctrine of non-resistance 
was the doctrine of the Gospels ("proved usque 
ad nauseam"); and that those who claimed for 
the-people the fountain and origisial of'power 
cast black and odious, colours on the Revolution 
0 
The aspect of the doctrine which received chief 
attention in the closing years of Anne's reign' 
(1) William Tilly, A return to our former 
good old principles and practic eý etc. (1710) 
P. 17. 
(2) A true defence of Henry Sacheverell D. D. 
in a letter to Mr D [olbel n. ' 1710 
.iý., 
. .i.. ýý .. 
i 
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was indefeasible hereditary right and was, 
consequently, closely bound up with the 
succession problem. It was no new phase of 
the teaching of the doctrine in Anne's reign, 
as we shall see later$'but after 1710 it 
, 
became the dominating one. 4 
The extreme form of the doctrine of non- 
resistance now so assiduously propagated, led 
to a corresponding extreme form of the doctrine 
of resistance. Bradbury, to whom reference 
has been made, tended to justify eveg tyrann= 
icide, a form of resistance which the Whigs had 
been careful to disavow. Furthermore, the Whigs 
had always been loathe to admit that James had 
been driven off the throne by an armed force f, 
but now many boasted that the Revolution had' 
been a military rebellion. 
It is not surprising, therefore, that 
there was a reaction against both extreme forms, 
But the potency of the doctrine of non-resist- 
ance is demonstrated by the fact that the 
attempt to reconcile the opposing doctrines 
resulted in a modified form of non-resistance. 
(1) See below, chap. 4ý sect. 3. 
III. iii. 
p 
When the Tories supplanted the Whigs in 
1710 9, Swift was employed by Harley to defend 
the new-Tory administration in the Examiner 
which had first appeared on August 3 of that 
year. Swift carried on fora year a most 
vigorous, attack on the , Whigs- and the -late - 
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Godolphin ministry. When the Tories were 
accused of being Jacobites, and abettors of 
arbitrary power, it is well to remember that 
both Harley and, Swift. had had leanings towards 
Whig politics. ' And while Swift condemned the 
Whig papers the Review and Obser: tator, written 
respectively by Defoe and Tutchin, whom he 
calls "two stupid illiterate scribblers"g-he 
reserved his bitterest invectives for the Tory 
(and Jacobite) Rehearsal written by Leslie of a 
whom he said : "His Rehearsal, and; the rest of 
his political paper, are more pernicious than 
those of the former two. " 
(1) See Robert W. Babcock's Swift's conversion 
to the Tory party in University of Michigan 
j ILLJ iiV GVJ. '.. # ' ý+baaý6 uaýýv Krau ii yvý a. a vMa rY iii' 
(1932) Mr Babcock overestimates Swi 's 
acceptance of Tory principles. 
(2) Examiner, No. 161 Nov. 16,1710. -. In Swift's 
Works ixe p. 
I,. 
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Swift, in his first äumber, complained 
that after the Revolution there began "the 
early practice" of "reproaching the-clergy 
with the. doctrine of divine right, passive- 
obedience and non-resistance. " This. was an 
injustice to the clergy, -,. The Whigs-paint the 
Tories blacker than they are and "among all 
the reproaches which the Whigs have flung 
upon their adversaries, there is none hath 
done them more service than. that of passive-, 
obedience, as they represent it, with the 
consequences of non-resistance, arbitrary ,., 
power, indefeasible right, tyranny, popery 
and what not. " Swift gives the doctrine as 
charged by the Whigs and as professed and 
practised by the Tories. According to swift, 
the Whigs-say that the doctrine of passive 
obedience means that a king holdS his power 
from God and is answerable only to him. Such 
a king is above the law and the cruellest 
tyrant must be submitted to in all . things: 
Even if his commands are unlawful, he cannot 
be resisted for that would be to resist God in 
the person of his vicegerent. The people were 
(1) Examiner, No. 14, Nov. 2,1710. Ibid. 9 p. -75. 
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made for him, not he for the people. His 
next heir, though a fool or a madman must 
succeed, for he has a divine indefeasible 
hereditary right which no act. of parliament 0 
can take from him. 'A king without this titlegf 
though he sits on ' the throne' by act of parl- 
isment, is an usurper while there is anywhere 
in the world a person with" an hereditary 
right. 
This, said Swift, is what the Whigs accuse 
the Tories of believing. TheWhigs will not 
allow anyone to affirm in general` that teed- 
is due to the supreme power 
On the other., passive obedience, 'as professed, 
by the Tories, is as'follows. ` '° 
The Tories think that in all' governments 
there must be an'absolute, unlimited supreme 
power to which passive obedience is due. This 
power rests with those who are entrusted with 
the making of laws. The legislature may 
pass or annul whatsoever laws it thinks fit*. 
and claim absolute obedience to them. In Eng- 
Examiner, No. 34 in Swift's Works, ixe 
pp. 21 -7. 
" (2) Ibid., p. 218. 
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land this power is lodged in the king and 
the two houses of parliament. '' The executive 
power is solely in the king, and while he 
administers the laws passed by parliament 
he may in no case:: be resisted. The Tories 
further believe that. this 'does not apply 
to a king who does not govern by law. He 
himself may not be resisted bpt his servants 
may. But should the king interpose his per=. 
sonal authority to support their insolence 
and illegality, then the people may resist 
him when they find no other remedy for their 
grievances. Even in this extremity there must 
be no violence'done to the person of the king. 
That theýTories-hold hese views was demon= 
strated by the active part they took in the 
Revolution. "Yet they see no reason for enter- 
ing upon so ungrateful a subject, or raising 
controversies upon its as if we were in daily 
apprehension of, tyrannyq under the reign of so 
excellent a princess. " As for the law of suc- 




is the best by its*own nature and is most 
agreeable to our own. constitution. But this 
right is defeasible by act of: parliament, 
"which is a truth so manifest, that no man 
who understands-the nature, of government, can 
be in doubt concerning it. " 
Another writer who attempted to reconcile 
the resistance at the Revolution with the doe- 
trine of non-resistance was the Rev. Benjamin 
4 
Gatton. In a sermon published in 1711, he 
endeavoured to justify the Revolution without 
abandoning the doctrine of non-resistance'in 
much the same way as Sacheverell's, couhsel 
and Swift had done. His analysis of rebellion 
is interesting. All resistance is against the 
laws or against the governors. The former is 
absolutely illegal, for although the laws may 
be unrighteous or oppressive they must be_ 
obeyed. Resistance against the governors may 
(1) Examiners No. 34, March 22,1711 in Swift's 
Works, ix, pp. 218-9. ý 
(2) The doctrine of non-resistance stated and 
vindicated. 
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be divided into two'categories t= (1) legal. 
(2) hostile. The first means resistance 
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through-courts of law. The'second`itself 
maybe divided into two classes %- (l)-private. - 
(2) public. Private resistance is absolutely 
unlawful for ' it is better for a few to suffer 
than a kingdom through the rebellion of the 
few. ' Public resistance, if it is offensive'', ' 
(i. e. if it invades the''just prerogative of 
the governor or his'life) is unlawful. Public 
defensive resistance is alone lawful. 'This' 
is justifiable when an oppressed nation takes 
up arms, not to invade the rights and preroga- 
tives of their prince, but to maintain their 
own natural rights and legal privileges? If 
a people cannot vindicate their rights even 
by force$ the laws of every nation are of no 
force or value, but may be violated at the 
pleasure of, an arbitrary' prince. "But yet 
though such-resistance as this, iss and may be 
lawful'in extraordinary cases, it is an exped- 
ient never to be used, but in the utmost 
(1)`. Op: 'cit., p. '6. (3) Ibid., p. 8, 
(2), Ibid., p. 7. ' (4) Ibid., p. 9. 
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necessity, and when nothing less can secure 
the established constitution of a people. '' 
This was the case at the Revolution. "They 
did not pretend to abridge the just prerog. 
ative of their prince. " 10 
It is obvious that the doctrine of non- 
resistance as outlined by Swift and Gatton 
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is. really the doctrine of resistance masquer- 
ading under another name. When we remember 
that Swift was employed by Harley to support, 
the Tory Ministry, Swift's analysis becomes 
very significant: for, what he wrote must be 
accepted as the official Tory point of view., 
The High-Church Tories, however, continued 
to propagate the doctrine in its extreme form, 
as we have pointed out. But the split in the 4 
Tory ranks, exemplified by the rivalry of 
Harley and Bolingbroke, showed that the extreme 
. form as preached 
by Sacheverell did lead to 
= Jacobitism. The Hanoverian Tories driven 
between Jacobitism and Whiggism4. inclined to- 
wards the latter. At any rate, the Whigs could 
(1) Ibid., p. 10. (2) Ibid. p. 11. 
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claim a victory when they succeeded in forc- 
ing Swift and the moderate Tories to admit 




The sovereign's title after 1689 according 
to'the doctrines of non-resistance and 
resistance: - 
1. By conquest. 
II. By possession: De facto kingship. 
III. By hereditary right.. " 
'LýýtA 





We have already seen that the Convention 
Parliament assiduously avoided the admission 
O 
of any claim to, depose James II. Parliament did 
not claim to be'a government-making organ. We 
have also seen that the assertion that James had 
abdicated involved difficulties in settling who ' 
was his successor. Even if James's abdication 
was legal, was William his legal successor? 
Many, apart from the non-juring Jacobites, had 
grave doubts. The pitfalls of the abdication " 
theory were avoided by the group of Williamites 
who asserted conquest. Their argument, as an 
answer to the non-jurors, appears to be the most 
plausible and unanswerable. The doctrine of 
non-resistance and passive obedience, taught by 
(1) above pp. 84-98 and pp. 109-111. 
(2) cf. Seeley, Introduction to political 
science (Eversly ed., ý18 6)j p. 240. 
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the church and hitherto universally accepted 
by the body of Englishmen, was in no way 
violated. Loyalty to that doctrine was professed. 
We were bound not to resist James, but at the 
same time we were not bound to assist him. 
0 
William, as a sovereign princel'was not bound by 
this doctrine; and, by the law of nations, he 
had the right, as a sovereign, to invade another 
sovereign in a just war. The Prince of Orangei 
said Bohun, "had a just cause to make war upon 
James III and, if he was conquered by hirn, he 
has as good right to our allegiance'on that score, 
1 
as ever any conquering prince had. ' Even Robert 
Wynne, though he was not an advocate of the con- 
quest theory, thought it an additional argument 
to add: "If in a just war, where the subjects are 
(1) A pamphleteer scoffed at this distinction. 
"And yet when the late king was to fight that 
battel, which was the last throw for his crown, 
they fetch'd themselves off from danger with an 
admirable distinction that their doctrine re- 
quir'd only a non-resisting, but not an assisting 
loyalty" - Plain English: or an inquiry concernir, 
the real and pretended friends o the Encr13sh 
). S. T. Wm. III, 
eI 
(2) The doctrine of non-resistance ... in n Lay concerned, etc, S. T. Wm. II ý p. 350. See also Appendix IQ-Note 
U. 
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not bound to assist their prince, he is brought 
to such circumstances as to be-, obliged to give 
satisfaction to the prince who brings his forces 
against hire Land. fails to give this satisfaction] l 
in such a case ... his subjects' allegiance 
0 
ceaseth. " Edward Fowler wrote: "God doth some- 
times, confer the right of sovereignty, that-iss 
by a Law-of Nations, which establisheth such a 
, 
right upon 'the success of,; a just war! '. 
© 
. With this theory there was no necessity to 
assert the legality, of James's abdication, or 
to deny the deposition of James. Whether James 
went away voluntarily or was forced, said Bohun, 
"is a question not worth a farthing at the bottom 
Fame he added, "I suppose no man ever said or 
(1) The case of-the-oaths stated (1689), S. T. . 
Wm. III9 ij p. 344. 
(2) An answer to the aper delivered by Mr Ashton 
at his execution 1691 S. T. Wm. III, iii p. 106. 
It is said that this pamphlet secured for 
Fowler the Bishopric of Worcester - D. N. B. 
(3) Op. cit., p. 350. 
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thought he-freely resigned the crown. " If 
James did not resign the crown, had the people 
the right to deprive him of it? The answer to 
this awkward question was avoided by-the counter- 
assertion that William, deprived him lawfully in 
a just war. - The: English nation was not, guilty 
of deposing their king., Was England, therefore, 
a conquered nation? Bishop Burnet, who preached 
the coronation sermon, disclaimed, on behalf of 
William, any right from conquest. His conquest 
was over James only, not over the people. 
From the moment that the invitation to William 
was contemplated, it was realised that William 
might be regarded as a conqueror. , 
For this 
(1) Ibid. 1. A7 , 
Mr. Keith Feiling does not draw a clear,., - distinction between the conquest and de facto 
schools of thought. He cites. Bohun as a , member of the de facto school. Nottingham did certain- 
ly belong to it and his appointment of Bohun 
as press licensor evidently led Mr. Feiling to 
make this mistake. He says: "The action of Edmund 
Bohun, the press licenser of Nottingham's appoint- 
ment, in passing the pamphlet 'King William and 
Queen Mary conquerers', which preached the very 
de facto doctrines of which the Secretary was 
accused, reinforced the charge that Nottingham, 
by the very fact of holding such opinions was 
unfitted to serve the crown. " - History of the Tory- party I p. 294. The conquest school, to which Bohun belonged, 
made William de jure king. 
(2) Referred to by Hampden, Some considerations 
about troper way of raising money. S. T. Wm. IIII 
ii, P. 311. 
For Burnet's attitude to the conquest school, 
see Appendix II Note 63. 
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reason, Sidney had urged that the-number of 
his Dutch troops should be small. William 
insisted on bringing sufficient-troops to 
ensure his own safety in case the English 
troops did not come over to his°side. - But 
he had no.. intention toi nor did he, claim the 
throne as aL. cgnqueror. He received the crown as 
a gift. His supporters who asserted conquest 
were fully aware that a , theory which made Eng- 
land a conquered nation could not be acceptable. 
James could be deprived of his sovereignty only 
by a sovereign, which naturally , inferred a for- 
eign prince. William was the instrument'in' 
that act: -But the conquest school hastened to 
point out that t1ere was a difference between 
this act of sovereignty-deprivation and sover- 
eignty-acquisition. Because William by the law 
of nations had wrested sovereignty from James, 
it did not follow that he had a right to possess 
(1) William in his Second Declaration said: 
"And as the forces we have brought along with 
us, are utterly disproportionate 
. 
to that wicked design-of conquering. the nation, 
etc. " 
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himself of it. To Fowler, allegiance was 
due to person in whom "the rights of 
sovereignty are placed by an extraordinary 
Act of Providence and the' concurrent consent 
of the nation". 
& 
He says: "We must distinguish 
between a right-to the government-and"the man- 
ner of assuming , it. The"right was founded in 
the just cause of the war and *t1ie success of it; 
but assuming of ' it' was not by any ways " of "force 
or violence, ýbut by a free consent of the people, 
who by a voluntary recognition and their inajea- 
ties acceptance of the government, as it is 
settled by our laws, take away any pretence to a 
conquest over the people or a 4overnznent by 
0 
force". 
It was admitted, however, that-in the case 
of conquest the people had no choice. They had, 
perforce, to accept the conqueror. Matthew 
Tindal, a disciple of Locke, attempted to avoid 
the 'conquered nation' corollary which followed 
(1) An answer to the paper delivered by Mr. 
Ashton at his execution 1691), S. T. Wm. III, ii, 
p. 106. 
(2) Ibid. P. 111. 
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from theýtheory, of conquest. William, by . 
freeing the people from their obligation to, 
James, did not thereby get a right himself 
to their allegiance. "Nothing can give'the 
conqueror right but their own consent". 
® 
However, he is forced to add: "The conquered 
may in a sense be said to be forced to what- 
they did'". They were under a moral necessity 
to submit to a government that could protect 
them and William alone could afford them that 
protection. We need not ernphasise,, this com- 
pulsory consent. For even Locke-realized that 
consent might only be tacit and that the main 
(1) An essay concerning obedience to the supreme 
powers, etc. (169 ý S. T. Wm. III, iii p. 446. The case ofowns in Flanders constantly 
changing hands was frequently cited in pamphlets. 
The towns men were obliged to swear allegiance " 
to each conqueror who could afford them pro- 
tection. See Burnet's Pastoral letter answered 
in Samuel Johnson's Notes on the phoenix edition 
of the Pastoral letter (1694) pp. 31-33; in 
Works 1710), p. 303. 
(2) Ibid., P. 447. 
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issue was the ruler's--recognition, that his 
office was founded in the consent-of the 
0 
people. .,, 
We must notice, however, that a-section 
of-the-conquest school did not base government 
on consent. One pamphleteer said that since 
laws. of countries are subordinate to the laws 
of nations, a sovereign prince may acquire'a 
just title to a . throne by'conquest, and therefore 
subjects must own that prince by the Law of" 
Nations. "Nay", he-continues, "the universal 
consent and practice of all nations, 'both of 
princes and people, have made this the standing 
law of all revolutions, to submit to the prevail- 
ing power even when there is no pretence of"' r" 
right, but only of force". Bishop Lloyd (whose 
pamphlet, God's way of disposing of kingdoms 
(1) Ferguszon, who anticipated Locke's, contract 
theory, declared, that a conqueror had no right 
to the throne until the. people "declare their 
submission to and acquiesce in him, upon the 
best terms which they can obtain and that'he is 
willing to grant" -A brief justification S. T. Wm. III, i, p. 136. 
cf. Locke, Second Treatise, ii , %189. 
(2) An enquiry into the nature and obligation 
of legal rights. S. T. Wm. III, ii, pp. 403-404. 
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(1691) was almost burned by. Parliament 
because it asserted conquest) had no doubt 
about the acceptance of the conqueror.. The 
king's "coming into power were so wholly of 
God", he wrote, "that the people had. -nothing 
to do, but to accept the-choice-of God j, and 
to submit to it" Lloyd admitted, moreover, 
that a conquest-might be pnjust. The conquer- 
or 
_ 
may be a usurper. -, "And if God gives no ..; 
right to him whom he sets ups then it-remains 
still in him whom-he puts down: so that he is 
rightful king-still, -, though he is out of pos- 
session and the other is. but an usurper that,, 
is in possession"* The usurper, nevertheless, 
should be obeyed. because the people must be , 
governed, and it is expedient that they should 
(1) See below, p. 214. 
(2) God's way of disposin of kingdoms, p. 10. 
See Appendix I1 Note 64. 
(3) Ibid., p. 56. Perhaps it was this section 
of the pamphlet which saved it from being burned 
by Parliament... It does not make William de 
facto king and James still de jure. Since it 
can never be known whether God regards William 
as a usurper or not it cannot be said whether 
is de jure king or not. 
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accept a government that can protect them. 
We can see two reasons why Lloyd met with 
so much opposition from the bulk of William- 
ites. Firstly, in his view, a conqueror, 
althougha usurper, ought to be obeyed. He 
did not state that, in his opinion, William 
was not a usurper. In fact, he inferred that 
he was by adopting the arguments of the de 
facto school. Secondly, in his view, William 
received none of his power from the people 
but wholly from God. "Sovereign princes-and 
kings" he said, "even where they are chosen 
by the nation ... as they have their authority 
from God, so they are only accountable to him 
... He alone makes. kings by his sovereign pow- 




Thus Lloyd still clung to the doc- 
trine-of the divine right of kings and . the 
doctrine of non-resistance., He differed from 
, 
the non-jurors only in his acceptance of William 
as the'instrument of God's deliverance. He 
(1) Op. cit. ", p. 19. 
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0 
reversed the well-known-, dictum and made 
the"voice of God the voice of the people. 
Parliament seems to have taken into 
consideration the conquest- theory"only once. '.,,, 
On January 217-1693, -the House of Lords dis- 
cussed several, books. The motion to burn ''" 
Lloyd's Discourse of. God's May of disposing 
of kingdoms fell. But both Burnet's Pastoral 
letter and Blount's King William and Queen 
Mary'conquerors were ordered to be burnt by 
the- oommon hangman. The House of Lords passed*-, '.. 
a- resolution "That the assertion- of King Wil- :: 
liam's and Queen Mary's being King and Queen-% 
by conquest was highly injurious to their 
majesties, and ingonsistent with the princi-=°, tý 
pies, on which their government is founded', -,.,., - 
and tending to the subversion of the-rights 
of the people". The House " of -Commons con- 
curred, adding the words "injurious to their 
majesties rightful title to the crown of this. 
realm": The lower house desired the'king to 
(1) It was attacked by Samuel Johnson in his- 
Notes on the phoenix edition of the Pastoral 
letter (1694). 
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remove Bohun from his office of licenser for 
0 licensing Blount's pamphlet. - 
What inferences can we draw from the con- 
quest school relating to-sovereignty? Firstly, 
sovereignty still resides in the", king. Second- 
lye the king derives his sovereignty solely from 
God, not, from the -community. Thirdly, the ' king 
can lose-his sovereignty only in one of two ways. 
He may lose it by direct-providence of God. ., 
In 
this case, William was God's agent and as such 
acquired the sovereignty forfeited by James. He 
may, in the second place, lose it-by the law-of 
nationsq'for one sovereign princeýcan: depriveý- 
another: sovereign prince of his authority. 
Quite clearly>. the advocates-'for the conquest 
theory were adapting the divine right theory of 
kings to suit the°circumstances'of the Revolution. 
They were, to a certain extent, reverting to the 
-sixteenth century theory which made any govern- 
- 
ment of divine right. It was contrary to the 
amplified seventeenth century doctrine which 
included the hereditary qualification. James I. 
(1) Parl. Hist., V 756. 
of. Sacheverell. Trial l° 6-. - S. T., 
xv, 212. 
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in 1606 had declined to. license the canons 
passed by convocation because the hereditary 
element in kingship had been omitted. If 
the king of Spain, said James, conquered 
England,. the. canons would justify Englishmen 
submitting to him., Archbishop Sancroft made 
a strategic blunder in 1690 when he.. published 
Bishop Overall's Convocation Book-which-con- 
tained these canons. Sancroft unwittingly put 
a weapon into the hands of. his opponents.,, on 
Overall's authority, William ought to be'accept- 
ed and the. oath taken to-himý, though Sancroft 
himself did not take the-advice and remained a 
non-juror. Lloyd's argument was the only one 
likely-to-win over the non-jurors. It maintained 
the doctrine of non-resistance, for, according 
to. it, James had been resisted by William, not 
(1) Sherlock when he finally decided to take 
the oaths. found Overall a useful supporter. He 
was satisfied from chapter 28 of the Convocation 
Book that anygovernment, when settled, ought 
to be obeyed "for conscience sake" - See The case 
of allegiance due to sovereign powers, etc. 2nd, 
ed. Edin., 1691. p. 3. 
"he was happily relieved. by a lucky coinci- 
dence of Bishop Overall's canons"-- Johnson :.. 
Notes on the phoenix edition of the Pastoral 
letter 1694 9 p. 50; in Works (1710)1-p. 307. -, -, 
of. below p. 222, note 1ý and p. 235. 
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by his subjects. The stumbling block in'the 
path of the non=jurors was not the illegality 
of resistance so much as hereditary right. 
That the conquest theory did'not win over 
the non=jurors must be-attributed to their 
personal attachment-to'James and to an over- 
scrupulous attitude to the oath of allegiance 
rather than to the doctrine of non-resistance. 
The conquest school was probably small; at 
least we have not found many pamphlets giving 
it support. The theory was put forward immed- 
iately after the Revolution and had a very- ., 
-short life. it contributed nothing to a more 
rational understanding of sovereignty and the 
problem of the 'true foundations of government. 
Had the bulk of Englishmen who professed the 
doctrine of divineI right before the Revolution 
(and they constituted practically the whole 
nation) accepted the conquest interpretation 
(1) But cf. Burnet, who Bays that the theory 
had a'great effect among the clergy, "and brought 
off the greatest number of those who came in 
honestly to the new government". (Hist., iii 
p. 382. ) He repeats the same view later. (Ibld., " 
p. 384. ) 
Samuel Johnson said: "This conquest is con- 
tinually alledged both in and out of the pulpit 
as a motive for swearing. " - Notes on the phoenix 
edition of the Pastoral letter 1694), p. 0; in 
Works (1710), p. 305. 
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of the Revolution we would have hada theory 
of government which did not coincide with the-., 
facts; and'another revolution might have been 
required before the modern interpretation of .. ° 
the state'and'of sovereignty would have found 
a place in our political philosophy. 
It is worth noting,. as a significant com- 
mentary on the trend of thought, that some men, 
who professed this line of reasoning, found- it 
expedient to 'introduce the element of consent and 
resistance. 
There iss however, -one aspect of the conquest 
. 
theory-which requires special notice. Its up- 
holders could not be Jacobites. They avoided 
the dilemma in which the de facto theorists 
found themselves. The latter could take the oath 
of allegiance to William as lawful king but not 
as rightful king and they exemplified this at- 
titude by resisting the passing of abjuration 
"R 
bills. The conquest theorists made William de 
jure king by right of his conquest over James, 
William having such a right by reason of his 
being a sovereign prince. It followed that James 
could have no similar right to win back his in- 
heritance by right-of conquest since James could 
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no longer claim to be, a sovereign prince. 
The conquest school denied the right of 
a people to settle its own government inter- 
nally. Presumably William could lose in turn 
his acquired sovereignty only at the hands of 
a foreign sovereign prince. Until he was so 
conquered, his subjects must render him absolute 
obedience and consequently the doctrine of 
non-resistance was still to be the measure of 
man's political obedience. 
0 
(1) Samuel Johnson said: "Calling in Providence 
. to decide a title ... is to employ the Majesty of Heaven in undersheriffy". - Notes on the 
phoenix edition of the Pastoral letter 1694), 
p. 7: in Works Qýp. 297. 




CHAPTER FOUR (continued) 
II. By possession : De facto kingship. 
II. By possession: ', De facto kingship. - 
The conquest, theory of the Revolution which- 
we considered in'the'last section was never 
popular, and made few'converts. It soon passed 
out of the realm of practical politics. The 
theory which dominated the political- philosophy 
of William's reign was the de facto theory of 
kingship, just as the dominant issue-in Anne's,, 
reign was the contest between the hereditary 
and parliamentary basis of kingship. 
At the outset it must be qb&atvdd that the 
theory was a political expedient advocated with 
the definitely practical object of persuading 
-non-jurors to take the oath of allegiance to 
William. The main theme of all the writers of 
this school was expediency. Many of the most 
prominent non-jurors had either actively assist-` 
ed in, or at least connived at, the banishment 
of James. To keep out that popish prince seemed 
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to the majority of Englishmen the most vital 
issue in politics. Why should Protestants - 
most of them divines of the Church of. England 
-. threaten the' stability of William's government 
by refusing to take the oath of a], legiance to 
him? They refused the oaths not because they,. 
desired to see James once again on the throne 
of his fathers . but simply because their consciences 
forbade them to take, to a new king an oath which 
seemed to conflict with. an, oath to-, the old. Those 
who pleaded with the-nonj urors on behalf of alleg- 
iance to William were willing for the, -sake of 
peace at home in the realm of practical politics,. 
to, waive aside as. irrelevant the claims of James. - 




the denial of James's. right. Thus William's 
claim was allowed to be only by law 
CD A converted 
(1) But although Sherlock recognised William 
as de facto king, he did not admit that he was 
'lawful' king. He seems to distinguish between 
a legal and a legitimist king but to give neither 
title to William. By de facto was usually meant 
legal by de jure legitimist. Sherlock 
said St. Paul (Romans, xiii) did 
not forbid allegiance to a usurper; which implied 
that he considered William as such. See The case 
of allegiance due to sovereign powers, etc, 
cf. above, P. 216 I note lf and below, p. 235. 
I 
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non-juror might recognise William and stren- 
gthen the cause of the Protestant succession 
(whose interest, it was believed, he really 
had at heart) while at the same time holding 
his private opinion as to James's 'right'. 
The success of the de facto theorists' campaign 
depended entirely on the shelving of the ques- 
tion of right and it is apparent from the debates 
in'Parliament that they hotly resented the in- 
trusion of right into any consideration of Wil- 
liam's claim to the throne. 
It was a time of great anxiety for ardent 
followers of William. Jacobite plots were numer- 
ous and were of monotous frequency in William's 
reign. Men in ppsitions of trust round the throne 
were corresponding with James. Men like Marl- 
borough and even Shrewsbury (one of William's 
favourites) had dealings with St. Germaine. 
Security at home and a united front to Europe 
were the watchwords of the de facto school. In' 
a time of anxiety and internal unrest, exped- 
iency was the true ideal of the enlightened 
statesman. It often forced into the background 
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of men's thoughts well-reasoned principles of 
politics and the urgency of everyday affairs 
overshadowed the fundamental: principles which 
were, nevertheless, guiding men's actions in. 
consolidating the-Revolution Settlement. There-, 
fore we must bear in mind these practical con-. '- 
siderations when we analyse the writings of-the 
de facto school, and while remembering the oc- 
casional nature of their pleadings, endeavour, 
0 
nevertheless, to, trace the general stream of 
political philosophy running through the tangled 
forest, of everyday affairs. - 
Their endeavours to"strengthen Williamis.. gov- 
ernment by winning over the non-jurors was-well- 
meant. But it must be confessed that they failed, CD 
The de facto theory was a political-strategy 
which could be"justified only by success. That 
single condition, of its justification being want- 
ing, it was fortunate that more and more attent- 
ion was given both inside and outside parliament 
to'the question of William's right. 
(1) The Whigs accused the clergy of being 
virtual non-jurors. There are few non-jurors, 
said one writer, because most of the clergy have 
taken the oath to William as de facto not de 
jure -A dialogue betwixt Whi and Tory, alias William to and taco to 169 
ý 
S. T. Wm. III- iý 
P. 379. 
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The oath was altered-to make it conform, 
as , it was thought-, to actual facts 
0 
As long 
as William's right-: was doubtful, - the oath should 
be simple - "to the-ancient. simplicity of swear- 
ing to bear faith and true allegiance to the 
king and queen" because "it was ... judged just 
and reasonable, in the beginning of a new-govern- 
ment, to make. -the oaths as general and comprehen- 
sive as might; be: for it was thought, that those 
who once took the oaths'to the government-would 
ry be after that faithful, and true to it". 'These 
are, the words of Burnet. He was evidently sat- 
isfied that William's title should not'be closely 
examined. He does not attempt, to vindicate'-- 
William's right. Hei it would seem, went no 
further than a recognition of William as de facto 
His whole-allegiance, however, was for William, 
(1) cf. above, Chap. 31 sect. 1. pp. 99-103., 
(2) Burnet, Hist., iii, pp. 380-381. 
(3) See Burnet's Pastoral letter and Samuel 
Johnson's reply to it, Notes on the -phoenix edition of the Pastoral letter (1694). 
a 
4 
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and-he condemned those. who divided their 
allegiance between William and James. "The 
sense many put, upon them!! i[the-:: ath$j: y: he.: said 
"was, that they-were only to obey them as 
usurpers, during their usurpation, and that, 
therefore l. as ý long as they ," continued in quiet 
possession, -they-were bound to bear them and to 
submit to them: but that it was still lawful 
for them to assist king James, if, he should 
come to recover his crown. and that, they might 
act and talk all they could, or durst, in his 
favour, as being still their-king.. de jure. 
This was contrary to the plain meaning, of the 
words ' ... Yet it became too _ 
visible , that mater, 
in the nation, and particularly among the"clergyj 
took the oath in this sense, to the great re- 
proach of the profession... The truth was, the 
greatest part of the clergy had entangled them- 
.ý., .. selves so far with those strange conceits of the 








In-1713 Harbin wrote: "The Revolution,... 
was begun and ended-on these grounds, that 
allegiance was 
, 
not, due to all kings in posses- 
sion: that king James was lawfully depriv'd;. .. 
that king William and queen Mary were lawfully 
put in possession: But these positions did-not 
suit with the. principles of many lawyers and 
divines, who had constantly maintain'd that the 
deposition of a ; lawful king was absolutely un- 
lawful by the law of God and the law of this 
kingdom. Therefore tojustify the translation 
of their allegiance, the former opinion that was 
, buried at the Restoration as reviv'd, viz, that 
allegiance was' due to all powers in possession 
and many eminent members of the Church of Eng- 
. land receiv'd it as consistent with the 
(1) Burnet, Hist., iii, p. 381. 
The clergy tried "to cheat their own cons- 
ciences with a ridiculous and foolish distinction 
of taking the oaths t, 9 a king de facto but not do 
jure". De¬acto6igegns, jni'downright English down- 
right'usurpers". -A modest enquiry into the caus- 
es of the present disasters in England, etc. 1 0) 
S. T. Wm. III, ii, pp. 97-98.1 
(2) George Harbin was a nonjuror. -He was chaplain to-Francis Turner, Bishop of Ely, and an intimate 
friend of Bishop Ken. -. D. N. B. 
(3) cf. above, p. 29" and note 1. 
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doctrine of non-resistance, " He referred to 
Stillingfleet's The unreasonableness of a new 
separation and Sherlock's Case of allegiance'. 
These l he said, were satisfactorily answered, 
and "no reply of moment being mäde, that contro- 
versy seem'd to be buried again, but'of-late it 
path had a second resurrection. The Rev. Dr. 
Higdinthought fit, after many years of satis- 
, ýfaction, , to examine the dispute again" 
:ý 
Higdsin's 
work, to which he referred, was A view of the 
English constitution with 'respect to the 
(1) Harbin, The hereditary right of the crown of 
England asserted, p. 2. 
Calamy says:. "Though. but a. single person 'appeared concerned in drawing up this book yet 
it was, generally thought to contain the utmost 
strength of the m¢st learned of the Jacobite 
party. The -performance was much cried up and the book dispersed with great industry and many 
copies were given gratis to men. in power. Yet " 
it was-obvious to every reader, that the grand 
design of it was to put by-the Hanover succession 
and pave, the way for a popish pretender to the 
throne". - An historical account of my own life, Ii, p}ß. 268-9. 
(2) William Higdin at first refused to take the 
oaths, but he eventually conformed and-published, 
in order to justify himself, A view of the English 
constituti n (1709) and A defence of the view, 
1710). Hearne thought that Harbin had the better 
of the argument. He said: "Nor is the government 
like to thank him, for his performance, since he 
resolves all into possession, and makes all usur- 
pers have a title to allegiance, not excepting 
Oliver himself". Higdin died in 1715. - D. N. B. 
(8) See 
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sovereign authority of the prince, published 
in 1709. 
This retrospective commentary by a contemp- 
orary is instructive. But Harbin was undoubtedly 
wrong in supposing that the dispute had been 
settled in the early nineties in:, favour of here- 
. ditary succession.,, 
John Hampden writing in November, 1692, took 
a census of opinion which is illuminating in that '' 
it no, doubt-gives a true picture of the confus- 
ion of thought which the Revolution had wrought 
inmost minds. "We are all entirely unsettled 
CD 
as-to the government" he wrote., "The king's titles 
and the legality of it, are as publickly disputed 
-and with, as little fear of punishment as' any -point 
of natural philosophy in-the schools of Oxford, 
or any moot case of law by the students in the', 
. (1) The, same complaint was made a'year later by Prideaux. "The government seems now to be 
brought to a kind of anarchy: nothing can long 
stand upon such abottom of confusion: we must: t« again tack about to our old constitution or bern, 
lost" -. Letters of,! Hum phrey Prideaux to John 




Temple... They will suffer no mention to 
be made of the original contract broken by 
King James-nor of that=new'contract made 
by King William with, this nation' in virtue 
whereof he is this day'King of England. But 
'instead of this, they write books and publish 
them, -one while to prove that he-is-King by 
an immediate providence of God, and direction 
from him ... There have been Bills and declar- 
'ations offer'd several times in Parliament for 
abjuring King James' authority and declaring 
King William and Queen Mary lawful` and right- 
ful king and queen of'this., realm; but nothing 





.. 'Tis astonishing to think l. that the 
officers-in the chiefest trusts of the. nation 
are not oblig'd to own this a lawful government 
as it is declar'd and asserted to be in the 
Bill of Rights ... several of those who have, 
now the greatest employments and highestr trusts 
. 
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in the kingdom did, both before and after 
the time of presenting the crown 'to their 
majesties, 'openly declare and maintain it 
as their opinion, that their majesties were 
not, nor could be made lawful king and 
queen, but were only so de facto and as such 
they submitted to them and nö otherwise" .0 
Even before the debates were concluded in 
the. Conventions'some men had made up their 
minds to accept William on the basis of a de 
facto kingship1 . Nottingham, made Secretary. 
of State in 1689, belonged to this school. 
He told Burnet "that, 'though he could not 
agree to the making a king as things stood, 
yet if he found one made, he would be more 
faithful to him, than those that made him 
(1) Hampden, Some short considerations concern- 
ing the state of the nation 1692) r S. T. Wm. IIIj iii pp. 324-5. 
Somers had said in the House of Commons on 
May 11 1690: "There are some opinions in the 
world, that the king is only de facto - You 
have declared him king of right - But if you 
look on printed books abroad, he is made only 
king de facto, and king in possession -I took 
the oath in another sense whatever others did". 
(Grey's Debates, x, p. 103. ) 
(2) Burnet, Hist., iii, p. 357. In his speech 
against Sacheverell he said: "The notion of a 
king de facto, which is but a softer word for 
an, usurper, came into vogue". -S. T., xv, 491. 
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could be according to their own principles" .0 
The more we examine the resolution of 28 
January 1689-in the Convention, the more we 
realize that it contained nothing but glit- 
tering generalities calculated, as Macaulay(D 
rightly . said, 
to appeal to all shades of 
opinion. It was a bundle of inconsistencies 
and one man might agree with one part and 
another man with another. It served its im- 
mediate purpose of securing a majority in the 
Convention in favour of the election of Wil- 
liam and Mary. But it did not provide a logical 
explanation of the basis of the new government. 
(1) Burnet, Hist., iii, p. 357. 
Johnson probably refers to Nottingham 
when he says "But''fay soul abhors above all 
those ... could creepingly come off with this 
excuse, That though they could not tell how 
to make-a king, -yet they knew how to obey a 
king; and have ever since vouchsafed to take 
his money in places of the greatest trust and 
profit" - An argument proving etc. 4th ed. (1694), pp. 35-36; in Works (1710), p. 270. 
(2) Hist., iii, p. 1277. 
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As we have seen the theory of the contract 
was not carried to its logical conclusion. CD 
The same may be said of the clause referring 
to abdication. Somers, who is held respon- 
sible for the framing of that resolution, 
deduced from it that William was de jure king. 
© 
But the prevailing opinion seems to have been 
that the conclusions arrived at by the Conven- 
tion did'not warrant the assumption that William 
was de jure king. The Convention when turned 
into a parliament did pass a bill in which 
William's right was recognised, but no one was 
required by the new oath of allegiance to swear 
©0 it. The word lawful was-left out of the - oath 
"and", said one writer "it looks as if this was I" 
done de industria for the same reason, namely, 
(1) See above, chap. 3, sect. 1. 
(2) Grey's Debates, xj p. 103. 
(3) of. below, p. 245. 
(4) For the wording of the oath, see above, p 101. 
_(5) 
The words 'lawful! and $ rightful' were 
constantly interchanged without any exact 
meaning being attached to them. 
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. that such as take the oaths might not think 
themselves bound thereby to be solicitous 
about the title to the crown". 
CD 
Perhaps this 
writer is referred to, when another pamphlet- 
eer says : 
"As was lately. well observed, the Parliament 
had avoided'all occasion of offence consis- 
tent with the security of the government; 
for by omitting the assertory part of the 
former, 'tis evident they do not require us 
by this oath to assert the title but to secure 
the possession and peace of the crown in King 
William and Queen Mary by our obedience accor- 
ding to law". "It is neither requir'd that 
we should abjure the title of the late king, 
nor assert the title of the present .x 
When Parliament showed itself so timorous 
about asserting William's right, it is not sur- 
prising that out of doors this lead should be 
followed up by pamphleteers. The abdication 
theory was forgotten, to be revived later by High 
Churchmen like Leslie, Sacheverell and Harbin. 
(1) Obedience due to the present king notwith- 
standing our oaths to the former - Som. T., x, 
p. 298. 
Samuel Johnson scoffed at this blind ac- 
ceptance of a king "at that ridiculous rate as 
no cotintryman will buy a pig" - An argument 
provin 1 etc. 4th ed. (1694), p. 12; in Works (1710), p. 262. 
(2) Agreement betwixt the present hnd former 
governments - S. T, Wm. III, il p. 430. 
(3) of. bciow, above g p. 116. 
(4) Sach. Trial, p. 80. S. T., xv, 81. 
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The de facto interpretation is expressed 
in the following passage: 
"There is nothing in the laws of the land, 
or the word of God, that necessitates the 
subject to trouble his conscience with 
scruples about the title of princes, or 
beyond the actual possession and administ- 
ration of the government". 
li Dr. Sherlock who took the oaths, having 
for some time refused, advised men to follow his 
example. His apologia is to be found in his 
Case of Allegiance, the keynote of which is the 
following sentence: "I do not dispute the legal 
right of James which is nothing to my present 
purpose". 
(D Allegiance is, due, says Sherlock, 
(1) Agreement betwixt the present and former 
governments - S. T. Wm. III- il p. 428. 
(2) Case of allefiance due to sovereign powers 
stated (1691), p. 32. 
Sherlock, for his conversion, was subject-. 
pd to the grossest abuse. cf. "The renown'd 
dean of St. Paul's was not inferior to any for 
a political squeamish conscience. He could not 
dispense with oaths upon King William's first 
accession to the throne. King James has got an 
army in Ireland, the chance of war was uncertain 
and the doctor knew not which king might prevail 
... that unfortunate prince was defeated at the Boyne ," he fled back to France and there was no 
more prospect of his return - How could a Tory 
conscience hold out any longer? The sword had 
cut the Gordian knot, which held the doctor, 
his eyes were open'd at that moment" etc. - 
Tories and Tory_ rinciples ruinous to both prince 
and people 1714 1 p. 80. 
cf. Macaulay, Hist. of Eng., iv, pp. 2012- 
2018. 
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only to the regnant king. In scripture 
we are commanded to obey the powers in 
O 
being. To refuse the oath to William is 
to disobey a scriptural' injunction. Fur- 
thermore, allegiance ' is due to the regnant 
king by the law of England. No one could 
deny that William and Mary were de facto king 
and queen. Hence it followed, according to 
this authior, that, "we owe them obedience, due 
bylaw, for then we are their subjects and we 
cannot conceive of sovereignty without author- 
ity; nor of subjection without obedience". For 
a legal proof of his statement he cited the 
statutes of 25 Edward III and II Henry VII-and 
3 
cited in support Cökdoännd Hales 
P 
Coke held 
that the Statute of Treason applied only to a 
de facto king and this ruling was not quest- 
ioned by any party in our period. "If treason 
(1) Case of allegiance p. 433. 'cf. above, 
p. 21tß note , and p. 222) note 1. 
(2) Ibid., p. 428. 
(3) Ibid., p. 428. 
(4) Whether de jure as well or not. 
.h 
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cannot be committed against the king that 
is out of possession, as he is not king 
according to law; so we cannot be thought 
to owe him our allegiance,, that is, obedience 
according to law, for he is not king so as 
to rule or command us". 
The citation of the Statute of Treason 
occurs with monotonous repetition in'the pam- 
phlets of the day. It is necessary there- 
fore, to consider whether or not that statute 
was a convincing argument against the non- 
jurors . 
Firstly, the statute of Treason enacts, 
inter alia, that any one (not being an inamicus) 
who (a) imagines the de facto king's death, 
(b) levies war against the king, (c) adheres 
to the king's enemies, is guilty of treason. 
To do any of these things against a king out 
of possession is not treason. The stante II 
Henry VII merely states that anyone who actively 
assists the de facto king will not be liable 
to impeachment or attainder at the instance of 
4 
a parliament under a king, who, at the time of 
(1) Ibid., p. 428. 
(2) An inamicus was subject to martial law. 
IV. ii. 238 
such assistance being given, was a de jure 
king but out of possession. 
. 
Secondly, the treason law applied to any 
one living in England. (not being an inamicus) 
who committed overt acts against the crown. 
It in no way affected the man who refused to 
take an oath of allegiance. The law dealt 
solely with acts-committed by a man owing 
local allegiance. Anyone enjoying the king's 
protection could be indicted for treason 
whether he had taken an oath of allegiance or 
not. 
The nonjurors fully appreciated these. 
limitations in the application of the treason 
laws. They hastened to retort that they were 
perfectly aware that if they were cauolt pur- 
suing treasonable designs against William they' 
would be liable to suffer under 25 Ed. III. 
Only overt acts constituted treason. Was it 
treason, therefore, for a man to elect to re- 
signr a bishopric or military or civil office 
rather than take the oath? 
The fictitious Mr. Meanweil in James 
Tyrrell's Bibliotheca Politica asserted that 
a 
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he was willing to pay the same allegiance 
as a foreigner would who was dwelling in this 
country. 'That the bare protection of a gov- 
ernment", he said, "does not give it an absol- 
ute right to the allegiance of all those that 
enjoy their protection q' I think may be suffic- 
iently droved from the instance of a Frenchman, 
or any other foreigner, who, tho' by living 
here and enjoying the common protection of the 
government, I grant he is obliged tobe obed- 
ient to its laws and not to act or conspire 
against it; yet this does not discharge him 
from his natural allegiance which he still owes 
O 
to his former prince". 
It must be conceded that those who used the 
treason law argument were adequately answered 
by the nonjurors' assertion that nothing was 
involved in that argument except local alleg-ý 
4 
fiance which they were willing to pay to William. 
It was no relief to their consciences to be told 
that it was not treasonable to take an oath to 
(1) Op. cit., p. 684. 
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a de facto king. William might'be king 
of England by positive law, but he was not 
king by the law of God. The peaceable non- 
jurors wished to remain passive. They would 
neither oppose nor help'William. In practice 
they might be harmless law-abiding citizens, 
but their principles contained the seeds of 
sedition; for, the case' of the Frenchman living 
in England, cited by Meanwell, was notso simple 
as he would have made it. That Frenchman, it 
is true, owed temporary local allegiance to 
William while he enjoyed his protection, but 
he also owed permanent allegiance to Louis XIV, 
To whom, then, did Meanwell owe this permanent 
allegiance? To James. IIl undoubtedly. And 
it must be allowed that so long as the support- 
ers of William based their allegiance on de 
facto kingship only, they implied that someone 
else might have a de jure right. They argued' 
that the question of someone ^s else's right, 
was beside the point., But, logically, the only 
difference between the de facto theorists and. - 
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the non-jurors was that the former turned 
their eyes away from, and the latter turned 
them towards, James. Powell Master of the 
Rollsl. said in the House of Commons in the. 
debate on the Abjuration Bill (April 26, 
1690) : "'A . king de facto and a king de jure' - 
Whoever mentions the de facto implies another-', 
de jure. There are two allegiances inýthat 
case, and therefore fit to stick to one. - To 
- obey the king de facto is no other than, to 
O 
obey till I have power torebell. " 
The de , facto' theory was founded on expediency, 
not on principle. The whole-hearted supporters 
of the Revolution regime came to regard the de 
facto. adherents"as Jacobites in disguise. A 
writer, early in William's reigns said that 
there were very few of the disaffected clergy- 
that had the courage to lay down their places 
for the oaths, so they cheated the world and 
their own consciences, "with a ridiculous and 
foolish distinction" of taking the oaths to a 
king de facto, but not de jure. This distinct- 
ion was made to salve their own consciences, 
(1) Grey's Debates, xq p. 86. 
- 
__________ 
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and to impress upon the minds of the people, 
that William and Mary were not lawful and 
rightful king and queen of England, but de 
facto only, "that iss in plain English, down- 
right usurpers" ... And indeed, "What" he asked, 
"could be more efficacious, to alienate the 
hearts of the people from their majesties, than 
either to suppose them king and queen de facto 
only, or to buzz into peoples' ears, that in 
swearing allegiance to them, they thereby ack- 
nowledg no lawful right to the crown to be in 
their persons? " 
0 
The de facto school did not accept the fin- 
ality of the Revolution. They should not be 
blamed for hesitating to give an unqualified 
aproval of all the steps taken in 1688/9. It 
is not to be wondered-that some men, while ac- 
cepting William and the verdict of parliament, 
should decline to go further than the bare ac-., 
ceptance of William. Sherlock rightly said 
that to justify the legality of the Revolution 
(1) 
present disasters 
III, ii, pp. 97-8. 
he causes of the 
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_ý_ _ ý, ý"N 
ý: 4 s 
.. ar 
. u. ... : 
'^i ,. 'fiwýM i%': ^Yrý. ý .v . wý_i ... a ý-r... ý.... ý__. _ .. 
"ý w. .. awR { Rý3Tlý'llSýuirMw<a. 
i' 
IV. ii. 243 
" "requires such perfect skill in law and 
history and the constitution of the English 
government that few men are capable of making 
so plain and certain a judgment of it, as to 
be a clear and safe rule of conscience". 
0 
This 
point was made clear when an abjuration bill. 
was proposed in Parliament. Its rejection 
proved that the oat1; of allegiance had been 
explicitly worded so as to exclude the question 
of. right; for, had an abjuration bill passed 
requiring the rejection of ! James's right, the 
öath of allegiance would thereby have come to 
imply William's right. The opponents of the 
bill argued that it could not strengthen the 
oath of allegiance. It could only create 
by ocrites or reduce the number of those taking 
the oath of allegiance. 
Humphrey Prideaux, ' Dean of Norwich, in a 
letter to John Ellis, December 41 1693, explain- 
ed his scruples about an abjuration oath. He 
had taken the oath to William as lawful king 
(1) Case of allegiance, p. 2. ' 
(2) The case of an oath-of abjtiration consid- 
ered, etc. (1693). , 
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but he would refuse an oath of abjuration 
which would thereby imply that he owned 
William's' right. William's right, he said, - 
"may be good so far. as' I know: but before 
he can have a right and title, King James 
must have lost his, and, of this we must be 
well assured before we can swear to the 
right of the other". - A man may be lawful 
possessor without having a just title. He 
did not doubt that Parliament could make; 
William king. By that authority he was law-.. 
ful king. But-. iab Parliament's decision 
right? "Whether the states did this right- 
fully still remains a question which I wish 
may never be proposed to be examined. It's. 
certain many that the oath will be imposed 
upon can never do it so far as to make a 
satisfactory judgment upon it". 
O 
(1) Letters of Hwnphrey Pridea x to John 
Ellis, 1674-1722. Ed. by E. Maue e ompson. 
Camden Soc., N. S. 15.1875., pp. 157-9. 
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When the abjuration bill was again brought 
up in 1702, Nottingham opposed it. Such dis- 
tinctions as the bill proposed, he said, were 
against "the terms of our submission to his 
majesty and upon which his majesty was pleased 
to accept the crown". 
0 
The disputes over the words lawful and right- 
ful continued from time to time in Parliament. 
In April, 1690, the Duke of Bolton. brought in 
a bill to recognise William and Mary as 'right- 
ful and lawful' sovereigns.,:, The House of. Com- 
mons , with a Tory majority, passed the bill; "to 
the wonder (says)Burnet) of all the people, it 
passed in two days in that House without any 
debate or opposition" 
©He 
suggested that this 
may have been owing to parliamentary tactics of 
of the Whigs, especially of Somers. Burnet' s, 
(1) Rogers's Protests of the House of Lords, 
24th Feb. -1702. cf. Feiling, History o the 
Tory party, p. 261. 
(2) Grey's Debates, x, pp. 45-52*., 
(3) BurnetýyHist"-, iv, p. 73. 
(4) Ibid. 
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explanation seems to be the only feasible 
one, for it is incredible that the, bill 
recognising William's right could represent 
the- true feeling of the Tory party. We have 
seen that 'right' was excluded from the oath 
of allegiance, and the abjuration bill in 
1690 which would have implied right was reject- 
ed. And it is said that no attempt was made 
to suppress the numerous pamphlets propagating 
the de facto doctrine of kingship. The Jacob- 
ite conspiracies, however'and the plots to 
assassinate William strengthened the view that 
the policy of attempting to-divide one's alleg- 
fiance between James and William was dangerous. 
A more pronounced leaning towards a recognition 
of William's right was the result. In the 
Association drawn up by the Commons in February 
1696 after William's announcement of the as- 
sassination plot, we find-these words: 
"We' whose names are hereunto subscribed, 
do heartily, sincerely and solemnly 
'. (1) = See Hampden! s , 'ev. dence , above, p. 229. 
r 
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profess, testify and declare, that 
his present majesty king William is 
rightful and lawful king of these 
realms". O 
In the Association as drawn up by the 
House of Lords, the word 'rightful' was omitted. 
On Rochester's suggestion it was stated "that 
king William hath the right by law to the crown 
of those realms; and that neither James, nor 
the pretended Prince of Wales nor any other per- 
son, hath any right whatsoever to the same". 
A recent writer, quoting the single phrase 'the 
right by law' comments: "The difference, if 
finely shadedl was a perfectlyintelligible one". 
This would be true of that single phrase. But 
it might be justly argued that the distinction 
made in that claifse was. -nullified by the con- 
eluding words that deny that James, the Prince . 
of Wales, or any other person "hath any right 
{ whatsoever" which mist mean that they do not 
have even a divine or indefeasible hereditary 
"(1) Parl. hist., v, 992: 0 92 members of the Commons and 15 peers refused to sign the 
Association. Ibid., 993. 
(2). Feiling, History of the Tory_party9 p. 319. 
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right. 
0 As we have seen, Prideaux argued 
that a man was lawful possessor if so adjud- 
ged by a competent legal authority: but the-' 
judgment might be unjust though legal, and 
men were entitled to their private opinions 
that it was wrong. It would be fair to re- 
quire them to admit the 'lawfulness' but un- 
fair to make them hypocrites by making them 
own, against their consciences, the 'rightful- 
ness'. The use of the word 'right' cut the 
ground away from the feet of the de facto! 
school. It seems to us'that Rochester induced 
the House-of Lords to go further than the 
Commons, although Rochester's career would not 
. warrant us 
believing that he had-this intention. 
Following on the debates over the Associat- 
ion, Parliament'passed and William gave his 
royal assent, in the same session, to a bill 
wherein it was provided-"to inflict a penalty 
on such as shall' by writing, or otherwise' de-- 
Clare that king William is not lawful and 
(1) On a'Tory interpretation of right, 
See below, p. 255, note 1. - 
0 
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rightful king of these realms". 
The abjuration bill of 1702 marks the 
triumph of those-who maintained the right of 
of William and of, Anne: of the former directly 
on the justice of the Revolution, of the latter 
on the basis of parliamentary succession, the 
legality of which depended on the right of re- 
sistance to James II. The victoryl'howeverl- 
was more apparent than real. Louis XIV's re-. '' 
cognition of the pretender on'the death, of 
James II alienated Jacobites whose patriotism 
was stronger than their Jacobitism. And second- 
ly, Anne's succession almost cöincided with the 
death of James II. Followers of the House of, 
Stewart saw again a Stewart on the throne of 
her father. They realised that there was no, 
longer any need for them to subscribe to de 
facto kingship, for they saw a way of basing 
Anne's claim on hereditary. right. De facto 
gave way to hereditary. Little was heard of 
U, ) 'An Act for the security of his majesty's 
person. ' The royal assent was given on April 
27th, 1696. Parl. hist., v, 993-4. 
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the former in Anne's'. reign: and consequent], y 
our next section will be concerned with the, 
latter, that is$, kingship based, on heredit= 
ary right. 
CHAPTER FOUR (continued) 
III : By hereditary right, against the claims 
of a parliamentary title based on the justice 
of the Revolution 
, 21) 
HEREDITARY 
°3.. Parliamentary- versus hereditary ,.. ; 
._... ý.. 
oýý. 
In William's reign no serious attempt was 
made to prove that'the succession had not 
been broken in 1689.0 As we have seen, Harbin 
held in 1713 that the, question had been for- 
mally settled, shortly after the Revolution,,. 
in favour of hereditary right. We suggested 
that this was historically inaccurate. The 
few attempts to prove William and Mary sover- 
eigns by hereditary right were abandoned by 
(1) Ferguson, writing before the Convention 
met, said that the new king should be chosen 
without regard to proximity of blood so that 
"The pretence of a divine right of succession 
which had almost destroyed us of late ... will by this means stand for ever branded and con- 
demned" -A brief justification, etc. (1688) 
S. T. Wm. III, i, p. 147. 
(2) See above, pp. 22? -229. 
252 
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the very authors who put forward the plea. 
Fullwood, for example, began his Agreement 
betwixt the present and former government 
by declaring that the Convention had voted 
the throne vacant as to James only, and that. 
the throne was therefore immediately full by 
succession. The Convention, he said, did not 
make William and Mary king and queen. They 
merely declared them to be so: "They do not 
say they make them so, but resolve they make 
them so, and then declare them to be what in- 
deed they were". 
0 
William and Mary were next 
heirs by right 
P But he immediately abandoned 
this position and devoted the rest'of his 
pamphlet to show . hat there was no proof that 
they had any 'right' and that therefore they 
must be accepted only on the basis of de facto 
It was realized that to plead hereditary 
right was a travesty of the°facts and the 
(1) S: T. Wm. I1I ,iýp., 423. 
(2) Ibid. 
::. 
(3) See above ý p. 234. . y;. , 
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\, attempt was abandoned. With. this brief 
notice of Williams reign we may pass to 
that of. Anne .' 
254 
I'The accession of Queen Anne revived the 
hopes of the supporters of divine right and, 
passive obedience. William III had had no 
claim to"hereditary right'except through his 
wife and, -except to a few men like Burnet 
, 
this right did not entitle him to have the 
administration)-as he did have, to the excltXs- 
ion of Mary. His right, in fact, was based 
solely on an extraordinary gift of the Conven- 
tion. But Anne as the sole surviving child 
of James II (on the basis that the Prince of 
Wales was supposi itious) could be said to 
possess a hereditary right to the crown. If 
James II had been alive'when William died, 
Anne's hereditary right could not have been 
asserted. The death of James a few months 
before William was exceedingly opportune for, 
if the legitimacy of the young James, now 
. styled James III, were not recognised, Anne 
(1) See above, p. 97. 
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:, might be regarded as James II's successor 
by hereditary right. The recognition of 
James III's title was now the sole disting- 
uishing mark between Jacobites and hereditary 
right theorists who supported-Anne. 
According' there was a sharp division of 
opinion in Anne's reign which had been almost 
wholly absent in that of William. Many Whigs 
and Tories under William had been content to 
support his crown on the plea of de facto 
kingship. The Whigs, now finding themselves 
strenuously opposed by Anne's hereditary claim, 
found it not only expedient but imperative to 
base William's and Anne's claims not on pos- 
session merely but on-a parliamentary basis 
r" 
The doctrine of resistance in William's reign 
had taken a subsidiary place among theories 
(1) Burnet, writing of the Abjuration Oath', 
1702, said: "in a paper (which I saw) that went 
about them [the Tories], it was said, that 
right was a term of law, which had only relat- 
ion to legal rights but not to a divine 
right-Or to birth right; so since that right 
was condemned by law, they, by abjuring it, 
did not renounce the divine right that he had 
by his birth" - Hist., vq p. 11. 
(2) See Appaddic 19 Note 66. > '. ý 
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employed to justify the Revolution. But 
now in Anne's reign'it became the only 
doctrine of the Whigs for it seemed to 
them that by the acceptance of that alone 
could the Revolution Settlement be*com- 
pleted by a Hanoverian succession. 
11 
From the very beginning of Anne's reign, 
" the bulk of the Tories had acclaimed her as 
the successor of James II by indefeasible 
hereditary right? Her father and elder sister 
were both dead and 'James III' was regarded 
as supposititious 
!o This attitude to the Pre- 
tender was necessary; for, when accused of being 
Jacobites, the Tories could reply that if they 
(1) See Appendix I, Note 67. 
(2) Leslie said to Hoadl¢y: "Her father and 
elder sister were dead before she came to the 
throne, and you have dispos'd of the Pretender [see below, p. 260] ... Therefore what have you to say against her hereditary right? " - Best Of all (1709), p. 15. 
IV. iii. 2 57 
did not accept him in 1702 they could not 
accept him on Anne's death. - 
Though this argument was logically sound, 
the Whigs were afraid to accept it or put ar 
trust in it. They naturally suspected that 
the Tories had passed over James in 1702 
because of the European situation. Louis XIV 
had made a diplomatic blunder by recognising 
the young prince as James III on his father's 
death; for it'is generally recognised that he 
thereby alienated the Jacobites whose patriot- 
ism was stronger than their Jacobitism. Even 
men'like Sacheverell, suspected-of Jacobitism, 
would not accept a king at the dictates of 
Louis. 
The Whigs, therefore, believed that the 
Tories accepted Anne because their hand was 
forced in that they realised that William 
died at a most inopportune time for a Jacob- 
ite restoration. And once Anne was settled 
a 
on the thrones there was little liklihood of 
_ 
(1) A defence of Her Majesty's title to the 
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a successful Jacobite rebellion. The 
popularity of Anne with all parties was 
the beat safeguard against her deposition. 
It was also a justifiable inference, on the 
part of the Whigag that the Tories merely 
pretended to regard James as supposititious 
to justify their passing him over in 1702; 
that meanwhile by preaching hereditary right 
and non-resistance they would prepare men's 
minds for a Jacobite restoration; 
® 
thatl. in 
addition, time would give them the chance to 
use all their efforts to induce James to 
change his religion. The Tories had to admit 
that England would not accept a Roman Catholic 
.' 
.ý. 
(1) The Judgment, -of K. James the First and 
King Charles the First against non-resistance, 
etc. 1710 Prefaces p. 3. See Appe =, 
Note 6. 
"Those who have cry'd up hereditary right 
against parliamentary right fused a side argu- 
ment in favour of the Pretender. " -A tend 
and hearty address to all the freeholders, 
etc. 1714), p. 18. 
0 
(2) It"is known that the Jacobites made 
frantic but fruitless efforts in the four 
last years of Anne's reign to induce James 
to become a Protestant. See Treve], yan, England 
under Queen Anne. Vol. 3, passim. 
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king but they could reckon on 
,a 
Protestant 
Stewart being more favourably received (at 
least, by-the Tories)_than a Protestant 
Hanoverian. 
Arme's attitude to her brother was, a watery. 
Burnet tells us that in-1703, "stories were con- 
fidently vented, and by some easily believed, 
that the Queen was convinced of the wrong done 
her pretended brotherl. and, that she was willing 
to put affairs -in the-bands of persons-who fav- 
oured his succession. It was also observed, 
that our court kept too cold civilities with the 
House of Hanoverl'and did nothing that was ten. 
der or cordial looking that way". Professor 
Trevelyan is inclined to believe that Anne's 
r" 
real mind in relation to her brother was never 
known. It had been told to William that Anne 
was in correspondence with James and that she 
agreed to accept, the crown on William's death 
for her lifetime and secure succession after 
2 
'her death for him. If there was any evidence 
(1)' -Hist., -v, p. 104. 




to prove-this arrangement, it-has been lost. 
But whether Anne ever contemplated any such 
arrangement or not is not material for our 
purpose. The important point for us iss that 
Whigs believed that-Tories who upheld heredit- 
ary right and non-resistance' were trying to 
pave the way for a Jacobite restoration after 
Anne Ia death. 
The'Tories' repudiation of James, therefore, 
appeared to be too slender a barrier between a 
Jacobite and a Hanoverian succession. As a 
Whig writer said in 1710: 
"They further strenuously inculcate the 
best title of a prince to the crown is 
an hereditary one ... Now by this doctrine they make her majesty's title to stand 
only upon the c3uestion of anther's il- 
legitimacy". 0 
The Whigs, therefore, owned James. This 
was a deliberate change of policy and it did 
not pass unnoticed. This new attitude haiLbeen 
criticised because, it is said, it strengthened 
the Jacobite cause towards the end of Anne's 
(1) A letter to the good people of Great 
Britain, pp. 4-5. -, 
r? 
(2) Leslie, Good old cause-(1710), p. 7.. 
See Appendix II Note 69- . 
Trapp, The character ... of the present 
set of Whigq7(1711), p. 20. 
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reign: But this is unjust. The Whigs had. 
a , very sound reason for what, they did. 
Whether James was supposititious or not did 
not matter to them nowt for such an enquiry 
was beside the point. To them James had no 
right to be - king even if he were beyond doubt ,-:,,. 
the sons: öt James " II 9 as we shall point out 
later. 0 But, by owning James, they hoped to 
drive the Tories into"a corner. - The Tories 
would be faced with the dilemma of confessing 
their Jacobitism or of abandoning the plea of 
hereditary right. They did neither and clung 
to their profession that James was illegitimate. 
But the Whigs would not have been true to their--,,, -.,, 
own creed if they, had not put this proposition: 
clearly before the Tories even at the risk of 
strengthening the Jacobite cause. 
In the next place, even if the-Tories were- 
not Jacobites, their hereditary right theory 
excluded the Hanoverian for there were other 
claimants to the throne-by hereditary right 
(1) Trevelyan, England under Queen Anne, vol. 
39p. 52. 
(2) See below, pp. 266 et'seq. 
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who came before Sophia.. Consequently, the % 
only guarantee of a Hanoverian succession was 
the Act of Settlement which depended on the 
Revolution for its validity. 
Setting aside the Jacobite question, we-see 
that the theory of indefeasible hereditary right 
_ 
condemned the Revolution. In 1702, Sacheverell, 
preaching before the University of Oxford-said: 
, '-"The highest indignity to any crowned head 
is calling in question the right and title 
of its power and authority. For this is 
downright flying in the face of majesty 
trampling upon its sovereignty and denying 
its vice-gerency ... It is mockery and 
deriding that wisdom and divine right where- 
by the crown is plac'd upon the head of 
majj esty .o 
Anne's title was "so clear, manifest-and undoubted, 
as even her very. yiorst enemies must acknowledge 
her title .., devolv'd upon her, by a long 
succession of her royal ancestors. " 
William's reign, the Bill of Rights and the 
Act of Settlement were all ignored. William 
was regarded as an usurper. That inference could 
(1) A defence of her majesty's title to the 
oý etc. 
(1702), 2nd ed. (1710 ý p,. 8, 
iý (2) ibid., p. 10. 
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" not be avoided. William's reign, it was 
inferred, might be regarded as being parat-- 
lelled by the interregnum between 1649 and 
1660, and just as in the latter year Charles 
II succeeded by hereditary right, so Anne suc- 
ceeded by the same rule, in 17D2. But, if Jatee 
at his death could transmit his right to Anne, 
it followed that he was king of right till his 
" death , Thus, the doctrine of hereditary right 
condemned' directly:; the Revolution. 
But the Revolution was also condemned indirectly 
by the doctrine of non-resistance-which went 
hand in hand with hereditary right. The Tories, 
when accused of Täcobitism,. used the doctrine of 
non-resistance in their. defence. Was that doe-. 
trine, they asked, not the greatest security 
(1) "If she had , it C the title] as-his heiress 
when he died, he of himself was of right king 
while he lived; and consequently all that was. 
done at the Revolution-and since that time was 
usurpation" - Queries to the new hereditary 
right-men (1710), pp. 3-?. 
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against a Jacobite rising?, Were not the 
Whigs who preached resistance and admitted the 
legitimacy of James, the true Jacobites? 
(P This 
latter query was manifestly too absurd to re- 
quire any answer. But to the former query, some. 
Whigs retorted that the doctrine of non-resis- 
tance applied only to a 'queen by indefeasible 
hereditary right. Anne, they saidg. did not have 
this attribute, and, therefore, the Tories could 
resist her in favour of James without breach of, 
that doctrine. 
(1) "Who are Jacobites now, the High Church 
that maintain 
The true right of succession in Anne's 
bright reign, 
Or your murmuring party, who grinning 
disown ,.. That the queen has, by birth, any 
right to the throne? 
- The new revolution; or, the Whigs turned Jacob- ites. (1710), p. 4. 
Cf. also: "The truth is, the Whigs themselves 
are Jacobites, if there be any such thing as a 
Jacobite in nature. Contrary to their oath, they 
assert the legitimacy and hereditary title of 
the Pretender: and then insist upon the lawful- 
ness, nay duty of resisting the present govern- 
ment .., whenever they think the publick good 
requires it. " - Trapp, The character and princi- 
ples of the present set of Whigq (1711), p . 20: 
} 
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Had there been no Jacobite problem, there 
would still have been the controversy over 
resistance and non-resistance. The question 
of the succession merely accentuated the dif- 
Terences because it gave to the doctrines, which 
would otherwise have been mere academic studies, 
vital applications to politics. To what extent 
the Whigs would have pressed the doötidne of re- 
sistance if there had been no Jacobite issue, it 
would be very difficult to say. Probably-they 
would have been content to'regard the Revolution 
as a fait accompli and as long as. the Revolution 
Settlement was left unquestioned by the Tories, 
accept it without troubling to justify it. 
We have found no evidence that the Tories ever r- 
openly condemned the Revolution. The only ac. 
cusation that the Whigs could make was that the 
Tories insinuated that it was a crime by their 
adherence to hereditary right and non-resistance. 
The Whigs, therefore, tried to counteract this (to 
them) fiubversive teaching of the. Tories. 
The Convention, they maintained, had given 
the crown to William despite his, lack of heredit. 
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parliamentary grant, ratified by the king 
in parliament l after William was crowned 
, king. The claim of William and the claims 
of all his successors could rest only on a 
parliamentary basis. The validity of these 
claims depended-on the legality of the Rev- 
. 
olution. And the right to resist a govern-"- 
ment must be held to be sufficient to con- 
stitute a legal-settlement. "This Revolution- 
title", said Hoadlty, "cannot be lawful (with 
respect to the. Queen's possessing the crown) 
unless resistance, in cases of extremity, be 
lawful. " 0 
The Whigs 
N 
justify resistance only by pro- 
pounding a revolutionary theory of government. 
The Tories might allow that the Revolution was 
legal, that the Revolution Settlement was legal; 
that a Hanoverian and not a Stewart should suc- 
ceed Annes but they would not allow that the 
Whig explanation for their legality was sound. 





The Tory attitude is expressed in their- 
taunt that the Whigs, 
267 
"... 'over coffee, like rebels declare 
That she rules by your courtesy, not as 
an heir. " 0 
I 
It was a denial of the whole Whig theory of 
government. As we have already mentioned, 
Sacheverell in 1702 struck the keynote of the 
controversy when he saJd that the questioning 
of the queen's title was doubting God's right 
to make her queen. But the Whigs openly declar- 
ed that the queen was a queen by their courtesy. 
John Toland, writing in 1701 to popularise the 
Act of Settlement, defended the doctrine of re- 
sistance and the election of William. 
"Nor did that Convention, or the present 
Parlüment" so mach as consider (as som 
would fain believe) whose right it was 
to succede as to whom they should give a 
right of succeding to the crown and regal 
government of England". 
He ran over the list of kings since Saxon days 
and triumphantly came to the conclusion. that 
t 
indefeasible hereditary right was never a rule 
of succession in England. 
0 
(1) The new revolution; or, the Whigs turned 
Jacobites 1710 p. 4. 
(2) Anglia liberal p. 130, of. Appendix I9 
Note-71 .- 
(3) Ibid., pp. 106-132. 
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Toland's conclusion with. regard to William, 
and Anne was "that no king can ever be so 
good as one of. their own making; as there is 
no title-equal to their approbation, which 
is the only divine right of. all magistracy. 
for the voice of the people is the voice of 
God". Absolute hereditary right "woul'd sub- 
ject us without remedy to be govern'd by 
tyrants, madmen, fools or idiots. " 
,.: "For the voice of the people ... -when declared by a free parliament is indeed the voice of 
God. And therefore whoever isýthus sovereign 
de facto is also to be owned, upon that very 
account to be sovereign de jure; nay and has 
a better title to the throne than if he 
could prove himself descended from Cain or 
Japhet by hereditary right, in case he wanted 
such an election by the people". 0 
It was difficult for men"to rid their minds 
of the hereditary element in kinng-ship. In the 
Convention, strong fears had been voiced that 
the English monarchy would become La Polish mon- 
arohy". The single word 'hereditary' was am- 
biguous. It was of value only when qualified 
by the words 'indefeasible! or' parliamentary'. 
(1) Anglia libera, p. 26. 
(2) Ibid., p. 109. Cf. his Memorial of the 
state of England. (1705) ems. e ow, p. . 
(3) Memorial of the state of Erýgland, pp. 96-97:. - 
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The confusion in which this controversy 
found itself would have been saved if men 
had clearly stated what they meant by an 
hereditary right. 
Swift] writing in 1710 in the the Examiner, 
asked how the queen's hereditary title could 
be in the interest of the Pretender. The Pre- 
tender's title, he said, was weakened by every 
argument ' which' strengthened Anne's. He thus 
admitted the validity of the claim of indefeas- 
ible hereditary right. But1he then went on to 
take a different view. "It is as plain, " he 
wrote, "as the words of an act of parliament 
can make its that her present majesty is heir 
to the survivor of. the late king and'queen her 
sister. Is not that an hereditary right? " 
And just as Swift put his own interpretation 
9 on the word 'hereditary' so he put his own 
-interpretation on 'indefeasible'. He knew 
as well'as any of his contemporaries that the 
word indefeasible was a stock word of the div- 
ine right theorists who meant thereby a right 
outwith the control of positive law. But he 
chose to ignore this meaning of it. When we. 
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examine, he said, "the word indefeasible 
with which some writers of late have made 
themselves so merry, I confess it is hard 
to conceive how any law which the supreme 
power makes, may not. by the same power be 
I 
repealed. " In the Bill of Rights where Queen 
_ 
Anne is named in remainder, we find these- 
words: "to which we bind. ourselves and our pos- 
terity for ever", Lawyers, said Swift, may 
argue that these words are against the very 
nature of government, "but a plain reader who 
takes the words in their natural meaning, may 
be excused in thinking a right so confirmed, 
is indefeasible, and if there be an absurdity 
in auch an opinion, he is not to answer for 
Qr 
it's . 
(1) Op. cit., in Works, ix, p. 91. 
The words "for ever" were omitted in the 
Act of Settlement. Burke followed Swift's 
reasoning very closely (cf. his Reflections on 
the Revolution in France in Works, ii, pp. 290 ff. ) 
It is unlikely that allegiance to the royal family 
"for ever" should be interpreted literally. We 
may compare Swift's remark in Clarendon's Hist- 
o. Clarendon refers to the Proclamation in 
Charles' II's reign that "we most hymbly and 
faithfully do submit and oblige ourselves, our 
heirs and posterity for ever". Swift remarks: 
"Can they oblige their posterity 10,000 yers 
to come? " - (Works ed. T. Scott, x, p. 323, ) 
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Though Swift was writing as a Tory he 
was not interpreting the Tory theory of here- 
ditary right according to their own meaning 
of it. He tried to take the sting out of 
their doctrine by pretending to believe that 
by hereditary right was meant not divine right 
0 
__but 
parliamentary hereditary right. He had 
already stated his own view that Anne's title 
was parliamentary. In 1708 he had said that 
the distinction between de jure and de facto 
was absurd, "For every limited monarch is a 
king de jure, because he governs by the con- 
sent of the whole, which is authority suffic- 
ient to abolish all precedent right. ;". 
The Whigs did not derer hereditary right for 




"The royal line is on the one hand heredit- 
ary, to avoid the uncertainty, venality, 
tumults and disorders, of frequent elections 
from different families; but on the other 
hand, to prevent the worse inconvenience of 
having for our kings, madmen, fools, tyrants, 
papists, or persons otherwise unfit to gov- 
erns the succession is so limited by laws as 
(1) Sentiments of Ch. of Engl. man (1708). 
Works. Ed. T. Scott, iii, p. 69. 
(2) Monarchy, as approved by Locke, was here- 
ditary. See Of civil Government, Bk. iii %222. 
1 
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as to be subject to diverse incapacities 
and 'tis at the pleasure of the legislat- 
ive power to encrease or diminish such 
incapacities, as they shall find most 
conducing to the welfare of the nation". 
(1) Toland, The memorial of the State of 
England, etc. (1705) p. 76. 
i 
CHAPTER FIVE 
The king and the law 
I 
CHAPTER FIVE 
1. THE OFFICE OF KING 
The prevailing idea- of kingship during the 
seventeenth century was that the office and 
person of the king were inseparable. Although .,: 
this was a doctrine of the divine right theor- 
ists, it had, nevertheless, legal support. 
Allegiance was held to be due to the person of., 
the king, not to the office.. The reason given 
was that it was absurd to. speak of allegiance 
to an office that was inanimate. The law gov-; 
erning allegiance was laid down in Calvin's 
r" 
Case, and it is worth noting that that case iss 
at the present day, the authority on this sub- 
ject' Coke reporting that case, said that the 
king had two capacities in him; one-a natural 
body, being descended from the blood royal of 
(1) Halsbury, Laws of England, " vol. ' 1. 
274 
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,, the'realm, and a politic capacity which was 
immortal. To which capacity was allegiance 
due? The decision in Calvin's Case was that 
it was due to the natural person of the king 
and not due to his politic capacity only, that 
iss to his crown or kingdom as distinct from 
his. natural capacity'. 
® Coke condemned the 
"damnable and damned opinion" of the De Spensers, 
who, in Edward II's reign, had hatched the treason 
in their hearts that since the king had two cap- 
acities, subjects were bound to remove the king 
by force if he. did not "demean himself by reason 
of the crown". Coke's conclusion is that "no 
man will affirm-that England itself, taking it 
for the continent thereof, doth owe arty legiance r" 
or faith, or that arr faith or'legiance should 
be due to it". U 4 
That an oath of allegiance can be taken 
(1) Coke Report, ed. 4. H.. Thomas and J. F. 
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only to a person is ordinary commonsense. 
The important part of Coke's report*is that 
the office is inseparable from the person. 
Coke held that allegiance was due to James not 
because-he had been invested with the office 
of king but because the office was inherent 
in him as hereditary successor to the crown. 
Kingship was his birthright. If a king, there- 
fore, could not lose his birthright he could 
not lose his kingship. 
In the rebellion against, Charles I the 
distinction between the person and the office 
of king was brought out. It may be seen 
tentatively formulated in the Declaration of 
the Lords and Commons in Parliament concerning 
His Majesty's Proclamation Lcondemning the 
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Militia ordinance of March 5 1641/23, 
27th May 1642. The explanation by the 
Houses that their desire was to protect 
the king against his enemies must have 
appeared later as more ingenious than 
sincere, when the king's person was actually 
struck at. When Charles's head fell on the 
block in 1649 and not only the king destroyed 
but kingly government too, the theory of the 
(1) It is acknowledged", tht Declaration ran, 
"that the king is the fountain of justice and 
protection, but the acts of justice and pro- 
tection are not exercised in his person, nor 
depend upon his pleasure, but by his courts 
and by his ministers, who must do their duty 
therein though the king in his own person 
should 
forbid them; and therefore if judgments 
-should be given by them against the king's will 
and personal command, yet are they the king's 
judgments" - Journal of the H. of L. vq 112. "; 
Gardiner, Constit. doe. 3rd ed., p. 256. 
The ordinance of March 5 1641/2 had con- 
tained these words: "For the safety therefore 
of his majesty's person the Parliament and king- 
dom in this time of imminent danger;, etc. 
Gardinerl op. cit. ' p. 245. 
of. Fortescue: "You Cthe king] will better 
pronounce judgment in your courts by. others than 
in person: it being not customary for the kings 
of England to sit in court, or pronounce judgment 
themselves; and yet they are called the king's 
judgments, though pronounced and given by-others" - 
De laudibus legum Angliae (c. 1470), Chap. viii. 
11 
- 
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separation of the. person and the office of 
king must have appeared a mögt dangerous 
tenet. And it was certainly so regarded at 
the Restoration. By the Corporation'Act, 
every officer in every corporation, besides 
. taking the other specified oaths, had to make 
the following declaratory oath: "That it was 
not lawful upon any pretence whatsoever to take 
arms against the king: and that he did abhor 
that traiterous position of taking arms by 
authority against his person, or against those 
commissioned by him". 
The same oath had to be taken by virtue of 
the Militia Act? of the Act of Uniformity . and 
. (1) In the debato. 's on the Militia Act, Sir-John Vaughan maintained that "the people of England 
not only might, but in some cases were bound toi 
take arms against persons commissioned by the 
king... as should put any such illegal commis- 
sions in execution". He desired, therefore the 
--word 'lawful' to be inserted before the word 'com- 
missions'. Finch, the Attorney-General, replied 
"that it was not necessary since the very word 
commission did impart its for if it was not law- 
sully issued out to lawful persons and for lawful 
reasons, it was no commission". Finch's interpre. 
tation was accepted. (See Cobbett's Parl Hist. 
of. Echard, Hist. of the Revolution. (1726), pp. 
17-18. 
In the debates on the Indemnity Act it had 
also been explained that commissions must be 
according to law. Although the debates indicate 
a feeling for the recognition of government bound 





In the debates on the Exclusion Bill, 
when it was proposed that a regent should 
govern in the name of James, it was argued 
that the person and office of the crown could 
not be separated, and this opinion prevailed. 
The same argument was used against. the regency 
plan in 1689. It is 'a remarkable fact that the 
University of Oxford in 1683 took no notice of the 
tenet that the person, and the office of the king 
were separable. But in the following year Parker 
satirically condemned it in a review oY Ruther- 
ford's Lex rex wherein that theory had been pro- 
pounded. The distinction, he said, between the 
(1) Reresby's Memoir(Dryden House Memoirs ed., 
1904), p. 212. 
The Earl of Essex argued for the crown being 
an office, following the 17th chapter of Edward 
the Confessor's laws. 
See Samuel Johnson's Notes on the phoenix 
edition of the Pastoral letter (1694F, p. 72. 
(2) Burnet tells us: "a great deal was brought 
from both the laws and history of England to 
prove that not only the person but the author- 
ity of the'king was sacred. " -: Hist., iii, P-355- 
.,.. 
,. ýý 
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king's person in concreto and the office in 
abstracto is a 'metaphysical nothing'. If 
the office could govern, there might be some 
meaning in the distinction. But he that corn- 
wands us to submit to the Office commands us 
to submit to the man in whom it is: "so that 
this is really no better than prophase trifling 
with the word of God, when we are in plain and 
express terms commanded to make no resistance 
to our governors, to get loose from so useful 
a law, by such childish and sensless trifles 
as plainly contradict the law itself". nV 
Parker was expressing the current conception 
of kingship as held by the divine right the or-. 
ists. It was this belief that was responsible 
for the schism of the non-jurors after 1689. 
The overthrow of the- tenet that the office and - 
I person of the king were inseparable was imperat. 
ive if. -the'English monarchy was to be prevented 
from becoming absolute and irresponsible. The 
problem does not arise today when the functions 
of the crown ammainly exercised by ministers 
(1) Parker, Religion and loyalty (1684), il 
pp. 32-83.1 
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responsible to Parliament; a fact which 
, explains why 
Calvin's Case is still the auth- 
ority on'the law of allegiance. But in the 
seventeenth century, subjects had either to 
submit to the will of the king during his life- 
time and so on for ever under his successors, 
without hope of redress against arbitrary rule, 
or else terminate arbitrariness by severing the 
link between person and office. And whatever 
theoretical justification might be put forward, 
such a severence did actually take place in 1688. 
James II during the remainder of his lifetime 
was deprived of his regal functions which were 
given to a king who had no natural right to them. 
By the divine right theory the-king, by being 
born of the blood royal, inherited the crown by 
natural right irrespective of positive law. The 
kingship was inherent in him. After the Revol- 
ution the Whigs disregarded birthright. The 
separation of the person and office of king en- 
, abled'them 
to discard James II and transfer his 
I 
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powers to William. 
0 Their new oath of alleg- 
iance to William was now justified behause 
he was king by law. The relationship between 
person and office was thus reversed. Alleg- 
iance was due to whatever person was lega14 
invested with the royal dignity. He was king 
who was invested with the power, and obedience 
was due to him in the same way as obedience is 
due to ar r temporary holder of an office. 
(P 
It was stated that the oath of allegiance 
was taken not to defend the person of the king 
(1) "Is our allegiance so inseparable from the 
. person we have once sworn toi that no case what- 
soever can alter it? ... Not the seeking the 
. utter ruin and destruction of the people? " - An answer to Mr. Ashton's paper-9 etc. (1691) - S. T. 
Wn. III, iii p. 111. 
(2) When Parliament came to discuss William's 
revenue, a curious problem arose. Could the 
revenue settled on James for life be claimed 
by William as long as James lived? (See Mac- 
aulay, Hist., iii p 1343. ) 
But Finch said in the Convention Jan. 28 
1688/9 "No man will say ... that the king has no more in the monarchy, than the exercise of 
it" - Grey's Debates, ixe p. 18. 
0 
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,, in his private capacity but to defend the 
0 crown which he represented Herein we see 
the conception of the crown as an integral 
part of the English constitution. James, 
it was said, had pursued a policy inconsistent 
, with 
that of the crown. He had exercised the 
functions of the crown not according to the 
rules of that office but according to his per- 
sonal will. Two authorities, therefore, came 
into opposition, that of the crown and that of 
(1) "The läw considers the king as the head of 
the polity, and the primum mobile of justice 
and'order; and has annexed to his royal dignity 
certain powers and functions, which cannot be 
separated from it, such as protection, govern- 
ment, and administration of the law. These 
compleat the idea of a king; and without them 
his royal dNile cannot subsist,. So that the 
separation powers or functions from 
" the person of the Icing, is as really and effect- 
ually a determination of his government or a 
demise as a natural death" - Some considerat- 
ions touching succession and allegiance. S. T. 
WTI. III i p. 334 
"Allegiance is due to the king as king, 
that is as a person vested with the royal 
authority. It is the exercise of royal author- 
ity that constitutes his politick ca acityl and 
draws to it the obedience of the subjects, and- 
not merely the descent of a right to the crown" 




Allegiance could not be due to both. 
By the theory of divine right it was due to 
James. -By the theory of the English consti- 
tution it was due to the crown. 
Who are traitors, asked Ferguson-, - they 
who attack the authority of the crown or they 
who preserve it? "The first and highest trea- 
son"l he said, "is that which is committed against 
the constitution: and such and such crimes 
against the person and dignity of the supreme, mag- 
istrate are only made and declared to be so,, by 
reason of the capacity he is put into by the con- 
stitution of preserving and defending the soc- 
iety". He who endeavours to preserve the consti- 
tution is no traitor. But "to go about to subvert 
the constitution ... is .. e the greatest' treason 
he can perpetrate against the person, crown ands 
dignity of the king". 
(1) "Tis with bleeding hearts that in this 
manifest extreme pppression and danger we beg your 
Highnesses aid to defend the rights of the crown 
and the realm" -A memorial to the Prince and 
Princess of Orange Nov, 1688) S. T. Wm. 111, if 
p. 35. 
(2) A brief justificationy-etc. (1688) S. T. 
Wm. III, il pp. 136-7. 
See also,, Appendix I1 Note 72; 
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When St. Paul's words in his Epistle to 
the Romans provided the foundation of the 
doctrine of non-resistance, it was natural 
that an interpretation should be sought which 
would conform to the new theory of resistance. 
It was argued that Paul did not forbid resis- 
tance to a person. By superior powers, it was 
said, Paul meant government, not a governor or 
king. The laws of the constitution constituted 
the'superior powers' and these must not be re- 
sisted. 
0 
The plea of the defence of the crown 
against the king was, naturally, not allowed to 
go unchallenged. Apart from the non-jurors, who 
would not separate the office and the person of 
the king, there were supporters of the Revolut- 
ion Settlement who would not abandon the old 
interpretation of the doctrine of non-resistance. 
Michael Maittaire, for instance, would not 
accept this interpretation of the Apobtle's words. 
He would not admit that the king could be 
(1) St. Paul and her Majesty vindicated. 2nd ed. (1710), p. 3. 
See also, Appendix Is Note - 73. ': 
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resisted even if he "contradicted his 
office"l for to him St. Paul's words 
plainly meant non-resistance to the 
person and did not refer to the office. 
0 
(1) The doctrine'of passive obedience 
and non-resistance stated, 3rd ed. 1711)x, 
p" u" 
r" 
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2. The king under the law. 
Having discussed the separation of the politic 
and natural capacities of the king, we must 
now consider what acts of the king constitute 
such a separation. If the king could forfeit 
the crown, then he must hold it by some other 
rule than that of indefeasible hereditary 
right. The measure of, rule was found in the 
laws of England. That the king was under the 
law was probably the most generally accepted 
opinion after the Revolution. 
The mediaeval conception of law was that 
-it emanated from the people and that its sanc- 
tion was to be found in custom and not in the 
will of a supreme"governor. Hence we find the 
poptlar conception that the ruler was subject " 
to the law equally with the rest of the nation. 
The Roman maxim that the 'ruler is legibus sol- 
utus never received unqualified acceptance in 
England. And we must bear in mind the distinc- 
tion between the king himself being legibus 
solutus and his governing arbitrarily without 




administration, for, until modern times, 
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legislation in our accepted sense was but 
imperfectly understood, if admitted at all 
The mediaeval conception of the king govern- 
ing according to the law of the land is clear- 
ly enunciated in the thirteenth century anony- 
mous poem Carmen de bello Lewensi 
"We say. " . that law rules the dignity of the 
-, king, for we believe that law is a light, 
without which we infer that the guide goes 
astray... If the king be without this law, 
he will go astray... If he conform to this 
law he shall stand and if he disagrees with,,,,, 
it he shall stagger. It is commonly said ' 
'As the king wills, the law goes',: truth 
wills otherwise, for the law stands, the 
king falls. 110 
Fortescue, in the fifteenth century, spoke of 
the power of an English king as 'dominium 
politicurn et regal(: ' Such a king "ma~y not rule 
his peple bi other lawes than such as that. 
assenten unto. " 
©. 
(1) Cf. Declaration of Merton, 1236. "Nolumus 
leges Angliae rnutare. " 
(2) Written about 1264 in praise of. Simon de 
Montfort. 
(3) Op. -cit. (ed. by Kingsford, 1890), pp. 51-52. 
(4) Fortescue, The governance of England. 
( ed. by C: Plurnmer, 1885. ) p. l. 
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The mediaeval conception of law was- ,s 
destined to be eclipsed under the Tudor and 
Stewart regimes. The legislative function, 
which, as we have noted, was imperfectly un- 
derstood in the Middle Age, began to assume 
importance in our constitutional development. 
While Henry VIII continued. to increase his 
executive powers in administering law, he real- 
ized the significance of making how laws through 
Parliament. Parliament as a legislative organ 
(as distinct from a money-voting one) entrenched 
itself deeper. and deeper into our constitution 
until it secured the recognition at the Revol- 
ution, as we shall see later, of the sole right 
of enacting and repealing laws. 
0WYhile 
the leg- 
islative continued to make headwayl the executive 
pursued an independent course. The king's pre- 
rogative steadily, increased till in the seven- 
teenth century we have the struggle between 
statute and common law on one side and. the royal 
prerogative on the other. The king by virtue 
of the royal prerogative came to set himself 
(1) See below, chap. 6: Parliament. 
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above the law. 
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In James II's reign it seemed 
to men that nothing short of a revolution 
could alter this. 
"Our laws are so many cyphers"©as the 
outcry of one writer at the Revolution. No 
one suggested that the king should be divested 
of the whole of his prerogative. Locke favour- 
ed its reasoned use: - 
"This power to act according to discretion 
for the public good, without the prescription 
of the law and sometimes even against it, is 
that which is called prerogative; for since. 
in some governments the law-making power is 
not always in being and is usually too numer- 
ous, and'so too slow for the dispatch requis- 
ite to executions and because, also, it is 
impössible to forsee and so by laws to provide 
for all accidents and necessities chat may 
concern the publicj or make such laws as will 
do no harm if they are executed with an in- 
flexible rigour on all occasions and upon all 
persons that may come in their wayy therefore 
there is a latitude left to the executive 
power to do many things of choice which the 
laws do not prescribe". ( 
The right of prerogative is to be exercised 
only in exceptional cases. It must not conflict 
with Locke's maxim that the government. is bound 
(1) Political aphorisms. S. T. Wm. III, i, p. 395. 
(2), Second Treatise$ 160. '' 
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to rule "by established standing laws, pro- 
mulgated and known to the people, and not by 
extemporary decrees. "(ýThat James II had en-- 
deavoured to set himself above the laws (main], y 
exemplified by his dispensing with the Test 
Act) was the primary cause of the Revolution. 
Amid all the divergent and often conflicting 
reasons given after 1689 for supporting the 
Revolution Settlement, the one argument which 
is common to all theories is the rule of law. 
"Absolute monarchy" said Locke, "which by 
some men is counted for the 'only government in 
the world, is indeed inconsistent with civil 
society, and so can be no form of civil govern- 
ment at all. " His reasons were logical. First- 
]. y, in the state of nature, he argued, there 
was no "known authority" to which men could 
ter; 1 
(1) Second Treatise, x. 131. 
(2) Ibid., § 90. This is quoted by Sir William 
Holdsworth to prove his contention that Locke 
denies legal sovereignty. But this quotation 
does not prove the point one way or another. 
A 'sovereign' Body which is not arbitrary is 
not sovereign. But it does not follow that 
the denial of arbitrariness to monarchy pre- 
cludes some other sovereign organ. See History 
of English law, vii p. 285, and note 11. 
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`appeal for redress of injuries. Men left the 
state of nature and entered political society 
to remedy this inconvenience, and if they sub- 
jected themselves to arbitrary government they 
put themselves, in a worse position than they 
were in in a state of nature. "By supposing 
__-. _ 
they have given up themselves to the absolute 
arbitrary power and will of a legislator [i. e. 
governora they have disarmed themselves, and 
O 
armed him to make a prey of them when he pleases. " 
Secondly, the government cannot be arbitrary 
because "nobody has an absolute arbitrary power 
over himself, or over any other" in a state of 
nature, and nobody can transfer to another more 
power than he has in himself. 
Toland said that a despotic monarchy was' 
, 
"a government of beasts", and practically all 
(1) Ibid. 137. 
(2) Ibid., 9135* (3) Ibid. ` 
(4) Memorial of the State of England. (1705) 
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writers in our period condemned arbitrary 
government. With a few exceptions (Leslie, 
for example) all men were agreed that the 
king had not only the law to guide him in 
administration but that he was strictly 
bound to govern according torlaw. Nothing had 
been left to the king's private discretion, 
and the law laid down rules by which the king 
must govern and the subject obey. Fortescue 
was constantly quoted to demonstrate that 
our government was a legal, regal or political 
in opposition to a despotical, absolute, arbitrary 
or tyrannical government. 
Although it was generally conceded that 
the king ought to eövern according to law, it. 
was not clear to many men how the king should 
be forced to observe this rule. It is one 
thing to say that the king ought to be under 
the law, and another thing to provide a means 
for enforcing it. ' The maxim that the king is 
(1) See Appendix II Note 74. 
0 
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under the law did not always have the right' 
of resistance for its corollory. 
But those who pleaded for the right of 
resistance always based their claim on the 
rule of law. 
"If the king is not obliged to govern by 
those laws that they have made, to what 
purpose are the people to obey such laws ? 
... If a : magistrate , notwithstanding all laws made for the we)l-governing a com- 
munity, will act plainly destructive to 
that commminity they are discharg'd either 
from active or passive obedience, and 
indispensably oblig'd by the law of nature 
to resistance. " 10 
At the same time, they made it clear that 
resistance to a king governing by law was not 
justifiable 
(1) political ap or isms, S. T. Wm. III, i, p. 395. 
'See also Appendix I i"Note 75: ' 
'(2) See Appendix Iý Note 76'. . 
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III : The constitutional original contract. 
In the two proceeding sections we have dis- 
cussed two points. Firstly, we saw that the 
person and the office of the king may be sep- 
arated. Secondly, we saw that the king may 
effect this separation by ruling contrary to 
law. We have now to consider why the people 
may resist if the king does not govern by law. 
This point is illustrated by the constitutional 
original. contract. 
The pactum unionis has already been discussed 
By it the government was made a trustee for the. 
people who remained sovereign with a right to 
recall the delegated power when the govern- 
ment dissolved itself. There was no equality 
between governor and governed. But the more 
. usual 
form of contract propounded by theorists 
, for contractual government was 
the pactum sub- 
jectionis, i. e., a pact between governor and 
governed, both parties to the contract being 
equal. This was the type of contract which 
engaged men's minds most after 1688. It, was 
the form indicated in the resolution of Jan- 
(1) Above, chap. 2, sect. 2. 
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uary-28,1689, according to the inter- 
pretation put upon it both inside and 
outside the Convention. Burnet, analys- 
"ing opinion in parliament in favour of 
the contract$ refers us for proof of the 
theory to the coronation oath, which, her, 
says, clearly showed that the king was 
crowned after the people had agreed to 
swear fealty to him and the king had pro- 
mixed to defend his people and govern them 
by law. - 'Homage was done to him only after, 
he had made this promise. "And though of 
'late the coronation has been considered 
rather as a solemn instalment than that 
which gave the king his authority", Neverthe-' 
less, it showed "what the government was 
0 
originally. " 
Burnet took a very cautious view-of the 
contractrand did not commit himself to the 
opinion that the coronation of William re- 
presented the re-ehactment of the original 
(1) Burnet, Hist., iii, pp. -'367-8. 
'- ýý-ý, 
V. iii0 
contract, as other writers boldly as-. 
serted. - But Burnet did make it clear 
that the conception of a pactum unionis 
was not entertained in the Convention. 
297 
In the reports of the debates which we 
have, we find no one making any such claim. 
We can supplement the negative evidence of 
Grey's Debates-, with Burnet's History. Burnet 
- tells us that, in the Convention, suggestions 
were made that the government was dissolved 
I 
and that the people were put back into a 
, -. state of nature, so that they were at liberty 
to erect a government on a new foundation. 
This was a bold assertion, says Burnet, "for 
,., 
that might have been carried so far, as to 
infer from its that all men's properties, 
honours, rights, and franchises, were dis- 
solved". 
© 
(1) In the Convention, Sir William Williams 
,. said.. 
"Should you. go to the beginning of gov- 
ernment, we should be much in the dark" (Grey's 
Debates, ixe p. 15) and Finch remarked: "That 
it is devolved on the people ... is I believe 
`farther than gentlemen would go ... If we 
were in the state of nature, we should have 
little title to any of our estates" (Ibid,, 
p. 18). 
(2) Burnett Hist., iii,, p. 362. 
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This was the obvious danger to be faced 
if James were regarded as having broken the 
pactum unionis, so that all government was 
at an end and a new one had to be built from 
the foundation. King James, it was held, had 
not dissolved political society but had merely 
endeavoured to subvert the constitution. Sher- 
lock shared Burnet's fear. In a state of nat- 
. 
he said, "all men are equal, and all 
O 
things common. " Such an idea as the reversion, 
to a state of nature, therefore, did appear .` 
to be quite out of keeping with the whole 
spirit of the Revolution, which had been 
undertaken to, preserve society and govern- 
ment from the subversive attacks of James. 
But the fear was groundless. For, as_ we have 
seen, Locke did not. share Burnet's and 
Sherlock's view that the state of. nature was 
one of equality, socially and economically, 
A return to a state of nature would not 
dissolve "All men's properties, honours, 
(1) See Appendix I, Note 77. 
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rights and franchises. " Society, as a social 
unit, would remain, but the government being- 
dissolved, society had the right to renew it. 
It is true that it was deduced from this 
theory that the people had the right to set 
up any new form. But the suggestion that a 
new form should be established was scarcely 
ever mentioned. But the acceptance of a pactum 
unionis required also the acceptance of a'com- 
plete theory of the fundamentals of government, 
the origin of the state and the basis of auth- 
ority. And these-were deeper matters than most 
men wished to probe into. 
The contract, therefore, to most men meant 
simply"the mutual obligation between the king and 
0 
the people. " The appeal was not to the, law of nat- 
ure, but to the laws of England. Though kings, said 
Samuel Masters, have the law of God to maintain 
and protect them in the use of that authority to 
-which they have a just right, yet that right is 
to be meaäured only by the constitution of the 
realm and it may be alienated without incurring 
(1) Political aphorisms. S. T. Wm. III, it p. 395. 
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any sin against God as they who assert jus 
divinum would pretend. -To ask for a book in which 
the original contract was recorded would be-absurd, 
he said, "that compact being nothing else than a 
tacit agreement between king and subjects to 
observe such common usages, and practises as by 
__an 
immemorial prescription have become the common 
2 
law of our government. " For Masters, the coron- 
ation oath was the symbol of this immemorial pact 
From that ceremony he concluded that there are 
rights and liberties reserved in the people and that 
the will of the king is limited by the law of 
the land and that he is bounds by his oath to 
conserve the laws, as the subjects are. b y their 
oaths of allegiance :, o obey them. 
© 
This view 
(1) The case of allegiance considered. 
S. T. Wm. III, i, p. 320. 
(2) Ibid., p. 322. 
(3) The coronation oath taken by William and 
Mary was : "Will you solemnly promise and swear 
to govern the people of this kingdom of England 
and the dominions thereto belonging according 
to the statutes in Parliament agreed on, and the 
laws and customs of the same 711 
(4) The case of allegiance considered. S. T., 
Wm. III9 it p. 322. 
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was taken by many writers. 
The coronation had, as Burnet confessed, 
come to be regarded merely as a ceremony. 
It symbolised the tie of fealty between sub- 
jects and king. But since the time of Edward I 
the king had succeeded on the death of his 
predecessor and thus the maxim had grown up 
that the king never dies. Coke, in Calvin's 
Case, had laid it down as the law, that the 
king was as fully king before as after his 
coronation. Allegiance was duet to the king 
irrespective of his coronation. Consequent- 
ly, allegiance was absolute and had nothing 
contractual about, it. But, by regarding the 
coronation as the re-enactment on an original 
contract, allegiance could be held-to be con- 
ditional. Locke's pactuna unionis was not capable 
of historical proof. But to those who asked where 
the original contract could be found, the reply 
(1) See Appendix; I, Note 78. 
(2) See above, p. 296. 
t_. 
(3) See Appendix I, Note 79- 
(4) e. g. by Phipps at the Sacheverell Trial. 
S. T., xv, 232. 
1 
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that it was to be found in the king's coron- 
ation oath was plausible. It is. very sig- 
nificant that that was the interpretation later 
put upon it by Blackstone. 
Resistance doctrinaires often contented 
themselves with the bare assertion that alleg- 





, the king could govern by law. We have seen 
that the advocates for resistance did not 
allow resistance unless this condition had 
been violated. Though some admitted that un- .. ý w 
successful resistance-would be treated as 
treason, thus inferring its illegality, never., -. 
theless, it was more usual to plead only for 
resistance which coulfl be regarded as non- 
(1) "As to the terms of the original contract 
between king and people, I apprehend to be now 
couched in the coronation by the statute 1 Wm. 
and Mary, sec. I, c. 6 is to be administered to 
ever king and queen. " - Commentaries. (9th ed., 
1783) Bk., chap. 3, p. 234. 
Blackstone did not accept Locke's contract. 
"This notion... is too wild to-be seriously 
admitted. "-- Ibid., p. 47- 
(2) "The subjects allegiance, though some may call 
natural, it hath always a respect to the laws in 
being and by consequence to the compact and 
agreement between prince and people. " - English 
loyalty, etc, S. T. Wm. III9 p. 408. 
S 
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illegal. The contract was the only way of 
constituting such resistance., Resistance was 
justifiable only after the king had broken 
the contract and absolved his subjects from 
their allegiance. A subject who owed no alleg- 
iance could-not be guilty of. treason 
0 
The mediaeval interpretation of the maxim 
'The king can do no wrong' - was usually accepted. 
That is to say, it was taken to mean that the - 
king could do nothing but: what the law empower- 
(1) ""If the prince violates his part of the contract 
and endeavours the subvertion of our laws and 
religion, the question is, Whether he does not 
thereby absolve the people from their allegiance 
to him if either they or their representatives 
find themselves under a necessity to assert their 
liberties ?"-A defence of the Archbishop's ser- 
mon on the death of her late majesty. 1695. S. T. 
Wm. III, iii p. 535- 
Lechmere at the-Sacheverell Trial said that 
our government was based on the original contract 
between the crown and the people "and if the 
executive part endeavours the subversion and total 
destruction of the government, the original contract 
is thereby broke, and the right of allegiance ceases, 
that part of the government, thus fundamentally 
injured, hath a right to save or recover that 
constitution in which it-had an original interest. "- 
- Sach. Trial. 8o ed., p. 34. S. T., xv, 61. 
Out of twenty speakers for the prosecution 
at the trial, Lechmere and Stanhope were the only 
speakers to mention a contract. 
(2) Holdsworth, History of English law. Voli, 3 
L3rdced. ) p. 465. 
I 
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v ed him to do. Occasionally, however, we find 
the modern interpretationg. that iss that the 
king's Ministers are responsible for the 
king's acts. But the convention of the con- 
stitution, whereby the king became'irrespon- 
sible and executive acts became controllable 
through the responsiblity of a cabinet, based 
on party government, to parliament had not yet 
been conceived. And the question of the respon- 
sibility of the executive can be considered, 
best in relation to parliament. This will be 
part of our consideration in the next chapter. 
(1) See Appendix I, Note 80. I 








Since 1689 parliament has sat every year, but 
we are not here concerned with the constitutional 
device which ensured annual parliaments. We are 
concerned with what Englishmen thought of the con- 
stitutional significance of parliament,, their 
attitude to its position in our polity, and with 
the powers which they thought parliament ought to 
possess. 
In 1610 James Whitelock in Bate's Case opposed 
to the sovereignty of the king the sovereignty of 
parliament. He said there must be, a sovereign power. 
"that can control all other powers, and cannot be 
controlled by itself ... The sovereign power, is 
agreed to be in the king, but in the king is a two- 
fold power; the one in parliament, as he is assisted 
with the consent of the whole state; the other-out, 
of parliament as he is sole and singular, guided 
merely by his own will. And of these two powers in 
the king, one is greater than the other, and can 
direct and control the other, that is suprema potes- 





It will then be easily be proved, that the power of 
the king in parliament is greater than his power 
out of parliament ... Acts of parliament be they 
laws, grounds or whatsoever else, the act and 
power is the king's but with the assent of the Lords 
and Commons, which maketh-it the most sovereign and 
supreme power above all and controllable by none". 
This view of Whitelocke's is hardly an advance on 
that of Sir Thomas Smith who, in his Commonwealth 
of England said: "The most high and absolute power 
of the realm of England consisteth in the Parliament 
... The Prince ... hath absolutely in his power the 
authority of war and peace ... The prince useth also 
to dispense with laws whereas equity requireth a 
moderation to be had ý.. The prince giveth all the 
chief and highest offices of magistracies of the 
realm ... To be short, -the prince is the life, the 
head and the authority of all things that be done 
in the realm of England" 
. 
Sir Thomas Smith was not 
inconsistent. He was merely stating that the parlier 
went was supreme legislator and king supreme admin- 
(1)- Prothero, Select statutes, etc. 4th ed. 19.13, 
PP- 351-2. 




istrator. Whitelocke amplified this concept and 
made the king in parliament greater than the king 
out of parliament. But he continues thus: "The 
sovereign power is agreed to be in the king. " The 
power of the king in parliament functioned only 
when the king willed that it should do so. And so 
long as the king was in opposition to the two 
Houses, Whitelocke's greater sovereignty had a poor 
chance of being a reality. - The inharmonious partner- 
ship between the king and the two Houses led to the 
Civil War, the abolition of the monarchy, and the 
predominance-of a kingless parliament. "England did 
not like the Commonwealth and the restoration of the 
Stewarts was made easy. The most important constitu- 
tional result of the Commonwealth regime was the 
increased strength of parliament with a corresponding 
decrease in the power of the king. Charles II did 
not dare to dispense with parliament for any great 
lengti of time as his father and grandfather had 
done. The constitutional positiont-however, was, 
falsified. The Church of. England had-suffered as 
much as the king at the hands of the Puritans under 
the Commonwealth and, therefore, at the Restoration 
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they entered into a close alliance. The church 
taught the doctrine of absolute non-resistance to 
the king as sole sovereign power in the state. 
And, therefore, whenever parliament showed, a ten- 
dency to limit the royal authority, the king could 
depend on the unwavering support of the church. 
The legal position of-the prerogative was stated 
in terms which would not have astonished a Tudor 
lawyer. Parliament,, which passed the Clarendon 
Code and the Test Act, was the servant of this 
Church-King alliance. It was as a servant that 
parliament was regarded. In 1683 the University 
of Oxford decreed that it was a damnable sin 'to 
assert that the sovereignty of England was in the 
0 three Estates viz. King, Lords and Commons. This 
theory of the constitution was maintained by the 
church as long as the church was supported by the 
king. By breaking the alliance between crown and 
church, James II brought about the Revolution. 
One significant fact stands out. Parliament had 
maintained its position in our polity. Its 
(1) Holdsworth, Hist. of Eng. Law, vi, p. 208. 
(2) Decree the Fourth. 
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strength existed in fact if not in'theory. And 
when the church withdrew its support from the 
monarchy, parliament was in a position to assume 
its place in theory as well as in fact. 
Even after the Revolution, however, parliament 
itself did not feel that it had secured the upper 
_hand. 
The chief ground for deposing James was his 
dispensing with statutes in the interests of Roman 
Catholics. James, it was said, assumed a legislat- 
- ive power that was not- his by the English constitut- 
ion. It may be noted here that the best legal 
opinion now is that James had a dispensing power. 
However, statesmen at the Revolution acted upon the 
Z 
assumption that James's acts were illegal and any 
doubt that existed wits removed in the Bill of Rights. 
(1) Holdsworth, Hist. of Eng. law, vi, p. 225. 
(2) "Did not the late king, by his dispensing 
power and his sole authority" make laws for the 
recusants ? "What could any law made by the true 
legislative authority, a king with his parliament, 
have done more for them than the king himself 
without a parliament's concurrence, did ? 1-think 
... this instance sufficient to shew that the dis- 
pensing'pbwer which King James used, was, to all 
intents and purposes, a legislative power. " -A 
letter to a bishop-concerning-the present settle- 
ment and the new oaths. Som. T. t ixe p. 375. 
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Parliament now claimed to be the only legislative 
organ, but this was the highest claim made. It 
was not clear'yet that the king in parliament-was 
sovereign. 
, Masters complained that the divine right theor- 
ists made the king's will the sole'spring of our 
_govdrnment and would not allow 
to an English parlia- 
, went any more power 
than to give some inauthoritative 
advice which the king might use or neglect as he 
thought fit, which made all'our laws entirely depend- 
ent on his pleasure for their being, continuance and 
influence. Masters was justified in making this com- 
plaint, for it was a true statement of the Divine 
Right theorists' attitude to parliament. That the 
two Houses of Parliaxent acted only in an advisory 
capacity to the king in legislation was a theory 
OIL 
which noii-jurors and High-Church Tories continued to 
hold throughout our period. But it was a theory no 
longer held by the majority of men. 
(1) The case of allegiance considered. S. T. Wm. III, 
i, p. 321. 
(2) e. g. Kettlewell. 
(3) e. g. Leslie. 
a 
)vI. 312 
After the Revolution; parliament was generally 
regarded as the only'law-making body In the nation. 
Some writers were confident in making this'assert- 
ion. That this was the position said one writer 
"I need not labour to make out. "0 But even by 1710 
the supremacy of. parliament in legislation had not 
been vindicated beyond dispute and pamphlets showed 
that this position had still to be hotly defended. 
We have already seen that it was a generally 
accepted maxim after the Revolution that the king 
was under the law. This meant that the king as ex- 
ecutive ought not to alter the law on his own auth- 
ority. He ought neither virtually to repeal a stat- 
ute by dispensing with it nor assume the power of 
parliament by making, a new law. - No law ought to be 
made or. repealed except by the king in parliament. 
Sir Humphrey Mackworth wrote in 1701: 
" 
"The King, Lords and Commons united together have 
an absolute supreme power to do whatsoever they 
shall think necessary or convenient for the public 
good, of which they are the only judges there 
" being no legal power on earth to. control them. " 
(1) A debate upon the query, etc. S. T. Wm. III, i, 
p. 233" 
Cf. "That no law be made or abrogated without 
consent of Parliament is a fundamental of our 
constitutioi. " - A'letter to a friend. (1689) 
Som. T. t x,. p. 196. 
(2) A vindication of the rights of the Com 
England. Som. T., xis p. 262. Cf. p. 312. 
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Mackworth's reference to there being no legal 
power to control parliament requires a word of 
explanation. This was an advance on the earlier 
interpretation of the legislative power of parlia- 
ment. It had been held that the Courts of law 
could control legislation to the extent of declaring 
_. a statute null and void which conflicted with nat- 
0 
. ural law, or positive fundamental laws. Burnet 
records that "It was a maxim among our lawyers, that 
even an Act of Parliament against Magna Carta was 
null of itself" 
© 
Swift called` this "a Sottish maxim" 
O 
and undoubtedly the theory that the law of nature, 
as interpreted by, the Common lawyers, could override 
an act of parliament was quickly going out of fash- 
ion. In 1690 Sir Wiliam Pultenay said in'the House 
of Commons: . 
"I will not dispute what an Act of Parliament 
can do. It may have resemblance of the great 
power of the world: it may create and uncreate. 
It may make the, moon shine, for 6ught I know". 
(1) 'Hobbes, A dialogue of the common laws (1681), 
Molesworth ed., vii 4- . cf. Speech of Serjeant Maynard, Grey's Debates, ix, 98 and Locke, Second 
Treatise: 8 188. . Cf. also Pollock, mays in the law (1922), p. 97" 
(2) Hist., iii p. 205. 
(3) 
. 
Swift's Works xj p. 347- 
(4) Grey's Debates, x, p. 104. 
I 
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But this, as we shall see, was mainly a 
contribution of moderate Tories to political 
thought. It was not always accepted by the 
Whigs. 
D 
The greatest power that can so far be 
assigned to parliament is its unrivalled 
right of legislation. It does not follow from 
this premiss that parliament is sovereign, 
that iss that parliament is irresistible. If 
parliament had been regarded as sovereign, 
then there could have been no place in polit- 
ical thought for the doctrine of resistance. 
It is true that advocates of resistance were 
usually thinking of resistance to the king as 
executive ; but, nevertheless, it was incon- 
sistent-to speak of any, resistance by the 
people if there existed a 'supreme power' over 
and above both king and people. 
The Revolution depressed the power of the, 
king without elevating any power to take its. 
place. Sovereignty, taken from the king, was 
not transferred to any other person or body. 
Nevertheless, parliament was often regarded 
as the 'supreme/ 
(1) See Appendix Ij Note 82. 
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power', but not to the extent of being irresis- 
tible in the same way that the king under the 
doctrine of non-resistance had been.. The trans- 
ition from the sovereignty of the king to the 
sovereignty of the parliament marks the period of 
the doctrine of resistance. 
Before the Revolution the king in parliament 
was not a successful rival to the king for the 
claims of sovereignty. Hence the doctrine of 
non-resistance was simple and straightforward. 
The king, as supreme power, -could on no account 
be resisted. After the Revolution several options 
were offered to political theorists. Firstly, the 
old doctrine of non-resistance could be adhered to, 
resistance to James admitted and consequently con- 
demned, and the Revolution regarded as a crime. 
Those who took up this attitude were the non-jurors. 
Secondly, the old doctrine could still be held and 
the Convention's interpretation that James had ab-w- 
dicated be accepted. In this case resistance to 
James was'not admitted. Thirdly, the doctrine of 
non-resistance could be abandoned, resistance to 
James admitted and the doctrine of resistance ac- 
cepted. Fourthly, the doctrine of non-resistance 
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need not be abandoned if that doctrine were 
made to apply to some supreme power other than 
the king. In this case, resistance to James was 
not a violation of the doctrine of non-resistance. 
The fourth case is the one we are now going to con- 
sider. 
The Tories held that there must be a supreme 
power in every state - not a vague sovereignty of 
the people - but a sovereign governmental institu- 
tion. The doctrine of non-resistance (while it had 
been recognised by all to apply to the king) had 
not always specifically mentioned the. king by name. 
It was the supreme power'that on no account could 
be resisted. - It was easy, therefore, for casuists 
after 1689 to give arnew interpretation to the 
phrase 'supreme power'. While the extreme Tories 
continued to regard the king as sovereign, the more 
- moderate section of the party came 
to place the 
supreme power in parliament. The Whigs, as we shall 
see, instead of being satisfied that they had 




their opponents to abandon the 'slavishf 
interpretation of the doctrine, opposed the new 
interpretation as well. 
Ofspring Blackall, who was attacked so vigour- 
ously in 1708 by Hoadly, as we have seen, said in 
a sermon in 1704: 
"This I say is the duty as it is plainly taught 
in Scripture, of subjects to their governors: 
that is to them who have the supreme authority 
of the nation to which they belong, by whatso- 
ever name or title they are called, that is to 
the legislative power in what hands soever 
It is 
lodged by the particular constitution of the 
place ... There is indeed in every country, state, kingdom, or commonwealth, the kingly or supreme 
power lodged somewhere or other either-in one 
in few or in more hands. This power, I say 
there 
is in the government of every nation, as well in 
a democracy, or aristocracy as in a monarchy: and 
as well in the most limited monarchy as in that 
which is the most arbitrary and absolute: and I 
say, it is this kingly power wherever it is by 
the constitution seated or lodged that is to be 
feared and obeyed". 'a 
No one particular form of government, says Blackall,. 
can claim divine sanction. All power is from God, 
but the form in which that power is exercised is 
of human institution. If this is granted, then: 
(1) The subject's duty in Works (1723), iii p. 1123. 
v 
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"There is no one form of government but may 
be changed and altered provided that they 
" that make the change have sufficient author- ity to make it: and sufficient authority he 
or they must be allowed to have, to make any 
change or alteration in the form and manner 
of government who-ar 'who have for the time 
being, the supreme and sovereign authority 
in that nation wherin such change is made. 
For the sovereign authority of every state 
or nation, whether it be lodged in one hand, 
or in many, is and in the nature of the 
thing must needs be, absolutes unlimited and 
uncontrollable". (D 
If the sovereign power is solely in the king, he 
may alienate it to one or many. If the right of 
government was originally in the people, the 
people may likewise alienate it. If the sovereign 
people choose a king, "they may choose him upon 
what conditions, they may constitute him with what 
limitations they please" s Consequently, "any of 
these changes or altcfrations in the form or manner 
of government, being made by such as, for the time . 
being, were lawfully possessed of the sovereign - 
powert will be regularly made: and being once made, 
3 
will be valid and binding"? Burke said: "A state 
(1) Ibid., p. 1126. 
(2) Ibid., p. 1127., 
(3) Ibid., p. 1127.; 
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without the means of some change is without 
the means of its conservation". Likewise Blackall 
declared: 
"No one generation of men can ever in such 
matters so bind the hands and restrain the 
power of the generation to come, but that 
they in their time will have the same full 
power to order publick affairs according to 
their own liking". 4 
Thus, Blackall in 1704 wrote of the sovereignty of 
parliament in as, unambiguous terms as Dicey has in 
our own day. If the Whig ambition was to put the 
king under the law, was it not in their interest 
that parliament should be exalted to this position 
of supremacy? Yet Hoadly feared the sovereignty of 
parliament as much as he feared the'sovereignty of 
the king. In reply to Blackallq he said: 
"Who can imagine Chat our parliament chosen by 
the people to maintain our constitution and 
enact wholesome laws, can receive immediate 
authority from God to ruin it, if they think 
fit, and to consent to turning it into an absol- 
ute monarchy ... and the people, in a state of damnation unless they meekly submit to all this" 
(1) Reflections on t 
in Works,. ii, p. 295. 
(1791) 
(2) Op. cit., p. 1128. 
(3) Some considerations humbly offered to . '... the Lord Bishop of Exeter 9p. 11-ý in Works, ii, 
P0 154 
ýYý ý. 
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Hoadly accepted Blackall's postulate that 
the supreme power was lodged in King, Lords and 
Commons. But he did not come to the same conclus- 
ion that this power was irresistible. It is sig- 
nificant, however, that some of Hoadly's followers 
were inclined to side with Blackall rather than 
with Ho adly 
The Sacheverell Trial illustrated clearly the 
confusion to-which the locus of sovereignty was 
subjected by the rival theories of resistance and 
non-resistance. Harcourt, Sacheverell's counsel, 
resorted to the new interpretation of non-resist- 
ance and declared that there was nojresistance in 
1688 to the supreme power. James only was resisted. 
But the supreme power-was parliament, which was not 
resisted. Dodd, too, pleaded that parliament could. 
not be resisted and since the doctrine of non-resis- 
tance applied only to the supreme power, that doctrine 
was still valid. Phipps followed this lead. It is 
(1) Some considerations humbly offered to... the 
Lord Bishop of Exeter, in Works, ii, p. 127. 
(2) "An Hoadleian believes that by the laws of. God 
and our constitution, passive obedience and non- 
resistance 
ýý.. is a duty to be paid to this power 
all subjects" -, Chuse which you [parliament] bT1710) 
please, etc. p. 4. 
ýVI 
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clear that Sacheverell meant in his sermon 
that'all resistance to the queen was illegal. 
But'it is significant that his counsel were 
compelled to adopt the supremacy of parliament, 
in order to reconcile Sacheverell's doctrine of 
non-resistance with the resistance (which they 
_admitted) at the Revolution. 
Swift attempted to reconcile the doctrine 
of non-resistance with the supremacy of parlia- 
ment. He said that it was clear that those who 
had-preached the doctrine had been "misguided by , 
equivocal terms. " The question had always been= 
"whether under any pretence whatever-it may be 
lawful to resist the supreme magistrate? " The 
answer, given-in the negative, said Swift, "is 
certainly the right opinion. " He continued: 
"But many of the clergy, and other learned men, 
deceived by dubious expressions, mistook the 
object to which passive obedience was due. By- 
"' the supreme magistrate is properly understood 
the legislative power, which in all government 
must be absolute and unlimited. But the Word 
,. mýgistrate, seeming to denote a single person, 
and to express the executive power, it came to 
pass, that the obedience due to the legislature, 
was, for want of knowing or considering this 
easy distinction, misapplied to the administ- 
ration. " m 
(1) The sentiments of a Church of England man, etc, 
in Works, iii, p. -67., 
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A Church of England man, said Swift, "would' 
defend it (the Church] by arms against all 
powers on earth, except our own legislature; in 
which case he would submit, as to. a general cal- 
amity, a dearth, or a pestilence. " 
m 
From-the Tories' new interpretation of the doc- 
-. 
trine two facts emerge. Firstly, the sovereignty 
of parliament was not an established constitutional 
maxim beyond dispute. It was put'forward as a 
makeshift argument to reconcile' resistance to 
James in 1688 and the-doctrine 
I 
of non=resistance. 
Secondly, it demonstrated that the supremacy of 
parliament was not regarded as inconsistent with 
resistance to the executive. There was little dif- 
ference between the opinions of the Commons and 
the counsel of Sacheverell. Both sides admitted the 
fact of resistance to James. Both admitted that' 
parliament was the supreme power. - But the conclus- 
. 
ionstq be drawn from these two premisses wee not 
the same. The Commons'said they negatived the doc- 
trine of non-resistance. The defence maintained 
that the doctrine was-not violated by'the Revolut- 
ion and was therefore as valid after 1688 as before. 




legislative power, which in all 




The Tories surrendered the substance of the" 
doctrine for the shadow. Had those Tories who 
adopted the new interpretation been able to ad- 
here to. the doctrine by shifting the sovereignty 
from the king to the parliament and still main- 
tain that all resistance to_both king and parlia- 
_ 
ment was unlawful, they would have provided the 
solution to the constitutional-problem of post- 
Revolution England. The new interpretation of 
the doctrine of non-resistance served to explain 
the Revolution; and the continued propagation of ,. 
a doctrine of non-resistance perhaps served to 
check the anarchic tendency of the-doctrine of 
resistance. Whether men accepted the new doctrine 
of non-resistance or. the new-doctrine of resistance' 
the same practical problems faced them. The fact that 
the ultimate development of the constitution admit- 
ted of no doctrine but that of non-resistance does 
not warrant its advocates in our period claiming 
more foresight than their opponents. Neither doc- 
trine, according to-the meaning as understood by 
men at the time, corresponded to the constitution 
as it was developingraftgr 1688. The resistance 
theorists--instead of attempting to reconcile the 
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" old doctrine of non-resistance with the Revolution 
abandoned that doctrine entirely. They were more 
honest, perhaps, than their opponents, for they 
scorned to quibble with words and, like Defoe, 
admitted that the doctrine had been based on the 
recognition that the king was irresistible. And 
--if they would no longer allow this quality to the 
king, then they felt that they ought to abandon 
the doctrine completely. 
That a doctrine of non-resistance, even if 
interpreted as applying to parliament, was untenable 
is brought out by a consideration of resistance 
doctrinaires' attitude to parliament. 
Locke admitted that the supreme power of a 
nation was lodged in 'the legislature. 
"This legislative", he wrote, "is not only 
the supreme power of the commonwealth, but 
sacred and unalterable in the hands where the 
community have once placed it. Nor can any 
edict of anybody else, in what form soever 
;- conceived or by what form soever backed, 
have the force and obligation of a law which 
has not its sanction from t hat legislative 
which the public has appointed and chosen,., 
and therefore all the obedience which by the 
most solemn ties any one can be obliged to 
pay, ultimately terminates in this supreme 
power, and is directed by those laws which- 
it enacts. (D 




In another place he says much the same thing : 
"In all cases whilst the government subsists, 
the legislature is the supreme power... all 
" other powers or parts of the society being 
derived and subordinate to it. "o 
Locke did not require to consider whether 
parliament may be resisted, for resistance 
could take. place only after'the government had 
been dissolved. In the chapter on the doctrine 
of resistance, we saw, that Locke made. the king 
solely responsible in four and.. partly responsible 
in one of the five ways mentioned by him in 
which the government may be dissolved. It is 
obvious, therefore, that resistance to the king 
is the remedy for any alteration of the constit- 
ution. There could be no case in which it was 
necessary to. resist parliament as a corporate 
body exclusive of the king. ' The most that can 
be said is that when the king is resisted for 
what he does in parliament, parliament is re- 
sisted, for the king is a constituent part and 
to resist a part is to resist the whole. -Although 
Locke justified resistance by his theory of 
(1) Second Treatise, 9150. 
. _, 




the dissolution of governmentl'and, although he 
made the king responsible, he did not make the 
king's guilt consist of usurping functions which; 
properly belonged to parliament. By the origin- 
al contract-the constitution was unalterable by 
constitutional means. It can be altered only 
by the people after it has been destroyed by the 
king alone or by the king in alliance with the 
two Houses. Locke gives a specific example of 
the limitations of parliament in constitutional 
legislation. Parliament, he says, cannot alter. 
the manner of-repreaentation. Discussing the 
rotten-boroughs, Locke writes : 
0 
"Most people think-it hard to find one because 
the constitution of the legislature being the 
original and suprepe act of the society ante- 
cedent to all positive laws in it, and depend- 
ing wholly*on the people, no inferior power 
can alter it. And, therefore the people when " 
the legislative is once constituted, having in 
such a government as we have been speaking of 
no power to act as long as the government stands, 
this inconvenience is thought incapable of remedy. " 
Locke's remedy is astounding. The executive, he 
says, acting on the maxim 'Salus populi supreme 
lex est' may alter the representation. When the 
executive does, this "it cannot be judged to have 
set up a new legislative, but to have restored 




the old and true one, and to have rectified the 
disorders which succession of time had insen- 
sibly as well as inevitably introduced? "0 Locke's 
use of the word 'inevitably' shows that he rea- 
lised that a constitution, set, up by the pactum 
unionis in some dim and distant past, could not 
possibly retain its. original form. Yet, in spite 
of this recognition and in spite-of his care to 
hedge the king about-with restrictions, he is 
forced to fall back on the very doubtful exped- 
ient of allowing the king toýalter the constitut- 
ion*in so far as representation in the Commons is 
concerned. By Locke's own showing, any alterat- 
ion made in the constitution by parliament could 
be justified on the,. grounds that parliament was,, -., 
. merely 
bringing it back to its 'old and true' 
form'. The fact that Locke has to employ the 
prerogative in such a case demonstrates-how 
loathe he was to. allow to parliament the use of 
its ordinary and normal powers of legislation 
for, constitutional legislation., Parliamentary 
(1) Second Treatise, ' S 158. 
,y .ý,. 
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reform was not a subject which interested 
statesmen of our period, so it is difficult 
to judge of the effecg of Locke's suggestion " 
concerning the rotten boroughs. But we do 
know that 'Julian' Johnson urged parliamentary 
reform immediately after the Revolution and 
- 
thatl'unlike Locke, he considered parliament 
as the appropriate body to make the necessary 
change. 
Thus; Locke, unlike Blackall and Swift, would 
not-admit that parliament was omnipotent. Never- 
theless, it was the highest power in the state 
" and to it was due' "all the obedience which by the 
most solemn ties any-one can *be obliged to pay. " 
So long as parliament did not use its legislative 
powers to alter the constitution it was sover- 
eign. Locke laid down definite standards by which 
the alteration of the constitution might be'jud-' 
ged. His followers were not so explicit in this 
respect. They agreed in principle that for the 
people to put themselves unreservedly under any 
governmental authority was to surrender all their 
natural rights. Although Defoe said s 
"The parliament of England consisting of the' 
1' 
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Kings, Lords and Commons are to me the sup- 
reme channel of power, the great collective 
body in miniature, "O 
he'still meant that the ultimate power was the 
"great collective body" itself. The whole 
body of the people would have the same right 
" to resist a parliament as a king if their 
liberties were invaded. And Hoadly, 'as we have 
seen, asked why parliament should not be resis- 
ed any more than a king if it tried-to change' 
the constitution from a limited to an absolute 
monarchy. 
If the people's rights and liberties had 
been imperilled under-an absolute monarch, would 
they not be safe under an absolute parliament 
in which the people Were represented? Why was - 
there a reluctance to give parliament unlimited 
power? There were two reasons. The first 
was born of prejudice. The second was based 
on the constitution of parliament as understood 
by Englishmen in the seventeenth c. 3ntury. 
(1) Jure divino, etc. (1706) p. vii. 
(2) Original power of-the . collective bodyof 
the people of ý; ngland, etc. ' 1701) in Works 
(11-703T, i P- 1399 See 'also Appendix I, Note 83. 
i 
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Firstly, there was marked suspicion of the 
power of Parliament. The two Houses had too 
often in the past been servants of the king and 
there wqs a strong fear that they might willingly 
or unwillingly concur with the king in the des- 
truction of the people's rights and privileges. 
'! The people, " said a writer, "have their privi- 
leges, which the*king and Parliament cannot take 
from them, If $ for example, a parliament should 
treat with the king for making an absolute change 
of the form of government, for 'abolishing the use 
of parliaments and for depriving the people of 
all their privileges-charters and immunities, the 
people might justly provide against. these violat- 
ions. " 
O 
Defoe had a profound distrust of parlia-. 
ment. In several works he violently attacked the 
subserviency of the two, Houses and exposed the cor- 
ruption which was only too prevalent in the 
I 
f 
House of Commons. 
(1) This was why the two Houses tried to keep the 
. king's ministers from being members of , 
the House 
of Commons. 
(2) A defence of their majesties King William and 




Secondly, the constitution was regarded 
as something fixed and unalterable. Thus the. 
Tory taunt-that the Whigs were republicans 
was absolutely without foundation. Both Whigs 
and Tories were staunch supporters of the 
constitution consisting of the king'as exec- 
utive and the king-in-parliament as legislat- 
e. At the present day constitutional lawyers 
would agree. that parliament, since it is sov- 
ereign, might, 'if it chose, destroy 'the House 
of Lords or the monarchy or might even abolish 
itself. We have seen that Blackall deduced the 
same' conclusion from his theory of sovereignty-, 
in a 
. 
state. His view was exceptional. Few (even 
among the Tories) woJ4ld 'have : been so bold as to 
. assert that parliament might interfere with the 
. 
'lex parliamentaria. ' The English constitution, 
though ill-defined, was felt tobe greater 
than either king or parliament. Consequently 
there was a fear that one branch of the legis- 
laturemight gain such an ascendency over the 
other parts as. to impose its will to the de- 




theories of the constitution were all'based 
on the balance of these various parts. 
0 
The 
balance weighted too much on the side of the 
Houses might be dangerous to the monarchy. Too 
much power invested in the monarchy might be 
dangerous to the Houses. And, omnipotency 
granted to the king-in-parliament might be dan- 
gerous to the constitution. In such a'case of 
the subversion of the equally balanced constitut- 
ion, resistance is justified. Did the constitut- 
ion. provide no legal check on such attacks upon 
itself by one or more of its constituent parts? 
The answer is to be-found in the constitution of 
parliament. 
We have seen tha) seventeenth century lawyers 
could speak at the same time of the sovereignty 
of parliament and the sovereignty of the king. 
Although thinkers like Whitelock, contended. -that 
the king in parliament was the greater sovereig- 
nty, they had to admit that the king by having 
the right to summon and dismiss parliament was 
the effective sovereign, This problem still re- 
mained after 1689 as we see when, for example, 
Locke refers to the legislature only being supreme 
(1) See Appendix I, Note 84. 
1. 
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when it is in session. After the Revolution, 
parliament sat every year and no king dared to 
dispense with itP Therefore the opportunity 
for parliament to secure the exercise of its 
sovereignty was provided. But the problem of 
the inter-relationship of the three constituent 
0 
members still remained. The solution of this 
problem proved to be the most perplexing task 
which, political theorists had to face after the 
Revolution. It was not a practical problem - for 
in practice it did not arise - but it was still 
of great theoretical importance, and was in fact, 
though-it was not always recognised, the pivot 
on which the doctrine of resistance War% turned. 
Writers on the side of popular government 
would not assign to any one branch of the legis- 
lature a preeminence over the two other branches., 
They relied on the balance of these parts to pre- 
serve the constitution. One thinker immediately 
after the Revolution said:. "Their power is so 
(1) "When the prince hinders the legislative 
from assembling in its due time" the constit- 
ution is altered. - Locke, Second Treatise, 5215, 
14 
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equal in the great point of legislature that 
one cannot properly say, that one is greater 
or less than another. " All have negative 
voices and the consent of the whole is re- 
quired both for the making and the abrogat- 
ing of a law, 
®The 
same thing was said by 
Hoadly, in only slightly different language, 
in 1710. But he further emphasised the bal- 
ance of the legislature by stressing the equal 
partnership of the House of Commons and thus 
aiming a blow at Leslie and his followers who 
denied this equality. The members of the House 
of Commons, said Hoadly, "are something more 
than a sluice to a mill, which is drawn up and 
let down entirely at,.. the miller's pleasure. " 
Leslie called this, "the mob and rebellious prin- 
. 
ciples of forty-one. "_ He denied that the king could 
be restrained by co-ordinate legislative powers. 
(1) Reflections upon the late great Revolution. 
S. T. Wm. III9 i2 p. 254. 
(2) The briginal and institution of civil govern- 
ment discussed. 2nd ed. (1710) p. 111, in Work 
ii, p. 242. , 
I 
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"This is the old notion", he said, "of the king 
being one of the three estates, which I have 
sufficiently exposed already. "U Leslie's pos- 
ition was untenable, for his theory that the 
crown was sovereign was quite out of . eeping 
with the constitutional consequences of the 
_. _. _Revolution. 
He clung to the old doctrines of 
divine right and non-resistance, doctrines 
which would not solve the problems of the post- 
Revolution constitution. He was still putting 
the king above the law and above the king-in- : 
parliament and in so doing set himself against 
{ 
the main stream of political philosophy. But 
even when we admit this, we must allow that 
.. 
the problem which Lealie propounded was the 
same problem which faced his opponents. This 
problem was thus expressed by Leslie: 
"They who would set up the two Houses of 
Parliament as powers co-ordinate with the 
king, these make three sovereigns. And- 
0 
(1) Rehearsal, May 12,1708 no.. 322. 
And Leslie's notion, said Hoadly sarcas- 
... tically, "is the voice of the people, i. e. 
the voice of Belzebub. " - The original and 
institution of civil government. p. 110, in WorksI 
iii p. 241. 
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if they happen to interfere, or haver diff- 
erent thoughts concerning their respective 
rights (which is almost impossible they 
should not, each being judge for himself) 
then there is no remedy but the sword, 
which cannot be sheath'd till one conquers 
the other two, as the Commons did in the 
late Civil Wars. " 
Leslie was right in arguing that a'theory 
of co-ordinate powers was fraught with danger. 
He must have recalled the disputes, for example, 
between the House of Commons and the House of 
Lords in 1701 and how that dispute was ended only 
by the action of the king in dissolving parliament. 
And he was also fairly near the truth when he . 
said that three co-ordinate powers made three 
. sovereigns. 
His inference that disputes among the 
three members would inevitably lead to bloodshed 
till one conquers the 'others was perhaps pessdtis- 
tic but it could not be denied by his opponents. " 
The central idea of co-ordinate powers was that no 
member ought to gain an ascendency over the two N 
(1) Best of all, etc., pp. 29-30. 
(2) Cf. Swift, A discourse of the contests and 
dissentions, etc. (1710) and Defoe, The original 
power of the collective body, etc. (1701 
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others. Could this theoretical arrangement be 
maintained in practice ? Leslie was sure that 
it could not, and the only remedy he could offer 
against these dangers was to make one supreme 
power, 'namely, the king. Hoadly's solution was to 
make the people supreme. But this, it could be 
_argued, 
was making a fourth supreme power 
P It 
. 
was not, however, making four sovereigns but 
one, for the people could not and were not re- 
garded as a fourth co-ordinate power with the 
three members of the legislature. The people were 
ultimate sovereign, if the three co-ordinate mem- 
berg of the legislature failed to work In unison..,. 
Of the three members, Leslie wished to make the 
king supreme. Could tot the opponents of regal 
sovereignty make the two Houses supreme since 
their avowed aim was to control the king? Before 
4 
answering this question, it would be advisable 
to dispose. of a quotation from Grotius that was 
frequently cited to justify the part taken 
by the Convention at the Revolution. This 
(1) Cf. Davenantg Essas upon peace at homey etc. 




quotation and the frequent references to it 
might suggest that there was a body of opinion 
in favour of recognising the superiority-of the 
two Houses over the king. This is the passage 
from Grotius: 
If a king should have but one part of the 
sovereign power, and the senate or people 
the other, if such a king shall invade that 
part which is not his own, he may justly be 
resisted, because he is not sovereign in 
that respect. Which I believe may take 
place, though in the division of the sover- 
eignty, the power of making war fell to the 
king, for that is to be understood of for- 
eign war : since whoever has a share of the 
sovereignty must have at the same time a 
right to defend it. And when the case is 
so, the king may, by the right of war, lose 
even his part of the sovereignty. '! 
(1) Dl jure belli ac pacis, Bk. 1, chap. iv, 
xiii. This passage is cited, for example, in, 
the following works x 
Allix, An examination of those who refuse to 
take the oath of allegiance. S. T. m. II, it p. 306. 
Important questions of state, law justice, ' 
and prudence, etc. S. T. Wt. III- p. 
17. 
Some short considerations relating to the 
settling of the government. S. T. Wm. III, 1ý p. 176. 
Tindal, An essay concerning obedience to the=, 
supreme powers, etc. S. T. Wm. III, ii, p. 434. 
Defoe A speech without doors p. 6p *9 
The divine rights of the British nation and 
constitution vindicated, p. 17. 
It was also quoted by Stanhope at the Sach- 
everell Trial. S. T., xv, L29. 
Kettlewell, the non-juror, attacked the use 
made of this passage. He said it was directly 
contrary to the Militia Act. (see above, p. 30. ) 
- Christianitya doctrine of the Cross (1691) 




But there are two points which prevent us 
from accepting this passage as an indication 
that the two Houses ought to have a controlling 
power over the king., The first comes from the 
quotation itself. Grotius speaks of a divided 
sovereignty. If the king, he says, has only one 
part of the sovereignty and he invades the sover- 
eignty of the other part (which may be in parlia- 
ment) he may be resisted. The senate (by which 
. 
word we may understand the two Houses) does not 
have a permanent superiority.; Grotius merely 
allows to it the right to defend its own share of 
sovereignty. And, furthermore, Grotius does not 
say whither resistance is to come from the govern- 
mental institution possessing the share of sover- 
eignty, or from the people, though it may be in- 
ferred that he means the senate. But the second 
point, which comes from the writers who. quote 
Grotius, is the more important. They quote him to 
justify resistance to the king - resistance by the 
body of the 'people, not resistance by the injured 
partners of sovereignty, acting constitutionally, 





theorists to defend resistance and the Revol- 
ution. It was virtually the argument of Locke. 
It was the common argument based on the dis-, - 
solution of government. The legislature is 
dissolved by the encroachment of one member, 
who having a share of the sovereignty, endea-- 
__vours 
to possess*it all. The two'Houses are. 
therefore, also technically dissolved and re- 
sistance comes from an inarticulate mass-of- 
6) 
sub 
Samuel Johnson was the stoutest advocate 
for the doctrine of resistance in William's 
reign. He brought arguments from the history 
of England to prove his contention that par- 
liament had the right.. to depose the king. The, 
objection that the two Houses do not form a 
parliament and that they cannot meet without 
the king's writ, he tried to overthrow by 
(1) We have fortunately, a clear statement 
on this point from Defoe. He considers whether, 
when the king encroaches on the powers of the 
two Houses, the whole power should devolve on 
, them. Although 
he cited Grotius, he concluded 
that the power does not fall to the Houses but ' , - to the people. See A speech without doors. 
(1710) p. 12. 
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maintaining that the king had no prerogative 
of not summoning parliament, and that accord- 
ing to the law of England (before it was abused) 
parliament could meet on its own authority. Yet 
in spite of this ingenious argument, Johnson 
could not envisage a peaceful resistance by the 
two Houses but must preach an'armed"-resistance 
by the mass of the people. 
Consequently, a theory of the superiority of. 
the two Houses was untenable for two reasons. 
Firstly, it was inconsistent with the theory of 
equal co-ordinate powers. -Secondly, it was not 
apparent how the two Houses could control the 
king, even, ifs in theory, it was allowed to be 
desirable. We have already discussed the first 
reason. We shall now discuss the second.. 
The parliamentary control of the-king was 
the most perplexing problem which statesmen and 
theorists had to face after the Revolution. It 
was because they could conceive of no satisfac- 
" tory constitutional provision that they were 
forced to adopt the doctrine of resistance. How- 
ever much men might speak of equal co-ordinate 
4 
powers, they could not overcome the difficulty 
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of demonstrating how the king was only equal with 
the others. Arguments which began by the assert- 
ion of three equal powers usually ended with the- 
admission that the king was actually superior. 
The. difficulty was caused by the, dual capac- 
ity of. - the crown. The executive power was allow- 
_ed 
to be solely in the king by all. shades of 
opinion. That was perhaps the only part. of our 
constitution about which men had no doubts. 
Leslie-accused his opponents of making three sov- 
ereigns, but they were forced to ask themselves 
whether, in fact, there were not'at least two, - 
legislature and executive. Leslie held that there 
could be only one, and they, too, came very near 
to admitting the same,. thing. The question which 
even resistance doctrinaires asked themselves 
was: Can therela e two supreme powers in a state - 
the king and the king-in-parliament? What actual- 
ly was the inter-relationship of the three branches 
of the legislature? Were, the two Houses, in fact, 
as well as in theory, co-ordinate powers, or did 
the king have a superiority over them? The answer 
to these questions was no foregone conclusion. 
343 
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', That a statute could be enacted or re- 
pealed only by the joint action of King, Lords, 
and Commons was not denied. But men put dif- 
ferent interpretations on the significance of 
veto or assent of each of, the partners. The, 
royalist point of view was that, although par- 
liament had a share-in making laws, it was a 
subjects part, not a sovereign's. The two 
Houses were called into consultation by the king, 
and no law could be passed or repealed without 
their consent, "which is a great security indeed 
of their being well governed. " But it was mere- 
ly "a ministerial-sort of power. " The power 
which gives force to laws is the sovereign power 
and this rests solely. ., -in 
the king., The real leg- 
islative power is the power of sanction, and no 
bill can become law until the king gives his consentP 
(1) Kettlewell, Christianity a doctrine of the 
Cross. (1691) in Works, ii p. 180* 
See Appendix I, Note i6. 
P"ýa 
(2) Tyrrell, Bibliotheca, p. 233. See Appendix 
- 11 I, 
Note 87. ', .. 
(3) Tyrrell, op. cit., p. 233" 
Jus sacrum, p. 40. See Appendix I, Note 88. 
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The Whig theory was that the Houses were 
coordinate powers with the king and that their 
share in the passing-or repealing of laws was 
equal. How could the Whigs meet their oppon- 
ents' objection that the king, by his right 
of veto, had really the enacting power? Wil- 
liam vetoed important bills. And although 
Anne was the last British sovereign to exercise 
this power, this was not observed in her reign. 
Even if it had been observed, it was too soon 
to pronounce any verdict on what came only grad- 
ually to be recognised as a constitutional con- 
vention. Therefore, the king's right of accept- ." 
ing or refusing a bill being admitted, could it 
not be said that the. Houses had the same right 
of accepting or refusing? Logically, this has a 
to be conceded. But even the Whigs had, to con-. 
Tess that the person who had the last word in 
legislation had the apparent superiority. 
(1) One writer did asserts somewhat boldly 
before the Convention met that the king's veto 
and power of summoning anc dissolving parlia- 
ment should be considered. See Good advice 





Tyrrell, a lawyer and a staunch Williamite, 
speaking through -. Freeman in his Bibliotheca 
politica, made the following concession : 
-"I have always supposed that the king con- 
tinues still supreme, that (as the Modus 
tenendi parliamentorum declares) he'is 
principium, caput et finis parliamenti 
that iss he can call and dissolve parlia- 
ments when he pleases... even in the leg- 
islature itself, that the king hath more 
eminently (though together with the parlia- 
ment) a supreme enacting power, 'without 
which it cannot be a law. " 
The king, he continued, was the supreme execut- 
ive power, and by giving consent to alaw, he 
gave the ultimate authority unless-one could 
suppose thatethere could be. two supreme powers 
in the state at one time? Thus, Tyrrell regard- 
ed the king-in-parliament as the sole and supreme 
r" 
law-making body in the. state, but it was not the 
sovereign body. The king was supreme and there 
could not be two supreme powers. Stillingfleet 
was faced with the same problem. Though he jus- 
tified the Revolution and the new oath of alleg- 
ianct to Vjilliam he still regarded the king as 
sovereign. Monarchy was the oldest form of 





government, he said, and it had always been es- 
teemed the best especially where it was limited 
by laws passed by the people. He did not think 
it inconsistent to speak of a limited sovereig- 
nty. Masters, opposing absolute monarchy, point- 
ed to the preambles to statutes wherein we read 
-. -that 
they are enacted not only by the king but 
by the authority of the Lords and Commons in 
parliament assembled. Is it not very evident", ', 
he asked, "from hence that the parliament hath 
a share in the legislative power which is an, 
eminent branch of the supreme power in this 
kingdom? " He does not say that sovereignty con= 
sists of the legislative power. It is merely 
"an eminent branch. " '. And like Tyrrell, while 
he defends the supremacy of parliament and the 
coordinate powers of the Houses, he concludes : 
" "There can be no authority in our kingdom sup- 
erior to that with which 'the king is invested. " 
(1) A discourse concerning the unreasonableness 
of a new separation, etc. t1689) S. T. Wm. III, i, 
p. 605. 
(2) The case of allegiance considered. (1689) 
S. T, Wm. III, iq p. 322. 
. 
(3) 
' Ibid., p. 324. 
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While, therefore, there was serious dif- 
ficulty in apportioning the exact degree of 
superiority possessed by the king as a partner 
of the legislature, the issue was further 
complicated by his second capacity, namely, 
the executive. The power which gives laws to 
__ all, 
it was held, was the supreme power and 
laws become mere cyphers if they are not put 
in execution. The executive, whose function it 
was to execute laws appeared consequently to 
be the ultimate sovereign power. The king's 
dual capacity provided this dilemma. As a con- 
stituent part of the legislature, he could not 
be subordinate exeept to the whole. But since 
he was supreme executive he could be controlled 
r" 
only through parliament by his own concurrence. 
Locke expressed this dilemma when he said :- 
"The executive power placed anywhere but in 
a person that has also a share in the legis- 
lature is visibly subordinate and accountable 
to its and may be at-pleasure changed and 
displaced; so that it is not the supreme 
executive power that is exempt from subordin- 
ation, but the supreme vested in one, who 
having a share in the legislative, has no 
distinct superior legislative to be account- 
Ivis 
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able toi farther than he himself shall 
join and consent, which one inay certainly 
conclude will be very little. " 
We must come to the conclusion, therefore, 
that there was no conception of parliamentary 
sovereignty in our period. Blackall did enun- 
ciate a fairly complete system of parliamentary 
__sovereignty 
in 1704 but he vitiated his theory 
by recanting in 1708. On the question of sov- 
ereignty we may distinguish three broad classes 
of opinion. The first class consisted of 
Jacobites and extreme Hanoverian Tories who 
still regarded the king as sovereign. Parl- 
iament was consequently subordinate. The second 
class is repesented by moderate Tories and'some 
Whigs who held that there must be some supreme 
power in the state, and since the king was no 
longer sovereign, but was limited by legislation, 
parliament must be supreme. But they did not 
regard parliament as the ultimate power against 
which there could be no appedl, for they allowed 
resistance to the king. The Tory section of this 
(1) Locke, Second Treatise 5152. 
See also Appendix Ii Note 8& 
I 
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group adhered to the doctrine of non-resis- 
tance and regarded any. case of resistance as 
an exception to that rule. The Whig section 
made the exception the rule, and deduced from 
it the doctrine of resistance. The third class 
is composed entirely of Whigs, including such 
thinkers as Locke I Defoe and Hoad], y (resis- 
tance doctrinaires like the Whigs of the second 
- class) who regarded parliament as having an 
exclusive right of legislation but not an 
absolute power. Parliament was debarred from 
constitutional legislation. Finally, all three 
groups were unanimous in agreeing that parlia- 
the king's actions as ment could not control/ 
executive. It was a conception of divided 
sovereignty. Parliament was supreme as legis-. 
lator, the king as executive. In their own 
departments each was sovereign and they must 
be kept separate. If parliament transferred 
any of its legislative power to the king, then 
it destroyed its own exclusive right to legis- 
late and thus destroyed its-own sovereignty. 
&at such. an act would be legal and without a 
k 
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legal remedy. But according to the Whigs 
it would be a subversion of the constitution 
and a breach of trusteeship and would entitle 
the people, by the theory of the original 










The Revolution was carried out by a small 
group of statesmen who, in their breadth of 
outlook, were far in advance of the rest of 
the nation. But fear of popery was greater 
--than fear of despotism, and loyalty to the 
Church of England stronger than loyalty to 
the monarchy. Hence, the nation, as 
'a. 
whole, 
acquiesced in the Revolution Settlement. But 
to the nation, especially to the Tories, it 
involved a sacrifice of principles hard to be 
borne. A change of dynasty in 1689 could not 
immediately change the heart of a people and, 
it could not be expected that the doctrine of 
non-resistance which had become 'the distin- 
guishing character of the Church of England'm 
_should 
be discarded in a day. The nation was 
quite unprepared for the catastrophic events 
of 1688/9 and there was no political philos- 
ophy ready to take the place of non-resistance. 
(1) Lake's dying confession. Cited by Leaky, 
History oP England, i, p. i9. 
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At the time of the Revolution there were 
many pamphlets which upheld the right of: the 
people to resist their king. But these were. 
isolated writings of individuals and the views 
they expressed were personal. They-formed, 
however, the basis of the doctrine of resis- - 
tance, and we'have drawn largely on them for- 
0r 
our analysis of the doctrine. Abdication was 
the official interpretation of the Revolution, 
and this was held to conform to the doctrine, 
of non-resistance? Although the oaths against 
resisting the king were repealed, there is 
some justification for believing that this ' 
was done, not to give sanction to the right of 
resistance, but to simplify the new oath of. 
allegiance. The new oath, had to be taken to 
a de facto king, and no one was required to. 
express an opinion on the king's right. It is 
(1) See above, chapter 2. 
(2) Cf. "It must not be forgotten that the. 
English clergy-claimed the phraseology of the 
Bill of Rights in support of their contention 
that the Revolution did not transgress the 
principles of non-resistance. " - Figgis, Divine 
right of kings. 2nd ed., p., 173. 
VI 
also significant that the first statute to 
recognise William's right was passed by a 
Tory House of Commons. The failure of an 
abjuration bill to pass until 1702 also 
showed that politicians were unwilling to 
deny James's de jure title. In William's 
354 
reigns pamphlets which argued for the right 
of a. people to resist tyranny, usually con- 
tained in addition the argument that it was 
lawful to swear allegiance to a de facto king, 
which, though, not inconsistent with resistance, 
obviously weakened the resistance theory. The 
conquest theory, based on a modification of 
the doctrine of non-resistance, was-usually 
reinforced by the de facto. , 
In fact most pamph- 
lets contain something of each theory. . Stress 
is often put upon one, but whichever theory is 
adapted as the primary, the others are brought 
in as secondary arguments. In fine, the dom- 
inating theory put forward to support the 




and the writings of Locke and Samuel-Johnson, 
4 
in which it was not only not made use -of -but 
was condemned-(implicitly by Locke, and, ex- 
plicitly by Johnson) are noteworthy for their 
isolation in this respect., 'These two writers 
stand almost alone in basing the new government 
exclusively on the justice of resistance to 
James and the subsequent consent of the people 
in the election of William. , 
The first signs that indicated that the 
doctrine of non-resistance had lost its undis- 
puted sway were the Whig attacks upon it. They 
endeavoured to. bring it into disrepute by show- 
ing that, but for it, James would never have 
tried to do what he did.,,, The Tories knew, in 
their inmost hearts, that this was true, and 
it is natural, therefore, that we should hear, 
very little of that doctrine in William's reign 
except from Jacobites. That doctrine was so 
closely bound up with the Church of England that 
we could not'expect the clergy, who were mostly 
Tories, to preach non-resistance to a king whom 
they regarded as lukewarm in their interests, 
.ý 
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even if they did not regard him as a-usurper 
as well. But when Anne came to the throne, 
they found a , monarch who was-not only a staunch 
Church of England woman, but a daughter of 
James II. The clergy-came into'their own again, 
and they marked the occasion by reviving the 
doctrine of non-resistance. This revival 
brought a corresponding strengthening in the 
Whig attitude to-the theory of resistance. And 
now for the first time since ' 1689 it is pos- 
Bible to say that the right "ofý resistance was 
formulated into a doctrine and became an of- 
ficial part of Whig t. eaching.. But it never 
became a doctrine capable of ' clear definition 
such- as the doctrine, of non-resistance had been 
before 1688. We should be scarcely' justified 
in calling it a doctrine'at all had not contem- 
poraries used the word. On the other hand, if 
resistance-never attained the sharp definitions 
which non-resistance had had, it is equally 
true to say that non-resistance after 1689 lost 
much of the-clearness which it` had, possessed. 
4 
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Resistance doctrinaires in our period were 
on the defensive except 14,1709/10-- But 
their defence constituted a very vigorous- 
opposition to the doctrine, -of non-resistance, 
which, under the onslaught, tended to break 
down. Both "the Whigs' * teaching and their. ul- 
. timate success 
in securing the Hanoverian 
succession forced the Tories to-weaken in their. - 
attitude to certain parts of their doctrine. 
We shall refer-to this later. 
Had there been no succession problem, the 
history of the rival doctrines would probably 
have taken a different course. That'problem 
not only accentuated the rivalry but confused 
the issues. An esseitial part, of the Caroline 
doctrine of non-resistance was indefeasible here- 
ditary right, and we have seen how the Tories 
tried to base Anne's title on heredity and so 
4 
justify their propagation of non-resistance. If 
James was the son of James III then he ought to 
have succeeded in-1702 instead of Anne. The_ 
Tories, therefore, professed to believe that he 





accepted in 1702, he could not be-accepted on 
Anne's death. But by strict hereditary right, 
there were other claimants to the throne who 
came before the House of Brunswick. The Han- 
overians'were thus excluded. -. The Whigs, con- 
sequently, realised that the only guarantee 
of a Hanoverian succession was the recognition 
of succession by parliamentary right. The Whigs 
did not deny hereditary right. But-it must be 
parliamentary and not indefeasible. A°parlia- 
mentary title depended for its validity on the 
justice'of the Revolution and therefore. on the 
recognition that James was justly resisted. 
SetAing 
. the Jacobite question, how did 
the rival doctrines gtand in relation to the 
Revolution? We have. come*definitely to the con-. 
elusion that the Revolution was not based on any 
theory of the right of resistance; but rather 
that the doctrine was: evolved to justify an ac- 
complished, fact. TheýWhigs came to hold-the. 
belief that only: by accepting the doctrine could 
4 
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the Revolution be justified. To uphold non- 
resistance was to. condemn all that was done 
in 1688 and all the consequences which flowed 
from that revolution. 
A fact that cannot be ignored is that the 
Tories never openly condemned the Revolution. 
How, then, did they join themselves with the 
Whigs in supporting the same cause and at the 
same time differ on the means by which that 
cause was -achieved? The Tories offered alter-,.. 
native solutions. 
Firstly, they submitted that the doctrine 
of non-resistance, was still as valid as it had 
been before 1688 and that the Revolution had not 
affected it in any way. Non-resistance was a. 
general maxim essential for all governments. But 
all general rules are capable of admitting ex- 
ceptions, and the , Revolution. was one of these ex- 
ceptions, One deviation from a general maxim 
does not nullify it. It would both be impossible 
and highly undesirable for any one, while, in- 
culcating a general maxim, to attempt to indicate 
what exceptions to the rule were admissible. Each 
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deviation must be examined on its own merits' 
when it arises. The value of non-resistance 
would be lost if its advocates"'hedged it 
about with possible exceptions'which no man 
could foresee. The doctrine of non-resistance 
was still the doctrine of, the Church of England. 
Every clergyman had to subscribe to it by law, 
and it was the duty of every member of the Church 
to accept it. 
Secondly, some Tories modified the doctrine. 
Non-resistance, they said, meant non-resistance 
to the supreme power which was parliament. But' 
James, and not parliament, had been resisted in 
1688 and, therefore, - according to the doctrine 
there had been no resistance.. Thus they had to 
admit that James, as executive, had been resis- 
ted, and that such resistance was permissible 
under the doctrine of non-resistance. But at the 
same time they taught that Anne could, on no ac- 
count, be resisted, and confirmed this view by 
their insinuation that the Whigs by, their doc- 
trine of resistance would permit of Anne being 
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resisted in favour of the Pretender. Thus 
these-Tories became entangled in their own 
theories. They tried to reconcile resist- 
ance to James with non-resistance to Anne = 
positions which could not be reconciled. 
- Tories'who denied resistance altogether 
had, if they were not-to be branded as Jacob- 
ites, to profess to believe that the Convent- 
ion, decree of abdication was correct, that 
James being alive had no heir, but that on 
his death in 1701 he could ' transmit- his right 
to Anne, and lastly that an act sanctioned by 
" Anne to give the succession to theýHanoveriana 
was valid since she was a legitimate sovereign. 
William was, consequentlyllif not a usurper 
1 during the 4 he whole of his reigns at least 
no more than a regent for James II from 
I 
1689 till the latter's deathl'and a usurper 
from 1701 till 1702 during which periodIhe 
excluded Anne from her inheritance. These 
Tories, therefore, could still uphold the 
theory of the divine right of kings and in- 




it is true, a large number of Tories in 
Anne's reign who professed to believe in, 
the divinity of kings. ý They, might be pot- 
ential Jacobites but there was more senti- 
mentalism in their profession than the Whigs 
were willingto allow. But the Tories who 
were definitely not Jacobites and who sin- 
cerely approved of the Revolution as an 
extreme act of necessity, being compelled 
to admit resistance and , abandon. 
divine right 
and indefeasible hereditary succession-clung, 
all the more tenaciously to a doctrine of non- 
resistance enunciated in general-terms. The 
Revolution might have compelled them to aban- 
don certain aspects of. the old doctrine but 
nothing would compel them to sacrifice the 
essence of the doctrine which, according-to 4 
them,, was that there must be a supreme power 
in every state against which there could be 
no resistance. 
The Tories said -that the doctrine of" ., 
resistance was a denial of'sovereignty in 
ý_ ý 
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a state. Resistance doctrinaires, they, as- 
serted, were republicans and anarchists, If 
the Revolution was just, why-did the Whigs 
not preach non-resistance'to the Revolution 
Settlement which they had founded ? To tell 
the people that they have a right to resist ' 
is to incite them to rebel, against the work 
of their own hands. There was force in this 
aspect of the Tory criticism. The Whigs 
found it a difficult argument to combat and 
at the Sacheverell Trial, as we saws the Com- 
mons hadýan awkward-task to prove that their 
doctrine of resistance did not imply a de- 
sire to rebel against'Anne. 
But the bare assertion of the Tories 
that there must be a supreme irresistible 
power-"in every state does not take us very 
far unless we know what the constitution of 
that supreme power is. Apart from the Jac-., 
obites°or very reactionary Hanoverian Tories 
who held the Caroline tenet that the king'was 
sovereign, there was no clear evidence thatý,, 
the Tories as a party had art , 
definite con- ;, 




Berkeley added a. paragraph in the third 
edition of-his Passive obedience in which 
he said that the doctrine of non-resistance 
against the supreme power could be applied 
only when one knew what that supreme power 
was. Once it is ascertained, then non-resis. 
tance'was a moral duty with the strongest 
obligations on the consciences of subjects. 
But Berkeley didnot"give the clue to the 
application of his doctrine. To preach a 
doctrine of non-resistance to the supreme 
power without'`stating what that supreme power 
was, was-useless at a time when neither pol- 
itician nor lawyer could give a 'definite 
ruling'on the locus of sovereignty. Casuists 
could place it anywhere that suited them 
best for the moment, - at one time in the 
king, at another time in parliament. 
The Whig reply to the general enunciation 
of this doctrine was that there was no supreme 
power in the Tory sense. The Revolution was 
an exception in the normal life of the people 
0 
but it was based-on fundamental principles of 
(1) 953. 
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politics and the Revolution Settlements 
based on that Revolution, could be justified 
and sustained , only 
by an acceptance -of these 
principles, the basic one being a right in" 
the people to, rebel in exceptional circum- 
stances; 
' 
against the highest-governmental 
authority however it may be constituted. 
Since the. Whigs were unanimous in agree- 
in that the-king was under the law they could 
not regard him as the possessor"of, sovereignty. 
The king had to govern according to the law . 'ý 
agreed upon in parliament which was, in the 
sphere of legislation, the highest authority. 
But they did not agree with the Tories that 
if the king was not sovereign then it must _- 
follow that parliament was. Of the two 
limitations put-upon the power of parliament 
by the Whigs we may dismiss that which re- 
lates, to natural, law, for the doctrine of re- 
sistance neither created this limitation nor 
s; f 
was it primarily, concerned with it. -When., 
a 
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Locke or Defoe spoke of, what parliament 
might not do contrary to natural law their 
" meaning was probably no different from our 
meaning at the present day when we speak of 
what parliament cannot, do, But the second lim- 
itation definitely restricted the power of par- 
liament. This was the essential part of 
Whig teaching that the; constitution cannot 
be altered so long as it. subsists. That 
meant that the supreme power, wherever-it 
might be lodged, could not alter it. This is 
illustrated, for example, by the opposition 
to the theory of Blackall and Swift that the 
supreme power may, if it choosesl"change the 
form of government from a monarchy to a repub. 
el. . 
lic. But it did not follow that parliament 
4 
(1) Dicey Law of the constitution (8th ed. j 
1915), p. 
69. 
Cf. Blackstone. He wrote: "Upon these 
two foundations, the law-of. nature and the 
law of revelation, depend all human laws: that 
is to say no human laws should be suffered 
to contradict these. " - Commentaries (9th ed., 
1783) .ip. 42. If a human law, he says, 
shouldýailow us to commit murder, "we are 
bound"to transgress that human law. " - Ibid., ', 
p. 43. Yet Blackstone's state had a sovereign 
body. In every state there must be"a supreme, 
irresistible, absolute uncontrolled authority, 
in which the Jura summi imp erii, or the rights 




would have-'to be ' resisted 'if 'it overstepped 
thislimitation. Defoe and Hoadly did state- 
explicitly that parliament may be resisted 
but their meaning was not clear.. They were 
probably thinking, along the same lines as 
]Locke and Locke did not require to deal with 
this question; for, by his 'theory `-of 'the dis- 
solution of 'government , there 'can be no separ- 
ate resistance either against the legislature 
exclusive of the executive or 'against -the 'exe- 
cutive exclusive of the. legislature.. Resistance 
is allowed only when the whole-constitution is 
dissolved.. The people are left without any 
government at all and , resistance l'therefore , 
is against any person or body who attempts to 
prevent'their setting up a new government'. - if 
parliament made the king absolute then that put 
the king above'the'law and deprived parliament 
of its exclusive right of making laws. Parlia- 
ment, by altering the executive, altered itself. 
The Whig theory, therefore, was that the consti- 
" tution- was fixed; and unalterable by constitution- 





The most pertinelit criticism against 
Locke and his followers is that they could 
not envisage a state with a governmental 
organ with the power to adapt the constitut- 
ion to-the changing needs of the people. Burke, 
when writing of the Revolution, spoke, of that 
Revolution as an example of the power of a 
state. to adapt its institutions. But he was 
obviously reading his-own meaning into the, 
changes made at that time. That any Institut- 
ion had been altered in 1688 to suit changing 
conditions the Whigs would have been the last 
to admit. The Revolution was the expression of 
the people's rightbto preserve'the old constit- 
ution intact. 
If there was no constitutional method, how 
could the constitution be preserved? The Rev. 
olution was undertaken to prevent the-king 
from becoming absolute. How was the icing to 
be controlled ? Even if the Whigs had admitted 
with the moderate Tories that parliament was 
absolute and irresistible, that would not have. 
solved the problem of executive control. The 
Tories had suffered-in 1688 and had resisted a 
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king who threatened to destroy their church. 
Could they not offer the Whigs an alternative 
to their doctrine of resistance by suggesting 
a constitutional remedy which would take the 
place of revolution ? They could ', offer none, 
for most Tories still regarded the, power of 
parliament as a concession from the king so 
that the two Houses were his servants and 
by no means co-ordinate with him. Consequent- 
ly it was impossible for them to admit that 
the king might be controlled by-his servants. 
The Whigs regarded the Houses as equal co-or- 
dinate partners with the king in legislation, 
but they, tool could conceive of no constitut-, 
ional method of controlling his executive r" 
actions. We have seen, firstly, that the, 
Whigs were unable to demonstrate how the 
king was not actually superior to parliament 
by his right of-veto and consent. He possess. 
ed the ultimate enacting power. --As a Tory 
pamphleteer said, although it was true a bill 
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negatived by the House-of Commons or by. the 
House of Lords could not become law, yet 
threescore negatives could not make a positive. , 
'i 
fý 
The king's fiat alone stamped-authority on a 
bill and made it law. Secondly, the king was 
not only an essential partner of the legislat- 
ure but he-possessed the whole administrative 
power and, as Locke pertinently said, -the king 
Was not likely to concur as a constituent mem- 
ber of parliament in any proposal calculated 
QA 
to oppose his actions, Consequently, of the- 
several partners in the constitution the Whigs 
were inclined to agree with the Tories that 
the -king was -the -greatest, not. for . his execut- 
ive capacity alone but for that combined with 
his share in legislation. We saw in the conolus- 
to the chapter in parliament that there was 4 
a dual or divided sovereignty. But this did 
not mean that theilegislature-and executive 
were 'separate, as Montesqu eu thought, for al- 
though"each. was supreme in its own sphere? 
each had a, common member - the. king - who 




and other thinkers"based liberty on a divis- 
ion of power not on a separation of functions. 
The legislature and'executive-were never sep- 
arate in England, nor did the Whigs or Tories 
wish to separate them. But they desired that 
an even balance should be kept between them. - 
It was the fact that the legislature and 
executive were so closely entwined that rev- 
olution took place in"l688.1' When the'even 
balance which ought to have'been maintained 
between them was lost revolution was the only 
way of 'rectifying it. Whigs 'in William's 
reign constantly referred to the'act passed 
-'in Elizabeth's reign which made it treason 
to satiy 'that parliament 'did not have the power 
to alter the succession. '' Their attempt to 
apply this statute to the-proceedings of the 
Convention was'futile for ''the Convention was 
not a legally constituted parliament, James' 
could have been legally'deposed only-by-an 
act to'which he had given his consent, No 
amount of casuistry-'could prove that the Rev- 
olution was not illegal. The divine right 
6 
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theorists held that an act of parliament 
could not alter the succession but in ad- 
dition to that argument they-could also 
maintain that James was-not legally deposed- 
even according to English positive. law. 
Nelson, the non-juror, Swift tells use stand- 
ing on the letter of the lawl, said to him 
that the succession could be altered only by., 
a parliament summoned by the king's writs. 
The Convention, therefore, -was illegall'the 
abdication was. illegal and everything done 
on the Revolution foundation was illegal. - 
Swift's comment is that that means that a" 
king who acts like, a devil cannot be dpposed 
except by an act*of parliament to which he 
must consent. What is the;. use of a limited,, -. 
monarch, asks-Swift, if . the king may not be 
resisted, except legally, which is impossible. 
To Nelson's scruples about-the legality of the 
Revolution, Swift concludes : "I desire no, 
stronger proof that an-opinion be-false than 
to find absurdities annexed to-it. " 
m.,,.. 
(1) Sentiments of a Church of England man in 




Ifs, then, the letter of the law was tobe 
used to'defeat political justice, there must 
be some higher law in the state than positive-_-- 
law. Since parliament was not in a position,:. -. 
to curb the: will of a , tyrannical monarch, 
then, according to the', Whigs, that duty must 
fall to the body of the people. To justify 
this position the Whigs offered a revolution- 
ary basis of political obligation. t.. F. _ 
They held that the king was not God's 
vice-gerent, and that therefore resistance to 
-him could be no sin against God. Every govern- 
ment was a divine institution in the sense 
that God ordered all things which were for our 
good, and government was for our good. The 
particular form of government in each country 
was determined by its own needs. In England 
it was monarchical because monarchy suited the 
genius of the English people. But it was not 
an absolute monarchyyl but limited by the laws 
of the constitution, which consisted, of parlia- 
ment with the sole right of making and repealing 
-all lawsl and a king as executive with the sole 
power. of administering these, laws. All govern.. 
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mental power originally carne from the people 
and it was exercised by the government only 
as a trustee. That there was'a contract between' 
the king and the people-'came to be the official 
creed of the Whigs, but it'was not stressed. 
Most emphasis was put on a tacit understanding 
between ruler and ruled that allegiance was 
due'only so-long as the government preserved 
the fundamentals of the constitution. Alleg- 
iance was due to the crown, that is, to the per- 
, 
son who filled the office, not to a king by 
reason of his birthright. The English consti- 
tution was the heritage of the people-and it 
was their duty to hand it on to their posterity 
unaltered. The Whigs, `who were mainly respon- 
sible for altering the'balance of the constit- 
ution, would have been the'last persona to 
admit it. Löcke, Defoe, Hoadly, and other ad-- 
vocates of resistance, when they spoke of self- 
preservation as the basis of the right of re- 
sistance, really meant the preservation of the. 
constitution. And when the doctrine is stripped 
of all ' its superfluities, it will be found to 




We can appreciatel'thereforel why the `- 
Whigs held a doctrine of resistance until a 
constitutional-. method was evolved whereby 
parliament not onltiy° gave , law but superintend- ,;. ý 
ed its. due execution. -When that method was-'', ', - 
found there was no-longer arty justification 
for the doctrine. The remedy was the ling 
between parliament and executive and that 
link was the system of cabinet government, 
which, although'it had its beginnings in, or 
even before, Anne's reign, only evolved slow. 
ly throughout the eighteenth century. So far 
as it was observed at all, it was held. to be 
highly undesirable: ' It must be allowed that-" 
a, doctrine of resistance would appear to the 
rWhigs 
p' and even to the 'Tories , as more just- 
ifiable than the-degrading alternative. -of de. 
_ priving 
the kingýof all personal. share in the 
government. Parties still in their infancy 
constituted for most men a schism in the nat. 
ion. '" -It' was the ambition of both- parties 
that this wound in the"nation'should be heal- 
ed ,' and that ministers should' be . servants . of ' 
1 
.ý ., ., 
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the king and not of a party. By place bills 
both-parties unconsciously tried to thwart 
the growth of ministerial responsibility. Their 
object was to prevent the king, from influencing 
the deliberations of parliament through place- 
men in the king's pay.,, But the real effect of 
the measures would have been to prevent the 
rise of cabinet government. Both Whigs and 
Tories were-content that in ordinary circum- 
stances ministers, should be liable to. impeach. 
ment. This control was at best retrospective 
and individual and could not have diminished 
the king's personal influence in politics. 
That he should govern in person and not through 
responsible ministers was accepted by both 
jol. 
parties as the normal working of our constitut- 
ion. Butpýfortunately for our constitution, 
cabinet government developed in spite of the 
theoretical objections to it. We - shall be 
less inclined to blame, thinkers in our period 
for failing to appreciate, -the importance of 
ministerial responsibility when we remember 
that,, cabinet government is not even mentioned 
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by-Blackstöne in his Commentaries, showing 
. -how little impression this most important 
convention had made on constitutional lawyers 
of the eighteenth century. When this con- 
stitutional method of controlling the execut- 
=ive had secured a place in our polity (after 
-George III's attempt to exert his personal 
influence had been defeated) there was no 
longer any need for the doctrine of resistance. 
A. French traveller in England in 1810 ob- 
served that parties were mainly divided over 
rival doctrines of resistance and non-resistance. 
But the doctrine of resistance held by Radicals 
was quite different from the Whig theory of the 
Revolution. Although they professed to draw 
their inspiration from the Revolution (witness 
their Revolution clubs) it is quite clears as 
Burke said, that they had misinterpreted the 
philosophy of the Revolution. Resistance for 
them did not mean the preservation of the con- 
stitution (as it was in 1688)-but resistance 
(1) Journal of a tour and residence'in Great 
Britain. [By Louis Simond ] (2 vole. Edin. j 






against a parliamentary system of government 
which, according to them, oppressed them both 
economically and politically. But although 
the doctrine of resistance of the Revolution 
period lost its significance with changing 
conditions, the political philosophy, which 
the Whigs had evolved to justify it, remained 
to form the basis of the modern theories 
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1. This very comprehensive theory of divine 
right is in strong contrast to the mon- 
opolising theory of divine right of kings 
in Stewart England. But we should note 
that in Tudor England the theory of divine 
right of the king was by no means lost 
sight of. In a sermon on Psalm 82, v. 6-7, 
Henry Smith reminds us that kings, are 
called gods in the Bible. "Thus their name 
telleth them how they should rule and by 
consequence how we should obey. God calls 
them gods therefore he which contemneth 
them, contemneth God; God calls them 
father, therefore we must reverence them 
like fathers; God calls them kingsl'princes, 
lords, judges, powers, rulers governors , which are names of honour, and shall we 
dishonour them whom God doth honour ?... 
They to whom God saith, I have called ye 
Gods, as if he had the naming and appoint- 
ing of them. 'Every power is from God, ' 
Rom. xiii, 2, for by nature no man can 
challenge power over another, but by the 
word: and therefore every soul which is 
subject to God, must be subject to them, 
1 Pet., iii 13, for he which calls them 
kings, calls us subjects; this is their 
patent... that God had chosen them kings, 
and set them upon the throne. " - The 
magistrates Scripture in Works, vol. 1t 
pp. 363-4. Nicholls Ser. of Stand. Divines. 
Puritan Period. ) 
2. The justification of the assistance given 
by England to the Netherlands against 
Spain was a thorny problem. It was jus- 
tified specifically by the Vindiciae 
contra ty_rannos (1579). The assistance 
rendered by Elizabeth was repeatedly cited 
after 1688 as a practical demonstration of 
the acceptance of the doctrine of resistance 
in Tudor England.. 
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rThere 
were t in Tudor England, men of 
eminence who did not hold with the current 
political conceptions. John Poynet, Bishop 
of Winchester, in his Short treatise of 
political power (1556) held that the king 
derived his authority fron the people and 
that the people may withdraw the authority 
they have delegated if it should be abused. 
He wrote : "The manifold and continuall 
examples that have been from time to time, 
of the deposing of kings and killing of 
tyrants t do most certainly confirme it to be most true, just, and consonant to Gods 
judgement ... As God hath ordained magistrates to heare and determine private mens matters, 
ýc to punish their vices : so also will he 
that the magistrates doings be called to 
account and reckoning and their vices 
, corrected and punished 
by the body of the 
whole congregation or commonwealth. " - 
1639 edition, p. 47 and p. 49. 
3. " Bodin wrote : "And 
in that the greatness 
and majesty of a true sovereign prince, is 
to be known ; when the-estates of all the 
people assembled together, in all humility 
present their requests and supplications 
to the prince without having power in 
anything to c'ömmand or deterývine, and to 
give voice but that which it pleaseth the 
king to like or dislike of, to coaamand or 
forbid is holden for law, for an edict 
and ordinance. Wherein they which have 
written of the duty of magistrates and 
other such like books, have deceived them- 
selvesq. in maintaining that the power of 
the people is greater than the prince; a 
thing which otherwise causeth the true. subjects 
to revolt from the obedience which they owe 
unto their sovereign prince and ministreth 
matter of great troubles in commonwealths. " - 
De Republica, Bk. I, chap. viii. (Eng, tr., 
1606, p. 95. ) 
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4. "Everybody's consent is involved in the, 
making of every English law: and then it 
is no more than common honesty to stand 
to one's own act and deed. " - Johnson, Notes on the phoenix edition of the 
Pastoral letter 1694 in Works (1710), 
p. 302. 
"The supreme power in a state can do 
no wrong because whatever that does, is 
the action of all. " - Swift Sentiments 
of a Church of England man 1708) in 
Works IiIp. . "Their acts are the acts of the whole 
nation: so if the people complain they 
complain of their own acts. "-- A 
letter to 
a friend occasion'd by the contest between 
the Bishop of Exeter and Mr Hoadly (1709), 
p. 3. 
5. Manwaring, as we have said, was held in 
considerable repute (or disrepute, accord- 
ing to the critic's bias) in the Revolution 
period. Cf. The proceedings of the Lords 
and Commons in the year 1628 against Roger 
D. D. the S 
for two seditious high-flying sermons, 
printed in London in 1709. The sermons 
themselves were reprinted in that year also. 
On the other hand Knight of Pembroke 
College, Oxford was 
Imprisoned in 1622 for 
asserting that It was lawful for subjects, 
in defence of themselves when persecuted 
for religion to take arms against their 
prince. The 
Convocation 
of the University 
of Oxford in the same year condemned the 
proposition 'That subjects not private 
persons, but inferiour magistrates, may 
take arms to defend themselves, the common- 
wealth, the Church, and true religion against 
theft sovereign, and the superior magis- 
, trate. ' The University decreed That accord- 
ing to the canon of the Holy Scriptures 
/ 
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subjects ought by no means forcibly to 
resist their prince; and that it is not 
lawful to take arms either offensive or 
defensive against the king upon the account 
of religion, or any other pretence. " David 
Owen in his Anti-Paraeus published at 
Cambridge in 1622 endeavoured to disprove 
the doctrine of resistance. (Cited by the 
Histo of passive obedience, 1689, pp. 
14-16. ) It is significant that the doctrine 
of resistance was attracting attention in 
England before the Rebellion. 
6. The Puritan divines preached of the divine 
right of magistracy and of non-resistance 
to the Cromwellian regime. But these men 
had resisted the king and violated the 
royalist doctrine of non-resistance. On their 
side, the royalists waited for the opportunity 
to resist Cromwell'in defence of their doc- 
trine of non-resistance. But until a Stewart 
was restored to the throne, it was not in 
their interests that the doctrine should be 
propagated. 
It is a striking fact that''tha political 
thought of the Commonwealth received no ' 
recognition at the Revolution. The deposition 
and beheading of Charles was universally 
classed as murder. Cromwell was detested. 
There were it is true, books published after 
1689 justifying the execution of Charles. 
Nottingham in 1702 moved in the House of 
Lords that an enquiry should be made into 
them. Referring to these. books, Burnet says : 
"The provocation of some of these, was, by 
"a sermon preached by Dr Binks before the 
Convocationg'on the thirtieth of January, 
in which he drew a parallel between King 
Charles's sufferings and those of our 
Saviour: and, in some very indecent ex- 
pressions, gave the preference to the former. "- 
Hist. v p. 16. 
Vie coo not mean that the ideas of- the 
Whigs after 1689 -are not be found ' in the 
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Commonwealth period but we mean that the 
Whigs would not admit any debt to that 
period. A Whig writer, for example in 
citing Milton's tenure of kings iss- 
trates because of an apt quotation, hastens 
to add : "It is not here intended to 
". justify that pamphlet. " - Tories and Tory 
principles ruinous to both prince and 
people. (1714) p. 66. 
7. We should marvel, said one author, "that 
God sho4ld all of a sudden inspire the 
nation to rise up in opposition to him 
11. e. James III though the doctrine of 
passive obedience had been inculcated upon 
them as a point to be believed on pain of 
damnation for thirty years before, " -A 
defence of the Archbishop's sermon on the 
death of her late Mgjesty (1695), S. T. Wm. 
III, ii, p. 534. 
Burnet wrote : "It is no wonder, if after 
such a war [the Rebellion, which Burnet 
held to be unjustifiable the doctrine of 
non-resistance was preach'd and press'd with 
moee than ordinary warmth, and without any 
exceptions. " - Speech in the House of Lords 
against Sacheverell, S. T., xv, 490. 
Swift, when 1 is sympathies were mainly 
with the Whigs, said that if we remembered 
that England had just passed through twenty 
years of rebellion, some allowance might be 
made for the extreme form of the doctrine of 
non-resistance. = The sentiments of a Church 
of England man (1708) in Worksl iii, p. 67. 
V1hen writing as a Tory he said : "Suppose 
two or three private divines, under King 
Charles the Second, did a little overstrain 
the doctrine of passive obedience to princes; 
some allowance might be given to the memory 
of that unnatural-rebellion against his 
father, and the dismal consequences of 
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8. Cf. Burnet, Subjection for conscience 
sake asserted. (1674 publ. 1675) This 
sermon was recalled 
In 1710 when Burnet 
upheld the doctrine of'resistance at the 
Sacheverell Trial. One writer pointed 
out Burnet's change of opinion and called 
on him to state whether he would stand 
by the sermon of 1674 or the speech of 
1710. See Some considerations humbly 
offered to... the Ld Bishop of Salisbury 
(1710) Burnet in his Vindication'of the 
authority_.. of the Church and State of 
Scotland 1673 said of the king : "He. 
is only accountable to God, whose minister 
he is. And this must hold good except 
you give us good grounds to believe, that 
God hath given authority to the subjects 
to call him to account for his trust, but 
if that be not made appear, then he must 
be left to God, who did impower him and 
therefore can only coerce him. " p. 
14. 
This passage was cited by the author of 
Torics and Tory_ princi les -ruinous 
to both 
prince and people. (1714) p. 53. 
Burnet in his speech at the Sacheverell 
Trial, referred to the pre-Revolution 
doctrine of non-resistance which was 
enunciated by some with exceptions and to 
justify himse]f added : "Some still kept 
these in view- so did both Dr Falkner and 
rrvself. " - 5. 
ý. 
, xv, 490. Swift wrote of 
Burnet : "That eary love of liberty he 
boasts is absolutely. false : for the first 
book that I believe he ever published is 
an entire treatise in favour of passive 
obedience and absolute power ; so that his 
reflections on the clergy, for asserting 
and then changing those principles, come 
very improperly from him. " See 'Short 
remarks on Bishop Burnet's History' in 
Works, x, p. 328. 
Hutton cites the Epitaph on passive 
obedience from a uS, in the Rawlinson . 




papers, wherein the versifier says that 
the doctrine 
"Was not long since in great favour 
As any doctrine of our Saviour. 
With Burnet Stillingfleet and Patrick" 
Hutton, The English Church from the accession 
of Charles I to the death of Anne, p. . 
9. Tillotson, in his letter to Lord Russell, 
June 20,1683, said : "That the Christian 
religion doth plainly forbid the resistance 
of authority... That though our religion be 
established by law... yet, in the same law, 
which establishes our religion it is 
declar'd 'That it is not lawful upon any 
pretence whatsoever to take up arms. "' Cited 
by Phipps in defence of Sacheverell. S. T., 
xv 231. Also cited by Tories and Tory 
principles ruinous to both prince and peoplg. 
(1714) p. 51. 
We are told, however, that "even Dr 
Tillotson himself tho' he had writt that 
letter to the Lorc Russell which had been 
often quoted as unanswerable, yet would not" 
generally affirm, tho' asked before the king 
in person that no case was to excepted. And 
his majesty was so far from being offended 
at his caution that he declared to his 
'brother, 'That the dean spoke like an honest 
man' and would not have press'd any further. 
- Echard, History of the Revolution, p. 22. Tillotson's letter is printed in fill in 
10. The author of The history of passive obedience 
(1689) referring to the sixth commandment of 
ý the Necessary doctrine and erudition of 6, L Christoman man (1543. A new edition was 
ion, By Charlwood Lawton. Som., T. l ix, at 
p. 371. 
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published in 1932. ) - 'No subjects may 
draw their swords against their prince 
for any cause whatsoever it be' -1 remarks: 
"So that hereby we see, that the declaration 
made in the reign of Charles the Second 
(That it is not lawful upon any pretence, etc. ) 
is no novel doctrine of the Church of England, 
but the old doctrine of the Church of England 
even in the infancy of its reformation. " pp. 
19-20. The Necessary doctrine was cited by 
the defence in the Sacheverell Trial. S. T., 
xv, 244-245. 
11, Ferguson said the right of parliament to 
dispose of the crown had never been doubted 
"till a few mercenary people about ten years 
ago [i. e. at the time of the Exclusion Bill) 
endeavoured to intrude upon us a pretended 
divine and unalterable right to the success, 
ion. " -A brief justification, etc. (1688) 
S. T. Wm. III, 1, p. 142. 
"There was nothing tºt that time to be. 
heard, in the most of our churches, but the 
divine right of succession. " -A modest 
inquiry into the causes of the present 
disasters in England, etc. S. T. WJm. III, ii, 
p. 96. 
12. The Decrees, drawn up; by Dr Jane, Dean of 
Gloucester and Professor of Divinity at 
Oxford, originally appeared in the London 
Gazette of July 24,1683, The first five 
propositions to be condemned are the most 
important for they formed the basis of Whig 
political theory after the Revolution. The 
Whigs could have no objection to, the con- 
demnation of some pf the-other decrees. The 
Decrees were cited by*the defence at the 
Sacheverell Trial (S. T., xv, 255-260) and, 
along with Sacheverell's sermons were 
burned by order of the House of 
6ommons 
at 
the conclusion'of the trial. 
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They were reprinted in 1710 under 
the title An entire confutation of Iir 
Hoadly's book of the original of govern- 
ment, taken from the London Gazette. At 
the end is a note : "Advertisement. This 
is to give notice that if Mr Hoadly will' 
not recant his rebellious and deditious 
principles which he has borrow'd from 
the vile authors here condemn'd, he may. 
speedily expect the'same censure from 
the universities which they underwent. " 
It would appear that Swift: though he 
upheld the doctrine of non-resistance, 
disowned these decrees. See his Examiner, 
No. 40, May 3,1711 in Works ix, p. 258. 
The Decrees are also published in full 
in Cooke 2 History of party (1836) i pp. 348-355. 
13, Dr Figgis shows that the divine right 
theorists were pleading primarily for 
sovereignty in general as an essential 
attribute of any-state. (Divine right of 
kings chap. ix. ) This is certainly true. 
But Hickes, for example, after laying down 
the rules of sovereignty which must apply, 
he says, to democracies as well as mon- 
archies, concludes : "In all perfect 
governments and particularly in the English, 
all these rights legally belong to the 
sovereign, who is the king, especially to 
" be accountable to none but God. " etc. - {" Jovian; or an answer to Julian the Apostate 
(1683). p. 203. 
I 4. "Qovern-nent in general... derives its ordin- 
ation and institution from God... All rulers 
are thus far under pact and confinement, that 
they are obliged by the Almighty and Supreme 
Sovereign, to exert their governing power 
for the promoting His service and honour, 
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and to exercise their authority for the 
safety, welfare, and prosperity of those 
over whom they are established. " - Fer- 
guson, A brief justification, etc. (1688) 
S. T. Wm. III , ij p. 135. 
OL 15. Government,. s'd Hoadly, "is the ordinance 
of God... in this sense, because it is agree- 
able to his will, that so good and useful 
an office should be kept up in humane soc- 
iety. " - Some considerations, etc. (1709) in 
Works, iii p. . 
16. "All political power'is from God... But then 
we must consider, that these powers are not 
immediately from God, but immediately from 
second causes. When we say God made us, we 
don't mean immediately created us as he did 
Adam : so when we say all governing powers 
are from God, we don't mean immediately by 
God's creation... If therefore we will enquire 
into the origin of this or that govermnent, 
we must look for the immediate second causes : 
which can be but two,, either force or consent, 
or partly one, partly t'. other. " -A letter to 
a friend occasion'd by the contest, etc. 
pp " 3-4 " ,,. 
I 
17. "Thus may government (abstractedly consid- 
ered they [the Whigs] say) be said to be 
of divine right ; but the particular modes 
or species of government are left wholly to 
mankind. " - The criterion, or touchstone, etc. 
(1710) pp. 5-6. 
18. "I will not deny that if we look back, as 
far-as history will direct us, towards the, -., 
original of commonwealths, we shall gener- 
ally find them under the government and . .,, administration of one man. ---And I am also 
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apt to believe that where a family was 
numerous enough to subsist by itself and 
continued entire together, without mixing 
with others, as it often happens, where 
there id much land and few people the 
government commonly began in the 
father. 
For the father having, by the law of nature, 
the same power with every man else, to 
punish, as he 
thought fit any offences 
against that law? might 
thereby 
punish his 
transgressing children, even when they were. 
-" men, and out of their pupilage ; and they 'were very likely to submit to his punish- 
ment, and-all-join with him against the 
offender in their turns, giving him thereby 
power to execute his sentence against any 
transgression, and so, in effect, make him 
the law-maker and governor over all that 
remained in conjunction with is family... 
Thus, though looking back as far as records 
give us any account of peopling the world, 
and the history of nations we commonly 
find the government to be 
In 
one hands yet 
it destroys not that which I affirm - viz., 
that the beginning of politic society de- 
pends upon the consent of the individuals 
to join into and make one society, who, 
when they are thus incorporated, might set 
up what form. of, government they thought fit. ', 
Lockel Second"-2freatise, $S105-106. 
19, "In transgressing the law of nature t the 
offender... becomes dangerous to mankind ; 
the tie which is to secure them from injury 
-and violence being slighted and broken by 
him, which being a trespass against the 
whole species, and the peace and safety of 
it, provided for by the law of nature, every 
man upon this score, by the right he hath 
to preserve mankind in general, may restrain, 
or where it is necessary, destroy things 
noxious to them, and so may bring such evil 
, on any 
one who hath transgressed that law, 
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they may make him repent-the doing of 
it, and thereby deter him, and, by his 
" example others from'doing the like 
mischief. " - Locke, Second Treatise, S8. 
"Supposing no fixed government... he would, 
be a public benefactor, who should kill a 
public enemy. " - Hoädly Some considerations 
etc. (1709) in Works, il, p. 1.0. 
20, Pufendorf said : "To object the vulgar 
maxim of Quod quis non habet, non potest 
in alterum transferre ... is but a piece of trifling ignorance. " - Of the law of nature 
and nations. (1672) Kennett s trans a, on 
of 1703, Bk. vii, chap. iii, p. 160. 
His answer to the objection is : "But 
now it may and often does happen, that a 
moral quality (in which class government 
ought to be reckoned) shall be produced in 
another person by the concurrence of those 
who had it not, truly and properly, in 
themselves before : so that they may,. be 
rightly deem'd the productive cause of the 
said quality. As many voices, joining in 
concert, produce a. harmony, which no single 
person himself could pretend to by himself., 
'Tis easily seen, that-some scatter' d seeds 
(as it were) of""government lie hid in 
particular persons ; which, by means of 
concurrent compacts, being excited into 
" motion, do grow and shoot forth. " - Ibid. 'p. 
162. 
ý. 21. The theory oft original popular power was not 
always required by contract theorists. Cf. 
"It is objected against this opinion of 
electing our governors, that the people 
having no power over their own lives, cannot 
give that power to any other... It is not the 
people that confer this power, but, God, " - 
il 
P" 
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22, "It is a contradiction to deny that all 
civil power is originally in the people : 
for what is civil power in English, but 
the city's power, and derived from the 
community ? And this either limited, or 
enlarged as they please. The intention of 
the people (as Fortescue tells us) is the 
heart-blood of the government and is the 
primum vividum in the body politick, as the 
heart is in the body natural. And it is 
impossible to be otherwise : the nation 
must make the king, for I am sure the king 
cannot make the nation. And as Sir William 
Temple very, well observes, the basis of 
government is the people, though the king 
be at the top of it ; and to found the gov- 
ernment upon a king, is to invert the 
pyramid, and set it upon the pinacle, where 
it will never stand. " - An argument proving, 
etc. (1692) in Works, p. 276. 
23, "But'since self-love and self-interest are 
oft-times prejudices too strong for that 
just and equal return of kindnesses, which 
is re quired in all human societies : men 
therefore lay down and submit to external 
forms and rules, which'they judg to be most- 
convenient measures of their obligations 
to each other. ""'- W, The case of the 
oaths stated. (1689) 
S. eT. 
Wm. III, i1 p. 340. 
"I easily grant that civil government is 
the proper remedy for the inconveniences 
of the state of nature, which must certain- 
ly be greatl-where men may be judges in 
their own case. " - Locke, Second Treatise, £13. 
"But finding this E the state of natured 'a 
state of no regular security, they resolve 
to transfer this right of self-defence to 
some particular persons, reserving to them. 
, selves the exerciseýof self-defence in those-, 
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cases in which the magistrate cannot act 
for their safety. " - Hoadly, Some consider- 
ations, etc. (1709) in Works, ii, p. 135. 
"That the inconveniences of society with- 
out government are so many that it quickly 
brings them to enter into such pacts as 
they think will best serve the end of`all 
political society. " - The criterion, or 
touchstone, etc. (1710) pp. 5-6. 
24. Tindal again followed Locke here without 
acknowledgment. He wrote : "If then men 
are naturally free, with no power over one 
another except what's reciprocal, they 
cannot lose their equality without their 
own consent in forming themselves into 
bodys politick : which cou'd'no otherwise 
be done, than by agreeing to be determin'd 
by a majority ; because a society can have 
only one mind, that of the greater number, 
who having the greater force must make the 
body politick move as they please. " - The 
rights of the Christian Church. 4th. ed., 
p. 6. 
Cf. also the following two passages 
written before the publication of Locke's. 
Treatises: - 
"The constitution of a government does 
lie in the original agreement of the people, 
which they make between themselves, or with 
their intended governor or governors, before 
the government be set up, whether there be 
none before, or the former at an end. " - 
Good advice before it be too late. (1688) 
Som. T. xý pp 198-199* 
"All politick societies began from a 
voluntary union and mutual agreement of men, 
freely acting in the choice of their gover- 
nors and forms of government. All kings 
receive their royal dignity from the com- 
munity, by whom they are made the superiors 
minister and ruler of the people. " - Political 
aphorisms. S. T'. Wm. III, itp. 389. 
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25, In the case of Spinoza, this is not 
surprising. His philosophy made. slow 
progress in England. His Tractatus 
theologico-politicus, however, was pub- 
lished in London in 1689. But there was 
no English edition of his Tractatus, 
politicus until last century. Spinoza's 
religious views were attacked in Spinoza 
revi ', etc. (London, 1709. ) 
26, "If the government be dissolved, the power 
devolves on the people;... the people-may 
set up what government they please, either 
the old or a new; a monarchy absolute or 
limited, or an aristocracy or democracy. "- 
A letter to a friend, etc. Som.. T., x, p. 195. 
27, This author asked : "If the regal power be 
fallen... whether of necessity it must not 
fall to its center or root from whence it 
sprung, which is the whole nation. " -A word 
to the wise, etc. S. T. IYM. III, il p. 227. 
28. If the government is dissolved "it devolves 
to the people who have a right to resume 
their original liberty, and by the estab- 
lishment of athew legislative (such as they 
shall think fit), provide for their own 
safety. " - Locke, Second Treatise, S222. 
29. Swift admitted that if the throne was 
vacant in 1688, then "the body of the 
people was thereupon left at liberty to' 
choose what form of government they pleased, 
by*themselves, or their representatives. ' 
Sentiments, etc, in Works, iii, p. 71. 
r 
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30, "There are it seems two different 
opinions about the origin of government; 
not the primary origin, but the origin of 
this or that place. Some affirm it in the 
people : and those of that opinion, I 
know not why, infer, that upon a male-ad,. 
ministration, the people may by force 
change their trustees. " -A letter to a 
friend occasion'd by the contest, etc, 
(1709) pp. 1-2. 
31, "'Tis agreed that in all govern-nent there 
is an absolute unlimited power, which 
naturally and originally seems to be 
Placed in the whole body, wherever the 
executive part of it lies. This holds in 
the body natural. For wherever we place 
the beginning of motion, whether from the 
head, or the heart or the animal spirits 
in general, the body moves and acts by the 
consent of all its parts. This unlimited 
power placed fundamentally in the body of 
the people, is what the legislators of all 
ages have endeavoured in their several 
schemes or institutions of government to 
deposit in such hands as would preserve 
the people from rapine and oppression 
within. Most of them seem to agree in this, 
that it was a trust too great to be com- 
mited to any one man or assembly, and there- 
fore they left the right still in the whole 
body, but the administration or executive 
in the hands of one, the few or the many. " - 
Swift. A discourse of the contests and 
dissentious, etc. (1701) pp. 3-4. 
32, Defoe, who was one of the most democratic 
writers of the age, in explaining that the 
people have a right of resistance, adds : 
"Note I do not place this right upon the 
inhabitants, but upon the freeholders : the 
freeholders are proper owners of the 
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country.. " ( Original power of the people 
in Works (1703)ß p. 157. Those who are 
not freeholders, are "but sojourners, like 
lodgers in a house, and ought to be sub- 
ject to such laws as the freeholders im- 
pose upon them, or else they must remove : 
because the freeholders having a right to 
the land, the others have no right-to 
live there but upon sufference. " ( Ibid., 
p. 160. ) This argument Defoe to the aston- 
ishing conclusion that if the king should 
come to be sole landowner, he would, be an 
absolute monarch, against whom there could 
be no appeal. 
Even with limited definition of 'people', 
Defoe went much further towards democracy 
than Locke. While for Locke and other 
writers, popular sovereignty was a dormant 
right, for Defoe it ought constantly to be 
asserting itself. He saw clearly thata 
reserved right of revolution, though admir- 
ably suited for a crisis, did not meet 
adequately the everyday needs of practical 
politics. He made representation a cardinal 
point of his political philosophy. In 
Legions Memorial he thus addressed the House 
of Commons : "You are not above the peoples' 
resentments, they that made you members, may 
reduce you to the same rank from whence they 
chose you. " (p. 11'The same thought runs 
through the Original power of the collective 
body of the people. His popular sovereignty 
was the fountain of legal sovereignty. There 
is a constant flow of power from the people 
to the government. Popular sovereignty is 
the dynamic, which not only gives life and 
force to government, but which constantly 
sustains it. But Defoe was in advance of his 
age, and it cannot be said that these views 
represented Whig thought. 
33. 'That individuals did not have the right to 
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the History of passive obedience is be- 
side the point, because that work only 
demonstrated "the unlawfulness of private 
persons their rising up in arras against 
the government. " See A modest inquiry 
into the causes of the present disasters 
in England. (1690) S. T. Wm. IIII ii, p. 98. 
George Ridpath said that if Sacheverell, 
when he condemned "appeals to the people 
as the only judges of right and wrong... as 
rebellious"l meant every individual, then 
Ridpath agreed with him. "But we say, that 
people have a right as courts of judicature 
established by law. " Yet he was a hearty 
defender of the doctrine of resistance. 
See his The perils of being zealously 
affected but not well. (1709) 
Wake made the. same implication. "Perhaps 
a prince who affects an arbitrary sway : and 
his ministers joyn in the same designs with 
him ; and nothing less than the authority of 
a parliament can put a stop 'to their attempts, 
This, therefore may make it necessary, in 
times of peace and quietness for the par- 
liament to meet at certain times, to prevent 
such attempts and to keep every member of 
the constitution within itd due bounds. And 
such was the case of the last reign. '' - The 
authority of Christian princes over their 
ecclesiastical synods, etc. (1697) p, 2797. 
Lechmere, at the Sacheverell Trial, said 
that "that part of the government, thus 
fundamentally injur'd had a right to save 
or recover that constitution in which it 
had an original interest. " S. T., xv, 61. 
Cf. also chap. 6. 
34, "When. that remedyjthe Revolution1took 
place, the whole frame of the government 
was restored entire and unhurt. This show- 
ed the excellent temper of the nation was 
in at that time, that after such provocations 
from an abuse of the regal powers,, and such 
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convulsions, no-one part. of, the constit- 
ution was-altered, or suffered the least 
damage, but on the contrary, the whole 
received new life and vigour. " S. T., xv, 
98. He 
. repeated 
this on the ninth day of 
the trial in his reply. Ibid., 387. 
35, Blackstone declined to say when'the right 
of resistance should come into force. 
His conclusion, drawn from the Revolution, 
was as follows :-a 
"And so far, as this, precedent leads, and 
no farther, we may now be allowed to lay 
down the law of redress against public 
oppression. If therefore-any future prince 
should endeavour to subvert the constit- 
ution by breaking the original contract 
between king and people, should violate 
the fundamental laws and should withdraw 
himself out of the kingdom ; we are now 
authorised to declare that this conjunction 
of circumstances would amount to an abdi- 
cation, and the throne would be thereby 
vacant. But it is not for us to say, that 
any one, or two, of these ingredients would 
amount to such a situation ; for there our 
precedent would fail us. In these therefore 
or other circumstances, which a fertile 
imagination may''furnishI since both law and 
history are silent, it becomes us to be 
silent too ; leaving to future generations, 
whenever necessity and the safety of the 
whole shall require it, the exertion of 
these inherent (though latent) powers of 
society which no climate, no time, no 
constitution, no contract can ever destroy 
or diminish. " - Commentaries, Bk. i, chap.?. (9th. ed., 1783, p. 245, ) 
36, "A people. will not-pretend a necessity for 
resistance if there is no real one. If the 
oppression is not genuine the body of the 
people will not be affected: consequently 
1 
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there will be, no inducement to rise in 
arms. There will be no rising without 
probability of success for men know that 
if it fail they will be put to death as 
traitors tho never so unjust]$. " - Chuse 
which you please, etc., p. 5. - fý 
It is noteworthy that William Paley 
a hundred years later basing his phil-,..,.,,, 
osophy on the Revolution, used this :.. 
argument of justification by success. - 
The principles of moral and political 
philosophy. (1785) Bk. vii chap. 3. 
37, "When then this Ci. e. the Great Sea11 
-disappears, and the king withdraws him- 
self, without naming any persons to re- 
present him, the government is certainly 
laid down and forsaken by him. " - Burnet, 
An enquiry into the present state of 
affairs, etc. Dec., 1688 S. . Wm. , 11 
p. 129. 
"It was the design of the popish party 
to persuade him to withdraw himself, their 
end in it being to put us thereby into 
confusion. This they did not boggle to 
speak out; the Lord Dover and Mr Brent 
made no secret'öf it. " -A letter to a 
bishop concerning the present settlernentý 
and the new oaths. (1689 Som. T., ixe D, ' 
378* 
Locke hinted at James's desertion when he- 
wrote': "There is one way more whereby 
such a government may be dissolved, and_ 
that is : when he who has the supreme 
executive power neglects and abandons'that 
charge, so that the laws already made can 
no longer be put in execution ; this is 
demonstrably to reduce all to anarchy, and 
so effectually to dissolve the government, ". 
Second Treatise , S219. ., k ,-, 
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38, The Tories were afterwards accused. of 
ulterior motives in wanting a regency. 
Of the Tories, and of the Bishop of Ely 
in particular, a pamphleteer said : "The 
pious prelate could have been well con- 
tented that the Prince of Orange had then 
retir'd into Holland, and left the admin- 
istration of public affairs and the dis- 
posing of the revenue of the crown to him, 
and other worthy Tories. In which case all 
had been according to the law and con- 
science, the king retaining the name, and 
the 'right reverend having the power. " 
See Tories and Tory_ princi les ruinous to 
both prince and eol. 1714 pp. 76-7 . Of the regency plan, Swift said : 
"It was certainly much the best expediency. " 
- Note on Burnet's History, in Swift's ý" 
Works, xj p. 364. 
39, The words abdication and desertion were 
both ambiguous. Their ambiguity served a 
useful. purpose when men were unwilling 
to speak bluntly. Several interpretations 
were put on the word abdication. One 
pamphleteer, who did not admit that James 
-'had been resisted wrote : "I suppose it is not pretended In England his late 
majesty forfeited his right-to govern by 
his misgovernment; but that the sense of 
it prevail' d upon him rather to throw. up . '' the government, than to concur with an 
English free-parliament in all that was 
needful to re-establish our laws, liberties 
and religion : and this is a proper legal 
abdication, as it is distinguished from a 
voluntary resignation on the one hand, and 
a violent deposition on the-other. " (The, 
history of the desertion. S. T. Wm. III, il 
p. 38. ) At the Sacheverell Trial, Jekyll 
took the same view as the committee of the 
lower house. He said that the word. abdicate 
was insisted on because it= included in it 
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the maladministration of James$ which 
the word desertion did not. (S. T., xv, 101. ) 
Ferguson used the verb 'to abdicate' in its 
transitive form. He spoke of the people's 
right "to abdicate the king. " (A brief 
justification, etc. S. T. Wia. III, ij p. 140. ) 
Roughly speaking, the word desertion 
was a Tory word " abdication a Whig. What- 
ever reason the 
Commons might give for 
choosing abdications it is clear it was 
chosen as being more in keeping with the 
conclusion that the throne was vacant. The 
Tories in Anne's reign who clung to the 
abdication theory did so to prove-that the 
throne had been vacant, but not: that. -James had abdicated, that is, that he had been 
resisted. 
Locke did not refer either to abdication 
or to desertion, but he certainly would 
have preferred the'latter expression. 
Government, he said, is dissolved when the 
"executive power neglects and abandons that 
charge. " (See above, Note 37. ) The con- 
clusion7 therefore $ that-'the throne was 
vacant' would have followed from the Tory 
word 'desertion' according to Locke's 
interpretation of it. 
40, Clarges said : "By'this vacancy I under- 
stand only that the king has abdicated 
for himself and divested himself of the 
right of government and that the govern- 
ment comes to the Protestant. heir in succ- 
ession. " - Grey's Debates ix, pp. 55,58. 
A pamphleteer believed that when 
James abdicated there was a vacancy but 
no interregnum. The Convention in their 
resolution only indicated that the throne 
was vacant as a consequence of the abdi- 
cation, and was vacant only so far as 
James was concerned. From the time of the 
abdication, the next heir was king. The 
kingship was not in abeyance, but "as the 
lawyers say" in abatement. - Agreement 
betwixt the present and the former govern-. 
men, S. T. Wm. III, ij p. 422. 
.ý 
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41. Sir James Mackintosh wrote : "the fact 
was shortly$ that the Prince'of Orange 
was elected king of England, in contempt 
of the claims, not only of the exiled 
monarch, and his son, but of the prin- 
cesses Mary and Anne... The title of 
William was then clearly not succession... - The deviation was indeed slight, but it 
destroyed the principle and established 
the right to deviate, the point at issue. 
The principle that justified the elevation 
of William III and the preference of the 
posterity of Sophia of Hanover to those 
of Henrietta of Orleans, would, in point 
of right, have vindicated the election of 
Chancellor Jeffries or Colonel Kirk. The 
choice, like every other choice, to be 
guided by views of policy and prudence 
but it was a choice still. " - Vindiciae 
Callicäe. 3rd. ed., pp. 301-302. 
The Vindiciäe was a reply to Burke I 
who had pleaded for hereditary monarchy' 
and cited the Revolution in his favour 
even though he had to-admit that there 
was "at the Revolution, in the person 
of king William, a snail and temporary 
. 
deviation from the strict order of a 
regular hereditary succession. ". - Reflect.. 
ions on the revolution in France, in 
Works ,_ ii , p. 29i'. 
42. William Paley took this view. The oath 
of allegiance, he said, "permits resis- 
tance to the king when his imbecility 
or ill behaviour 
Is 
such, as to make. 
resistance beneficial to the community. 
It may fairly be presumed that the Con- 
vention Parliament which introduced the 
oath in its present form did not intend, 
by imposing it, to exclude all resistance 
since the members of that legislature 
had many of them recently taken up arras 
against James the Second, and the very 
authority by which they sat together was 
ý'aý 
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itself the effect of a successful 
opposition-to an acknowledged sovereign.. 
Some resistance, therefore was meant to 
be allowed ; and, if any, 
It 
must be that 
which has the public interest for its 
object. " - The principles of moral and 
political philosophy 1785) in Worksý1831) , i7 p. 151. 
43, In the numerous pamphlets upholding the 
right of resistance, the verb 'to resist'. 
is'seldom used as synonymous with 'to 
depose'. Deposition inferred a formal 
sentence against a lawful king. Resistance, 
on the other hand could take place only 
after the king had ceased to be a king by 
his own unlawful acts and thus absolved his 
subjects from their allegiance. There were 
some writers, however, who continued to 
speak of James's deposition even after the 
period mentioned in the text. Johnson in 
An argument Provi $ etc. (1692), Toland, 
who said : "We deposed a prince" in his 
Memorial of the State of England (1705), 
p. 13, and Thomas Bradbury who asserted : "People have a right to dethrone a tyrant" 
in. hi$ The lawfulness of resisting tyrants 
(1714) p. 2 are examples. B-uV-W is 
significant that the author of Parliament- 
ary right maintained (1714), after he 
spoke of the deposition of "James for his 
tyranny, more majorum" added : "Yet it 
must be confessed, to be the more accurate 
and true way of speaking to say our 
parliaments never pretended to depose kings 
till they had first deposed themselves by 
bubverting our laws. " p. 40. 
44. Cf. "If your Lordship should ask me when 
this dissolution of government happened, 
I think I should be able to fix the-time ; 
your Lordship does remember, that upon the 
) / 
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Duke of Monmouth' s rebellion . . 
the late 
king gave commissions to several popish 
officers ; this was the forerunner of it. 
But when upon the sitting down of the 
parliament in October afterwards he not 
only in his speech told his parliament that 
he had done it, but that he was resolved 
to stand by it, and. thereupon dismisst his 
parliament for their opposition to it, he 
finished his design and our ruin ; and 
from that moment I 
look 
upon the English 
constitution to be altered, and must lay 
my finger upon this as the compleat subversion 
of our legal government. ". -A -letter 
to a 
bishop concerning the present govern- 
ment and the new oaths. So: u. T. 9 ix, p. 375. 
45. "But alas : poor king James soon lost. the 
kindness of these his former votaries. For 
he who had been told every day, he might 
do what he pleas'd, and was accountable to 
none but God, thought he might safely 
venture to make trial of the passive obed- 
ience of men that told hire so. Here he was 
mightily mistaken, and hence he may date 
all his misfortunes. " -A -modest 
inquiry 
into the causes of the present disaster 
in England, etc;, S. T. Wm. III, ii, p. 96. 
"But... when the burden of their own ill- 
contrived oppression came home to them- 
selves, and touch'd but one of their 
fingers they soon let him understand that 
they had given him on], y a spiritual king- 
dom, and not a kingdom of this world. " - 
Johnsong An argument proving, etc. (1692) 
in Works, p. 261. 
"But when the prince, taking them at their 
word; ventures to lay the burden on their 
backs, they rice up and kick hire in the 
face. " - Defoe, Jure diving. (1706) p. ii. 
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"There's no such creature in Great Brit- 
ain as a passive obedience man " they 
have all resisted when touched. " - High 
Church address. (1710) p. 16.. 
46. Kettlewell, the non-juror t however, 
re-iterated the doctrine in his Christian- 
iy, a doctrine of the Cross. (1691) And 
Ashton on the scaffold died professing it. 
See An answer to the paper delivered by 
Mr Ashton at his execution... Together with 
the paper itself. (1690) S. T. Wm. III, 11I 
pp. 104-115. Both Fowler and Stillingfleet 
have been suggested as: the author of this 
pamphlet, but it was probably Fvaler. The 
author said that Ashton did not suffer for 
the doctrine of non-resistance but for the 
want of it. Ibid., p. 106. Johnson'called 
him "poor Ashton", "because I heartily 
pitied his death : for he acted in pur- 
of those principles which his suance 
answerer, to my knowledge has publickly 
preach'd above these twenty years. " 
The doctrine of non-resistance had 
been frequently called the 'doctrine of 
the Cross', for example, in Charles II's 
reign. See Echard History of the Revol- 
ution (1725), p. 21. Johnson said -..,, To 
Christen their bowstring obedience, and 
to call it the doctrine of the Cross, there- 
by abusing the adorable mystery of our 
salvation, and turning it into a state- 
engine of tyranny and slavery. " - Notes 
on the phoenix edition, etc. (1694) in 
Works, p. 302. 
47. "Passive obedience must be crook'd and 
bent like a ninepence and look contrary 
ways, 'before he Sherlock] can make a 
token of it to 'this government ; for 
actual resistance of tyranrW gave this 
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government its birth and being, and'it 
stands and-can stand on no other bottom. " - 
Johnson, Notes on the phoenix edition, etc. 
in Works, p. 308. 
A writer in 1710 said : "Julian 
Johnson was the first builder upon this 
bottom jresistance) but was never reward- 
ed for his labour. " -A true defence of 
H. Sacheverell D. D. in a letter to Ir 
Dtolbe3n, p. 5. 
48. Hoadly's sermon contained a very slight 
notice of the doctrine of resistance. The 
gist of it can be given in a few words. 
All power, he said, was from God, but no' 
particular form of government was divine. 
St Paul says submission is dueýto a ruler 
who rules for the good of the people. A 
ruler who does not rule for the public 
good cannot claim obedience and subjects 
may resist. 
Hoadly-replied to his critics in The 
measures of obedience to the civil magis- 
trate considered in defence of the doc- 
trine delivered in a sermon, etc. in 
Worksii, pp. -. 
In the House of Lords, Bishop Compton 
said that "sermons are now preached where-, 
" in rebellion was"countenenced, and resis- 
tance to the higher powers encouraged. " 
On this occasion, Burnet answered Compton 
and upheld the doctrine of resistance. - 
Parl. Hist., vi, 485-492. 
Comptons attitude to the doctrine-is 
noteworthy. He was one of those who invited 
over the Prince of Orange. But here he is, -. = found opposing Burnet and Hoad7, y, and he., - 
voted Sacheverell not guilty at his trial. 
49, A Tory pamphleteer, referring to this 
dispute, wrote : "The next business of the 
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Whigs was to make choice of'a proper 
subject to work upon : This they thought 
they had found in a sermon preach'd by 
a Right Reverend before the queen " upon. 
this sermon, their teazer Hoadly had begun 
the chase in a letter to his lordship. " - 
The " fourth and last part of a caveat 
4gainst the Whiggs. 2nd. ed. (1710), p. 119. 
Hoadly's part in his controversy with 
Blackall was derided in Advice from the 
Hobbs of Malmesbury to h1s brother. B- 
H--div. 1710 
50, Swift, no doubt, had this speech in mind 
when he satirically made the Whigs say : 
"Because nothing so much distracts the 
thoughts as too great variety of subjects, 
therefore they had kindly prepared a bill 
to prescribe the clergy what subjects they 
should preach upon, and in what manner, that 
they might be at no loss. " - The Examiner, 
No. 22, Jan. 41 1710/11. And again : If the 
Whigs came into power again, they would 
bring in a bill "to forbid the clergy 
preaching certain duties in religion 
especially obedience to princes. ' - 
the 
Examiner, No. 26, Jan. 25 9 1710/11. (Works ý ix, p. 161. ) ''' 11 
In the queen's speech at the close of 
the session in which the trial had taken 
place, Anne said : "I could heartily wish 
that men would study to be quiet, and do 
their own business, rather than busy them- 
selves in reviving questions and disputes 
. of a very high nature... since they can only tend to foment... divisions and animosities. " - Parl. Hist., vii 898. 
The clergy were blamed for bringing the 
troubles of 1688 upon the country through 
their preaching of non-resistance. Clergy- 
men, said one writer, are no politicians, 
and ought not to meddle with politics. God 
never intended them for it. "What a hotch- 
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potch have they made-with their kings 
de facto, their jure divino, their 
passivity, and non-resistance ? But 
these are beaten topics. " - Plain English, 
or an inquiryL: into the causes, etc. 
S. T. Wm. III, ii, p. 184. 
It must be pointed out in fairness to 
the Tories that Hoadly used the pulpit to 
preach politics ; and, considering their 
position, the clergy were less to be cen- 
sured for preaching non-resistance than 
resistance. 
Defoe recommended the clergy to leave 
politics to ministers of state. No one, he 
said, thought the church was in danger till, 
a Hoadly told them they ought to defend it, 
or a bigoted Sacheverell puzzled his head 
with the power of the prince. "But our 
modern priests have laid aside divinity 
and are all turning politicians. " - High- ::. 
Church address to Dr Henry Sacheverell. 
(1710) p. 9. . Why should Sacheverell be blamed for F't 
preaching politics, asked a pamphleteer 
when the House of Commons commended Hoadly 
for it ?-A true defence of Henry Sachev- ; 
erell, etc. (1710) p. 5. 
When Steele attacked the clergy for .: s "ý the same cause (see his The crisis 1714). 
Swift replied t1Yat Hoadly, a champion of 
the doctrine "was never charged for med- 
dling out of his function. "- The public 
spirit of the Whigý9 etc. (1714) in Works, 
p. 326. v, 
51. John Mather, preacYiing before the Univer- 
sity of Oxford on, May 29,1705, had said 
practically the same thing. He attacked 
"those receptacles of wickedness, the 
schismatical illegal seminaries, wherein 
the seeds of sedition are carefully sown. 
(p. 22) He attacked comprehension whereby 
"the true sons of the church-are passion- 
j' 
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ately exhorted to receive and treat the 
revolters with all imaginable respect and 
tenderness, as their trusty fellow-citizens. " 
(p. 23) -A sermon preached before the 
" University of Oxford. The same attitude 
was taken by the Memorial of the Church of 
England (1705) and refuted Toland in 
memorial of the State of England and 
other pamphleteers. 
52. The Solicitor-General (Sir Robert Eyre) 
said : ! 'When the question is not, whether 
the Revolution was brought about by conquest, 
or what would be the consequence of such an 
assertion, either in regard to the honour 
of the king, or the condition of the people, 
there can be no colour for saying that he 
meant by this general expression which 
carries no such meaning in itself, that the 
king disclaim'd conquest, or a resistance 
which tended to conquest only. 
"Especially? my Lords, when the subject 
matter of his discourse naturally led him 
to assert this proposition in the common 
and ordinary sense which the words import : for he is asserting the doctrine of absolute 
non-resistance and shewing that the lawfulness 
of the Revolution was no argument against 
it : and why ?, "*Because the king disclaim'd 
the least imputation of resistance, there 
was no such wicked ingredient as resistance 
in it ; no other answer would have, serv'd 
him, and therefore it can never be supposed 
that he meant to clear the king from any 
design of conquest, or intended to say any. 
thing in vindication of his majesty upon 
that head. " - S. T., xv, 106-106. 
53, Lechmere, for the prosecution, said : 
"My Lords, the necessary means (which 
is the, phrase us'd by the Commons in the 
first article) are words made choice of 
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by them with the greatest caution... The 
Commons, who will never be unmindful of 
the allegiance of the subjects to the 
crown of this realm, judg'd it highly 
incumbent upon them, out of regard to the 
safety of her majesty's person and govern- 
ment, and the ancient legal constitution 
of this kingdom, to call that resistance 
the necessary means; thereby plainly found- 
ing that power and right of resistunce, 
which was exercised by the people at"the 
time of the happy Revolution, and which 
the duties of self-preservation and reli- 
gion call'd them to, upon the necessity 
of the case. " - S. T., xv, 60. 
Jek 1l said : 
"It id far from the intent of the Com- 
mons to state the limits and bounds of the 
subject's submission to the-sovereign. That 
which the law hath been wisely silent in, 
the Commons desire to be silent in too: nor 
will they put any case of a justifiable 
resistance, but that of the Revolution only". 
- S. T., xv, 97. 
Sir John Holland made the same admission : 
"Iy Lords, the Commons would not be 
understood, as if they were pleading for a 
licentious resistance- as if subjects were, 
left to their good will and pleasure, when 
they are to obey, and when to resist. No, 
my Lords, they know they are obliged by all 
the ties of social creatures, and Christians, 
for wrath and conscience sake to submit to 
their sovereign. The Commons do not abet 
humoursome factious arms. They aver 'em to 
be rebellious. But yet they maintain, that 
that resistance at the Revolution, which 
was so necessary, was lawful and just from 
that necessity. 
"Vie do agree that the laws concerning 
obedience, both human and divine are very 
express and positive; and no wonder that the 
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Homilies and Fathers, dead and living, 
follow the same way of expressing our 
duty in general terms. We readily grant 
this, but it does not follow that there 
can be no exceptions from the general 
rules in conscience. " - S. T., xv, 111. 
Robert Walpole likewise refused to enun- 
ciate a general doctrine of resistance : 
"Resistance, " he said, "is no where 
enacted to be legal, but subjected by all 
the laws now in being, to the greatest 
penalties; 'tis what is not, cannot, nor 
ought ever to be describ'd, or affirm'd, 
in any positive law, to be excusable: when, 
and upon what never to be. expected occasions, 
it may be exercised, no man can foresee: and 
ought never to be thought ofq but when an 
utter subversion of the laws of the realm 
threatens the whole frame of a constitution, 
and no redress can otherwise be hoped for. 
It therefore does, and ought for ever to 
stand in the eye and letter of the law, as 
the highest offence. " - S. T., xv, 115. 
54. "And the doctor's refusing " said Sir John 
Hawles, "to obey that implicit law is the 
reason for which he is now prosecuted, tho' 
he would have it. 'believ'd that the reason 
he is now prosecuted was for the doctrine 
he asserted of obedience to the supreme 
power, which he might have preach'd as long. 
as he had pleas'd, and the Commons would 
have taken no offence at its if he had 
stop'd there, and not have taken upon him- 
self, on that pretence or occasion to have 
cast odious colours upon the Revolution. " - 
S. T., xv, 120. 
55, "'Twas insisted, on the first day... that he 
had expressly affirm'd, that the Revolution. 
was not such a case-as ought to be excepted 
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out , of the general rule. This 'I deny: if 
such an expression can be found in the 
doctor's sermon, I shall think no punish- 
ment too great for him. 'Tis one thing tx- 
pressly to affirm the Revolution is such 
"a case as ought not to be excepted out of 
the general rule, and another thing, not 
to make the exception. The Apostle, who 
in general terms enjoins the duties of 
obedience and non-resistance to the higher 
powers, makes no exception when he lays 
down those precepts; nor on the other side 
does he say, no such case can ever happen, 
wherein obedience is not to be paid, or 
resistance not to be made. He is silent in 
the matter; and the doctor's expression, 
in this case, is agreeable with that of the 
Apostle'" - S. T., xv, 200. 
Harcourt, a little later in his speech, 
said : "The general rule ought always to 
pressed, but the exceptions of extraordinary 
cases, of cases of necessity, are never 
particularly to be stated. To point out 
every such case. before-hand is as'impossible, 
as: it is for a man in his senses not to 
perceive plainly when such a case happens. " - Ibid., 201. 
56. "To aggravate m$i guilt, " Sacheverell com- 
plained, "I have been accus'd not only for 
what I am suppos'd to have said, but for 
what I hm--allow'd not to have said: not only 
for what I have taken notice of in ray ser- 
mons, but fot what I have pass'd by unob- 
serv'd: I have been charg'd with negative 
crimes; as if what I omitted to say had 
been omitted with design, and my silence it 
self were criminal. " - S. T., xv, 346. 
57. In his reply to the case for the defence, 
Jekyll unfairly blamed Sacheverell for not 
excepting the Revolution from his general. 
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doctrine. "Is there no difference between 
a divines mooting and putting cases of 
lawful resistance, and excepting the 
resistance at the Revolution out. of the 
general rule of the illegality of. resis- 
tance ?" He admitted that the House of 
Commons did not call "upon divines to. state 
the cases wherein resistance is lawful, and 
wherein not. A task unfit for any one, and 
more especially for them to meddle with. " - 
S. T., xv, 387. Sacheverell's guilt, there- 
fore, lay evidently in his omission to 
state catagorically that the Revolution was 
the single exception to his doctrine of 
non-resistance. 
If Sacheverell was guilty of not ex-'° r' 
cepting the Revolution, how'did the Commons 
support their contention that Sacheverell 
positively condemned the resistance used 
at the Revolution ? 
58. Parker said : 
"We say, he has stirr'd up her majesty's 
subjects to arms and violence; he says, he 
has declar'd. all resistance unlawful; yes - 
all resistance to the supreme power; but he 
has never declar'd resistance to her 
majesty unlawful. He maintains the utter 
illegality of retistance on arty' pretence 
whatsoever to the supreme power, but no 
where says, that in the supreme power he 
includes her ma, jestyq or that it is illegal 
to resist her. The utter illegality of 
resistance to the supreme power upon any 
pretence whatsoever, her majesty's profess'd 
enemies will come into, and labour for; 
meaning only to condemn the resistance that 
was made against King James the Second, 
which brought about the Revolution, and 
any resistance that shall be made against 
the Pretender, whenever he comes" and Dr 
Sacheverell goes no further. " xv, 
177-8. " 
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59, Coxe in his Memoir of Sir Robert Walpole 
wrote : "To bring Sacheverell to a trial, 
and to distinguish him with an impeach- 
ment, managed in the most solemn manner, 
for a miserable performance, which with- 
out such notice, would speedily have sunk 
into oblivion was an inexcusable degrad- 
ation of the house of commons and affords 
a striking instance of the height of folly 
and infatuation to which the spirit of 
party will carry even the wisest of men. " 
(1798) i) p. 24. 
Lord John Russell wrote : "It must be 
owned, however, that the Whigs gave a 
handle to the designs of their enemies. 
The trial of Dr Sacheverell was needless 
and imprudent. Under an established gov- 
ernment it was not exceedingly wise to 
proclaim aloud the doctrine of resistance 
nor could there be any great danger in 
leaving a clergyman of no great station 
to vaunt his absurdities unmolested. " - 
An essay on the histo of the England 
government, etc. (1821 p. 146. 
60. Somers was against impeachment. (cf. Swift, 
History of the four last years of the Queen 
in Works) x, p: 24. ) Sunderland and Go ol-ph1n 
favoured it. Godolphin thought that he was 
attacked by Sacheverell under the nickname 
of Volpone. Sacheverell in his sermon had 
said : "In what moving and lively colours 
does the Holy Psalmist paint the crafty 
insidiousness of such wilely Volpones ?" 
(S. T., xv, 90) Walpole in a pamphlet pub- 
anonymously referred to this when he wrote 
that Sacheverell directed his attack against 
"one minister of state in particular, whom 
he was strictly commanded to defame. '' 
(Four letters to a friend in North Britain 
upon the publishing the Tryal of Dr Sach- 
everell. 1? 10) p. 13. ) Bishop Smalr dge 
in an anonymous work noted pertinently : 
) 
/ 
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"It is true in another audience 'twas 
urg'd that 
there 
was an ugly words in the 
sermon; which, tho' most people believed 
was the chief motive of the impeachment, 
was to our surprize, never made any use 
of 
In the tryal. " (The thoughts of a 
country gentleman upon reading Dr Sach- 
everell's tryal. P" 33-) 
If these views are correct, that iss 
that the impeachment was suggested by 
personal and party animosities rather. 
than by a sincere desire to vindicate the 
doctrine of resistance, they may partly 
explain the weakness of the prosecution's 
case. 
61. "Twas a scurvy mischance that you 
stumbl'd upon him, 
But a worse to you Whigs that you could 
not o'er-run him: 
Since it shew'd You too weak in the height, 
of your glory, 
To grapple with. one bold honest priest of 
a Tory. -"", ,7 ..... . 
But, alas, what a railing and raving you 
make 
Now you find yourselves cramp'd by your 
foolish mistkke, 
And confounded at once, by your building 
awry, 
republican babel you carry'd too 
high. " 
- The new revolution; or the Whigs turned 
Jacobites. (1710). pp. 2-j. 
1! 
62.. "For my part I. am amaz'd to see man scruple 
the submitting to the present king; for 
if ever man had a just cause of war, he 
had; and that creates a right to the thing 
gained by it: the king by withdrawing and 
disbanding his army, yielded him the throne; 
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and if he had, without any more ceremony 
ascended it, he had done no more than all 
other princes do on the like occasions. " - 
History of the desertion. (l689)..: s. T. Wm. 
III9 ig p. 989 
63. Burnet's attitude to the conquest school 
creates a perplexing problem. In parliament 
he was accused of being "the inventor of the 
notion of their majesties being conquerors 
which he had first of all published in his 
Pastoral letter. " It was carried by 162 
votes against 155 "that the said Pastoral 
letter should be burnt by the common hangman. ", 
Parl. Hist., v, 756. Jan. 21,1693" 
But Burnet, in his History, says: "A 
notion was started, which by its agreement 
with their other principles [non-resistance 
doctrine held by. the clergy] had a great 
effect among them, and brought off the great- 
est number of those who came in honestly to 
the new government. " - Hist. -, iii, p. 2. 
But Burnet did not approve of the theory. 
"This might have been made use of more justly, 
if the prince had assumed the kingship to 
himself, upon king James's withdrawing; but 
did not seem to belong to the present case. " - Hist., iii, p. 384. 
Samuel Johnson attacked Burnet's theory in 
his Notes on the phoenix edition of the Pas- 
toral letter (1694) and in other works such 
as An argument proving, etc. 
64. Samuel Johnson's answer to this argument was: 
"I know it; He can make them a new world on 
purpose for them, or take the forfeiture of 
the old, and dispose of His own creation as 
He pleases: but then it must appear to be 
His Will, and He must send a new revelation 
into the world along with such a highly fav- 
our'd prince, to every man that is to be his 
/1 
65. 
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subject. For I am not bound to do what 
God would have me do, till I can certainly 
know that He would have me do it. Promul- 
gation is of the essence of law. ". - An 
ar en proving, etc. in Works (1710Y, 
pp. 262-3.0 
"A false and dangerous notion, and most 
justly condemned. The prince of Orange 
came over by invitation from the body of 
the nation -expressed or implied; had 
no other right to do it, and whatever was 
done against king James and for the 
prince and princess of 
Orange, 
was, in 
fact (and could have had no other found- 
ation of justice) done in virtue only of 
the rights of the people. No act of a 
king of this country, be the act what itt 
will, can transfer or be the cause of 
transferring the crown to any other per-, 
son, no not even to the heir apparent, 
without the consent of the people, 
properly given. The interest of gov- 
ernment is theirs. Sovereigns are the 
trustees of it, and can forfeit only to 
those who have entrusted them nor can 
conquest of itself give any right to 
government: the e must be a subsequent 
acquiescence, or composition, on the 
part of the people for it, and that 
implies compact. If this be so with 
regard to the conquest of a whole 
nation' it is more strongly that, 
when the conquest is over the king 
only of a country, and the war not 
against the kingdom" (Burnet's H istory, 





66, Defoe in 1705 said: "The University 
that burnt books separating person 
and power should now burn books making, 
a distinction between de jure and de 
facto king. " - Jure diving, p. viii. 
Toland wrote: "Everyone. sees how, 
impossible 'tis to coin a distinction 
that can in the least excuse High-Church 
from perjury in swearing to bear. true 
allegiance to K. William, while they, 
thought K. James had neither parted 
with nor could forfeit the right he 
had to their true allegiance - Yet 
this oath they broke thro like a cob- 
web, by the distinction of de jure and 
de facto: and no doubt applauded them- 
selves for having found out such a happy 
expedient, as gave them all the protect- 
ion and advantages of the government and, " 
yet left them at liberty to oppose it. " - 
Jacobitism, 
_ p rjury and 
Popery of High- 
Church priests. (1710), pp. 4-5. 
67. In the addresses to Anne on her acces- 
sion such phrases as these were normal - "to the imperial crown and throne of your 
renowned. and famous ancestors by an un- 
doubted rightful fand lawful succession" ; 
"descended from the blood royal in the 
right line" ; "by lineal descent. " Her 
parliamentary title was sometimes mention- 
ed but only after her hereditary one. 
See the addresses of the Bishop of Durham, 
Bishop of Norwich, Dr Wake, County of 
Somerset, Oxford, Westbury, Carlisle, 
Gloucester, etc., etc. 
Cf. also A true defence of H. Sachev- 
G1 GÜ YYa ýr iVý. d iah ' 
(1710), PP" 9-10.,. 
A 
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68. "The restless endeavours'of the modern 
Highfliers to revive and assert the exploded 
notions of passive obedience, non-resistance 
and that princes are jure divino, were never 
more strenuously asserted than now; ... for 
could they imprint this foolish notion, which 
they did not believe themselves, upon the minds 
of the people it might be a good preparitive 
for the reception of the Pretender. " - The 
judgment of K; James the First and'King Charles 
the First against non-resistance, etc. Pre- 
face, p. 3. 
69. Leslie said : It is observable that in all the 
last reign, they gave the Pretender no'other 
name but that of Perkin and Impostor. But now 
Observators, Reviews and all are turn'd about 
and plead for his birth 'and own it. What their 
meaning is in this, I leave to themselves to 
explain for I make no innuendoes. ". - Good old 
cause (1710), p. 7. 
70. It had been argued in the Convention that 
James had lost his personal right to be king, 
but there was no definite ruling that James 
could not transmit his right. This was why 
the Convention adopted the argument of 'haeres 
non viventis' put forward by Serjeant Maynard. 
(see above p. 94. ) But in 1702 James was dead 
and consequently by Maynard's own argument, 
could have an her. And that heir, excluding 
James, was Anne. 
71. Robert . Ferguson, writing 
before the Convention.. 
met said: "The disposal of the crown being 
fallen to the people by a cess and devolution; 
the supcession unto it is not to be governed 
by proximity of blood, but by weighing what is 
most expedient for the benefit of the community 
... The pretence of, divine right of-succession, 
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which had almost destroyed us of late 
will by this means stand for ever branded 
and condemned ... We shall thereby foreclose 
all claim to the crown arising by the plea 
and pretence of an immediate successor and 
a next heir; for by'the exclusion of all 
right: to the sovereignty in way of descent, 
there is no room left for any to challenge 
a title to the government upon that bottom 
and foundation. " -A brief itification, etc. 
S. T. Wm. III, i, pp. 145-7. 
72, Cf. "If the king do manifestly separate his 
person from and engage it against his crown 
and'dignity so that we cannot defend them 
both ... none can be bound by this, or any 
other oath, to defend the king's person, in 
attempts so contrary to the very reason and 
end. of all government, with the neglect of 
the other part of our duty which is to defend 
his crown and dignity ... If any should imag- ine, that the oath will not suffer us to con- 
sider the person and crown of the king thus 
divided, but that it binds us to assist and 
defend them togg her: 'tis true, while they 
are kept together. But if the king himself 
divide them and 'tis become impossible for us 
to assist his person but we must betray his 
crown; nor defend his crown without forbsar- 
ing to assist his person, to say we are bound 
to assist and defend both makes a plain 
repugnancy in the oath and} in our duty (to 
do and not to do the same thing) and conse- 
quently the obligation ceatheth. " - Obedience 
due to the resent-king .notwithstanding' r oaths to the-form er. (1689) Som. T. 0 xt pp. 297-8. 
"Nor can a man declare it to be a traiterous 
position in some cases ... to take up arms 
by the king's authority against his person. ". - 
A resolution of certain queries concerning 
submission to the gove= . S. T. Wm. III, i, 
p. 4 0. 
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"The oath could certainly have no further 
obligation to him when he had divested him- 
self of his kingly power, by destroying that 
very government whereby and in which he was 
king, so did the declaration about taking 
up arms upon no pretence against the king fall 
with them. That declaration, every one will 
grant me, was made for the preservation of the 
government which the late king took such inde- 
fatigable care to destroy. " -A letter to a 
bishop concerning the present settlement, and 
the new oaths. Som. Tog ixe p. 377. 
"But in the way of the passive doctrine to 
prostitute the lives and liberties of the 
people of England to the will of the prince 
is treason against the realm, and higher 
treason than the high-treason against the 
prince. " - Johnson, Notes on the phoenix ed- 
ition of the Pastoral letter (1694), p. 30. 
"The keeping our allegiance to King James's 
. person would have perjured us; for we owed 
a higher duty to our country and laws to 
which he was sworn as well as we. " - 
Ibid., 
p" 36.1 
If the king endeavour to subvert the consti- 
tution the people must resist the king in de- 
fence of the. government. " - Resistance and non- 
resistance stated and decided. 1710), 
_p. 
13. 
A pamphleteer said that if the prince shall 
attempt to destroy the government every one 
who refuses to defend it is felo de so. These 
people betray the government. - St Paul and her 
majejty vindicated etc. (1710) 2nd ed. ý p. 
Defoe asked if James's power, person or office 
was fought against at the Battle of the Boyne. 
This question was irrelevant, for, as a Tory 
who chug to non-resistance and the abdication 
interpretation of the Revolution pointed out, 
James at that battle was no longer king in any 
case. See A true defence of H. Sacheverell. D. D. 
1710), P" . 
,- ___ 
/ 
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73. "The public power of all society is above 
every soul contained in the same society, and 
the principle use of that power is to give 
laws unto all that are under it. " - Hooker 
Ecclesiastical polity Bk. I chap. xvi, 
Cited by Locke, Second Treatise, 9 90. 
"Obedience is due to government, and not to 
the person that governs, but upon the account 
and for the sake of it; otherwise people might 
be oblig'd to pay allegiance to a king after 
he had resign'd his regal office. It is im- 
possible for a king to lose his government, and 
not lose the allegiance of his subjects because 
they are relatives; and according to all relat- 
ives, one cannot subsist without the other. " 
Tindal, An essay concerning obedience to the 
supreme powerss etc. (1694) S. T. Wm. III, iiy 
p" 437- 
"I don't doubt but to satisfy you that the 
government may be so distinguished from gover- 
our, as to reconcile resisting the one, with 
non-resisting the other. " - Resistance and 
non-resistance stated and-decide d 1710 ' p. 12. 
74. "In our constitution, he that does not govern 
by law, does not overn at all and he that 
does not, nor will not govern at all, cannot, 
nor will not be king, but ceases to be such 
from the time he makes his own will, on his 
civil counsellors advices, the rule of his 
government, and not the laws. " - Comber, A 
letter to a bishop concerning the presentset- 
tlement,. and the new oaths (lb89)' Som. T. _-71i xe 
P-. 377. 
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"The measure of our government is acknow- 
ledged to be by-law. " - Doctrine of pa ive 
obedience and jure diving proved. $) 
S. T. 1 m. it p. 366. 
"The prince is bound by the laws. " - 
Ibid., p. 369. 
"They have left nothing to the king's private 
discretion, much less to his arbitrary will, 
but have assign'd him the laws as the rules. and 
measures he is to govern :b ."- Ferguson, A brief justif ca , etc. 
(1689) 
S. T. WmIII,, 
i, P-. 138- 
"Government according to law is essential to.. 
our government, otherwise our lawyers ä. re 
much out that generally tell us our govern- 
ment is a legal, regal, or as Fortescue, 
a political government in opposition to a 
despotical, absolute arbitrary or tyrannical 
government. " - Fullwood, "! igreemen betwixt 
the present and former governments (1689) 
S. T. Wm. III, i, p. 419. 
"Our monarchy is not absolute and unlimited 
... the law is the stated rule and measure 
of our government. " - Masters, The case of 
allegiance considered (1689) S. T. Wm. III, i, 
p. 322.4 
"Our happiness then consists of this, that 
our princes are tied up to the law as well as 
we, and upon especial account obliged to keep 
it up to its full face, because if they des- 
troyed the law, they destroyed at the same 
time themselves, by overthrowing the Very 
foundation of their kingly grandeur and regal 
power. So that our government not being ar- 
bitrary, but legal, not absolute, but polit, 
ical our princes can never become arbitrary, 
absoiute or tyrants, without forfeiting at .. 
1 
i 
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the same time their royal character Iby 
breach of the essential conditions of their 
regal power, which are to act according to 
the ancient customs and standing laws of the 
nation. " -A vindication of the late pro- 
ceedings-of the Parliament of England etc. 
[By Lord Somers? ] Som. T. j xq p. 263. 
"All kings and princes are, and ought to be 
bound by the laws, and are not exempted from 
them: and this doctrine ought to be incul- 
cated into the minds of princes from their 
infancy. " - Political aphorisms (1690) S. T., 
Wm. III i, p. 399" 
"Kings ought to be subject to their king- 
dom's laws. " - Ibid., p. 394. 
"The. crown... limited by those laws... the ex- 
ecutive acknowledging the just superiority 
of the law. " - Defoe, jure diving: a satyr., (1706) p. vi. 01 
75. Hoadly in his St. Paul's behaviour towards the 
civil magistrate 08) expounded the rule 
of law. Let us learn from St Paul, he said, 
that "the laws of the Roman state were above 
the executive power; and, that the authority 
of the magistrate.. could not make that law which 
was against the written laws; ox1 oblige him 
to comply with what was injurious to his civil 
privileges. " The king is merely the executive 
and he must be governed by the same laws as 
the subject. If we embrace the notion of ab- 
solute power with the will of the executive 
above law "what must we think of the envied, 
constitution under which we live and by the 
virtue and power of laws all enjoy 
the 
chief 
happiness that humane lire can wish for? What 
must we think of that Revolution in which high 
and löw so unanimously joyn'd chiefly to res- 
cue our -laws from a dispensing power; and to 
divest the executive from all pretence to a 
superiority over the legislature? And what 
mtiat weäthink of these magistrates whom the. 
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present age beholds with veneration... who, 
tho commissioned by the supreme executive 
power yet acknowledge no rule of their 
conduct but what is prescribed to them by 
the legislature? " Hoadly's concluding 
words are : "Let our government by laws be 
the chief object of our wordly concerns. " 
The law is superior to the will of the king, 
said a pamphleteer "and therefore to say 
here in England that the king is unaccount- 
able to his subjects is stuff. "'- St Paul 
and her majesty vindicated. (1710) pp. 39 5. 
76. In the Declaration of Nottingham, 1688, it 
was stated that to resist a king governing by 
law was owned to be rebellion, but if the 
prince, makes his own will the law, "to re- 
sist such a one, we justly esteem no rebellion 
but a necessary defence. " - Cited by Ridpath 
The peril of'being zealously affected but not 
well. (1709) -P-. -10; 
A monarch observing the laws must not be 
resisted - The doctrine of passive obedience 
and diving disproved. (1689) S. T. Wm. III, 
it pNon-resistance 
applied to a king governing 
by law. That doctrine "was intended for the 
security of, and was made to a king govern- 
ing by law and therefore did not concern the 
late king from the hour he set up his own 
will against the laws. " - Comber, A letter to 
a bishop concerni e present settlement 
and the new oaths. 1 9) Som. T. ix, p. 377. 
Masters said that we must distinguish be- 
tween maladministration and illegal administrat- 
ion. For the former= the'king can be pro- 
ceeded against only judicially. For the latter 
the people may resist, and "subjects will be 
excused before God for defending themselves. " - 
The case of allegiance considered. (1689) 
S. T. Wm. III, i p. 324. 
The king fl is safe and ' impregnable while 
circumscrib d by law. " - Plain : ng h, etc. 
(1691) 'S. T. Wm. III ii, p. 182. 
A writer in 1710 ` defending the doctrine of 
resistance, said that the'executive was sole- 
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ly in the Queen. and "an Hoadleian doththere- 
fore, believe, that whosoever doth. resist 
this executive power he shall receive to 
himself damnation; and so therein doth 
acknowledge that the authority (that is) the 
legal power of the crown ought not to be re- 
sisted in any case whatsoever. " - Chuse which 
you please, etc. (1710) p. 4. 
Another Whig, writing in the same year, 
said he challenged anyone "to name any one 
Whig who ever denied it to be a damnable sin 
to resist lawful and just government and gov- 
ernors. " -A vindication of the faults on 
both sides. 1710) p. 37. 
"No man ever yet affirm'd that the. Queen's 
authority lawfully exercis'd 
Is 
resistable 
on the contrary "they whom you 
LSacheverell] 
deny to be genuine sons of the Church say, it 
is damnable to resist the authority of the 
prince acting according to the laws. " - Some 
short remarks ... in a letter to Dr S. M-L-G. E, [Smalridge]. (1711) p. 12. 
"It is in vain to object Rom. xiii, 29 
Whosoever therefore resisteth the power, re- 
sisteth the ordinance of God, and they that 
resisteth shall receive to themselves damnation; 
for that relates only to magistrates governing 
according to law. " - Parliamentary right main- 
tain'd, etc. (17,14) p. 35. 
77. Sherlock, before he took the oaths, wrote: 
"If the government be dissolved, and honour 
and property dissolved with them, and then I 
doubt the mobile will come in for their share 
in the new divisions of lands, and set up 
for men of as good quality as anyjýfor if our 
laws are gone, we return to a state of nature , in which all men are equals and all things 
common; this I believe you will not be for. " - 
A letter to a member of the Convention. (1688) 
Som: T. 9 x, p. 169. 
Cf. "But now, how contrary is this to those 
new models which some politick arähitects-are 
proposing to -or rather imposing upon the 
nation? Would they reduce tos to a state of 
nature, wherein the people are at liberty to, 
,) 
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agree upon any government, or none at all? 
They will have to abolish monarchy, episco- 
pacy and all fundamental laws established by 
Magna Carta and all successive parliaments. ' - 
Reflections upon our late and present ro- 
ceedings in England. Som. T., x, p. 180. 
78, "And to speak freely; the whole solemnity 
of the coronation appears to carry in it 
evident marks of consent and stipulation. ", - 
Some considerations touching succession and 
allegiance. k1689) S. T. Wm. III iý P" 336. 
It was easy, said Peter Ailix, to con- 
vince any rational man. that there was an 
original contract between the king and the 
people merely by reminding him of the coro- 
nation oath and the oath of allegiance which 
are "the real seal of that original contract, " 
An examination of the scruples of those who 
refuse to take the oath of allegiance. (1-689) 
S. T. Wm. III iq p. 302. 
This, too, was Samuel Johnsons's view of 
the contract. The "contract is still contin- 
ued in the coronatio1 oath and the oath of 
allegiance. It - An argumen proving, etc. 
(1692) in Works T. 276- 
The whole of the Bill of Rights was often 
regarded as a renewal of the original contract. 
In the debates on the Abjuration Bill, April, 
1690 Lord Digby said: "The foundation of the 
government is the Bill of Rights: wherein the 
king promises his part, etc. and we swear 
fealty. This is our original contract: if 
there be any, I am of opinion that is it. " - 
Grey's Debates, x, p. 75" 
Ridpath took the same view. See his The 
peril of being zealously affected u nom 
well, etc. (1709) pý . 6_1 
Macaulay calls the Bill of Rights, "this 
great contract between *the governors and the 
governed, this titledeed by which the_ king . held his throne and the people their liberties. " 
- Hist., rviv, p. 
1663- -- ,- 
) / 
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79. - "The idea that allegiance constituted a 
mutual tie to which either party could put 
an end leaves its traces even in English 
history If, in fact, this solemn notice 
[diffidatio] that allegiance had been 
renounced was given, the levying of vwar 
against the king was probably not, treason 
till Edward III's statute. Even were that 
statute a conspiracy to levy war was no 
treason. When Edward II and Richard II were 
deposed, there were no such theoretical dif- 
ficulties-as were felt . in 1688. " - Holdsworth History of English law. 3rd ed. iii, pp. 461-ý. 
In view of these changes between the con- 
ditions mentioned above, and Coke's time, we 
, can appreciate why thinkers after 1689 usually 
appealed to-the mediaeval period. On the 
reference to the deposition of Edward II and 
Richard III cf. above, p. 110. 
80. "Tis upon this account affirmed of an Eng- 
lish king, that. he can do no wrong, because 
he can do nothing but the law empowers 
him. " -A brief justification. S. T. Wm. III,, 
i, p. 138. 
Burnet said that some quoted the maxim to 
prove that Jamee"'s ministers and not James 
should have been punished. "To all which", 
he said, "this is to be answered, that the 
maxim The king can do no wrong is perverted 
to a sense very different from that which 
was at first intended by it, for the meaning 
of it is only this, that the king's power 
cannot go so far as to support him in the 
doing of any injustice, or wrong. " - An en. 
quiry into the present state of affair 
S. T. Wm. III, is p. 131. 
"That the kings of England can do nothing 
as kings, but what, of right, they ought to 
do:, that the. king can do no wrong", etc. - Shower, A letter to a convocation man, (1697) 
P- 31" 
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"This I take to be the foundation of that 
saying The King can do no wrong; that iss 
he has no right invested in him to wrong 
any man, but is oblig'd by law as well as 
conscience, to govern and conform himself 
to the laws of his kingdom. " - The'liberties. 
of England asserted, etc. (1714 p. 7. 
81. "We have a maxim in law, That the king can 
do no wrong, because he-is suppos'd to do 
all things by his ministers. " Although 
-- this writer takes this interpretation, 
nevertheless he is compelled to make the 
king responsible. The king may be resisted 
when he "shall chuse such ministers as will 
act against the laws, and defend them 
therein. " -A resolution of certain queries, 
etc. (1689) S. T. WVm. III, it p. 447. 
"Tis presumed he can do; no wrong... If 
the king has erred... in God's name let his 
ministers be called to account. " - Reflections 
upon our late and present proceedin s in F- 
land. (1689) Som. T., ' xq p. 182* 
"The unaccountable king was dethroned, but 
his accountable ministers continued in play. " 
- Defoe, Jure diving (1706) p. iv. Defoe, of 
course, was sarcastic. 
Burnet seems to have changed his views. In 
an undelivered speech on the Treaty of 'Ut- 
recht, he wrote : "I am sure I have such a 
profound respect for the queen, that no part 
of what I may say can be understood to reflect -, rr 
-on her in any sort: her intentions are, no doubt, as she declares them to be, all for 
the good and happiness of her( people: but 
it is not to be supposed that she can read 
long-treaties, or carry the articles of them 
in her memory: so if things have been either 
concealed from her, or misrepresented to her, 
she can do no wrong: and if any such thing has 
been done, we know on whom our constitution 
lays the blame. " - History, vii p. 1550 
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82. The Observator said that the Test Act ex- 
cluding men from civil and military offices 
was null and void for no act could'preclude 
a king from making use of his subjects. The 
author of The case of the Protestant dissen- 
ters represented and argued took the same 
view. See A letter to a Bishop concerning 
the present settlement, and the new oaths. 
Som. T., ix, P. 376. 
"No human law is binding which is contrary 
to the Scripture or the general law of nat- 
ure. " - Political Aphorisms. (1690)-'S. T., 
Wm. III, i, P" 393. 
Reason, said Defoe, was the test of law. 
"All law or power that is contradictory to 
reason is ipso facto void of itself and 
ought not to be obeyed. " - The original pow- 
er of the collective bd of the peop2g, 
1701) tin Works (1703)9 1, p. 139. 
Stillingfleet practically said the same thing 
by justifying the breach of oath of allegiance 
to James III not on legal grounds but because 
the oath was contrary to public good. 
83. "It has been fatal to favourites, to judges,, 
to Lordso and to kings, and will certainly 
be so even to Parliaments, if they descend 
to abuse the people they represent. " -, Hist 
ory of the Kentish pet ti n. (1701) p. 19. 
"And tho' there are no stated proceedings to 
bring you to your duty, yet the great law of, 
reason. saysq and all nations allow, that 
whatever power is above law is burthensom - 
and tyrannical; and may be reduc'd by extra- 
judicial methods ": you are not above the 
peoples resentments, they that made you mem- 
bers, may reduce youýto the same rank from 
whence they chose you. - Legion a memorial, 
(1701) p. 1. 'r 
i, 
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The people have not only a right to resist 
the king but also the House of Commons and 
House of Lords. - Defoe The original power, 
etc. (1701) in Works (i703)ß it p. 142. 
If the House of Commons act arbitrarily and 
illegally "it is the undoubted right of the 
people of England to call them to an account 
for the same, and by Convention, assembly of 
force may pryceed against them as traitors 
and betraiers of their county. [sic] 
Legion's memorial. (1701) P-39 
"Englishmen are no more to be slaves to 
Parliament than to a king. "''- Ibid., p. 4. 
84, Locke speaks of restraining the exorbitances 
of monarchy by "balancing the power of gov- 
ernment by placing several parts of it in 
different hands. " - Second Treatise. 107. 
"The three several powers vested in the king, 
lords and commons are like three perfect con- 
cords on music, which being exactly tuned to" 
one another, upon proper instruments, make 
admirable harmony; but if you stretch any one 
string, beyond its proper pitch, you put all 
out of tune, and destroy the whole concert. " - 
Mackworth A vin ication of the rights of the 
commons of England. (1701) Some T. q xis p. 285, 
Swift said that it will be an eternal rule 
of politics among every free people that there 
is a balance of power to be carefully preser- 
ved in every state. "A tyrant need not be a 
single man. In fact, if any one of the three. 
constituent powers in the state usurps the 
powers of the two others, it becomes a tyrant. " 
-A discourse of the contests and dissentions_ 
etc. (1701) pp. 5.1 6-9" 
"As all the constituent parts aggregately con- 
sidered, ought to have their cue weight, so 
no one part is to invade the others right. " - Davenant, Esaa yyon peace at home, etc. (1704) 
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"where one of the extremes comes soýfar as 
to overbalance the. other: I cannot see bi t 
the government must die, as it is in nat- 
ural bodies'when one humour is over all 
the rest in too great disproportion. " - 
The British constitution, etc. (1712) p,,! .g 
85. "But to set up a fourth estate, consis- 
ting of the people, with distinct rights, 
and to leave the other three remaining, 
would be a strange sort of government... 
Which part of the constitution was to be 
subordinate to this fourth estate ? Their 
representatives only ? This would hardly 
have proved the case, for we all have seen 
by experience, that when the people get 
the power, they soon lay aside both king 
and lords. " - Davenant, Essays upon peace 
at home, etc. (1704) in Works (1771) 91 iv9- 
p. 292. 
86. Kettlewell wrote : "'Tis true, our Parlia- 
ment are taken into the government and 
have a share in the highest acts, as making 
laws... This share of them in the legislat- 
ion as I conceive, is not a sovereign's 
but a subject's part. They are called 
In 
to consult and with authority to negative 
upon all laws to be imposed on them, which 
is a great security indeed ofýtheir being 
well governed and. bound to nothing but 
what is for their benefit: no law being* 
to be made or repealed without their own 
consent. But this liberty of consulting 
and. authority of negative is still under 
the king the only sovereign: not on equal 
terms with him as two independent sovereigns 
... Theirs is only a subjects part ... and lie alone is supreme both in legislation 
and execution. For our law and church, too, 
fixes all the sovereignty of the realm 
solely in the king. " - Christianity acr ne 
of the crass. (16911, in Works, ii, p. 1 0. 
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87. "Nothing but that-which the king pleases 
to allow of is to pass for law: The 
laws not taking their coercive force 
(as Judicious Hooker well observes) from 
the quality of such as devise them, but 
from the power that giveth them the strength 
of laws. So that, to determine the matter 
logically, the legislative is either large- 
ly and improperly or strictly and properly 
taken: largely taken, it signifies any 
power, which hath the authority to provide 
the materials of a law and to judge what 
is just, convenient or necessary to be en- 
acted: and to-declare when any matters, 
duly prepared are made and granted into 
a law: and this ministerial sort of legis- 
lative power, improperly so called, the 
two houses have and exercise, yet by auth- 
ority from the crown. But then the legis- 
lative power is strictly and properly taken 
for the power of sanction, or. from that com- 
manding, ordaining power which gives life 
and being to the law, and force to oblige 
t1e consciences of the subject: and this is 
radically and incommunicably in the king as 
sovereign. " - Bibliotheca politica, p. 233. 
*ý The quotation is from the Ecclesiastical. 
polity, Bk. I, ch4p.. *, sect. ` 8: "Howbeitg" laws 
do not take their restraining force from the 
quality-as such as devise them, but from the 
power which doth give them the strength of 
laws. " The quotation is misapplied. The 
force, to which Hooker refers, is not the 
king but the consent of the people. For, 
Hooker amplifies thus :, "Laws they are not 
therefore which public approbation hath not 
made so. " 
This passage from Hooker is cited by 
Allix in his An examination of the scruples 
of those who reruse To tiaicu i, rie oazn or aileg- 
i anc e. (1689) He says: "We .. s; e e clearly 
that our judicious Hooker'in his Ecclesias- 





that all civil governments in the world 
are derived from the deliberation, con- 
sultation, and consent of the parties 
concerned, and consequently the power of 
making laws belong to the body of the 
community: and that it is mere tyrrany for 
any prince to arrogate this power of im- 
posing laws, except the same be exercised 
by divine authority or by the authority 
at first'deriv'd from the consent of the 
people. " - S. T. Wm. III, ig p. 311. 
88. "The Lords might advise and the Commons 
petition but the enacting part is only 
in the king. He enacts with their advice, 
not they with his ... Threescore negatives 
cannot make an affirmative. A negative is 
only saying, This shall not be a law. But 
who has power to say, This shall be a law? 
... That is only the king, whose fiat 
stamps the authority of a law upon what the 
three estates have prepared. And if he 
likes it not, he may reject it. " - Jus 
sa___crum, etc. 2nd ed. (1712) p. 40. 
89. ` Tindal, who followed Locke , sa r. this diffi- 
culty, but made,, no attempt to suggest a way 
out. And whoever the, legislators entrust 
... are their ministers 
in putting their 
will, the laws, into execution: to which 
they can have only a precarious right, de-- 
pendent on the pleasure of the legislature, 
except where the executive is lodg'd with 
one without whose consent no law can be 
made. " - Tindal, The rights of the Christian 






There are no modern works on the doctrines of 
resistance and non-resistance for the period 
covered by this study. Numerous books dealing 
with the period have been consulted, but the 
amount of information derived from them iss 
in each case, so small that it would be mis- 
leading to include them in this bibliography. 
Some of them are acknowledged. in the footnotes. 
A few, which are most helpful for the political, 
legal and constitutional background, and for a 
comparative study of the doctrines, are noted 
below. Of the contemporary pamphlets, there are 
literally. thousands which throw light on the 
doctrines, but it is possible t6 give here only 
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(Works, ii, pp. 126-139. ) 
74. ----- The thoughts of an honest Tory, upon 
the present proceedings of that party. In a 
letter to a friend in town. London, l710. 
(Works, is pp. 623-630. ) 
75. ----- The true, genuine Tory-address " to 
-which is added, an explanation of some hard. 
terms now infuse : for the information of all 
such as read, or subscribe, addresses. 
London, l710. 
(Works qis pp. 601-605. 
) 
76. ----- The voice of the addressers: or a 
short comment upon the chief things mdintain'd 
or condemn'd in our late modest addresses. 
London, l710. 
(Works i pp. 606-614. ) 
. 77. Honesty 
the best policy, or the mischiefs 
of faction, shewn in the character of an High 
and a Low-Church clergy-man. London, 1711. 
78. HOBNEY (CHARLES). " The fourth and last part 
of a caveat against the Whiggs, etc. London11712. 
79. HOUSE OF COMMONS. Debates of the House of 
Commons from the year 1667 to the year 1694. 
Collected by... Anchitell Grey, etc. 10 vols. 
"London, 1769. 
80. HUMPHREY (JOHN). Advice before it be too 
late: ors a breviate for the Convention, 
humbly represented to the Lords and Commons 
of England. n. p. 1688. 
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81. ' HUNTON (PHILIP)'. A treatise of monarchy, 
containing two parts. 1. Concerning monarchy 
in general. 2. Concerning" this particular 
monarchy. Also a vindication of the said 
treatise. Done by an earnest desirer of his 
countries peace. London, 1689. 
(Harl. Idisc. vii pp. 296-332. ) 
Originally published in 1643. 
Impartial (An) inquiry into the causes'of the 
present fears and dangers of the overnnent. 
See Warrington (H. Booth, Earl of) 
82. Inquiry (An) into the nature and obligation 
of legal rights : with respect to the popular 
pleas of the late King James's remaining 
right to the crown. London, 1693. 
(S. T. Wm. III, iii pp. 392-412. ) 
83. Jacobite (The) plot ; or, the Church of 
England in no danger, etc. London, 1710, 
Jacobite's (The) hopes revived, etc. See 
Hoadly (B. ) 
Jacobitism (The) I perjury and popery of High- Church priests. See Toland (J. ) 
84. JOHNSON (SAMUEL). The works of the late 
Reverend Mr Samuel Johnson sometime chaplain 
to the Right Honourable William Russell. 
London, 1710. 
85. ----- An argument proving, that the abro- 
gation of King James by the people of England 
from the legal throne and the promotion of the 
Prince of Orange, one - of the royal family was 
according-to the constitution of the English 
governnent, and prescribed by it. In opposition 
to all the false and treacherous hypotheses of 
usurpation, conquest, desertion, and of taking 
the powers that are upon content. 
London, 1692, 
(Works, pp. 259-278. ) 
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86. JOHNSON (SAMUEL). lcontinued. 1Julian the 
Apostate : being a short account of his life : 
the sense of the primitive Christians about his 
succession : and their behaviour towards him. 
Together with a comparison of popery and 
paganism. London, 1682. 
(Works, pp. 1-116. ) 
87. ----- Notes upon the phoenix edition of 
the Pastoral letter [by Bishop Burnet. ) Part 1. 
London, 1694. 
(Works, pp. 294-322. ) 
88. ----- The opinion is this : That resistance 
may be used, in case our religion and rights 
should be invaded. London, 1689. 
(Works, pp. 161-168. ) 
89. ----- Reflections on the History of passive 
obedience [by A. Sellar. ] London, 1689. 
(Works, pp. 253-258. ) 
This was republished in 1710 under the 
title 'An answer to the History of passive 
obedience just now reprinted under the 
title of A defence of Dr Sacheverell. ' 
Judgment (The) of K. James the First, and King 
Charles the First, against non-resistance. 
See Toland (J. ) 
Jure divino :a satyr. See Defoe (D. ) 
90. I! TTLEWELL (JOHN). Christianity, a doctrine 
of the Cross : ors passive obedience, under MW 
pretended invasion of legal rights and liberties, London, 1691. 
'(Works, 1719, iii pp. 141- 191. ) 
King William and Queen Mary conquerors. See 
Blount (CO 
Legion's memorial-to the Commons. - See Defoe (D. ) 
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/ 91. LESLIE (CHARLES). The best answer ever was 
made, and to which no-answer ever will be made 
(not to be behind Mr Hoadly in assurance) in 
answer to his bill of complaint exhibited 
against the Lord Bishop of Exeter for his 
Lordship's sermon peached before her majesty, 
March 89 1708. AdAress'd in a letter to the 
said Mr Hoadly himself. By a student of the 
Temple. London, 1709. 
92. ----- Best of all, being the student's 
thanks to Mr Hoadly, wherein Mr Hoadly's 
second part of his Measures of submission 
--(which he 
intends soon to publish) is fully 
answered, etc. London, 1709. 
93. ----- The good old cause, further dis- 
cussed in a letter to the author of the 
Jacobite's hopes reviv'd. London, l7l0. 
94. ----- A view of the times, their prin- 
ciples and practices ; in the Rehearsal : with 
prefaces and indexes by Philalethes. 6 vols. 
London, 1750. 
Letter (A) from Captain Tom to the niobb, etc. 
See Defoe (D. ) 
Letter (A) to a bishop concerning the present 
settlement, etc. See Comber (T. ) 
95. *Letter (A) to a friend concerning the 
behaviour of Christians under the various 
revolutions of state governments. 
London, 1693. 
(S. T. Wm. III, ii, pp. 159-169. ) 
96. Letter (A) to a friend, occasion'd by the 
contest between the Bishop of Exeter: and Mr 
Hoadly. London, 1709. 
Letter (Ä) to a member of the Convention. 
See Sherlock (W. ) 
'f 
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Letter (A) to Sir -J [acob)B [arks] ... concerning . the late Minehead doctrine, etc. See Benson ('N. ) 
, 97. Letter (A) to the good people of Great 
Britain. London, 1710. 
98. LLOYD" (WILLIAtd). ,A discourse of God's way 
of disposing of kingdoms, etc. London, 1691. 
"99. LOCI (JOHN). The works of John Locke. 
11th. ed., 10 vols.. London, 1812. 
100. ----- Two treatises of government : in the 
former, the false principles and foundations 
of Sir Robert Filmer and his followers are 
detected and overthrown. The latter is an essay 
concerning the true original extent and end of 
civil government. London, 1690. 
(Works, v, pp. 207-406. ) 
101. °LONG (THOMAS). A resolution of certain 
queries concerning submission to the present 
government. By a divine of the Church of Eng- 
land, as by law establist. London, 1689. 
(S. T. Wm. III, ig pp. 439-465. ) 
102. MACMVORTH (SIR HUMPHREY) ."A vindication 
of the rights of the Commons of England. 
(Som. T., xi, pp. 276-315. ) 
103, ILXITTAIRE (MICHAEL). The doctrine of 
passive obedience and non-resistance stated; 
and its consistence with theology, reason 
justice, the Revolution, our laws and policy, 
impartially consider'd. London, l710. 
104. MASTERS (SAMUEL). The case of allegiance 
in our present circumstances considered. In a 
letter from a minister in the city to a minis- 
ter in the country. London, 1689. 
(S. T. Wm. III, ij pp. 318-333. ) 
105, MATHER (JOHN). A sermon preached before 
the University of oxford, at St Mary's on 
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Tuesday, May 29,1705, being the anniversary 
of K. Charles II restoration. Oxford, 1? 05. 
Memorial (The) of the Church of England, etc. 
See-Drake (J. ) 
Memorial (The) of the State of England, etc. 
See Toland (J, ) 
Memorial (A) offered to.... the Princess Sophia, 
etc. See Burnet (G. ) 
106. MILBOURNE (LUKE). Torn of Bedlan' s answer 
to his brother Ben Hoadly, St Peter's-Poor 
parson, near the Exchange of Principles. 
London, 1709. 
Modern (The) fanatick, etc. See Bisset (W. ) 
107. Modest (A) answer to the four immodest 
letters to a friend in North Britain. 
London, 1710. 
108. Modest. (A) inquiry into the causes of the 
present disasters in England. And who they are 
that brought the French fleet into the Channel, 
describ'd. London, 1690. 
(S. T. Wm. III, ii, pp. 95-104. ) 
109. New (The), revölution : ors the Whigs 
turned Jacobites. A poem. London, l710. 
Obedience due to the present king, etc. See 
Whitby (D. ) 
Objections (The) of the non-subscribing London 
clergy, etc. See Swinfen (J. ) 
Opinion (The) is this : That resistance maybe 
used, etc. See Johnson (S. ) 
110. OLDISWORTH (WILLIAM). A vindication of the 
Right Reverend the Lord Bishop of Exeter, 
occasion'd by, Mr Benjamin Hoadly's reflections 
on his Lordship's two sermons of government.,, 
a 
r, 
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March 81 1704 and... March 81 1708, ' 
London, 1709. 
Original (The) power of the collective body 
of the people. See Defoe (D. ) 
111. PARIER (SAMUEL). Religion and loyalty- or, 
a demonstration of the power of the Christian 
church within it self, the supremacy of 
sovereign powers over it, the duty of passive 
obedience... exemplified out of the records of 
the church and empire, from the beginning of 
Christianity to the end of the reign of Julian. 
- London, 1684. 
112. ----- Religion and loyalty. The second 
part, etc. London, 1685. 
Peril (The) of being. zealously affected, but 
not well, etc. See Ridpath (G. ) 
113. Plain English; or an enquiry into the 
causes that have frustrated our expectations 
from the late happy Revolution, and obstructed 
the progress of our affairs, consider'd in 
relatthn to the present conspiracy, and what 
advantages have by the foresaid means been 
given to the enemies of the government. 
(S. T. WM. III, ii, pp. 't77-186. ) 
114. Political aphorisms : or the true maxims 
of government displayed, wherein is likewise 
proved that paternal authority is no absolute 
authority, and that Adam had no such authority, 
that the Protestants in all ages did resist 
their cruel and evil and destructive princes. 
By way of challenge to Dr William Sherlock and 
ten other new dissenters, and recommended to be 
read by all Protestant Jacobites. 
London, 1690. 
(S. T. Wm. IIII ij pp. 386-402. ) 
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115. Prelude (A) to the tryal of skill between. 
Sacheverelisn and the constitution of the mon- 
archy of Great Britain. Occasion'd by the 
printing Dr Sacheverell's Answer to his impeach- 
ment. With reflexions upon the notions of Bishop 
Sanderson, and the deans, Hicks, Sherlock, and 
Atterbury; with other clergy-men who have de- 
parted from the doctrine of the 
Church 
of Eng- 
landl profess'd in queen Elizabeth's days. 
London, 1710. 
116. PRIDZAUX (HUMPHREY). Lette I's.. " to John Ellis, Under Secretary of'State, 1674 - 1722. 
Ed. by E. M. Tho: npson. (Camden Soc. N. S. , 15. ) Westminster, 1875. 
117. Proceedings (The) of the present parlia- 
ment justified by the opinion of the most 
judicious and learned Hugo Grotius ; with con- 
siderations thereupon. Written for the satis- 
faction of some of the learned clergy con- 
cerning the original right of kingto, 
their 
abdication of empire; and the people's insep-+ 
arable right of resistance deposing, and of 
disposing and settling of 
the 
succession of 
the crown. London, 1689. 
, (S. T. WYm. III, il pp. 178-184. ) 
118. Queries to thernew hereditary right men. 
London, 1710. 
Reasons against receiving the Pretender, etc. 
See Hoadly (B. ) 
Reasons (The) of the absenting clergy, etc. 
See Swinfen (J. ) 
119. Reflections upon the late great Revol- 
ution. Written by a lay-hand for the satis- 
faction of some neighbours. London, 1689. 
(S. T. SNrn. III, i, pp. 242-265. ) 
120. Resistance and non-resistance stated and 
decided. ' In a dialogue betwixt a Hotspur- 
High-Flyer, a canting Low-Church man, and 
B--f, censor of Great Britain. London, 1710. 
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Resolution (A) of certain queries concerning 
submission, etc. See Long (T. ) 
121. Revolution (The) no rebellion ; or serious 
reflections ofered to the Reverend Mr Benjamin 
Hoadly; occasion'd by his Considerations on the 
Bishop of Exeter's sermon before her'majesty, 
March 81 1708. By a citizen of London', a lover 
of the present establishment in church and state. 
London, 1703. 
122. RIDPATH (GEORGE). The peril of being 
zealously affected but not well : ors, reflec- 
tions on Dr Sacheverell's sermon, etc. 
London, l? 09. 
123. SACHEVERELL (HENRY). A defence of her 
majesty's title to the crown, and a justi- 
fication of her entring into a war with 
France and Spain as it was deliver'd in a sermon 
preach'd before 
the University of Oxford, June 
10,1702, etc. Oxford, 1702. 
----- 2nd. ed. London, 1710. 
124. ----- The perils of false brethren both in 
church and state : set forth in a sermon before 
the... Lord Mayor, Aldermen, and citizens of 
London at the Cathedral-Church of St Paul, 
Nov. 5,1709, London, 1709. 
(S. T., xv, 69-95. ) 
125. St Paul and her majesty vindicated in 
proving from the apostles own words, Rom. xiii, 
that the doctrine of non-resistance as com- 
monly taught, is none of his. London, l710. 
126.. SELI IR (ABEGNEGO). The history of passive 
obedience since the Reformation : taken from 
the authentick writings of the greatest doctors 
of the Church of England : in two parts. To 
which is added, an appendix containing the 
opinions of the most eminent divines of the 
Churches of Scotland and Ireland in the same 
point. 5 parts. Amsterdam, 1688.90. 
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127. SHERLOCK (WILLIAM). The case of allegiance 
due to sovereign powers stated and resolved 
according to Scripture and reason, and the 
principles of the Church of England ; with a 
more particular respect to the oath -lately 
en. oyned, of allegiance to their present 
ma, 7esties K. William and Q. Mary. s 
London, 1691. 
128. ----- A letter to a member of the Con- 
vention. London, 1688. 
(Soin. T., x, pp. 185-190. ) 
129. ----- Their present majesties govern- 
ment proved to be thoroughly settled, and that 
weýmay submit to it, without asserting the 
principles of Mr Hobbs, shewing also that 
allegiance was not due to the usurpers after 
the. late Civil War. Occasion'd by some late 
pamphlets against... Dr Sherlock. 
London, 1691. 
130. ----- A vindication of the Case of 
allegiance due to sovereign powers : in reply 
to an Answer to a late pamphlet, intituled 
"Obedience and submission to the present 
government, demonstrated from Bishop Overall's 
convocation book. With a postscript, in 
answer to Dr*Sherlock's Case of allegiance. 
." London, 1691. 
"131. SMALRIDGE (GEORGE). The thoughts of a 
country gentleman upon reading Dr Sacheverell's 
tryal in a letter to a friend. London, 1710. 
Some considerations touching succession and 
'allegiance. See Allix (P. ) 
132. SOMERS (JOHN SOMERS, Lord). A collection 
of scarce and valuable tracts, etc. 2nd, ed. 
revised -augmented and arranged by W. Scott. 
13 vols. London, 1809-15. 
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(SIR RICHARD). The crisis : or 
representing. the just causes 
happy Revolution and the several 
of the crowns of England and 
her majesty... With some season- 
on the danger of a Popish 
London, 1714. 
134, STILLINGFLEET(8DWARD). The case of an oath 
of abjuration considered; and the vote of the... 
Houses of Commons vindicated, in a letter to 
a friend. London, 1693. 
135. ----- A discourse concerning the unreason- 
ableness of a new separation on account of the 
oaths. With an answer to the History of passive 
obedience so far as relates to them. 
London, 1689. 
(S. T. Wm. IIIý 1, pp. 598-614. ) 
136. ----- A vindication of their majesties 
authority to fill the sees of the deprived,, 
bishops. In a letter out of the country, 
occasioned by Dr B ---s refusal of the 
bishopric of Bath and Wells. London, 1691. 
(S. T. WWm. III, ij pp. 635-639. ) 
137. Submissive (A) answer to Mr Hoa. d], y's 
Humbly reply to my Lord Bishop of Exeter., 
-'" London , 1709. 
138, SWIFT (JONATHAN). The prose works of 
Jonathan Swift. Ed. by, T Scott. With a bio- 
graphical introduction by V7. E. H. Lecky. 
12 vols. (Bohn's standard library. ) 
London, 1898-1911. 
139. ----- A discourse of the contests and dissentions between the nobles and commons in 
Athens and Rome, with the consequences they 
had upon both those states. London, 1701. 
(Works, i, pp. 228-270. ) 
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140. SWIFT (JONATHAN). (continued. lThe Examiner. 
(Swift's contributions are in Works, ixe pp. 
67-299. ) 
141., ----- The public spirits of the Whigs, 
set forth in their generous encouragement of 
the author of the Crisis, with some obser- 
vations on the seasonableness, candour, 
erudition, and style of that treatise. 
London, 1714. 
(Works , 
142. ----- The sentiments of a Church of 
England man with respect to religion and 
government. [Written in the year 1708. 'Probably 
appeared for the first time in Miscellanies 
in prose and verse, 1711. ] 
(Works, iii, pp. 49-75. ) 
143. SVWINFEN (JOHN). The objections of the 
non-subscribing London clergy, against the 
Address from the Bishop of. London and the clergy 
of* London and Westminster printed in the Gazette. 
of Thursday, Aug. 22,1710. Humbly offer'd in 
a letter from a clergy-man in London to a mem- 
ber of parliament in the country. By the author 
of the Reasons of the absenting clergy. 
London, 1710. 
144. ----- Reasons bf the absenting clergy for not appearing at St Pauls on Monday, Aug. 
21t 1710 when the Address from the Bishop and 
clergy of London was propos'd and sign'd, etc. 
London, 1710. 
Their present majesties government proved to 
thoroughly settled, etc. See Sherlock (W. ) 
Thoughts (The) of a country gentleman upon 
reading Dr Sacheverell's tryal. See Stnalridge 
(G. ) 
Thoughts (The) of an honest Tory, etc. See 
Hoadly (B. ) 
..., 
APPENDIX SI 463 
// 
145. TILLY (WILLIAM). A return to our former 
good old principles and practice, the only way 
to restore and preserve our peace :a sermon 
preach'd before the University of Oxford... 
May the 14th., 1710... Mith a letter to Dr 
Sacheverell. London, 1710. 
146. TINDAL (MATTHEW). An essay concerning 
obedience to the supreme powers and the duty 
of subjects in all revolutionst with some 
considerations touching the present juncture 
of affairs. London11694. 
(S. T. Wm. III, ii, pp. 431-461. ) 
147. ----- An essay concerning the laws of 
nations, and the rights of sovereigns. 
London, 1694. 
(S. T. Wm. III, Jig pp. 462-475. ) 
148. TOLAND (JOHN). Anglia liberal or the 
limitations and succession of the crown of 
England explained and asserted : as grounded 
on his majesty's speech, the proceedings of 
parliament, the desires of the people, the 
safety of our religion, the nature of our 
constitution, the balance of Europe and the rights 
of mankind. Londonll`101. 
149. ----- Jacobitism, perjury and popery of High-Church priests: " London, 1710. 
150. ----- The judgment of K. James the First 
and King Charles the First against non-resis- 
tance discover'd by their ovm letters and now 
offend to the consideration of Dr Sacheverell 
and his party. London, 1710. 
151. ------ The memorial of the State of England 
in vindication of the queen, the church and the 
administration design'd to rectify the mutual 
mistakes- of Protestants and tqýnite their 
affections in defence of our religion and 
liberty. London, 1705. 
(Som. T., xii, pp. 526-574. ) 
I 
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Tom of Bedlam's answer to his brother Ben 
Hoadly. See Milbourne (L. ) 
152. TRAPP (JOSEPH). The character and prin- 
ciples of the present set of Whigs. 
London, 1711. 
Treatise (A) of'monarchyl etc. See Hunton (P. ) 
153, True (A) defence of Henry Sacheverell, 
D. D. in a letter to Mr D---n. By L. M. N. O. 
London, 1710. 
154. True (The) genuine modern Whig address. 
To which is added, an explanation of some 
hard terms now in use : for the information 
of all such as read or subscribe addresses. 
n. p., 1710. 
(Som. T., xii, pp. 658-662. ) 
True (The) genuine Tory-address, etc. See 
Hoadly (B. ) 
155. True (A) relation of the manner of the 
deposing of King Edward III together with the 
articles which were exhibited against him in 
parliament. As also an exact account of the 
proceedings and articles against King Richard 
III and the manner of his deposition and 
resignation, etc. '* London, 1689. 
156. TYRRELL (SIR JAMES). Bibliotheca 
politica : or, an enquiry into the antient 
constitution of the English governanent, etc. 
New ed. London, l718. 
157. ----- A brief disquisition of the law of 
nature, according to the principles and method 
laid down in the Reverend Dr Cumberland's (now 
Lord Bishop of Peterborough's) Latin treatise 
on that subject : as also his confutations of 
Mr Hobbes's principles `put 
into another method, 
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Vindication (A) of the Right Reverend the 
Lord Bishop, of Exeter, etc. See Oldisworth (W. ) 
Vindication (A) of their majesties authority 
to fill the-sees of the deprived bishops. 
See. Stillingfleet (E. ) 
Voice (The) of the addressers, etc. See 
Hoadly (B. ) 
Voice (The) of the people, no voice of God. 
By F. A. See Atterbury (F. ) 
158. WAGSTAFFE (WILLIAM). Crispin the Cobler's 
confutation of Ben H -- dly, in an epistle to him. London, 1711. 
159, WALPOLE (SIR ROBERT). Four letters to a 
friend in North Britain, upon-the publishing 
the tryal of Dr. Sacheverell. London, 1710. 
160. WARRINGTON (HENRY BOOTH, Earl of). An 
impartial inquiry into the causes of the 
present fears and dangers of the government. 
Being a discourse between a Lord: Lieutenant 
and one of his Deputies suromon'd to hold a 
lieutenancy for raising the militia. 
London, 1692. 
(S. T. Wm. III, ii, pp. 218-233. ) 
r" 
löl. ----- The charge of... Earl of Warrington to the Grand Jury. . . Chester, 
25th Apr., 1693. 
(S. T. ýYm. IIIý ii, pp. 342-348. ) 
162. ----- The charge of... Earl of Warrington to the Grand Jury.. . Chester, 11th 
Oct., 1692. 
(S. T. Wm. III, iii pp. 201-208. ). 
163. What has been may be again: ... Published to let us see the advantage we may expect from those new-revived maxims, that the supreme 
power is in the people and that rebellion is lawful. Address 'd to, the modern Whigs. 
London, 1710. 
0 
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164. IVIHITBY (DANIEL). Obedience due to the 
present king notwithstanding our oaths to the former. Written by a divine of the Church of 
England. London, 1689. 
(Som. T., x, pp. 296-300. ) 
165. WILLIAMS (JOHN). A defence of the Arch- 
bishop's sermon on the death of her late 
majesty of blessed memory : and of the sermons 
of the late Archbishop, Bishop of Litchfield 
and Coventry, Bishop of Ely, Bishop of 
Salisbury, Dr Sherlock, Dr Wake, Mr Fleetwood, 
etc. preach'd upon that and several other 
solemn occasions. Being a-vindication of the 
late queen, his present majesty, and the 
government from the malicious aspersions cast 
upon them in two late pamphlets : one Eby T. 
Tenisonj entitled, Remarks on some sermons, etc. 
the other by T. Ken] A letter to the author of 
a sermon preach'd at the funeral of her late 
majesty Queen Pltary. London, 1695. 
(S. T. Wm. III, ii, pp. 522-538. ) 
166. WITHERS (JOHN). The history of resistance, 
as practised by the Church of England : in which 
it is proved, from most authentic records, that 
in every reign since the Reformation of religion 
the said Church hath aided and assisted, justi- 
fied and approved of, such subjects as have defended themselveb against the oppressions of 
their tyrannical, though natural princes. 
Written upon occasion of I. Ir Agate's sermon at 
Exeter on the 30th January, and in defence of 
the late Revolution, the present establishment, 
and the Protestant succession. London, 1710. (Som. T., xii, pp. 249-267. ) 
167. Word (A) to the wise for settling the 
government, s. sh. London, 1689. 
168. WYNNE (ROBERT). The case of the oaths 
stated. London, 1689. 
(S. T. Wm. III, 1, pp. 340-347. ) 
